
"A very important and compelling book."
—Edward Curtin, International People's Tribunal, 1965



JFK vs. ALLEN DULLES


BATTLEGROUND INDONESIA

GREG POULGRAIN

INTRODUCTION BY OLIVER STONE
Academy Award Winning Director

AFTERWORD BY JAMES DiEUGENIO
Author of *The JFK Assassination*

"A very important and compelling book."
—Edward Curtin, International People's Tribunal, 1965



JFK vs. ALLEN DULLES

BATTLEGROUND INDONESIA

GREG POULGRAIN

INTRODUCTION BY OLIVER STONE
Academy Award Winning Director

AFTERWORD BY JAMES DiEUGENIO
Author of *The JFK Assassination*

[redacted]

JFK
VS.
ALLEN DULLES

JFK VS. ALLEN DULLES

BATTLEGROUND INDONESIA

GREG POULGRAIN
INTRODUCTION BY OLIVER STONE
AFTERWORD BY JAMES DiEUGENIO



Skyhorse Publishing

Copyright © 2020 by Greg Poulgrain
Introduction Copyright © 2020 by Oliver Stone
Afterword Copyright © 2020 by James DiEugenio

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any manner without the express written consent of the publisher, except in the case of brief excerpts in critical reviews or articles. All inquiries should be addressed to Skyhorse Publishing, 307 West 36th Street, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10018.

Skyhorse Publishing books may be purchased in bulk at special discounts for sales promotion, corporate gifts, fund-raising, or educational purposes. Special editions can also be created to specifications. For details, contact the Special Sales Department, Skyhorse Publishing, 307 West 36th Street, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10018 or info@skyhorsepublishing.com.

Skyhorse® and Skyhorse Publishing® are registered trademarks of Skyhorse Publishing, Inc.®, a Delaware corporation.

Visit our website at www.skyhorsepublishing.com.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available on file.

Cover design by Paul Qualcom

Print ISBN: 978-1-5107-4479-0
Ebook ISBN: 978-1-5107-4480-6

Printed in the United States of America

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Timeline
List of Names
Introduction by Oliver Stone

Chapter 1: JFK and Allen Dulles
Chapter 2: Gold! The 1936 Discovery and Concealment
Chapter 3: Dulles, de Mohrenschildt, and Oil
Chapter 4: 1958 Rebellion PRRI
Chapter 5: Dulles and Hammarskjöld
Chapter 6: 1962–63
Chapter 7: Suharto and 1965

Afterword by James DiEugenio
Acknowledgments
Bibliography
Notes
Index
Plates

TIMELINE

1859	John D. Rockefeller (twenty years old) starts commission agency in Cleveland; American Civil War demand for foodstuffs, clothing, and kerosene for the North; profits soar.
1870	January 10: John Rockefeller established Standard Oil Company with his younger brother William as vice president; secret deals cut out most refineries in Cleveland: "one of the most gigantic and dangerous conspiracies ever conceived" (US Congress). Rockefeller effigy hanged and burned.
1878	Standard Oil controls 95 percent of US pipelines and refineries; European markets supplied by Russian oil from Baku oil fields in Caucasus.
1882	Standard Oil (New Jersey) sets up legal base for Standard companies in other states. Rockefeller allied with business figures, like John D. Archbold, who have influential Senate connections; Office of Naval Intelligence established, before US Army equivalent and before British or German counterparts.
World War I	US Secretary of State Robert Lansing (Allen Dulles' uncle) sets up Secret Service in State Department.
1915	Allen Dulles in US embassy, Vienna, begins career in intelligence (USA enters WW1 on April 6, 1917); elder brother John Foster married (1912) into Rockefeller family.
1917	John Fitzgerald Kennedy born, May 29.

1919 Standard Oil New Jersey (part of Rockefeller oil empire) secretly purchases Humble Oil and Refining Company, the largest producer in Texas and next year buys into Baku oil fields in Russia; oil fields then held by Noble Brothers soon under Red Army control. (Later, Russia becomes USSR.)

1920–21 Allen Dulles in US embassy Constantinople (Istanbul), on behalf of Rockefeller oil, negotiates with head of Baku oil, von Mohrenschildt, father of ten-year-old George (de Mohrenschildt), who in 1938 emigrates from Belgium to USA. In 1940–41 George works with Allen Dulles in Humble Oil, selling oil to Vichy French. (George de Mohrenschildt in 1964 is key witness for Warren Commission in which Allen Dulles is dominant figure.)

1933 Hitler's Nazi party on the rise; Japan quits League of Nations. USA recognizes USSR. In Netherlands East Indies, new oil company formed: Standard-Vacuum (Stanvac).

1934 Standard of California (Socal) gets oil concession in Netherlands East Indies: ten million acres in Sumatra for drilling. Rockefeller since WW1 has been denied entry into Netherlands New Guinea (NNG) or West New Guinea; Indies oil mogul Henri Deterding publishes pro-Nazi memoirs.

1935 NNGPM starts oil exploration in NNG: 40 percent Royal Dutch Shell, 60 percent Stanvac and Socal. (NNGPM has Dutch name, Dutch staff, and headquarters in the Netherlands, but majority share held by Rockefeller interests.)

1936 NNGPM expedition to highest peak in the territory (16,000 ft.) Ertsberg and Grasberg discovered but not announced (only much later described as world's largest primary deposit of gold.) Freeport, the US company still mining today, starts producing in 1972.

1941 Humble Oil conducts oil exploration in West New Guinea; 26,000 barrels per day (b/d) is largest well ever discovered in Southeast Asia, but not announced, as Japanese Imperial army about to invade and war starts a few months later. ("Rediscovered" in 1972 after Sukarno replaced by Suharto; this oil has no sulphur, is exceptionally pure and light, and needs no refining.)

1945 President Sukarno proclaims Indonesian independence from Dutch colonial rule; four years of armed struggle before Dutch transfer sovereignty of Indies, excluding NNG.

1958 Allen Dulles (now Director of Central Intelligence) uses CIA to start Outer Islands Rebellion (PRRI) supporting disparate Indonesian army commands in Sumatra and Sulawesi to attempt break-away from Java; Dulles' actual aim is to create unified central army command in Jakarta.

1960 When CIA covert operation in PRRI is perceived as failure, Moscow offers Jakarta huge arms deal to oust Dutch colonial presence from Netherlands New Guinea (NNG).

1961 President Kennedy reappoints as DCI Allen Dulles, who already has arranged for Bay of Pigs and Dutch-Indonesian NNG sovereignty dispute to be Cold War crises awaiting JFK. DCI Dulles fails to inform Kennedy that Sino-Soviet dispute is real, not an intelligence ploy. UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold agrees to intervene in NNG, but is assassinated in the Congo.

1962 Kennedy intervenes in NNG sovereignty dispute in favor of Indonesia and proposes follow-up program of US aid (against earlier advice from Dulles).

1963 CIA gun-running in Sarawak helps to start Konfrontasi between Indonesia and Malaysia. US Congress disapproves of Indonesian aggression against (British) Malaysia and stops US aid program for Indonesia; JFK decides to visit Jakarta (set for early 1964) to stop Konfrontasi in order to

	restart US aid package. JFK unaware that his support for Sukarno will end Dulles' plan for regime change and jeopardize Rockefeller brothers' plans (which involve Allen Dulles and Henry Kissinger) to "drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing." Kennedy assassinated.
1965	Major General Suharto (Strategic Command, Kostrad) on CIA list as "top anti-communist general," yet maintains close friendship with those in September 30 Movement, an army group led by Kamaruzaman Sjam, an undercover agent for the Indonesian Communist Party and Suharto's friend who can access Kostrad headquarters. Six top Indonesian army generals killed. Suharto alleges September 30 Movement is PKI front and blames it for attempted coup against Sukarno and killing the generals. Mass killing starts.
1966–1967	Suharto replaces Sukarno.

LIST OF NAMES

Abdulgani, Roeslan—born in 1914; youth activist, 1945; Indonesian foreign minister, 1956; prominent in Suharto era and still advised President Megawati Sukarnoputri in 2002; after his death in 2005, documents from Dutch intelligence described him as an "asset."

Adhayatman—linked to CIA; adjutant to Adam Malik.

Aditorop, Jusuf—the deputy party secretary of the PKI.

Aidit, Dipa Nusantara—youth activist; led the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) for more than a decade, up to November 1965.

Allison, John—US ambassador in Jakarta (1957–early 1958).

Aquino, Benigno "Ninoy," Jr.—sent by President Garcia of Philippines to observe "CIA assistance" for 1958 rebellion in Sumatra and predicted rapid defeat for rebels; later, opponent of CIA-assisted President Marcos. Returning from exile in USA, Aquino was assassinated at Manila International Airport (Sunday, August 21, 1983) as he stepped off the plane.

Archbold, Richard—zoologist and grandson of a former president of Standard Oil; head of 1938 expedition to West New Guinea sponsored by American Museum of Natural History; US Navy provided a flying boat.

Atmodjo, Heru—lieutenant colonel, Indonesian Air Force; in 1965 was deputy head of intelligence; accused of complicity in September 30 Movement and imprisoned without trial for fifteen years.

Bakker, Theodore—Dutch director of East Borneo Company (OBM), which joined with Freeport in 1958 to claim mining concession over Ertsberg-Grasberg area, the world's largest primary gold deposit.

Barton, F. C.—brigadier, 3rd Commando Brigade, Royal Marines; landed in Kuching, Sarawak, "by mistake" on the way to quell Brunei Rebellion in December 1963; caused Clandestine Communist Organization (CCO), a Chinese underground group that had secretly been given small arms by the CIA, to flee across Sarawak-Indonesian border. This was the spark that started Konfrontasi.

Barwick, Garfield—key figure as Australian foreign minister in ousting Dutch from Netherlands New Guinea, 1962, followed by secret CIA briefing September 14, 1962. As chief justice (1964–1981) played key role in ousting Australian Prime Minister Whitlam, 1975. Whitlam's speech-writer, Graham Freudenberg (a Brisbane resident, interviewed 2014), said the CIA was involved. At that time, Marshall Green, previously in Jakarta, was US ambassador in Canberra.

Benson, George—major, army attaché US embassy, associate of Guy Pauker.

Benson, Roy—admiral, commander of Task Force 75 (US naval power amassed off the coast of Sumatra during PRRI).

Berlin, Jack—colonel, in charge of Stanvac Oil depot in Padang, Sumatra.

Bernhard—prince from Lippe-Biesterfeld, Germany; in 1935 working for IG Farben in Paris; in January 1937 married Princess Juliana, only child of Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands; starting in Paris, the link between Bernhard and Allen Dulles lasted for decades.

Brown, William Andreas—CIA staff in Singapore, 1962; provided small arms to an underground Chinese group in Kuching, Sarawak, which was an important step in the start of Konfrontasi; later US ambassador to Israel.

Bunker, Ellsworth—US diplomat; mediated New York Agreement, 1962; associate of Allen Dulles.

Bungkus—sergeant-major; on night of September 30, 1965, drove one of the trucks that were going to the houses of the generals.

Clay, Lucius—general; succeeded Eisenhower in 1947 as military governor of Germany; associate of Allen Dulles in post-war Berlin; as head of Clay Committee, recommended restricting financial aid for Indonesia.

Colijn, Anton H.—one of three in 1936 expedition that discovered gold in Netherland New Guinea; son of Dutch prime minister.

Collier, Robert—army attaché US embassy, 1957.

Cottrell, Sterling J.—military attaché, then counsellor, at U.S. embassy in Jakarta from January 1958. The PRRI rebellion was launched during Cottrell's brief space in the embassy (after Ambassador Allison's departure and before the arrival of Ambassador Jones); later in charge of Vietnam Task Force, with General Lansdale under him.

Cumming, Hugh S., Jr.—US ambassador in Jakarta (1953–57) then Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

Deterding, Henri—prominent pro-Hitler figure in prewar Royal Dutch Shell, Netherlands East Indies.

Djahurup, Pelda—described as "a kid"; the highest-ranking noncommissioned officer among those going to the house of General Nasution on the night of September 30, 1965; from Madura.

Djojohadikusumo, Sumitro—Indonesian economist, Minister for Finance 1957; joined PRRI rebellion based in Singapore, with CIA; became part of "Berkeley Mafia" (Suharto's economic advisors) after 1965; father of Lt. General Prabowo Subianto (twice presidential candidate).

Djuarsa, Ishak—brigadier general, regional military command in Aceh, 1965.

Djuanda *see* Kartwidjaja.

Donovan, William—with Allen Dulles, set up the OSS in 1942.

Dozy, Jean Jacques—Dutch chief petroleum geologist in NNGPM; in 1936 discovered and named the Ertsberg and Grasberg, world's largest primary gold deposit, in Netherlands New Guinea.

Dul Arif, Pak—from Madura; person in charge of organizing trucks that went to the houses of various generals on night of September 30, 1965.

Dulles, Allen Welsh—started in intelligence in May 1916; director of Central Intelligence under Eisenhower; reappointed then removed by Kennedy, 1961.

Dulles, John Foster—diplomat, secretary of state (1953–1959).

Eisenhower, Dwight—thirty-fourth president, January 20, 1953–January 20, 1961.

Felt, Harry Donald—admiral, commander in chief of Pacific Command (CINCPAC), 1958–64.

Fomenko, Michael—born in Russia, emigrated to Australia prewar; paddled log canoe from Cairns, east coast of Australia, to West New Guinea when still Dutch-controlled; deported; arrested for political reasons to prevent his return to Indonesian-controlled West New Guinea in 1964 when Jeanne de Mohrenschildt (née Fomenko) was witness in Warren Commission; endured six months of electroconvulsive shock therapy; spent next fifty years in north Queensland jungle and became known as "Tarzan"; died 2018.

Forrestal, Michael V.—aide to McGeorge Bundy, National Security advisor for JFK.

Fraiss, Pierre—Vichy French intelligence officer who worked with George de Mohrenschildt in 1941.

Gerbrandy, Pieter—former Dutch prime minister, aware of gold discovery in Netherlands New Guinea.

Gheyselinck, R. F. G. R.—Dutch geologist in Netherlands New Guinea; died 1956.

Gijadi, Wignyosoeharjo—sergeant (second class); after confessing in military court to be responsible for shooting General Yani in 1965, his execution was not carried out until 1988.

Gilchrist, Andrew—British ambassador sent to Jakarta during Konfrontasi to provoke Sukarno; infamous Gilchrist letter created impression coup was being planned in conjunction with Indonesian army.

Goodell, Val—CIA station chief, Jakarta, 1958.

Goodpaster, Andrew—brigadier general; President Eisenhower's staff secretary.

Green, Marshall—US ambassador in Jakarta (1965–69).

Gruisen, Jan van – with Theodore Bakker was director of OBM.

Haan, Raphael den—head of internal affairs, Netherlands New Guinea; placed Michael Fomenko ("Tarzan") under house arrest before

deporting him back to Australia in 1959.

Hammarskjöld, Dag—UN secretary general, 1953–1961.

Harr, Karl Gotttlieb—joined Sullivan & Cromwell legal firm; in the Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Committee that advised Secretary of State Dulles on Indonesia; associate of Allen Dulles.

Harrer, Heinrich—Austrian mountaineer and explorer; in 1962, sent to retrieve time capsule about gold discovery left by Dozy in 1936, at edge of snowline in New Guinea mountains.

Hatta, Mohammad—vice president of Indonesia (1945–56).

Herter, Christian A.—secretary of state, April 1959–January 1961.

Heymann, Henry—US consul general in Surabaya, 1965.

Hollister, John B.—director ICA (1955).

Humphrey, Don D.—professor, Georgetown University.

Husein, Ahmad—lieutenant colonel; announced PRRI on February 15, 1958.

Jenner, Albert E.—counsel for the Warren Commission.

Jonge, B. C. de—governor-general of prewar Netherlands East Indies.

Jones, Howard Palfrey—US ambassador in Jakarta, 1958–1965.

Kadane, Kathy—US researcher and journalist.

Kadri, Kartono—member of Subandrio's BPI (Central Intelligence), interviewed in his home in Jakarta, November 1999–January 2000.

Kartawidjaja, Djuanda—Indonesian prime minister with economic expertise, and minister of defense from 1957 to 1959; died November 1963.

Kent, Sherman—Yale historian who directed Office of National Estimates, 1952 to 1967; in World War Two, he was in the OSS and became life-long associate of Allen Dulles.

Kissinger, (Heinz Alfred) Henry—born in Germany, May 27, 1923; Jewish refugee 1938; worked with Allen Dulles in post-war Berlin; secretary of state and National Security Advisor in presidential administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford.

Khoman, Thanat—former Thai ambassador in United States; foreign minister, 1959–71. Informed US embassy Thailand about hoax-plan for

British coup against Sukarno while in Bangkok, 1965, which promoted the rumor of a council of generals in Jakarta that was planning to oust Sukarno.

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich—premier of the Soviet Union, 1958–64.

Komer, Robert—staff member of National Security Council in Kennedy's presidency.

Kotzebue, Paul de—count and formerly czar's imperial guard; in pre-WWII Paris, married Allene Tew; Prince Bernhard was staying in their house before he married into Dutch royal family; Allen Dulles' residence was several hundred metres away from Kotzebue residence, and Dulles would meet Russian friends at the Scheherazade bistro in Montmartre; Kotzebue and Tew emigrated to the United States in 1938.

Kutepov, Pavel—lieutenant general in Russian army supporting czar in 1917, deputy to General Wrangel.

Lansdale, Edward G.—major general; secretary of defense's deputy assistant for special operations; close associate of Allen Dulles.

Lansing, Robert—secretary of state (1915–20) under President Wilson; began civilian intelligence group, which evolved into the CIA. As Allen Dulles' uncle, opened the door in 1916 to Dulles' career in intelligence.

Latief, Abdul—colonel, Jakarta garrison; with Untung in September 30 Movement; regarded Suharto as friend; imprisoned for three decades.

Leimana, Johannes—deputy first minister under Sukarno.

Lovell, Robert—represented Rockefeller interest in the Clay Committee (see Lucius Clay).

Lijphart, Arend—author whose publication did not reveal presence of gold in Netherlands New Guinea.

Lingen, G. F. T. van—Dutch geologist in Netherlands New Guinea; died during war.

Lloyd, John Selwyn—British foreign secretary, 1955–60.

Lubis, Zulkifli—colonel in Indonesian army, former head of intelligence and PRRI leader; sent person to London to ask me to write history of Islam in Indonesia.

Lumumba, Patrice—first president of the Congo; according to US Senate Investigation, Allen Dulles responsible for his assassination in 1961.

Luns, Joseph—Dutch foreign minister for nineteen years, then secretary general of NATO, 1971–84.

Malik, Adam—Indonesian political figure instrumental in ousting Sukarno; later vice president of Indonesia; linked with CIA.

Mao Zedong—founding father of the People's Republic of China, 1949–76; known as Chairman Mao.

MacArthur, Roderick—described as a "nephew" of General Douglas MacArthur (who had only one son, Arthur) Roderick and George de Mohrenschildt met in Mexico in 1943–44.

Macmillan, Harold—British prime minister, 1957–63; had American-born mother.

Maeda, Tadashi—rear admiral and wartime superior of Nishijima and Yoshizumi; in charge of West New Guinea, where he found rich oil field; in 1963 Maeda formed a new oil-exploration company for the same (supposedly worthless) land Sukarno had donated to the PKI. By this means, Maeda blocked any other oil exploration on that site until Sukarno was replaced by Suharto.

Maheu, Robert—former FBI agent commissioned by CIA to make a "blue movie" with Sukarno impersonator and blonde Soviet woman; for thirteen years was public liaison for Howard Hughes.

Marjono and Usman—Colonel and Lt Colonel respectively, friends of Suherman in Semarang; supported September 30 Movement.

Martens, Robert, J.—political officer, first in US Embassy in Moscow, then in Jakarta.

Mashuri—Suharto's neighbour in 1965.

Masters, Edward E.—counselor for political affairs, US embassy Jakarta, 1965; ambassador to Indonesia, 1977–81.

May, Brian—author, *Indonesia Tragedy*; former Jakarta correspondent for Agence France-Presse.

McNamara, Robert—JFK's secretary of defense.

Mealey, George A.—author of *Grasberg*, a book about the world's largest gold mine in Papua Province.

Mein, John Gordon—director of Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs until May 1960.

Melvin, Jess – Australian academic focusing on Indonesia; author of *The Army and the Indonesian Genocide: Mechanics of Mass Murder*.

Merle-Smith, Van Santvoord—war hero from WWI; associate of Allen Dulles; in charge of US intelligence in Australia during WWII.

Menzhinsky, Vyacheslav—head of Stalin's secret police (OGPU), 1926–34.

Menzies, Robert—Australian prime minister, 1939–41 and 1949–66

Mohrenschildt, George de—born in czarist Russia; was a child when Allen Dulles first visited his father, who was head of the czar's Baku oil fields at the time of the Russian Revolution; when he emigrated to the United States in 1938, he changed the nobiliary particle in his name from "von" to "de"; in 1941, worked in Standard Oil subsidiary with Allen Dulles; in 1963 befriended Lee Harvey Oswald; chief witness in Warren Commission; found with gunshot wound to head in 1977.

Mohrenschildt, Jeanne de—originally Eugenia Fomenko; her parents fled eastward to Harbin, China, from Russian Revolution; married and went to United States and later divorced; met George de Mohrenschildt in 1956, married in 1959; participated in Warren Commission; related to Michael Fomenko, whose father emigrated to Australia (via Japan) just before war in the Pacific.

Mohrenschildt, Baron Sergius von—father of George; as representative of czar, directed Baku oil fields before Bolshevik revolution and mobilized czar's army; met Allen Dulles

Murdani, Benny—Indonesian army officer, Christian; started as assistant to Ali Murtopo; became Indonesian armed forces commander in chief, but later removed by Suharto.

Murphy, Robert – Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (1955-59).

Murtopo, Ali—Madurese ancestry, born in Java; Suharto's intelligence officer starting in 1950s; key figure in 1965; "architect of the New

Order"; acquired a reputation for covert activities such as penetrating radical Islamic groups to perpetrate violent action and benefiting from the outcome.

Muskita, Josef—major general chief of staff of the Sumatra Coordinating Command.

Mussert, Anton—leader of NSB (Dutch National Socialist Movement, pro-Nazi); visited Netherlands East Indies.

Nasution, Ade Irma Suryani—five-year old daughter of General Nasution accidentally killed on night of September 30, 1965.

Nishijima, Shigetada—Japanese agent in prewar Netherlands East Indies; trained Indonesians up to 1945; helped prepare Proklamasi; arranged for President Sukarno to meet his Japanese wife, Dewi.

Notowidigdo, Moekarto—Indonesian Ambassador in Washington, 1958.

Nyono—a member of the PKI Politburo.

Nyoto—PKI leader, ranking third under Aidit.

O'Brien, Conor Cruise—UN officer in Congo in 1961.

Oltmans, Willem—Dutch journalist who befriended George de Mohrenschildt; had prewar family links with Netherlands East Indies and knew President Sukarno.

Palmer, William—director of the Association of American Film Importers in Indonesia, 1965.

Pauker, Guy—Indonesia and SE Asia analyst; academic at Harvard and UC Berkeley; author; member of RAND staff; consultant to NSC, CIA, and other government agencies.

Pope, Allen—CIA mercenary pilot who parachuted from B-26 over Ambon, May 1958, and was captured by Indonesian army. In his pocket were thirty documents implicating Chinese support for the PRRI, which led to anti-Chinese action by Indonesian government.

Powers, Gary—pilot of U-2 that came down in May 1960 over the Soviet Union.

Prijono, Achmad—Indonesian correspondent for *Mining Annual Review* (1979).

Pohan, E. S.—Indonesian agent; in WWII had worked with Kempeitai (Japanese Imperial Army military police); PRRI contact in Singapore, 1958, in contact with MI5 and CIA (Frank Wisner, Singapore). Given new identity and retired in California, where I contacted him in 1992.

Rahman, Tengku (also Tunku) Abdul—prime minister of Malaysia.

Reddaway, Norman—Singapore-based British intelligence agent (in the Information Research Department) involved in broadcasting anti-PKI radio propaganda for Indonesian Muslims. One broadcast (which also appeared in printed form) claimed PKI was planning widespread massacre—whereby killing of PKI seemed more justified as self-preservation. The claim that Reddaway's involvement was only after November 1965 is retrospective attempt to avoid legal and moral responsibility for helping to incite mass killing.

Rijkens, Paul—director of Unilever (Dutch company).

Robertson, Walter S.—assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs (April 8, 1953–June 30, 1959).

Rockefeller family—including (almost) ninety-eight-year-old oil magnate John D. Rockefeller, Nelson (governor of New York, 1959–73 and vice-president 1974-77), and his son Michael.

Roosa, John—author and academic; wrote *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement & Suharto's Coup d'État in Indonesia*.

Sakirman, Ir.—only PKI leader with university degree; his brother, Siswondo Parman, was head of army intelligence.

Schacht, Hjalmar—German economist and architect of Hitler's war economy; an Allen Dulles' contact; invited as economics advisor to Indonesia in 1950s.

Schermerhorn, Willem—headed Dutch aerial surveying of Netherlands New Guinea in 1936; prime minister of the Netherlands, 1945–46.

Simbolon, Maludin—colonel; Indonesian PRRI commander in North Sumatra.

Sjam—nickname of Kamaruzaman bin Ahmad Mubaidah; worked in PKI under Aidit in the "special bureau"; also had links with Indonesian army, especially Suharto; reported by General Nasution (Indonesian

army chief of staff) to have visited CIA contact in Bandung together with Suharto. Sjam's evidence in military court was used to implicate Aidit (and the entire membership of the PKI) in the action of the September 30 Movement.

Smith, George Ivan—assistant to Dag Hammarskjöld.

Smith, Joseph Burkholder—led CIA operations in Malaysia and Indonesia, 1957–58.

Sorensen, Theodore—Kennedy's speech writer.

Sprague, Mansfield D.—assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, 1958.

Starr, Frank—referred to as "Starr of Texas," he and his catamite ran guns for the CIA.

Subandrio—Indonesian minister of foreign affairs; head of Indonesia's largest intelligence organization, BPI.

Subekti—secretary of D. N. Aidit; claimed in the military court he typed out the crucial 2:00 p.m. radio announcement on October 1, 1965 (that Sukarno's cabinet be decommissioned, the list of forty-five names in the revolution council, and two other declarations), all under Aidit's supervision with Sjam present. He also claimed signatures were obtained from persons nearby on Halim Air Force Base—subsequently denied by all. Yet this was the basis for Suharto's accusation of a PKI coup, implicating Aidit! In Subekti's willingness to comply, perhaps, lies the reason he was not executed.

Sudarso, Yos—commodore; deputy commander of the Indonesian Navy. On January 15, 1962, killed with fifty-seven others on *Matjan Tutul*.

Sugama, Yoga—intelligence officer (with Murtopo) under Suharto, before and after 1965. In the 1950s sent by (then) intelligence chief, Zulkifli Lubis, for training under MI6.

Suherman—Colonel in Semarang, friend of Untung and Suharto, who supported September 30 Movement.

Sujiman—lieutenant colonel, sent by Major-General Umar Wirahadikusumah to house of Suharto, on October 1, 1965, about 6:00 a.m., to inform him about the shooting and abduction of generals.

Sukarnoputri, Megawati—born January 23, 1947; daughter of Fatmawati and Sukarno; Indonesian President from July 23, 2001, to October 20, 2004.

Sukatno—secretary general of Pemuda Rakyat.

Sukmawati, Diah—born October 26, 1951; daughter of Fatmawati and Sukarno. She was younger sister of Megawati (Sukarnoputri) but generally known by one name only.

Sumarsono—was head of Pesindo (earlier name for Pemuda Rakyat) in Madiun in 1948; has consistently claimed that Suharto officially came to inspect the "uprising" in Madiun. When he spoke on Madiun's Radio Gelora Pemuda, Suharto declared there was no uprising, despite the provocative claims by PKI leader Muso. Sumarsono died in Sydney, 2019, (almost) one hundred years of age.

Sumual, Ventje – commander of Territory VII, Eastern Indonesia, 1957.

Sutowo, Ibnu—Indonesian general who headed Pertamina (state) oil company under Suharto.

Supardjo—brigadier general; Kostrad commander in Kalimantan during Konfrontasi. He joined September 30 Movement two days before action in Jakarta; executed.

Suwarto—colonel at Seskoad, Bandung; known CIA asset according to General Nasution; close friend of Guy Pauker; key figure in organizing prior training of Berkeley Mafia—the US-trained Indonesians who directed the economy once Suharto assumed power.

Suwito, Kusmowidadjo—secretary-general, Foreign Office, under Subandrio.

Syamsuddin, Hamid—television cameraman who knocked on door of Suharto's house at 4:30 a.m. on morning of October 1, 1965, to inform Suharto there had been shooting.

Syamsuri, Untung—lieutenant colonel; commanded the army First Battalion of Sukarno's palace guard, the Cakrabirawa; titular leader of September 30 Movement; regarded Suharto as a friend; executed.

Tat, Oei Tjoe—lawyer, top-level Chinese in Sukarno's government; key figure in Chinese-Indonesian organization Baperki, before 1965.

Teagle, Walter C.—Standard Oil president and chairman of the board.

Temple, Philip—New Zealand alpinist who accompanied Harrer on 1962 expedition to retrieve the notebook left by Dozy in 1936, in a time-capsule marked by a cairn at the edge of the snowline in alpine West New Guinea.

Tendean, Pierre—lieutenant; taken from house of Nasution and killed on October 1, 1965.

Tew, Allene—richest woman in United States; inherited fortune from several husbands, e.g., a top executive General Electric (which was a client of Sullivan & Cromwell, with Allen as lawyer). When living in Paris in 1936–38, married Count Kotzebue from czar's palace guard and took in Prince Bernhard as "adopted son," who married Juliana, daughter of Dutch Queen Wilhelmina.

Thant, U—UN official from Burma who was appointed to replace Hammarskjöld as UN secretary general.

Tonkin, Derek—worked the Indonesia desk, Foreign Office, London.

Treibel—rear admiral, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1958.

Trotsky, Leon—leader of Bolshevik army in Russian revolution; in exile after differences emerged with Lenin and then Stalin; assassinated in Mexico City, 1940. (Nearly all of Trotsky's extended family were killed in Paris during the 1930s by Stalin's secret police.)

Trujillo, Rafael—president of the Dominican Republic; assassinated May 1961 by the CIA.

Truman, Harry S.—thirty-third president, April 12, 1945–January 20, 1953.

Tubun, Karel—police brigadier killed while on guard outside residence of Nasution's neighbour (Johannes Leimana) on night of September 30, 1965.

Tutu, Desmond—archbishop, chairman of TRC; located intelligence documents implicating Allen Dulles in death of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld.

Ulmer, Alfred, Jr.—CIA head of Far East Operations, 1955–58.

Van Kampen—head of private office of NATO Secretary General Luns.

Warren, Earl—chief justice; head of Warren Commission in 1964 to investigate assassination of President Kennedy.

Washington, George—American founding father; first president, 1789–97.

Wassing, Rene—young Dutch anthropologist with Michael Rockefeller when their boat overturned at the mouth of the Eilanden River, an estuary fifteen miles wide. All afternoon and all night they were washed more than twenty miles out to sea. Next morning, Michael Rockefeller decided to leave the upside-down boat. Wassing told me, "We could not see any land in any direction." Michael swam against the current, thinking it was still the flow of the river, but it was the coastal current running parallel to the coast. Nine hours later, rescue aircraft spotted Wassing with the upturned boat.

Whiting, Allen S.—expert on Sino-Soviet split; associate of Guy Pauker at RAND.

Wibowo, Sarwo Edhie—commander of RPKAD (later Kopassus); known as "the bloodhound of Central Java" from his role in mass killing in 1965–66.

Wilson, Forbes—Freeport director and geologist.

Wirahadikusumah, Umar—in 1965, major general in charge of Jakarta garrison; close to Suharto; later vice president.

Wisner, Frank—former head of OSS in southeastern Europe; was leading figure in CIA until Wisner's project in Hungary failed in 1956 when John Foster Dulles gave priority to Suez crisis. Allen Dulles deliberately used Wisner, in Singapore, to run the CIA intervention in Indonesia in 1958, and its "failure" (following Hungary) led to Wisner having a mental breakdown. After a brief stint as CIA station chief in London, Wisner committed suicide in October 1965.

Wissel, Frits J.—Dutch navy pilot in 1936 expedition; during WWII in Dutch intelligence.

Wood, Edward (Lord Halifax)—lord, viceroy of India; part of Cliveden Set, a pro-Nazi group including around the Astor family (British and American); expressed support in 1938 for Hitler to take over Netherlands New Guinea.

Wrangel, Pyotr—general (one of four commanders) in Russian White Army against Bolshevik Red Army; son of last Russian governor of Alaska.

Yani, Ahmad—also written "Jani"; Indonesian general, army commander; killed in 1965.

Yoshizumi, Tomegoro—Japanese agent in prewar Netherlands East Indies; in 1945 trained Indonesians in readiness for independence; set up Indonesian commando squads to fight during 1945–49 war of independence; was at Surabaya in 1945 when British General Mallaby was assassinated.

Zijlstra, G.—managing director, Dutch Government Geological Foundation. His plan to exploit the gold discovery in West New Guinea, under UN auspices after the departure of the Dutch colonial government in 1963, did not proceed after he was killed in the Netherlands in December 1962.

Agencies/Companies/Titles

BAKIN—State Intelligence Agency (after 2001 known as BIN).

BPI—Badan Pusat Intelijen (state intelligence).

BPM—Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij (Batavian Oil Company); Batavia, now Jakarta, was capital of Netherlands East Indies, now Indonesia.

Burns Philp—Australian company operating in Papua New Guinea and Netherlands New Guinea.

CIA—Central Intelligence Agency.

CCO—Clandestine Communist Organization; composed mostly of Chinese youths in Sarawak.

CNO—chief of naval operations.

DCI—director of central intelligence (i.e., all US intelligence agencies, including the CIA).

HMS *Victorious*—British aircraft carrier.

Humble Oil—started in 1911 and post-WWI majority of shares controlled by Standard Oil; conducted oil exploration in Netherlands New Guinea

in 1941.

ICA—International Cooperation Administration, established 1955 by Allen and John Foster Dulles.

IG Farben—German company; Prince Bernhard worked in Paris office.

JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff.

KRI *Irian*—Sverdlov-class cruiser in Indonesian Navy from 1963.

MI5—UK intelligence (domestic), security service and counterespionage.

MI6—UK secret service (foreign), gathering and analysis of intelligence.

NICA—Netherlands Indies Civil Administration, based in Brisbane, Australia, during WWII; returned to Hollandia, New Guinea, in 1944, in the wake of General Douglas MacArthur.

NIE—National Intelligence Estimate, a type of report prepared by joint intelligence agencies.

NNGPM—An American company, despite the name—Nederlandsche Nieuw Guinea Petroleum Maatschappij—established 1935. US interests held 60 percent; Dutch (BPM) held 40 percent.

NSC—National Security Council, agency to advise US president on domestic, foreign, and military policies related to national security.

OBM—Oost-Borneo Maatschappij (East Borneo Company); joined with Freeport Sulphur for mining lease over Ertsberg in 1959 (just when the state-run Dutch Geological Foundation under Zijlstra was about to take out a lease).

OGPU—Stalin's secret police.

ONE—Office of National Estimates, part of CIA intelligence analysis. OSS—Office of Strategic Services, forerunner of the CIA.

RAND—think tank for US Armed Forces, established 1948.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee—standing committee of US Senate.

Sullivan & Cromwell—Wall Street legal firm linked with Rockefeller oil empire.

TRC—Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa).

USS *Renville*—ship provided by Dean Rusk for Dutch-Indonesian negotiations in 1948.

Agreements/Treaties/Terms and Indonesian Words

Ansor—NU youth group involved in 1965—66 violence. Antara—Indonesian news service.

ANZUS—Cold War treaty signed in 1951 by Australia, New Zealand, and the United States; antinuclear policy in New Zealand led to suspension in 1986 that was part-lifted in 2012.

Banser—NU youth group with paramilitary training, involved in 1965–66 violence.

Baperki—a Chinese-Indonesian social-political group; accused by Suharto of being a lackey of the PKI.

Bintang Timur—Partindo newspaper; editor March 1965 was Armunanto, former Indonesian ambassador to Czechoslovakia.

BPS—Body to Promote Sukarnoism; Adam Malik and Chairul Saleh leading figures; aim was to turn Sukarno away from influence of PKI.

BTI—Barisan Tani Indonesia, Indonesian Peasant's Front.

Council of Generals—group of Indonesian army generals in 1965 suspected by PKI of planning to oust Sukarno on October 5, 1965.

Darul Islam (DI)—house of Islam. When Indonesia won independence from the Netherlands in 1949, the Islamic militia Hisbullah (established during Japanese occupation) continued fighting for an Islamic state. In the 1950s, the CIA funded Darul Islam to destabilize Sukarno's government. In the late 1960s–70s during the Suharto era, with help from Ali Murtopo, DI re-formed as Komando Jihad and was involved in various terrorist acts, e.g., plane hijacking and bombings. With continued covert assistance, DI evolved into Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), responsible for the Bali bombing in 2002 that killed 202 people. The Indonesian army in the post-Suharto era was facing reform but with the Bali bombing suddenly became "the frontline defense against radical Islam." Hambali was a key figure in the Bali bombing, with links to JI, persons in the Indonesian army, Al-Qaeda, and the CIA. His trial pending, he is still detained in Guantanamo Bay in 2019–2020.

Dekon—economic declaration laying out a plan to reform Indonesian economy with help from President Kennedy; unable to be suitably implemented without funding, after death of Kennedy.

Dwikora Cabinet—Indonesia's twenty-first cabinet; inaugurated by Sukarno September 2, 1964, it continued until February 21, 1966.

El Dorado—refers to a mythical kingdom of gold in Columbia. During a king's initiation ceremony, he would be covered in gold dust; golden bracelets and ornaments were dropped into a lagoon. In the 1500s, all attempts by Spanish, German, and English explorers failed to locate the site, yet the abundance of gold taken from indigenous inhabitants magnified the El Dorado myth.

Konfrontasi—confrontation with Malaysia. This period of hostility between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur involved armed clashes between British troops and Indonesian forces, mainly in Kalimantan/Borneo along the Sarawak border. Sukarno has incorrectly been blamed for starting Konfrontasi. In fact, in 1963 he and President Kennedy tried to stop the conflict, and only when their joint attempt ended (November 1963) did Sukarno change to support Konfrontasi.

Kopassus—Indonesian army special forces, identified by a red beret (when in uniform); conducts covert domestic operations.

Kostrad—Strategic Command; in 1965, under Major General Suharto.

Lubang Buaya—"crocodile hole"; located outside the perimeter of the Halim Air Base and adjacent to an old rubber plantation known as Pondok Gede, this was the location where Lieutenant Tendean and the abducted generals (Soetojo, Parman, and Soeprapto) and three already-murdered (Yani, Haryono, and Pandjaitan) were brought on October 1, 1965, an hour or so before dawn.

Muhammadiyah—modernist Muslim organisation.

Murba Party—one of ten Indonesian political parties in Sukarno's Guided Democracy; led by Adam Malik, Soekarni, and Pandu Martawiguna; banned January 7, 1965.

New York Agreement—August 15, 1962, agreement whereby Dutch colonial administration of West New Guinea was handed to Indonesia.

The Dutch negotiator, van Roijen, considered the safeguards for Papuan inhabitants of the territory as insufficient but signed the agreement under pressure from Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns, refusing to speak to him ever again.

NASAKOM – a form of government proposed by Sukarno to include nationalist, religious, and communist representatives (nasional, agama, and komunis).

New Order—term referring to Suharto regime, 1967–98; the "old order" was the Sukarno era.

NU—Nahdlatul Ulama, a traditionalist Muslim organization.

OPEX—Operational Executive. A plan principally devised for newly independent countries in Africa being implemented by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld at the time of his death, which would have led to independence for the Papuan people.

Operation Celeste—the name of the plan to assassinate Dag Hammarskjöld.

OPSUS—Special Operations; set up within Kostrad in 1964 to seek an end to Konfrontasi.

Partindo—Indonesian political party whose secretary-general, Asmara Hadi, was an adopted son of Sukarno; but the dominant radical voice was Iskandar Kamel, formerly Ibrahim Ya'acob, who had fled from Malaya in the 1950s. As well, the former Indonesian ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Armunanto, was prominent in Partindo. In 1965 he was one of the editors of *Bintang Timur*, Partindo's newspaper, far left of the PKI. (Subandrio's links are explained in *The Genesis of Konfrontasi*.)

Pathuk—name of area in Yogyakarta from which came the name of a group in which Sjam and Suharto first became acquainted in 1945; Latief also participated in the group but said he never met Sjam at this time.

Pemuda Rakyat—"youth of the people"; part of the PKI.

Petani—rice farmer.

Preman—gangster or hit man, operating out of uniform, wearing street clothes.

Progressive Revolutionary Officers Movement—Gerakan Perwira Progresif Revolusioner; group of naval officers in mutiny against senior officers, in Surabaya, February 1965.

PRRI/Permesta—the CIA-assisted rebellion against Sukarno in 1958, centred on outer islands Sumatra and Sulawesi. PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia) Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia; Permesta (Piagam Perjuangan Semesta) Charter for Universal Struggle.

Seskoad—Indonesian Army Command and General Staff College in Bandung.

Sino-Soviet split—ideological disagreement between Moscow and Beijing that, as manifested in Indonesia, centered on different ways to achieve political power. Historically, China exerted influence over Southeast Asia as its own backyard. Regime change in Indonesia greatly influenced the Sino-Soviet split, as did the protracted war in Vietnam.

Spice Islands—between Sulawesi and New Guinea, now the Indonesian province of Maluku. In the 1500s, starting with the Portuguese, many European countries sailed here for cloves and pepper, nutmeg and mace (today the 'secret ingredient' of Coco-Cola.) Modern banking started by funding these expeditions; here began the first colonial possession of the British Empire, later exchanged with the Dutch for Manhattan. The Spice Islands for 350 years were part of the NEI (Netherlands East Indies).

Trikora—tri-command; issued by Sukarno December 19, 1961, to "crush Dutch colonialism," raise the Indonesian flag in Papua, and prepare for general mobilization.

Vichy—refers to the southern portion of France headed by Marshal Pétain during WWII, which surrendered to Hitler; it kept control of all French colonial possessions in Africa and Southeast Asia (to which Japan gained access, in readiness to move south to take control of oil fields in the Indies).

INTRODUCTION
BY OLIVER STONE

This book is ostensibly about the fall of one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement, Sukarno of Indonesia. But Greg Poulgrain's work goes much further than that subject. He also shows us two different views of modern American foreign policy. He exemplifies them through the figures of Allen Dulles and John F. Kennedy. His focus is on how these differing views impacted the fate of Sukarno, and how that fate caused one of the most horrifying slaughters of the twentieth century.

In 1991 when Zachary Sklar and I wrote the screenplay for *JFK*, we concentrated on President Kennedy's foreign policy in Cuba and Vietnam. Concerning Cuba, we stated that Kennedy suspected he had been duped by the CIA into launching the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion in hopes that once it failed he would order an all-out American invasion of the island. We also stated that many in the Pentagon were disappointed when Kennedy decided not to invade Cuba when he had the opportunity to do so a second time, during the Missile Crisis in 1962. In regard to Vietnam, the film stated that Kennedy refused all attempts to introduce combat troops into the country. We also wrote that he was withdrawing American military advisors there at the time of his assassination. We concluded by demonstrating how that policy was altered and then reversed when Lyndon Johnson became president.

That film was severely attacked upon its release. But today—due to the work of many scholars in the field of Kennedy's foreign policy—I feel quite comfortable with this information that the film conveyed. For much of

the viewing public, this was the first time they were made aware of this hidden history.

For the years leading up to 2012, when Peter Kuznick and I worked on *The Untold History of the United States*, we expanded the list of places where Kennedy's policies were altered after his assassination. We listed the overthrow of the João Goulart government in Brazil; Johnson's insertion of over twenty thousand marines into the Dominican Republic to stop the rightful president, Juan Bosch, from returning to power; and the CIA subversion of democracy and later the establishment of a military dictatorship in Greece. And, to address the subject at hand, we also listed the overthrow of Achmed Sukarno in Indonesia.

As we noted, Sukarno was one of the native leaders who fought against Dutch colonialism in order to establish Indonesia as an independent state. He included one of the largest communist parties in the world, the PKI, as part of his coalition. Along with Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Jawaharlal Nehru of India, he was one of the leaders and originators of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). NAM was formed as a reaction to the policies of the American government in the Third World. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and President Dwight Eisenhower established a two-prong policy with the emerging nations in that area. First, those two men did not support the rising tide of nationalism against the European colonial powers that began to emerge as a ripple in the late forties, and then broke into a huge wave in the fifties.

Secondly, once a new nation did succeed in breaking free, Foster Dulles and Eisenhower expected their leaders to fall in line with one of the anti-communist alliances America was constructing in order to encircle the world: the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Baghdad Pact, and the Rio Treaty. Foster Dulles' attitude was that if you did not join up, then you were against the United States. The next step was you were quickly labeled a communist. As many have pointed out, and as Greg Poulgrain demonstrates once more, Sukarno was not a communist.

Some of these enlightened Third World presidents had seen what happened to emerging leaders in Third World countries who were not

communists, e.g., Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala and Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran. Foster Dulles used his brother—CIA Director Allen Dulles—to undermine and then overthrow their governments. What followed did not benefit the native peoples there. It benefited a small landed aristocracy, along with imperial powers, which now included the United States.

The principles for NAM were laid out in a conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, and hosted by Sukarno. This initial conference was held in 1955, right after the 1954 overthrow of Árbenz, which was preceded by the 1953 coup against Mossadegh. Nasser, Nehru, and Sukarno resented the Foster Dulles policies that deliberately polarized the politics of the Third World. None of their nations joined up with the Dulles alliances. Instead, they proposed an alternative: nonalignment. That is, they should be allowed to forge their own foreign policy, free from any Cold War influence. Their prime considerations were the security of their nations and the well-being of their citizens.

Needless to say, the Eisenhower administration did not appreciate NAM. The year after Bandung, on June 9, 1956, at Iowa State University, Foster Dulles made a famous speech titled "The Cost of Peace." In it he condemned neutrality in the Cold War. He said that his alliance system had abolished neutralism, making it obsolete. As historian Robert Rakove has written, that speech "cemented into place an image of American contempt for the attendees of Bandung."

In 1956, Sukarno visited both Washington and Moscow. He accepted Soviet aid for his ailing economy and formally brought the PKI into his concept of Guided Democracy. To the Dulles brothers this confirmed their suspicions: Sukarno was not a neutralist but a communist. On September 25, 1957, Eisenhower issued a directive to begin planning for a coup. Joining forces with some dissident regional commanders who wanted autonomy from Jakarta, the CIA now began to aid a rebellion against the Bandung leader. The 1958 overthrow attempt failed. But as Greg Poulgrain shows in this book, Allen Dulles decided to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear. That is, by ending up discarding the rebels and backing Jakarta, Dulles

managed to strengthen the central command of the army. This centralized command could be used later to overthrow the charismatic Sukarno.

From the beginning, John F. Kennedy had taken a different view of the Non-Aligned Movement. His policy in this sphere was called "engagement." He signaled the change during his inaugural address. There he pledged that he welcomed the new nations emerging in the Third World and that "we pledged our word that one form of control shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny." He then added two sentences that extended an understanding that Dulles did not have: "We shall not always expect to find them supporting our view. But we shall always hope to find them strongly supporting their own freedom."

What Kennedy's engagement policy consisted of was rather simple. He felt America could compete successfully for these emerging nations due to the simple matter that he could offer them more of the help they needed than the Soviets could. America had better student exchange programs, better economists, more agricultural surplus for the needy, and more credits since the American economy was doing well. Further, he wanted to show how interested he was by arranging economic seminars with his best men in both Latin America and Africa, e.g., the August 1961 Punta del Este conference in Uruguay that launched his massive $20 billion loan program, the Alliance for Progress, in Latin America.

Sukarno understood that Kennedy's attitude and approach were both different than what preceded it. With the new president it wasn't a one-way street—that is, with the citizens of Indonesia getting little or nothing in return. Kennedy wanted Allen Pope, the CIA pilot shot down during the attempted coup, returned. So, he asked Allen Dulles for a review of what had happened back in 1958. Famously, the CIA director gave the president a redacted copy of the report. But there was still enough visible so JFK could understand what happened. He memorably exclaimed, "No wonder Sukarno doesn't like us very much. He has to sit down with people who tried to overthrow him." Kennedy immediately went to work, as he had done with other estranged NAM leaders like Nasser to try and cure the past misdeeds and forge a new and trusting balance of interests. When Sukarno

visited Washington, Kennedy offered him an aid program coordinated with the economics department at Tufts University. He then worked out an exchange that would help both sides, without appearing as a quid pro quo. Foster Dulles and Eisenhower knew that Sukarno wanted the area called West Irian (sometimes termed Western New Guinea) turned over to Indonesia. The Dutch mightily resisted this for reasons that are thoroughly examined by Dr. Poulgrain in this book. To put it plainly, that area possessed a potential for wealth in both precious metals and petroleum that made it a veritable mining and drilling paradise. With just the preliminary exploratory work done by the Dutch, the exponential value reached past the millions and into the billions. Neither Sukarno nor Kennedy were aware of these extravagant riches that could do so much to benefit the Indonesian citizenry. But the Dutch did know about it. This is why they were so resistant to turn the area over to Sukarno. But through his brother Robert Kennedy, the president essentially forced their hand at a meeting called the New York Agreement, in 1962.

Afterward, the Dutch expressed surprise at how unbalanced the Americans were in favor of Sukarno. Sukarno very much appreciated Robert Kennedy's efforts. As Roger Hilsman later wrote, the Indonesian leader thought that, like JFK, Bobby had an understanding of what the new nationalisms were all about. President Kennedy now issued an order saying with this dispute now settled, he wanted to move forward "toward a new and better relationship with Indonesia."

In a fair world—one with rational discourse, one without shadow governments, one with a strong United Nations—this should have been a most beneficial arrangement. Kennedy understood that Sukarno wanted to nationalize some of the imperial industries in the archipelago. The idea was to give his citizens a larger slice of their own resources—as Mossadegh had tried to do in Iran. But unlike Eisenhower, who joined with the British to resist Mossadegh's equitable sharing, Kennedy sent his trade representative to help get better deals for the Indonesian government. Sukarno was jubilant about the new arrangement. He invited Kennedy to be the first American president to visit Jakarta; he set about building an extravagant

estate for him and his wife to inhabit while there. Kennedy's aim in the upcoming 1964 visit was to protect Sukarno from the British threat through their creation of the federation of Malaysia. In other words, instead of working with the Brits against the Third World country, Kennedy was trying to help that country against British encroachment—all in an election year.

On November 19, 1963, Kennedy prepared the aid bill to Indonesia. He was going to sign it on his return from Dallas. That bill was never signed. As he told reporter Cindy Adams after Kennedy's death, Sukarno loved John Kennedy. The reason was because he felt JFK understood him. Starting to perspire, he mopped his brow and said, "Tell me, why did they kill Kennedy?" Without Kennedy, Sukarno lost his shield. With the enormous wealth at stake, it was just a matter of time before he was deposed. But unlike with other overthrows, like Guatemala, Iran, and Congo, it took quite a bit longer for scholars to fill in the precise calculus as to how it all happened. As former CIA officer Ralph McGehee later noted, the agency considered its 1965 Indonesian operation its masterpiece of covert action. The plot was so cleverly designed and so well concealed by the ensuing cover up, that it has taken the world over fifty years to comprehend it. But recent work by scholars like Geoffrey Robinson and Jessica Melvin has helped pull back the curtain on the horrible atrocity that took the lives of at least a half million innocent PKI members. This book incorporates their work into a larger, more intricate mosaic.

From nearby Australia Greg Poulgrain has made it his academic goal to try to find out just what the twists and turns of the 1965 plot really were. Probably no author has explained just how preplanned and well executed the year of living dangerously was. Let him be your guide.

Chapter 1

JFK AND ALLEN DULLES

The very first announcement by President-elect John F. Kennedy when organizing his new administration—Allen Welsh Dulles would remain as director of Central Intelligence (DCI)—was a fateful inheritance from the Eisenhower presidency. The problem was not his affiliation with the Republican Party but Dulles himself. As DCI in the previous administration, he had worked alongside his elder brother Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who died of cancer on May 24, 1959. Yet when Kennedy's predecessor, Dwight Eisenhower, was organizing his administration in 1953 after replacing Democrat Harry Truman, the appointment of Allen Dulles to head the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was the very last appointment, the very last announcement.

In the closing days of the Truman presidency, Allen Dulles was deputy-director of the CIA under General Walter Bedell Smith,[1] who during World War II had been chief of staff for General Eisenhower, supreme Allied commander. At that time the person in charge of intelligence was a British officer, Major-General Kenneth Strong, who later became head of military intelligence in the United Kingdom. Both Smith and Strong had seen how Dulles operated in the early surrender of German forces in Italy, straining relations with Russia so seriously that the tension was a precursor to the Cold War. When Eisenhower replaced Truman in 1952, Smith mistakenly believed, or was led to believe, he would be offered a position in the new administration as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Smith resigned as CIA director in anticipation of being appointed, opening the door for Allen Dulles. However, on December 19, 1952, instead of the promotion Smith

desired, he became undersecretary of state for eighteen uncomfortable months. Smith merely disliked his superior, John Foster Dulles, but had serious misgivings about Allen, whose two-year tenure as Smith's CIA deputy had been "marred by tension,"[2] especially Dulles' approach to covert action. Smith conveyed his concerns to the president-elect. Eisenhower's delay in announcing who would head the CIA came from his doubts about Allen, not the appointment of his brother as secretary of state. Both Dulles brothers were still closely linked with the Rockefeller oil empire. Peter Grose has commented that newly elected President Eisenhower was so concerned about "two brothers in sensitive high positions of government with inevitable personal interests and loyalties beyond their allegiance to the president … [that] he delayed for long and agonizing weeks before naming the younger Dulles director of central intelligence."[3]

Smith proved to be correct. In the first month of the Eisenhower presidency, Allen Dulles began a covert operation to topple the elected government of Iran after its thirty-fifth prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, nationalized British oil interests. The Guatemala coup in 1954 and many other examples in the 1950s were all the outcome of the greatly expanded role of CIA covert operations under Allen. This expansion was facilitated if not always knowingly condoned by John Foster Dulles as secretary of state. Eisenhower belatedly expressed his regret at the end of his presidency, but his often-quoted warning about the inherent danger of the "military-industrial complex" actually came after Kennedy had reappointed Allen Dulles in 1961. This only further highlights how extraordinary it was for Dulles' appointment to have been the first announced by Kennedy, the day after the election. The timing of Kennedy's announcement was even a surprise for Dulles, or so he said in an interview with Thomas Braden[4] in 1964, but the fact that JFK reappointed him, he admitted, was not a surprise:

> **Dulles:** *Well,* I'll tell you I wasn't surprised that he considered my continuance on in the job. Our relations were such and our

> friendship such that I thought that might happen. I didn't think it would happen as soon as this. This happened right after—it was one of the first things he did after the election—
> **Braden:** Within a day or two.
> **Dulles:** I thought that the one thing that could be most damaging to the agency [CIA] at the time of presidential change is that if you establish the precedent that when a new president, new director of Central Intelligence, new party is in, change the director and get somebody that is the same party as the president. I've always felt that intelligence ought to be kept out of politics…. I don't think there was time for anybody to bring a lot of pressure on him *even if anybody wanted to* do it. So I have every reason to believe that this was his own idea[5] (emphasis added).

When Kennedy reappointed both Allen Dulles as DCI and J. Edgar Hoover as director of the FBI, making the announcement very early had the effect of highlighting the impression it *was* Kennedy's own idea. The comments by Dulles in his interview saying there was no time for anybody to bring pressure on him are redolent with hypocrisy wrapped in a veneer of truth. In fact, the nature of the personal pressure on Kennedy was decisive.

There were both public and private reasons for the early announcement. Dulles explained that one day after the successful result of the presidential election on Tuesday, November 8, 1960, Kennedy simply telephoned him to say, "I would like to announce that both you and J. Edgar Hoover will continue on in your present functions, respective functions, after I take over as president. I want to announce that right away."

There were strong political undercurrents in the reasons Kennedy had for retaining Allen Dulles. First, there were the two reports commissioned by Kennedy soon after his election in November 1960, and the other reason harkened back to the presidential debates between Republican Richard Nixon and Kennedy before the election, involving Allen Dulles himself as the incumbent DCI. Nixon later suggested that the preliminary CIA briefings on world politics, given to both candidates by Dulles, might have

favored Kennedy. Consequently, Dulles was linked to the narrow victory over Nixon. The winning margin of votes, only 120,000 out of a total of sixty-nine million,[6] was attributed to Kennedy's success in the televised debates. Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy's speech writer and special counsel throughout most of his political career from congressman to senator and then president, described the debates as "the primary factor in Kennedy's ultimate victory."[7] The televised debates in October 1960 were the first time such an event was held, although nowadays televised debates between presidential candidates are the norm. For Kennedy and Nixon, there were four debates, four unprecedented opportunities to reach millions of Americans, and the first, which was on domestic policy, had an audience of seventy million. The second and third debates were questions and answers, while the fourth debate was on foreign policy, and this was where Allen Dulles played his hand. Castro and Cuba, "only ninety miles from our shore," had been much in the news during the year of presidential campaigning and claimed an important part of the fourth debate. Nixon already knew that the CIA was planning an invasion of Cuba but of course could not mention this during the debate, but Dulles had provided Kennedy a strategically timed briefing on Cuba shortly before the debate.

Dulles commented to Braden: "Nixon indicated he'd thought he'd been double-crossed … [and] was quite furious—it comes out in that book he wrote, *Six Crises*—because he thought Kennedy, being in the know, had made use of this [during the TV debate]."

Dulles had the audacity to say to Braden, "It was a perfectly honest mistake, I'm quite sure, that Kennedy had been [advantageously] briefed by me on Cuba."[8] Dulles said that before the TV debates he provided three briefings for Kennedy with a focus on Cuba. Dulles did not divulge information about the invasion—that would come at Palm Beach when he was president-elect and during his first week of office—but at this stage Dulles gave Kennedy an edge which proved crucial during the debate. And crucial too, it could be argued, when the time came for Kennedy to decide whether or not to retain him as DCI. Dulles' briefings must have seemed

like a godsend when Kennedy was analyzing the votes that won him the presidency.

The other reason for Dulles being included in the president-elect's first announcement were the reports he commissioned. After winning the Democratic nomination, Kennedy had requested two persons to prepare separate reports on the anticipated transition from Republican to Democratic administration. These two persons were Columbia professor Richard Neustadt and Clark Clifford, whom Sorensen described as "a Washington attorney," although his former experience included special counsel to President Truman during the 1948 presidential campaign against Thomas E. Dewey. Special counsel for Dewey was Allen Dulles, who was described as "the confidential link on foreign policy matters between the Truman administration and the Dewey campaign."[9] So the bipartisanship in appointing Allen Dulles would have replicated Clifford's earlier contact with Dulles. In finding "the best person for the job" to meet the multifarious demands of staffing the new administration, Kennedy often adopted a bipartisan approach, and his staff finally included fifteen Rhodes scholars.

In both reports, Kennedy was advised to retain Dulles as DCI (and also J. Edgar Hoover as director of the FBI). Ironically, in May 1961 after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Kennedy invited Clifford into the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to ensure the accuracy and unbiased nature of the intelligence being supplied to the president. Neustadt had recommended the directors of five "sensitive positions" remain unchanged, but of these only Dulles and Hoover were retained. Sorensen quipped that, of the five, "Kennedy kept only the first two, whom the dinner guests the previous evening had reportedly suggested be the first to be ousted."[10]

The intelligence on Cuba, which Dulles provided to Kennedy before the crucial debate with Nixon, gave the Democratic candidate a clear advantage over his Republican rival. More than just highlighting Dulles' familiarity with Cuba, this showed Dulles was investing in the possibility of Kennedy winning the presidency. Dulles knew the Kennedys through social and family connections, especially the patriarch Joe Kennedy, whom he had known since the 1930s. John F. Kennedy first entered Congress in 1947 and

became a senator in 1953, the year he married Jacqueline Bouvier. It was during that time—'51, '52, and '53, Dulles explained to his interviewer—that he'd call in to the Kennedy's house and talk about foreign affairs with the "intelligent young man," usually for a few hours.

When Allen and John Foster visited together just after Mossadegh had been ousted, Allen explained to Braden that "[Kennedy] was trying to find out what the facts were." In 1955, Dulles told the interviewer, when young Kennedy was writing *Profiles of Courage*, he was quite ill: "He was lying on—he was suffering a good deal of pain—and he was lying on the sofa there in the study in Joe Kennedy's house, that house that you probably knew quite well there at Palm Beach."

By the time Kennedy was elected president, he and Dulles were reasonably well acquainted through family links, as Dulles explained:

> Jackie Kennedy gave me the first James Bond that I ever had … *From Russia, With Love*.... I bought the next two or three [books] and sent them to him [as a senator, then as president] … and we often talked about James Bond, and we, both of us, kept up our interest in it until his sad death recently. I'm speaking there of James Bond…. [or] rather, Ian Fleming [who died August 12, 1964, shortly before the interview in early December].[11]

Dulles talked about intelligence but never his own covert networks. Nor did Kennedy come to grips with Dulles' style of communicating via euphemism, which he could use to conceal a point when answering officially as DCI. In relation to his early appointment, Dulles knew (if there were any choice in the matter) Kennedy would not leave a debt unpaid. He already had his measure of the man:

> I thought he had a very keen appreciation of foreign problems, and being in the intelligence business, I pumped him as much as I could to get his views on things, and his reaction to things, and that continued until the days when I served under him for a short time as director.[12]

As it turned out in the close election result, the narrower the margin of winning votes, the greater seemed the debt. If Dulles' briefing before the historic debates could be described as a preelection psychological strategy, it worked perfectly. Kennedy's perceived familiarity with the issue of Cuba may have proved crucial in winning the debate, but Dulles' duplicity soon became apparent. In Kennedy's first week in office, it was his unfamiliarity with the issue of Cuba, or rather, with the CIA's half-baked invasion of Cuba, that was an international embarrassment for the new president. Sorensen commented, "The Bay of Pigs had been—and would be—the worst defeat of his career."[13]

#

Between election and inauguration, there were seventy-two days for Kennedy to survey the tumult of domestic and international issues he would soon encounter as the thirty-fifth president. Chief among these issues were political unrest in the Congo, Laos, Vietnam, and Berlin. However, two issues ballooned into potential crises during his time as president-elect. One of these involved Cuba, the other Indonesia, and in the preparation of both, DCI Dulles was involved. On Kennedy's first day in the Oval Office, these two international crises were awaiting him on his desk.

Dulles commented in the interview that after Kennedy became president, he was no longer the polite young man with whom he'd discussed foreign affairs during the previous decade; as president, Dulles said, he became more "snappy." Contributing to this change, no doubt, was the fact that both crises on Kennedy's desk were part of Dulles' continuing covert operations. Both were Dulles-engineered and timed to perfection for JFK's first day in office. Both crises reached the stage of possible nuclear war with the Soviet Union, but the American public heard next to nothing about Indonesia. Fidel Castro's Cuba, not Indonesian Papua, became the bête noir of US foreign policy. The CIA invasion force foundered in the Bay of Pigs on April 18, 1961, Castro declared a socialist state, and the importing of Soviet missiles led to a nuclear standoff. But the crisis in Indonesia involved continuing covert operations even when Dulles was

being interviewed in 1964. He was no longer DCI, but he still did not mention Indonesia because the extensive planning he had started in Indonesia was ongoing. It came to fruition when the country began tearing itself apart only ten months later, after the Braden interview. Replying to another question, Dulles commented:

> I might just add at that time, when I went down to brief the president, I took up with him—and I don't think it's necessary to put this on the record what I took up with him—I took up with him two or three other covert operations that were going on, that were significant.[14]

Not without the initial pressure applied by Allen Dulles did both Cuba and Indonesia reach high-points of Cold War tension. On the missile crisis in Cuba, Kennedy had negotiated with Khrushchev while the world, collectively, held its breath. Indonesia had long been kept off the political agenda and virtually absent from US media because Allen Dulles deliberately "kept it under wraps." When he was the dominant figure in some meetings, such was his level of secrecy, it was sometimes recorded that he as DCI instructed no minutes of the meeting were to be taken.

The Wedge

Allen Dulles' involvement and fascination with the Indonesian archipelago went back as far as the 1920s and '30s when he first realized the huge potential of the country known today as Indonesia. In prewar colonial days, Indonesia was known as the Netherlands East Indies. The archipelago has been described by George Kahin, one of America's most prominent Indonesia specialists, as "probably the world's richest colony … [or] ranked just after India in the wealth it brought to a colonial power."[15]

The Dutch began there in the spice trade about the same time as the first successful colony began at Jamestown, Virginia, in 1607. But very soon the Dutch were conducting business on an industrial scale, a century earlier than the British in India. In the 1600s, vessels were arriving at the "Spice

Islands" and returning to Europe with profit margins not equaled for centuries—or not until the advent of Bill Gates and the information-technology phenomenon. It was the golden age for Amsterdam, 150 years or so during which it became the center of world commerce.

It was in the late 1770s, around the time of the American Revolution against the British, that Allen's ancestor, Joseph, first went to the United States. In a brief outline of his early activities, Srodes[16] has explained that Joseph had made his fortune in the Netherland East Indies. While his background was only partially acknowledged by his descendants, we can say with some assuredness that he was a Scottish settler in Northern Ireland and that his surname "Douglas," once in the Dutch Indies, was pronounced "Dulles" because of the glottal *G* in the Dutch language. Joseph's personal history was murky and incomplete. To make a quick fortune in the Indies at that time, individual traders shipped either slaves or opium. When these occupations were deemed inappropriate in later centuries, gaps appeared in the historical records. It can be said, on the one hand, individual fortunes were made before the British East India Company began to tighten its monopoly on opium for China. On the other hand, South Carolina was Joseph's port of entry, the same port as almost half of America's human cargo from Africa up to that time. Whatever the source of his fortune, he (to start with) obviously considered it preferable to adopt the new name. So, it was Joseph Dulles who arrived in the New World in 1779 during the Revolutionary War. With this political heritage, Allen's ancestral line adds a genealogical dimension to his differences with Kennedy's southern Irish descent. As well, anybody whose ancestor worked the South Carolina slave trade would seem politically tainted alongside JFK's commitment to human rights as a moral necessity.

For Allen Dulles in the 1920s and '30s, when he and John Foster were top lawyers for the Rockefeller oil empire, the initial lure of the archipelago lay in its mining and oil potential. One of the oil fields in Sumatra operated by Caltex turned out to be the size of those in Saudi Arabia. In West New Guinea (now called Indonesian Papua or West Papua), a primary gold deposit was discovered in 1936, by far the largest in the world, and the

deposits of natural gas that were discovered a few decades later are now also ranked among the largest in the world.

Dulles' ability to gain access to the natural resources of Indonesia came from his skill in political intelligence, unmatched by any of his peers or opponents, combined with the power he wielded to pursue and ruthlessly implement his goals. Indonesia's seething internal political dynamic in the late 1950s and '60s was being closely monitored by Dulles. Two years after the Kennedy assassination and ten months after Braden interviewed Dulles, Indonesian politics reached a culmination. In 1965–66, Indonesia fell into the lap of the CIA. The nationalist president, Sukarno, was ousted by a military regime after the absolute annihilation of the Indonesian communist party, Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI). An observer from the CIA described it as "one of the worst mass murders of the [twentieth] century."[17] In Cold War politics, the effect of this horrendous blood letting led to a significant widening of the split between Moscow and Beijing, which Dulles had first confirmed toward the end of the Eisenhower presidency.

In the twilight of Dulles' career as DCI—although he certainly did not retire from intelligence in 1961—he incorrectly briefed Kennedy on several occasions, most notably on the Sino-Soviet split. He did not tell Kennedy that it was real. Instead, he left open the possibility that it was a Cold War–intelligence ploy. Accordingly, Kennedy proceeded with his own Southeast Asian policy in which Indonesia was the most important part, as it was in Dulles' strategy. JFK remained unaware that his plans regarding Indonesia absolutely conflicted with Dulles' own policy in which Indonesia was being used as a wedge to further the split between Moscow and Beijing. The wedge strategy was first mentioned in the 1958–59 Rockefeller Brothers Panel Report, in which both Allen Dulles and Henry Kissinger participated. Twelve years earlier they had worked together when Dulles was chief of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Berlin, and when Kissinger was editor of Harvard University's *Confluence*. In November 1952, Kissinger visited Allen Dulles (by invitation) at 2430 Street, NW, Washington DC. This was the old OSS building at Foggy Bottom, near the Potomac river, where Dulles first began as DCI in the Eisenhower era.[18]

The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), or the destruction of the PKI, became the wedge. Moscow and Beijing were vying for influence over the PKI, which was the largest communist party outside the Sino-Soviet bloc. Gaining the support of the PKI, or influencing the PKI, would have given either Moscow or Beijing relative advantage over the other in their ongoing ideological dispute. But when the PKI was physically annihilated in 1965–66, Moscow and Beijing blamed each other. When Kennedy became president, Dulles did not inform him that the PKI was, in effect, being wooed separately by both Moscow and Beijing, each hoping to gain advantage over the other. Their rivalry, at times open animosity toward each other, was clouded for most American observers by the misconception that the communist bloc was monolithic.

Into this matrix of intelligence entanglements, Kennedy proceeded unawares. When the time came in 1963 to follow up his intervention in the New Guinea sovereignty dispute with a US aid program for Indonesia, bad relations (small-armed conflict) had erupted between Indonesia and Malaysia," and when it caused a blockage of funds from Congress, Kennedy and Sukarno jointly resolved to bring the conflict with Malaysia to an end. To do this, he and Sukarno agreed that a visit to Jakarta by President Kennedy was necessary. They both agreed to proceed with the plan to make it the first visit by an American president to Indonesia. When Sukarno had first met Kennedy in 1961—ninety minutes in the White House on April 24—their talks dealt with the NNG dispute and included discussion of the PKI. Kennedy continued with questions in subsequent correspondence, leading up to the proposed trip to Jakarta. Sukarno always described the PKI as mostly nationalist farmers or peasants. While the PKI was the "best organized and most effective party," he explained, "only 10% are communists; 90% are revolutionary nationalists."[19] Because Dulles' covert planning in Indonesia (which started in the 1950s) was very nearly at the point of completion, JFK's trip to Jakarta posed a massive problem. Had the announced visit to Jakarta proceeded as planned in early 1964, it would have consolidated Sukarno's presidency, and JFK would have totally disrupted years of covert activity by Allen Dulles, preparing for regime

change. This book is an investigation of Dulles' Indonesia strategy and how it resulted in the negation of Kennedy's Indonesia policy and with it, the president himself. Once Kennedy had officially agreed to make the visit to Jakarta, his joint agreement with Sukarno to stop Konfrontasi stood an excellent chance of success, so much so that Dulles had no way of preventing the outcome other than to stop the visit from taking place.

Dulles and Rockefeller

Ironically, the differences between JFK and Dulles, apart from the generational difference, were made even more obvious because of an extraordinary similarity. JFK's younger brother Robert as attorney general worked alongside him, and Allen's elder brother, John Foster Dulles, as secretary of state under Eisenhower worked alongside DCI Dulles. The depth of experience in the two Dulles brothers was unprecedented. They first started together at the time of the Versailles Treaty when both Allen and John Foster participated in the American Commission to Negotiate Peace—John Foster in drawing up the reparations agreement and Allen in the intelligence section.

Between them, however, was a fierce sense of rivalry to achieve results in international affairs. This was a continuation of the sibling rivalry that had persisted throughout their childhood. It started perhaps from John Foster being the first-born and favorite, and Allen seven years younger with a club-foot. As young men, Allen was always trying to prove he was as good as Foster, if not better. Leading up to World War II, they at first uniformly agreed the United States should remain neutral in the event of Hitler initiating conflict. Always a realist, Allen was the first to change, but he was still involved in selling oil to the Nazis during the Battle of Britain.

Allen's uncle in the Wilson presidency and his maternal grandfather in the Harrison presidency had both reached the political pinnacle that Allen always aspired to—secretary of state—yet it was John Foster who achieved that goal. And when his brother was dying of cancer and Allen asked him to pass the baton, John Foster refused. Perhaps it was not so much sibling

rivalry that John Foster took with him to the grave as much as serious misgivings about his brother (the same concern about Allen Dulles expressed by General Walter Beedle Smith).

The Dulles in-family brinkmanship far exceeded any similar rivalry in the Kennedy clan. In the case of John and Robert Kennedy, when JFK was president, the two brothers were intensely reliant on each other's abilities and tended to act as one unit, such as their joint input at the time of the Cuban missile crisis or when Robert, on JFK's behalf, conducted talks with Sukarno on the New Guinea sovereignty dispute. This issue (like the Cuban crisis) might have led to a nuclear standoff with Moscow backing Indonesia and Washington backing its Dutch ally had Kennedy not intervened as he did.

In the first Eisenhower administration, the link between John Foster as secretary of state and Allen as director of Central Intelligence was seen by US media as beneficial for the national interest. The Dulles brothers were perceived as having created not just their own niche but their own legend even before serving together under Eisenhower. Although they seemed to act in unison, they were not one unit, not one clan as the Kennedys were in the 1960s. This impression was perhaps reinforced by the media reaction to JFK and Bobby Kennedy being the first Catholic family to reach such political heights. John Foster followed his father in the Presbyterian faith, attending church every Sunday, while Foster's son did not merely follow his father's religiosity but also became a Catholic priest and rose to the level of cardinal. Allen's religious instruction seems to have progressed no farther than the Garden of Eden in that he had adulterous affairs for most of his working life, without jeopardizing his life-long role in intelligence. Allen reveled in intelligence, whereas John Foster "often chose to adopt the State Department mentality of knowing as little as possible about sordid operational details of intelligence." Grose expounds this point further, saying that Allen always claimed his duty was intelligence, whereas policy-making was John Foster's responsibility, but "Allen was ever imaginative in devising intelligence operations that by their very nature determined the shape of national policy."[20]

When John Foster Dulles passed away after two years of failing health because of colon cancer, Allen's covert intelligence operations entered an even more radical stage. He and the new secretary of state, Christian Herter, who was reliant on crutches because of osteoarthritis, were not close friends despite being acquainted since World War I. The changed dynamic in the upper echelon of power for the remaining twenty-one months of the Eisenhower administration influenced Allen's mode of operations. As well, John Foster's death no doubt reminded Allen of his own mortality. He was, after all, almost sixty-seven years old when retained by Kennedy as director of Central Intelligence. He clearly sensed he was reaching the end of his career. Time was running out for a major project he had started years earlier, in which a CIA-assisted Indonesia operation in 1958, the Outer Islands Rebellion, was but one part. The second part involved ousting the Dutch from West New Guinea. Drawing on contacts only Allen Dulles could have had at his disposal because of his vast experience in diplomacy, intelligence, and state affairs, the second part of his well-timed Indonesia strategy coincided with the Kennedy presidency. However, Kennedy fired him on November 29, 1961, officially ending Dulles' nine-month role as DCI, but Allen's network of contacts going back to the 1920s was like an intelligence tsunami held in abeyance. President Kennedy, in describing the departing DCI in prophetic terms as "an almost unique" figure in American history, was well aware that Dulles still held enormous influence. The newly appointed director, John McCone, was an engineer and successful businessman from the West Coast. Unlike Dulles who had no compunction about resorting to assassination and using paramilitary forces, McCone was uninterested in covert operations. With legions of staff, McCone moved into the new building at Langley. In the design and construction of the new headquarters, Dulles had played a prominent role but never occupied the new building. He still kept his former office in the old CIA headquarters on the hill overlooking the suburban area in Washington known as Foggy Bottom. As well, he resumed his position with Sullivan & Cromwell, the legal firm in which he had worked with John Foster in the 1930s representing Rockefeller oil interests and the myriad subsidiaries. Allen had

not actually married into the Rockefeller family as John Foster had done, but nevertheless his life-long association with Standard Oil made him an essential member of the extended family. In the years between World War I and II, there was no legal restriction on someone like Allen Dulles sharing his expertise between private enterprise and the State Department, and John D. Rockefeller, at ninety-eight years of age, openly expressed his thanks. In his pre–World War II publication *Random Reminiscences of Men and Events*, he said:

> We did not ruthlessly go after the trade of our competitors and attempt to ruin it by cutting prices or instituting a spy system…. One of our greatest helpers has been the State Department in Washington…. I think I can speak thus frankly and enthusiastically because the working out of many of these great plans has developed largely since I retired from the business fourteen years ago.[21]

Rockefeller's reputation as the richest man in history was not achieved without the acumen of Dulles gaining entry into oil-rich regions, from the Near East to the Far East, when European colonial power was still dominant. Mining and oil exploration were conducted in Netherlands New Guinea shortly before the World War II by a Rockefeller-based company established by Allen Dulles. It discovered a bonanza of natural resources, and prying these from Dutch colonial control became an important part of Dulles' postwar covert operations in Indonesia. In the 1950s Dulles' Indonesia strategy was focused on ensuring West New Guinea changed hands, from Dutch to Indonesian control, and became an integral part of Allen Dulles' political strategy leading toward regime change. The unexpected obstacle created by JFK, when he decided to support Sukarno's presidency, caused Dulles to cast them both as political anathema for his larger strategy. Despite the fact that Sukarno's anticolonial, anti-Dutch policy seemed to have scored an immense victory when the Dutch were ousted from West New Guinea, from Dulles' perspective the settlement of the sovereignty dispute was actually bringing Indonesia one step closer to regime change.

The Legend

Within the first three months of his presidency, there is no doubt Kennedy realized that the appointment of Dulles was a mistake. It was painfully evident: Dulles had snared Kennedy in the Bay of Pigs. Kennedy's well-known reaction—he wanted to "splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds"—led to Dulles' dismissal. It is interesting to note that Allen Dulles, when the crisis first erupted, had taken the precaution of being unable to be contacted. When asked in the Braden interview if his absence was deliberate, "a ruse, in effect, that you've followed before?" Dulles answered:

> Yes I have, I have followed that before; during certain phases of the Iranian matter I was deliberately away. I wasn't deliberately away here…. I had one very important speaking engagement [in Puerto Rico]. It wasn't just a thing that you give up and say you had a bad cold or something of that kind. It would have had significance because it just happened to be on the eve of the [Bay of Pigs] landing…. So I was in Puerto Rico the night before, the night of the landing, and then I came right back, and I saw the President during that following period several times.
> **BRADEN:** While things were still uncertain?
> **DULLES:** Well, while things were going badly.

Kennedy's regret is captured in Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.'s *A Thousand Days*, which restates what JFK told him:

> I probably made a mistake in keeping Allen Dulles on. It's not that Dulles is not a man of great ability. He is. But I have never worked with him, and therefore I can't estimate his meaning when he tells me things…. Dulles is a legendary figure, and it's hard to operate with legendary figures.

Kennedy had to confront Dulles' legendary status and his enormous network of contacts from which came the power to effect adverse change in

American foreign policy. Dulles was born a quarter of a century before Kennedy, but the gulf between them was far more than a difference of years. It was a difference in experience, seen by the fact that Allen Dulles had started his lifelong work in intelligence even before John F. Kennedy was born. Moreover, he was still operating in 1964, as shown by being the first person announced by President Johnson to join Justice Earl Warren in the commission to investigate Kennedy's assassination. While both Dulles and Kennedy held respect for each other's remarkable ability, this book shows how their differences were irreconcilable; the Indonesia strategy Kennedy was pursuing in 1963 was on a collision course with the Indonesia strategy Allen Dulles had started in the mid-1950s. The ultimate irony was that Kennedy was unaware how much his strategy—centered, as it was, on keeping Sukarno as president of Indonesia—would so totally have disrupted the planning of Allen Dulles.

A lifetime in the world of intelligence, covering two world wars and the emergence of the United States as the world's first superpower, had led to Allen Dulles in the late 1950s having access to an unprecedented triumvirate of power—military, industrial, and political power. This he wielded through an ailing President Eisenhower (his first heart attack was in September 1955), an ailing secretary of state, and his own role as DCI. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., who had known Allen Dulles for fifteen years, simply noted: "Years in the intelligence business had no doubt given him a capacity for ruthlessness."[22] Even Allen's sense of humor was ruthless, as shown by an interview on American radio in 1960, when asked what he would do if an enemy agent threatened national security. Dulles unfortunately blurted out, "I'd kill him"—a patriotic response, perhaps, but considering the gulf between the world of intelligence and the world of the radio audience, it was callous beyond the call of duty.

While still a senator in the 1950s and ahead of the UN declaration on decolonization in 1960, Kennedy's political perspective shows that he realized the epoch of European colonial rule was ending. He was critical of the policy of both Dulles brothers, as shown in the *New York Times* headline (July 3, 1957): "Kennedy Urges U.S. Back Independence for Algeria;

Senator Assails Support for France's Policy—Dulles Cool to Bid." It was like a warning shot across the bow of John Foster's old-school approach, reluctant to admit that the imminent end of the colonial era required more than a readjustment of deckchairs and then business as usual. For Allen Dulles, however, Kennedy's stance on Algeria (and Indonesia too) was mere confirmation of their previous five years of private discussions on foreign-affairs issues. In 1958 Kennedy specifically drew attention to DCI Dulles' covert activities in Indonesia but did not realize then—or later when he was president—the actual depth of Dulles' involvement in that country. When Allen Dulles was the top European-based lawyer for Sullivan & Cromwell, the Wall Street legal firm that was virtually the front desk for the Rockefeller oil empire, he managed to surmount the restrictions imposed by the Dutch colonial government. He gained access to the Indies for a Rockefeller company not in a minority position. He had broken through the bar of colonial subservience, an achievement which nobody in Rockefeller Oil had ever previously managed to do, using his political skill in oil intelligence. During World War II, he demonstrated remarkable skill in the OSS based in Switzerland, from November 1942, penetrating Hitler's inner circle of advisors. And in the war in the Pacific, after Japanese troops had occupied almost all the Indies for three years, it was Allen Dulles whom the Japanese first approached—before the dropping of the first atomic bomb—when the time had come to surrender. Perhaps the highest accolade, however, came from the spy chief who dominated British services for decades, Sir Kenneth W.D. Strong, who declared Allen Dulles was the "greatest intelligence officer who ever lived."[23]

Indonesia and New Guinea

Allen Dulles' interest in the Indonesian archipelago began when it was still a colony, the Netherlands East Indies. The sovereignty dispute that Dulles presented to Kennedy on his first day in the presidency needs to be seen in the context of links between the archipelago and the island of New Guinea, the land of the Papuan people. In the far eastern extremity of Indonesia

today, it seems to have been at the heart of Indonesian politics since Indonesian independence. So 1945 is a good starting point.

Two days after Japan surrendered in World War II, Sukarno proclaimed Indonesian independence on August 17, 1945. The territorial extent of the new country was decided under the supervision of Japanese naval officials. The main person involved was Nishijima Shigetada, who is best described as plainclothes naval intelligence. He was operating under Admiral Maeda Tadashi in whose house in Jakarta the proclamation was prepared.[24]

When I interviewed Nishijima in his house in Tokyo (three times in August 1983), he was seventy-two years old.[25] He had offered the Indonesian nationalists three options for the territorial extent of their new country: the Netherlands East Indies plus Malaya (also under Japanese control), the Indies excluding West New Guinea, or the Indies including West New Guinea. Only with Nishijima's encouragement was the third option accepted. A principal aim of the entire war in the Pacific was for Japan to claim the island of New Guinea for its natural resources. It was the grand plan of the Japanese Navy for a new Japan. Handing the Dutch half of the island to Indonesian nationalists was intended to prevent post-war recolonization by the Dutch.

After the proclamation of independence, four years of fighting ensued before the Netherlands relinquished sovereignty of the archipelago, but it kept Netherlands New Guinea (NNG), the western half of the island.

During the war, Admiral Maeda was in charge of West New Guinea. In Japan he came from the southern region around Okinawa and after rising to a high position in the Japanese Navy helped to plan the move south. During the war, he had already found a large oil deposit in NNG and was aware of rich mineral deposits in a remote location in the central mountain range. But when Nishijima offered the Indonesian nationalists the Indies with NNG, there was some opposition to including "the land of the Papuans." Mohammad Hatta, who was declared vice president of Indonesia at the time of the proclamation of independence, strongly disapproved. Before the war, Dutch colonial authorities had sent Hatta to NNG where he spent one year in exile before being relocated to the isolated island of Banda Neira. Unlike

Hatta, who was speaking from personal experience, Sukarno, in accepting Nishijima's offer, was not.

"Papuans are Melanesians," Hatta declared. "I am inclined to say that I do not need Papua and that it should be left to the Papuan people themselves. I recognize that the Papuans have the right to be an independent nation."[26] (Today, the Indonesian provinces of Papua and West Papua, formerly NNG, comprise 23 percent of the land area of Indonesia.) Sukarno and a majority of the nationalists opted to include West New Guinea only because of Nishijima's strong support.

At that time in 1945, the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration, which had sought refuge in Brisbane during the war, was slowly reestablishing itself in NNG, but the wartime commander, General Douglas MacArthur, was still in control. According to the official Dutch historian just before World War II, the area actually controlled by Dutch colonial administration covered only 5 percent of NNG, and 95 percent was still the land of the Papuan people. So the question should be asked, by what right did Nishijima offer Indonesian nationalists—excluding Hatta—100 percent of territory that was 95 percent free of colonial rule? In this instance, the claim that the boundary of a newly independent country should assume the same territory occupied by the former colonial power would seem misplaced and excessive.

Clearly, the claim made in 1945 was the outcome of Japanese supervision, but Indonesia for various reasons persisted with the claim. Many Indonesians themselves believe the territory was once under the control of a former Javanese dynasty, Majapahit, but this was a historical concoction by a famous advisor of Sukarno, Professor Yamin. Some trading occurred, but this is a far cry from saying Majapahit controlled the territory. Throwing more light onto this problem might help to explain why Indonesia is still facing difficulty in the land of the Papuans even today. In any case, we are concerned with Kennedy's role in the sovereignty dispute that erupted at the start of his presidency.

Four years of fighting followed the 1945 Proklamasi, first against the British but mainly against Dutch attempts to recolonize the Indies. When

the time came in December 1949 to relinquish Dutch sovereignty of the Indies, initial moves to excise NNG from the Indies had already been made in 1946 (at a conference in Denpasar), and when the transfer of sovereignty finally took place, NNG was not included. The real reason the Dutch wanted the territory—its known oil and mineral deposits—was the same reason Nishijima wanted to include it, and indeed, it was the same reason Allen Dulles had in mind, without informing Kennedy, when he first introduced the sovereignty dispute to the new president.

When the Dutch relinquished sovereignty of the Indies in 1949 without NNG, it was just three months after the historic formation of the People's Republic of China. Washington was threatening to withhold post-war reconstruction aid for the war-ravaged Netherlands and post-war anti-colonialism was gathering momentum, so Indonesian freedom fighters had history on their side. What was especially surprising for some observers in the United States was that Indonesian independence came without NNG. A large primary gold deposit had been discovered there just before the war, and the Dutch were in no mood to give it away. In any case, nobody in Indonesia complained because nobody in Jakarta was aware of the huge deposit. Of course, gold was never among the reasons stated by the Dutch government for retaining the New Guinea territory. One can only imagine the reaction of Allen Dulles, who set up the prewar US-Dutch company in 1935, which made the gold discovery in 1936, only to have it snaffled by the Dutch government.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear Dulles would not be supporting the Dutch in the protracted dispute with Indonesia over sovereignty of the New Guinea territory. The dispute continued through the 1950s, culminating in 1961–62 soon after Kennedy had reached the presidency. DCI Dulles should have advised Kennedy about this primary gold deposit but never did. Under UN auspices, six months of Indonesian-Dutch negotiations concluded on August 15, 1962, with the New York Agreement. An American mediator, Ellsworth Bunker—whom DCI Dulles had previously asked to be his deputy in the CIA—had conducted negotiations,

continually overruling the Dutch and effectively dictating the terms by which Indonesia took control of the territory from the Netherlands.

Compared to the media coverage and political furor surrounding the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy's intervention in the New Guinea sovereignty dispute in 1962 and his proposed follow-up visit to Indonesia passed by imperceptibly. News on this region of the world was infrequent throughout the 1960s, apart from the brief, tragic episode in 1961 when Michael Rockefeller, son of the governor of New York, disappeared off the coast of NNG. This area was part of the larger region known from wartime terminology as the Southwest Pacific Area which in the 1950–60s was replaced by the term "Southeast Asia." The 1958 popular movie, *South Pacific*, with its idyllic war setting based on James Michener's Pulitzer-prize-winning book, *Tales of the South Pacific*, may have relieved some residual wartime angst, but for most people this region of the world was geographically unfamiliar. Indonesia and New Guinea were not locales that entered public debate and even today are largely unfamiliar. For this reason, I'd like to include a brief introduction to New Guinea and Indonesia because this was the area that had Kennedy's close attention from 1961 to 1963.

Papua

While the immediate aim of the Japanese Imperial Army in 1941 was to seize the productive oil wells of the Netherlands East Indies (the Indonesian archipelago), the ultimate aim of the Japanese Navy was to gain control of the resource-rich island of New Guinea, more than twice the area of all the islands of Nippon. Indonesia is by far the largest country in Southeast Asia, both in population and in area. Forty-eight degrees of longitude on the equator, Indonesia covers almost one-seventh of the circumference of the globe and has long been prized for its abundant natural resources.

Over a timeframe of three-and-a-half centuries, the archipelago gradually came under Dutch colonial control, region by region. As a reflection of Dutch colonial wealth, the seventeen thousand islands were

once described as a “belt of emeralds” slung around the equator. Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and Sumatra—three of the five main islands—are intersected by the equator but the other two, Java and Papua, are entirely in the southern hemisphere. Not until the twentieth century did Bali become part of the Dutch Realm, and, after thirty years of war in the western extremity of the archipelago, so too did Aceh.

In the eastern extremity of the Netherlands East Indies was the territory of NNG (nowadays two provinces but generally called “Papua”). It is a big territory, larger than California, but is only the western half of the island of New Guinea. In the 1950s it was virtually untouched—a wilderness of rainforests and rivers, highland valleys and mountains. In one location, there is a sheer precipice of ten thousand feet. The whole island is the shape of a bird, looking westward, with a central mountain range like a backbone that is higher in the western half. The mountains rise to cloud-forest, snow and glaciers; higher than sixteen thousand feet. It is only a few degrees below the equator and even today very remote. Yet since Napoleonic times, on international maps the territory was marked “Dutch.” Passing ships could collect coconuts and water, but up to World War II only 5 percent of the territory was under colonial administration. It was still “the land of the Papuas,”[27] as named by the Portuguese when they unsuccessfully attempted to colonize the territory in the early sixteenth century.

NNG was sparsely populated by black-skinned inhabitants who were dubbed Melanesian (“black island”) by an early French navigator. Today they are better known as Papuans. For centuries, in both halves of the island, the bulk of the Papuan population lived in remote highland valleys, free of malaria. According to anthropologists, the system of agriculture practiced there in centuries past was advanced and well developed, comparable to the best farming techniques located between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers in the Middle East. The eastern half of New Guinea was claimed by two European colonial powers, Germany and Britain, while the Dutch in the western half simply added the territory to its existing colonial possession, the East Indies. An arbitrary colonial line down the center of the island, 141 East, created the two halves.

Pre–World War II development in the Dutch territory was meager, half a dozen small colonial settlements scattered around the far-flung coastline. These had begun as a cluster of army encampments at the start of the twentieth century in response to the United States gaining control of the nearby Philippines. When the giant US company Standard Oil was still inseparable from the name Rockefeller, it initiated a takeover bid for Dutch oil interests in the Indies. The Dutch responded by joining forces with the British in 1907 to form Royal Dutch Shell. This started decades of pressure from Rockefeller oil interests to gain exploration rights in NNG. Ultimately, in May 1935, with the formation of the Netherlands New Guinea Petroleum Company (NNGPM),[28] which had 60 percent controlling US interest, Standard Oil was successful. This occurred only with the help of their top European-based lawyer, Allen Dulles. NNGPM was formed with the approval of Sir Henri Deterding, who was general manager of the Royal Dutch Shell group of companies. Deterding and Rockefeller had long been fierce opponents in the global oil business, and when Allen joined his brother John Foster Dulles in Sullivan & Cromwell, his first big case in 1928 brought him face to face with Deterding. The silver hair and penetrating black eyes helped to create a Napoleonic presence for Deterding, but he backed down and Allen Dulles won. However, in the 1930s, Dulles and Deterding shared a common interest: the new leader of Germany, Adolf Hitler. Allen Dulles wasted no time in arranging to speak with Hitler personally, soon after he came to power in 1933, and he also met Goebbels, who like Dulles was born with a club foot. With remarkably accurate political foresight after interviewing Hitler, Allen predicted that Poland would be the German leader's casus belli. Deterding's friendship with Hitler led to million-dollar donations. However, the key element that swayed Dutch opinion in the formation of NNGPM was evidence that Japanese units were secretly conducting oil exploration in New Guinea territory. Without American assistance, the Dutch could do little to assert colonial control. Dulles used the political tension generated by the Japanese incursion of colonial sovereignty to push through the 60 percent US controlling interest in NNGPM.

New Guinea was the goal of Japan's march to the South (Nanshin-ron). Admiral Maeda and Japanese Naval Intelligence formulated this plan not merely as an answer to the problems then facing the Japanese army in China but also as a grand theory of expansion. The Netherlands East Indies was producing eight times the volume of oil that Japan had requested. Following US advice, the Netherlands Indies government denied this request. Moreover, for natural resources the eyes of the Japanese Navy were on New Guinea. They envisaged this vast island becoming the source of raw materials for a new imperial Japan. Japanese anthropologists were dispatched to collect information on the tribes people of New Guinea. Dutch concern about Japanese intrusion inspired the mountaineering expedition in 1936 that wanted to be the first to climb the highest mountain in NNG, and it was during this trek that gold was discovered—the world's largest primary deposit of gold.

After the Pacific War, geologists attached to General Douglas MacArthur's forces remained in the Dutch territory for most of the next decade conducting exploration. Only some of their findings were released, such as the nickel discovered on Gag Island being 10 percent of world nickel reserves. There was no mention of any primary gold deposit because it was so big it was politically explosive. During the dispute over sovereignty, neither Dulles nor the Dutch political hierarchy was willing to admit that the real struggle (apart from the Dutch-Indonesian dispute) was to maintain control of the territory in order to access its natural resources. Moreover, several times it was loudly proclaimed that the territory had no natural resources. Both Dulles and the Dutch hierarchy knew that gold, copper, and oil lay waiting to be exploited, but there was no such ulterior motive behind Indonesian demands. During the 1950s, using the Cold War to his advantage, Allen Dulles' strategy took shape, and Indonesia became a central part of his plan. It is our collective unfamiliarity with this vast country which has led to our failure to ascertain how closely intertwined it was with the fate of President Kennedy. Dulles very early recognized the significance of Indonesia for both the political destiny of Southeast Asia and the Cold War.

After 1949, the Dutch announced a plan to develop NNG and bring the indigenous people to independence. An Indonesian campaign to oust the remnant colonial Dutch presence from New Guinea began in the early 1950s, claiming the territorial extent of Indonesia was from Sabang Island on the western extremity of the Indonesian archipelago to Merauke in the east. Starting with the length of Sumatra, this is a distance of 3,350 miles—a distance greater than New York to Dublin. Ironically, the campaign initially focused only on the colonial Dutch presence in New Guinea rather than the continuing Dutch presence in Indonesia, as pointed out by Herbert Feith[29]who was a leading Indonesia expert based at Monash University, Melbourne, during the second half of the twentieth century. In newly independent Indonesia at the start of the 1950s, he explained, "the largest chunks of economic power" were still mainly in Dutch hands—"estate agriculture, the oil industry, stevedoring, shipping, aviation, modern-type banking … internal distribution, trade, manufacturing and insurance" as well as exporting and, to a lesser degree, importing. It was no wonder that Sukarno often declared that the struggle for independence was ongoing, his revolution not yet finished. As former Foreign Minister Sunario pointed out to me, in the late 1950s "US sources" (he did not precisely confirm their identity) were providing covert funding for the Indonesian army to promote the anticolonial campaign against NNG. Sunario[30] was unwilling to state clearly the source of the funding but it was understood the choice was between a CIA representative and an oil-company representative. Without pressing the point, I agreed with him that differentiating between the two can at times be difficult. Sunario's information was in the same vein as the concern expressed at that same time in the late 1950s by a prominent Australian politician, Herbert Vere Evatt, leader of the opposition in the Australian parliament and former president of the UN General Assembly. Evatt pointed to the possible involvement of US oil interests in the Indonesian quest to oust the Dutch from New Guinea when he declared on November 14, 1957, "Surely we are not going to have an argument as to who should have the sovereignty of Dutch New Guinea unless the exploitation of that territory by certain interests is involved."[31]

After losing the Indies temporarily to Japan in 1942 and then losing the Indies permanently to Indonesia in 1949, it was not until the 1950s that the Dutch attempted to impose their stamp of colonial rule on the New Guinea territory. This brief period has been recalled in a positive light by many now-elderly Papuans in the coastal, urban areas because they enjoyed a vast improvement in health and education; but as the Dutch presence increased so did the anticolonial cry of Indonesia. The claim that the territory should not have been excluded from being part of Indonesia in 1949 only grew louder. The dispute reached crisis level only after Indonesia had acquired a centralized army command and an arms deal with the Soviet Union, two of the three things that led to a settlement of the dispute. The third was US intervention. It was at this point, 1960, Allen Dulles assisted Kennedy into the presidency.

Chapter 2

GOLD! THE 1936 DISCOVERY AND CONCEALMENT

In the alpine region of Netherlands New Guinea in 1936, three Dutchmen discovered a mountainous outcrop of ore with high copper content and very high concentrations of gold. When later analyzed in the Netherlands, the gold (in grams per ton) proved to be twice that of Witwatersrand in South Africa, then the world's richest gold mine, but this information was not made public. If the real concentration of the gold discovery had been announced, Dutch sovereignty of the remote territory would have become even more precarious than the slim hold it had, with only a few hundred Dutch people living there. Various demands for greater access to the territory, or leasing it entirely, had been made since the 1920s, and political or commercial pressure had come from three different sources, Germany, Japan, and American subsidiary companies in the Standard Oil empire. The Dutch attempted to downplay the 1936 discovery by concealing the extraordinary richness of the gold, but inevitably it transformed the land of the Papuan people into a political lodestone.

Jean Jacques Dozy, the geologist among the trio who made the discovery, was an employee of the Netherlands New Guinea Petroleum Company (NNGPM) formed the previous year. Its managers and most of its employees were Dutch, its headquarters were in the Hague, and most people assumed Nederlandsche Nieuw Guinea Petroleum Maatschappij was a Dutch-controlled company, but it was not. The Dutch share was 40 percent, while two US oil companies, Standard Vacuum Oil and Standard Oil of California, held the 60 percent controlling interest. Both US

companies were linked with the legendary Rockefeller family, and more than thirty years later, so too was the company that finally started mining operations, Freeport Indonesia. Among the company directors was a Rockefeller, and it was he who landed on-site by helicopter in 1982 to inspect the world's largest cable-operated mining operation in one of the most remote locations.

When Dozy first discovered the mountainous extrusion of copper suffused with gold, he realized the geological discovery, because of its sheer immensity, would have political significance. It goes without saying his prewar allegiance unquestionably was to the Dutch throne, not Standard Oil. As an old man in the 1990s, however, when he was invited to revisit the site that he and his two companions had discovered in 1936, his allegiance was a blend of Dutch pride and multi national praise for the huge mining operation. Accessing the world's largest primary deposit of gold, in Dozy's opinion, took the skill of the Americans in "doing what had to be done"—as he explained to me. Getting the mine operational certainly was an exceptional feat of engineering. Exceptional also were the decades of political machinations that preceded the start of these mining operations, but this did not seem to concern Dozy whom I interviewed in his home in the Hague, Netherlands, in 1982.

In post-war years, after the Netherlands East Indies had become Indonesia, the Dutch struggled to retain sovereignty of NNG, losing it in 1962–63 when forced to hand over the territory to Indonesia. This occurred through the intervention of President Kennedy, who responded to political exigencies without even knowing of the gold. In the eye of the public and in the world arena of international affairs, both the Dutch and the Indonesians had claimed sovereignty of the territory while the fact that it contained a vast gold deposit was never publicized. Both Sukarno and Kennedy remained unaware of the gold. At no time during the political struggle was the presence of a vast, primary gold deposit publicly revealed by the Dutch government. The territory, it was claimed, was almost bereft of natural resources, apart from an often-acknowledged abundance of timber. At the same time as the international sovereignty dispute between the Netherlands

and Indonesia, the Dutch were also in dispute with the Americans (or Rockefeller interests might be more accurate). But this never reached the public eye. In this dispute over control of the world's largest gold deposit, Rockefeller interests used their connections within the US government.

One of the principal figures involved in the sovereignty dispute was DCI Allen Dulles, whose clandestine operations would eventually oust the Dutch colonial presence from the territory. At the same time as President Sukarno was officially claiming the territory after the Dutch departure in May 1963, Dulles was preparing for regime change in Indonesia, which would see Sukarno ousted in 1965–66, replaced by Major General Suharto. In the same way that Dozy held aspirations all his life for the development of the gold discovery he made in 1936, so too did Allen Dulles, once the Paris-based international lawyer working for Rockefeller's Standard Oil who arranged for the joint company NNGPM to be formed on May 23, 1935. At this time of the Great Depression, the Indies authority could no longer refuse Standard Oil access to Netherlands New Guinea as it had done since World War I. The long delay in gaining access was a reflection of Dutch wariness of Rockefeller's oil interests since the attempted takeover in 1907. At that time, American pressure was fended off by the formation of Royal Dutch Shell, 60 percent Dutch and 40 percent British. But in 1935, Rockefeller oil interests held the majority interest, and a Royal Dutch Shell subsidiary, BPM, held 40 percent in NNGPM. It began oil exploration in New Guinea immediately.

Jean Jacques Dozy had retired as a geologist when he spoke to me about the remarkable 1936 expedition and retired too from university lecturing, which he had continued until the early 1980s. In his home in the Hague in 1982, I interviewed Dozy, ensconced in the comfort of his armchair and his reminiscences about the prewar expedition with his two friends, A. H. Colijn and Frits Wissel.

The pioneering trio were publicly acclaimed in the Netherlands for their achievement in reaching the snow-capped summit of Mount Carstensz. It was described as the highest mountain in the Dutch Realm, and there were three glaciers nearby in the immense range of mountains. The Dutch public,

however, was not accurately informed about the trio's other historical feat of discovering a mountain of copper suffused with extraordinarily high concentrations of gold. The secretive response to this gold discovery—and Dozy was compliant in maintaining the secret—was considered necessary at the time because of the turmoil in world politics on the verge of World War II Dutch officialdom was always mindful of the near absence of colonial administration after more than a century of being a Dutch possession. There was a clear need to affirm Dutch sovereignty of the territory even though the strong interest shown by Germany, Japan, and Standard Oil before World War II did not yet directly challenge Dutch sovereignty. With only 5 percent of the territory under colonial administration, those with no allegiance to the Dutch throne might well have thought the name *Netherlands* New Guinea a misnomer.

The Expedition

It all began at the NNGPM headquarters in Babo, in Maccluer Gulf just under the "head of the bird," Dozy explained to me during the interview. He was twenty-eight years old; the year, 1936. "I remember that when we were in New Guinea there was a little notice that the Japanese, maybe, were thinking of climbing the mountain, and, of course, that was irksome."

Dutch authorities in the Netherlands East Indies had no answer to the expanding economic influence of Japan in prewar days, even when Japanese cotton concessions in NNG were being used as a base for secret oil exploration. This was a crucial bargaining point used in arranging the sixty-forty split in NNGPM. Dulles' position in Standard Oil blended neatly with his official role in the State Department in arms-limitation talks. For a decade he was involved in these post–World War I negotiations, and in the spring of 1935, he left the United States on the SS *Europa* to attend a conference on collective security of special interest to the Dutch. This was because in December 1934 Japan had given notice of its intention to terminate the Washington Naval Treaty. Japanese military power and consolidation of the area, which Japan had been granted after World War I

(for having sided with the Allies against Germany), opened the possibility for expansion southward, which had been restricted during the previous decade by the treaty. Japanese territory extended as far south as the equator almost contiguous with the northern shoreline of New Guinea. This meant NNG would be even more beholden to the United States to protect Dutch sovereignty. All of these concerns were packed into the word "irksome" that Dozy used. So if a Japanese climber had been first to the summit of the highest mountain in the territory, Dutchmen like Dozy felt that it could only have been a precursor to further expansion of the Japanese presence. Dozy, Colijn, and Wissel had much experience in alpine climbing in Europe, so it was agreed that they, as Dutchmen, should be the first to climb Mt. Carstensz, especially after revised surveys had shown it was the highest peak in the territory, not Mt. Wilhelmina.

The decision to make the expedition seemed apt from a political viewpoint too because Colijn and his father, who was then prime minister of the Netherlands, enjoyed close relations with the Dutch royal family. The Indies, the motherland, and even Prime Minister Colijn's political support were all feeling the effects of the Great Depression, so claiming the Carstensz summit for Queen Wilhelmina would provide a timely boost to national pride. Along the way, they would take the opportunity to examine geologically prospective sites.

A. H. Colijn was the Borneo-based manager of the Royal Dutch Shell subsidiary for production and refining, BPM, and the leader of the expedition. His father was one of the founding figures of the Dutch oil industry in the 1890s. (That same year, 1936, Henri Deterding resigned after offering Hitler one year's supply of oil on credit, adding to his notoriety after publishing his pro-Nazi memoirs.) The Colijn family had a centuries-old link with Dozy in that their original family names were identified as Huguenot, French Protestant refugees from France in the seventeenth century.

Dozy was working with NNGPM as the chief petroleum geologist. The third keen alpinist in the historic expedition was Frits J. Wissel, a pilot in the Dutch Navy who resigned from the service after the expedition to do

aerial mapping for BPM in Borneo. During the war a few years later, he was with Dutch Intelligence in Australia still involved with mapping, and he lived until the mid-1990s while Dozy saw in the new millennium. Both A. H. Colijn and his father died during the war.

Wissel's expertise as a pilot was the vital addition that made the expedition successful. The use of a plane, not just for spotting but also for dropping supplies, was the novel strategy. Dozy reminisced, "One day, when we got the old Sikorsky amphibian, we made a reconnaissance flight and saw the mountains, and then slowly, one thing after the other, plans developed."

Plotting the expedition path from the plane, Dozy and Colijn realized that the central mountain range ran much farther inland than the Carstensz, a whole system of mountains and glacial valleys. Flying above the central massif, they took note of one access route that looked like an alpine meadow leading on to the Carstensz. If aerial drops were made by Wissel ahead of Colijn and Dozy to reduce the volume of provisions to be carried, their rate of travel would increase dramatically. Wissel could follow the path they had already made through the wilderness and rejoin them in the foothills before making the ascent. That was the plan.

On October 23, 1936, Colijn and Dozy left Babo on the government steamer *Albatros* heading for an isolated aerial-survey camp called Aika, which actually was no more than a tin shed. At this point, the southern coastline was closest to the sixteen thousand foot peak. Before them stretched thirty-five miles of flat, swampy terrain intersected by a maze of small waterways. Beyond the coastal swamp, more thickly forested land rose to a plateau landscape for another nine or ten miles. Wissel air-dropped supplies just ahead of the group, then he himself started out from Aika, also with some porters, retracing the path of Colijn and Dozy to rejoin them in the foothills. In all there were thirty-eight Dayak porters from Borneo but only a handful accompanied the trio beyond the plateau section before the three made the precipitous assault on Carstensz. Passing the level of thirteen thousand feet, the expedition reached the alpine meadow they had sighted from the preliminary aerial reconnaissance.

It was here that Dozy found the mountainous outcrop that he named "the Ertsberg" (ore mountain). "There was no other rock, only ore," he said to me, with a look of geological disbelief and wonderment. He could remember that in the damp and chilly conditions at that altitude, the smell of ore pervaded the entire countryside and was detectable a long way before confronting the actual mountain. It was a rich copper deposit with fine gold throughout. As a single extrusion of ore from the surface of the earth, it was later estimated to be the world's largest, with still larger deposits underground. Across the alpine meadow, Dozy even took note of another very prospective site and called it "Grasberg"—which today is described as the world's richest gold deposit with a large open-cut gold-copper mine and two underground gold mines.[32] On December 5, the group reached the summit, and they were back in Babo on Christmas Day.

Neither in Colijn's book on the expedition, which was published in 1937,[33] nor in the ore specimen analysis, which was published two years later[34] just as Europe was about to erupt into war, was the significance of the gold discovery mentioned. The Ertsberg discovery was noted for its copper possibilities and its extreme remoteness; only an insignificant presence of gold was acknowledged, not the actual concentration.

Dozy's discovery created an extraordinary degree of national sensitivity among the Dutch elite. The actual history-making discovery of that 1936 expedition for many years afterward was spoken of only in whispers. The potential value of the discovery was beyond calculation and never openly discussed, let alone publicly revealed. The vast area of NNG was larger than either Germany or Japan, both of whom were continuing to express interest in the territory and straining for more access to it. Despite its remoteness, the immense potential of the El Dorado[35] in the central mountain range was in silent but stark contrast to the fragility of Dutch sovereignty, so a policy of concealment took hold.

With war looming, there was widespread belief in both the mother country and the colony, the Netherlands and the Indies, that the Dutch policy of neutrality that left them relatively unscathed in World War I could

do the same again. Moreover, despite the war mongering by Hitler and the demand by Japan that Indies oil exports be increased dramatically, this belief persisted. Pin-on badges depicting a rifle barrel broken to signify neutrality were often worn by the general public, but members of the Indies government held no such illusion. The likelihood of invasion increased when the US government limited oil exports to Japan—and when the United States insisted the Netherlands East Indies do the same. US military protection was the key. The Dutch complied with the request to limit oil for Japan even though Stanvac (Standard Vacuum) oil production in the Indies was only 25 percent of the total output. The Indies government had purchased more armaments from the United States, but only a small portion was delivered,[36] and, in effect, limiting oil for Japan set a deadline for the end of Dutch colonial rule.

Luns

In the few years before war erupted in Europe, news of Dozy's remarkable discovery was restricted to a few persons in the upper echelon of Dutch political figures. Discretion was demanded in that time of international crisis. The geological results published in Leiden in 1939 deliberately misrepresented the assayed gold concentration. Written incorrectly in the summary of the results, the gold concentration was stated to be only one-fifteenth of the actual gold concentration, and this created a false impression that the Ertsberg was not worth consideration as a viable gold-mine. There was no opportunity nor any need for this to be rectified during the war, and afterward, during the 1945–49 Indonesian struggle for independence, there was even more reason *not* to divulge the discovery. NNG remained apart, separate from the Indonesian independence struggle, as it had been reclaimed by General MacArthur's troops before the Japanese surrender. Excised from the Indies before 1949 when sovereignty of the Indies was handed over to Indonesia, this started a thirteen-year dispute between the Dutch and the Indonesians over sovereignty of the Dutch-occupied territory. The policy of concealment, a mutual arrangement

between Dutch officialdom and NNGPM, continued throughout this dispute. The 60 percent American holding in NNGPM played a crucial role in the final outcome. While the Dutch government and NNGPM seemed to work cooperatively in some respects (such as the Ertsberg policy of concealment), government officials were unprepared for other covert methods that NNGPM used in support of Indonesian aspirations to oust the Dutch from the territory.

Post-war, Dozy worked in South America. Only when two decades of political wrangling over New Guinea sovereignty seemed to be an issue well in the past did Dozy comment on his 1936 discovery that it "was just like a mountain of gold on the moon."[37] It was not so much the remoteness that was in question but the fact that he acknowledged it was a "mountain of gold," not a mountain of copper. Yet the policy of concealing the true concentration of gold in the Ertsberg did not stop. This policy, which had started at the time of the 1936 discovery and continued for decades, did not stop in 1972 when the American mining company Freeport Indonesia began production. Of course, this was no longer a matter of concern for the Dutch but for the Indonesian government, then and now. Ten years after mining began, Joseph Luns (former Dutch foreign minister from 1952 to 1971 and NATO secretary general from 1971 to 1984) informed me, in an interview in his headquarters in Brussels, that the Dutch government had unsuccessfully tried to gain American support to mine "the largest outcrop of base metal ever located."[38] Luns declared: "The American companies had conversation with the Netherlands government but were prevented by the American government from pursuing it with the argument that the Dutch would be out of it."

One of the American companies Luns was referring to was Freeport Sulphur, the predecessor of Freeport Indonesia. While it may have been advised not to pursue any joint investment in NNG for political reasons, this does not imply such advice came as a result of any awareness on Kennedy's part about the potential El Dorado. Kennedy was in the process of taking the Indonesian option in the sovereignty dispute between the Netherlands

and Indonesia. So far as Kennedy was aware, the territory was lacking in natural resources.

After Kennedy intervened, he wanted to follow up with a US economic aid package and investment in Indonesia, and he sought to gain the interest (in the words of Arthur Schlesinger) of a "blue-ribbon panel of bonded conservatives" by setting up the Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World. Freeport Sulphur was represented on the panel. Still, Kennedy remained uninformed of the El Dorado he had unwittingly taken out of Dutch hands, and once the remaining political hurdles were overcome, Freeport would have unimpeded access.

The committee, headed by General Lucius Clay, was stacked with international lawyers and bankers who served on the boards of corporations invested (or interested) in Indonesia, including Robert Lovett of Freeport Sulphur.[39]

At no time during the sovereignty dispute did either Luns or "the American companies" that also were fervently working to gain control of the El Dorado in New Guinea (in opposition to Luns) reveal to Kennedy the actual size of the ore deposit in NNG. Because it was far greater than had been revealed publicly, acknowledging its potential would have transformed the sovereignty dispute. Kennedy was driven by political imperatives to end Dutch colonial rule in New Guinea, unaware of how the concealed natural resources in the territory were actually influencing the political outcome.

During the 1982 interview with NATO Secretary General Luns, he and I were joined for a few minutes by Mr. Van Kampen, head of the private office, which was about fifteen meters from where we were talking. Van Kampen, who had been in his office and unseen up to that point, suddenly emerged to interrupt the interview precisely when the subject turned to gold.

> **Luns:** I knew and most people knew that there was some gold there, but we thought of the gold as being of relatively small quantity and not easy to mine.

Poulgrain: Let me say that when Freeport made an analysis of the gold, they confirmed that the gold was fifteen grams per ton, which confirmed the 1949 report [a Dutch government report by Van Bemmelen which I had brought to the interview] and the report from 1936 [also brought to the interview]. Wouldn't you say that gold of this quality and quantity—fifteen grams per ton of ore when the ore is the largest outcrop ever discovered in the world—must have had a significant influence in the New Guinea dispute?
Luns: No, because if it had had any impact either the Indonesians or the Americans—[at this moment, Mr. Van Kampen entered the room]
Van Kampen: I happen to know something about gold. Even at that time it was very difficult to produce gold which was commercially marketable …. and moreover, I would add that this being an argument that generally in Holland would be a negative argument.
Luns: Counter productive.
Van Kampen: Counter productive.
Luns: Anything which smells of profit—
Van Kampen: I … I … Everybody would have *heard* about it if that argument would have been used.
Poulgrain: It could also have been a very good reason for the severity of the dispute, as it—
Luns & Van Kampen (together): Developed!

The vocal affirmation of Luns and Van Kampen together, just for an instant, seemed like they were jointly declaring the same ulterior motive that had driven the Dutch government's effort to keep control of the territory, and they fell silent for a few moments. Evident throughout the ninety-minute interview was Luns' dislike of President Sukarno, but in his final summary he left no doubt about the ultimate arbiter of Dutch sovereignty:

> The economic argument was no argument for the Dutch. The only argument was legal argument, arguments of the interests of the population, and of the principle of self-determination. Otherwise,

> the Dutch Houses (of parliament) would never have supported me. We finally gave up the territory when it became certain that the Americans would not give us the beginning of assistance.

After Freeport gained access to Dozy's Ertsberg, they steadfastly described the deposit as "copper, with silver, and some gold," and the export tonnages stated in the annual reports confirmed this deception. This also raises another question about concealment. While the initial prewar concealment had its own valid reason, this validity had expired decades ago. The true concentration of gold was known by two parties, Dutch officialdom and executives of NNGPM, so after Freeport mining began in 1972, what arrangement was made with the coterie of Dutch officialdom (involved in the initial concealment) to participate in long-term concealment?

Time Capsule

Dozy's heightened excitement at the time of the 1936 discovery was recorded in a small notebook he deposited, for posterity, in a zinc tin which he left in a cairn at the edge of the snowline. Given the importance of the discovery and the dangers of the return trip, leaving a time capsule is perfectly understandable. The descent down the main cliff face took three days, and any wrong move could have been disastrous. So Dozy penned a brief description of what the expedition had achieved, wrapped up his notebook in weather proof material, and placed it in a zinc tin, and then the three Dutchmen headed back to civilization. So he left behind written evidence about discovering a primary deposit of gold, and twenty-five years later this evidence became highly problematic. By the 1960s, Dozy's airtight information about the gold discovery (which still had not been publicly announced) had become highly strategic information.

In 1962, Freeport was concerned that the political preparation already invested in securing access to the Ertsberg gold deposit not be undone by a notebook left at the edge of the snowline in 1936. For Dozy, the ultimate irony of the time capsule was that so much now depended on his notebook *not* being found and made public, so a decision was made to retrieve the

time capsule. This was done in 1962, just as Indonesia was about to assume control of the territory, by organizing a new expedition to Carstensz led by Heinrich Harrer, aided by a group of New Zealand, Australian, and Dutch climbers. Dozy explained to me the rationale for the Harrer expedition (which was well funded) by claiming that the 1936 expedition had climbed one of three peaks at the summit, but bad weather had actually prevented them from climbing the highest peak.

Contrary to Dozy's on-the-spot explanation in his living room, in G. A. Mealey's account of the final ascent in 1936, inclement weather was not a factor at all when the trio reached the summit. Nor do photographs of the three alpinists at the summit support the claim of inclement weather. When the three Dutchmen set out at two o'clock in the morning of December 5, "the men set out under the light of the moon for the highest point in the Carstensz mountains…. They reached it in just five hours [and] Dozy's barometer read 5,030 meters."[40] This figure remained the accepted highest point until glacial melting reduced the ice level in recent decades, so perhaps Dozy (in telling me the story about Harrer) was more concerned *not* to convey the fact that one of Harrer's primary tasks in the 1962 expedition was to retrieve the notebook. Harrer was given the precise location of the cairn that Dozy had constructed in 1936 but took several hours to find it. He had to reorientate himself with the changed conditions on the mountain, following Dozy's footsteps twenty-six years before, because in the intervening years the snowline had retreated. Finally, he found the cairn, and inside the zinc tin was Dozy's notebook. According to his fellow climbers who informed me that Harrer had placed great importance on relocating the time capsule, he then kept it very much to himself. In Harrer's own account of retrieving Dozy's notebook, in the book he published on the 1962 expedition, Harrer commented enigmatically that the "pages were damp and stuck together but to strike gold could hardly have been more exciting."[41]

"Poverty of Natural Resources"

One individual who was in a position to know about the gold discovery was Pieter Gerbrandy, the former Dutch prime minister when the government was in wartime exile in London. In the 1950s Gerbrandy was a founding member of the Foundation for the Preservation of the Realm (Stichting Rijksbehoud) which, Arend Lijphart[42] says, "kept insisting on the economic wealth of West New Guinea in spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary." Lijphart, whether deliberately or through ignorance, was one of those who contributed to the concealment of the immense wealth of natural resources in Netherlands New Guinea and, by doing so, to the political consequences. It is Lijphart's guilt by omission that is overwhelmingly evident:

> The spectacular claims of wealth in gold and uranium have to be strongly discounted. There is no evidence that there is uranium …. Two natural resources that abound in West New Guinea …. are timber and a large reserve of hydraulic energy.

In the 1950s the Dutch people were still adjusting to the loss of the Netherlands East Indies. The Dutch parliament, in refusing to relinquish sovereignty of the New Guinea territory, was yet to gauge the full extent of opposition to a continued colonial presence. As the dispute with Indonesia gathered momentum, no mention of Dozy's discovery was made by either party in the dispute. President Sukarno's political priorities and other factors, not gold, were motivating his quest to oust the colonial Dutch presence from New Guinea. Dozy's gold discovery would only have detracted from the Dutch argument in the international arena for retaining the territory. Gerbrandy in the 1950s issued dire parliamentary warnings about losing the New Guinea territory. With all the resonance of a Dutch church bell across the land, tolling the same message (but without clear definition), he declared that "the natural resources of the territory should not be allowed to fall into the hands of the enemies of the West."[43]

Of course, Gerbrandy was not referring to the abundant forest and water resources of Papua, yet these were the only natural resources mentioned during the 1949–1962 dispute over sovereignty of the territory. During that

dispute, the Dutch government desperately tried to retain sovereignty of Netherlands New Guinea but made the mistake of seeing Indonesia, vociferous, visible, and very near, as the main opponent. The international bickering with Indonesia was merely the extraneous portion of the dispute.

A former Indonesian foreign minister (at the time of the Bandung Conference in 1955) was one of several Indonesian officials who explained to me that opposition to the Dutch stance also came from "American sources." During the course of several long talks I had with former Minister Sunario, he told me that funding, amounting to "millions of dollars from an American source,"[44] was secretly received by Indonesia to promote their claim in the sovereignty dispute. In the home of Sunario, there were several large cardboard boxes full of documents marked SECRET that obviously should have been deposited in the archives.

Political subterfuge at all levels was used to undermine the Dutch position, and part of this came from creditable academics who contributed a barrage of publications. In addition to the book by Lijphart, another such book was *The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem*, which emphasized its "poverty of natural resources."[45] The author, R. C. Bone, commented, "It continues to be the curious destiny of this deficit economy area to have its possession disputed for strategic, psychological and emotional reasons far removed from any concern with its basic intrinsic value."

Concealment

Shortly before the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands, a geological report with limited circulation published Dozy's results of the 1936 expedition. The delay of three years was far longer than normal for geological results to be published. So too was the choice of language, English rather than Dutch. This was totally new, totally out of the ordinary, and the only explanation Dozy offered was "scientifically, it was logical to do it in English." Dozy offered no further comment apart from "it is so historical that nobody takes much interest in this anymore." Because the use of English language in

Dozy's pre–World War II report provided an opportunity to disguise the unit of measurement, it could now be described as the beginning of the policy of concealment.

I had brought a copy of the original report with me to the interview and Dozy himself had a copy readily available. The actual title was: "Geological Results of the Carstensz Expedition 1936." As I read from the 1939 report, I could momentarily see the young man in Dozy desperately wanting to be back in the alpine meadow and glaciers of New Guinea, rather than in the Hague, in an armchair, in his mid-seventies: "The Ertsberg shows a black wall of ore with large green patches of malachite. There are gold-containing copper ores …"

With his forefinger resting on a photograph of the black mountain of ore that he discovered in 1936, Dozy looked at me and commented, "This is gone completely now." In less than a decade, Freeport had mined the entire outcrop and was now digging a giant hole in the earth to extract more of the same. "It was all ore," Dozy said, "the largest outcrop in the world…. The concentration of copper in the rock is the essential thing. All other large mines in the world have, in general, a lower copper content than this one. This one happens to have a pretty high copper content."

Freeport director and geologist Forbes Wilson, a friend of Dozy, had published an account of how Freeport came to mine the Ertsberg. The title he gave it was *The Conquest of Copper Mountain.*[46] Dozy showed me a copy of the book that Wilson had given him one year before. In Wilson's words, "Dozy had no inkling of it in 1936, but the Ertsberg later turned out to be the largest known above-ground copper deposit, 33 million tons of high-grade copper ore worth over a billion dollars at 1980 prices."[47] Had Forbes Wilson been even half honest with details about the gold potential of the Ertsberg, it would have cost the mining company considerably more in the set payments they were making to the Indonesian government. Forbes was even referring to the Grasberg when he said, "Below-ground copper deposits were recently discovered nearby that ultimately may turn out to have five or more times as much copper as the Ertsberg."

The Ertsberg ore, mined at 10,800 feet (3,300 meters) was carried in an aerial tramway spanning more than 1,600 yards (1.5 kilometers). From the concentrating mill at 8,800 feet, the copper-silver-gold was then pumped in slurry form through a pipeline for sixty-eight miles downhill to the southern coastline to be stockpiled and (in the 1980s) shipped to Japan and Germany. Before the Freeport mine commenced production, the copper content was estimated to be 2.5 percent, but the 1973 company report of the first year of business increased that estimate to 3.5 percent. The copper concentrates shipped abroad "averaged slightly more than 30 percent in contrast to the 26 percent originally contemplated."

Even this proved to be an understatement when the head of the Freeport office in Cairns provided further details in 1979. (From Cairns, the remote Freeport mine is serviced by sea, once every ten days, and by air several times a week.) The Cairns Freeport office manager revealed (in personal conversation with a close friend) that the average copper content was 5 percent (twice the original estimate) and the copper-slurry concentrate was in excess of 40 percent. When asked about the amount of gold, he replied discretely, "more than all the running costs … there's so much gold." This brief comment was regarded as a serious breach of security by the Freeport CEO (who found out a few months later), and the Cairns manager was instantly removed from his position of employment.

I brought Dozy's attention to the 1939 report that showed the copper content was high but also revealed (and here I read deliberately from the 1939 report) "the gold content may prove to be considerable." It was not so much the copper content as the gold that I wanted Dozy to confirm, so I continued reading from the report: "There are gold-containing copper ores…. Dr. C. Schouten investigated these ores, and the reader is referred to his article." W. J. Jong similarly provided a description of the rock samples. On page eighty-three there was a note of thanks to A. Gerzon-Caffé for proofreading the texts in English—a seemingly insignificant point yet one that was crucial in the concealment of the true concentration of gold at the Ertsberg, for there was an error in the vital unit of measurement. Grams and grains are abbreviated to *g* and *gr*, respectively, in English, but in Dutch the

abbreviation for grams is *gr*, which naturally reads as "grains" when the rest of the text is in English. Schouten and Jong thanked the person for assistance given in proofreading or translating, whereas Dozy apparently had written the original in English. In retrospect, we may only surmise that the error was deliberately inserted. It very effectively disguised the El Dorado aspect of the Ertsberg and, by doing so, greatly alleviated the political pressure on the Netherlands.

I wanted Dozy simply to confirm his own findings by reading the same report he published before World War II. I turned to the original 1939 publication and read, "The copper content appears to be high (0–40 percent) while the gold content might be rather considerable (0–15 gr. per ton)."

Dozy added, "Well, there is quite some gold in … in … [and he seemed to falter mid-sentence] … in the ore, indeed."

Pointing to "15 gr. per ton," I asked him his interpretation of this, and he replied without hesitation, "Fifteen grams per ton." He did not say fifteen *grains* per ton.

As it is the key to this misrepresentation that has gone on since 1939, I'll state it again. In English, fifteen grams is written as 15 g; in Dutch it is written as 15 gr. In English, fifteen grains is written as 15 gr.

In all but the final summary of Dozy's 1939 results, grams were correctly translated (*g*) and left no question as to the unit of measurement. The first and only time that *gr* was used instead of *g* was in the summary.

This was a simple but effective way of concealing the Ertsberg's gold potential as subsequently it was quoted ad infinitum as "15 grains."

There are approximately fifteen grains to one gram, so Dozy's results were, in effect, mistakenly stating the concentration of Ertsberg gold at only one gram per ton, when in reality the concentration of gold was fifteen grams per ton. For comparison, the Witwatersrand underground goldmine was 7.5 grams per ton and the richest in the world in 1936, so an outcrop twice as rich in remote New Guinea meant that Dozy had discovered an El Dorado.

Dozy told me that when Forbes Wilson visited the Ertsberg to check his original findings, he brought back "many more samples in order to appraise

this thing, to have an idea what it all amounted to. They came back and then they confirmed that what I had found was correct—*even that it was better than that*. However, I think it was then the Indonesians came in. Anyway, let's say the Dutch went out."

Dozy's sudden burst of enthusiasm here, before regaining his composure, suggests Wilson's sampling may have found that the concentration was even richer than first thought. We can say with assurance, however, that the seventy-five samples gathered by Forbes Wilson *before* the replacement of the Dutch administration by Indonesian rule confirmed the findings of Dozy's 1936 expedition.

In addition to this confirmation, the Dutch Government Geological Foundation (under G. Zijlstra as managing director until he died in a car accident in 1962) also noted that Wilson's analysis confirmed Dozy's original findings. The Foundation virtually ceased to function after the official Indonesian takeover on May 1, 1963, and the foundation report was delayed until 1966, by which time President Sukarno had been ousted. It noted that the South Pacific Copper Company (in which the East Borneo Company and Freeport Sulphur company participated) was granted a prospecting license until July 1963—two months *beyond* the official departure in May 1963 of Dutch colonial government—and noted also the copper and gold concentrations as 4 percent copper and "15 g Au/ton with some Ag"[48] (i.e., fifteen grams per ton gold with some silver.)

In any case, there was no confusion about grams and grains for the Geological Foundation, as Dozy was a member and Zijlstra was in charge. Funding was the main problem for the foundation during its brief few years' existence starting on June 28, 1956. European Economic Community funding did not become available until November 1960. So there was little more than one year available for the foundation to operate before the New York Agreement in August 1962 brought the Dutch presence in New Guinea to an ignominious end. Actually, even this one year was spent waiting for helicopters for transportation, and in June 1962, when the helicopters had finally been delivered and less than three months before the New York Agreement, the foundation was stopped from using the

helicopters because the manufacturing company discovered a construction fault in the rotor mast! With such interminable delay holding back Zijlstra at the reins of the Geological Foundation, it is easy to see how his persistence, a few years earlier, could have brought serious changes to both the mining and political arenas.

The grams-and-grains mistranslation error was just the start of concealment. While neither Dutch nor American interest in the Ertsberg waned, the reasoning behind the mistranslation was that it would provide the Netherlands additional time, as well as relieve the prewar political pressure from Germany and Japan. It is important to note that many Dutch companies operating in Indonesia in 1958–59, including oil and mining, aviation, shipping, banking, and plantations, were supporting the Indonesian claim in the sovereignty dispute because their business interests faced President Sukarno's threat of expropriation. More than $5 billion of Dutch investment was seized when Sukarno made his move. The Dutch Geological Foundation was on the opposite side of the sovereignty dispute to many Dutch mining companies. Those facing the wrath of Sukarno had effectively changed sides and were working together with American interests who were keen to end Dutch colonial rule in the territory.

Dozy's Neighbor and Family Friend

The Freeport explanation of how Forbes Wilson (from the Rockefeller company, Freeport Sulphur) found out about the Ertsberg reads like an excellent mining tale but lacks one important ingredient—the truth about what actually happened. Freeport officially became aware of the report in 1959. Any claim that Rockefeller interests or persons in the Dutch government were already aware of the correct version of Dozy's gold discovery merely highlights the concerted policy of concealment. Yet Freeport persistently claims they were not aware of the report before it was brought to their attention in 1959.

The concocted explanation is that after Fidel Castro took control of Cuba in 1958–59, Freeport Sulphur began searching further afield for new

nickel deposits when its Cuban refinery, the world's most advanced nickel refinery in Cuba, was taken over by a new manager, Che Guevara. Freeport linked up with a Dutch company called the East Borneo Company (OBM), whose directors were Jan van Gruisen and Theodore Bakker, after a similar fate of nationalization by President Sukarno of Indonesia. This twist of fate, according to Freeport's account, caused Forbes Wilson to link up again with a former workmate, Jan van Gruisen. And how did van Gruisen find Dozy's paper and bring it to the attention of Forbes Wilson?

All Freeport publications claim that Dozy's report on the Ertsberg was deposited in a library before the Nazi invasion and simply remained there "lost and forgotten" until an OBM representative chanced upon it in 1959. (Even NATO Secretary General Luns, during the early part of the interview, tried to claim that "many files got completely lost during the war.") Forbes Wilson's own account of how he first came in contact with Dozy is just a repeat of the widely circulated Freeport account that OBM chanced upon Dozy's report in the library.

Without adding an iota of credibility to the story about "finding by chance Dozy's lost paper," even George A. Mealey, former president and chief operating officer of Freeport, added more details, explaining that the OBM were looking for nickel prospects in Dutch New Guinea. Jan van Gruisen, a mining engineer, conducted a literature search and came upon Dozy's report. Van Gruisen had a mining friend from the United States whom he had known for years. They had even worked together on a couple of nickel projects, including one on Sulawesi. This friend was Forbes Wilson, then chief of exploration for Freeport Sulphur.[49]

If either Freeport Sulphur or OBM were serious about searching for nickel deposits, apart from the Pomalaa deposit at Sulawesi that earlier had attracted not only OBM and Freeport Sulphur but also Sumitomo Metal Mining Company, it would have gone straight to Gag Island in Netherlands New Guinea where General MacArthur's wartime engineers in NNG had found 10 percent of the world supply.

What Freeport never explains in its story is that the OBM director, Theodore Bakker, lived just around the corner from Jean Jacques Dozy.

Their families were close friends, and their children had grown up together. Dozy's wife told me this when I returned for the second interview. Apparently, as soon as I had left after my first visit, Dozy had immediately walked around to Bakker's house to tell him everything I had discussed about the Ertsberg. Dozy's wife had not been present during my first interview with her husband, but because he had become so agitated after I had left, she asked me (during a brief absence of her husband in the second interview) what things we had discussed in the first interview to cause her husband to become so agitated. The long-term family links between Bakker and Dozy meant that the Freeport explanation for finding Dozy's report from 1939 was utterly fabricated, completely untrue—or in plain language the Dutch would say "*onzin*." It has the same level of credibility as the official figures for gold output since mining operations began in 1972.

Toward the end of the second interview, I confronted Dozy with the other explanation for how OBM obtained his report, but he was clearly unwilling to discuss the matter and replied, "They found this article, the OBM, then took up a *vergunning* on it [mining permit] according to the Netherlands East Indies Mining law."

One very obvious reason for "finding" Dozy's paper in 1959 and taking out a mining permit in 1959 was to preclude the Dutch Geological Foundation from taking a permit on the Ertsberg, because funding for the foundation finally came through in 1960. So I asked Dozy why the OBM had waited so long—until 1959—before it made this move.

He replied:

> That is quite logical, that is quite logical. If you had been there, you would have noticed that this mine was located at an altitude of about 4000 m, 3800 m, let's say, in one of the most toughest areas to penetrate into without any proper infrastructure, no inhabitants, a lousy coast for shipping, shallow—well, for god sakes, you could at that time better have a treasure on the moon!

Because of its remoteness, the problem with mining the Ertsberg treasure seemed insurmountable in 1936, but three decades later, turboengine

helicopters made access much more possible. Nevertheless, the delay of three decades was not solely due to the difficulty of access; the silence that surrounded the Ertsberg was due more to a political curtain imposed jointly by those in government and in the mining industry who were competing to exploit this massive gold deposit.

Dozy outlined the steps to final exploitation with Freeport's Forbes Wilson at the helm:

> May 1960—then they really fly into the area with helicopters. They drilled the whole ore body through. They really sampled it well. From 1961 to 1966 nothing happened. [*This was the culmination of the sovereignty dispute, followed by the ousting of Sukarno.*] In June 1966, they go back to Indonesia and negotiate contracts, the new Foreign Investment Law in 1967. [*So soon after Suharto took power were the contracts signed in Jakarta, Forbes Wilson wrote that he could hear the sound of army tanks outside the building, during the hours of curfew, as the signing took place.*] And then they go back quickly to complete exploration in 1967–68. In 1969 they have a feasibility report by Bechtel-Pomeroy, who did it very well. They started really developing this thing in 1970…. It is unusually rich. And don't forget, it is right away at the surface. You can right away dig it out. They have a second ore body now [*Ertsberg East*] which is slightly richer, and bigger, and which they mine underground.

I drew attention to the remarkable discrepancy between the figures in the original reports and the figures Freeport say it has mined throughout the 1970s and '80s, up to the time of the interview.

The Freeport official figures for the concentration of gold and silver are given as .025 ounces of gold per ton and .265 ounces of silver per ton.[50] This gold concentration is equivalent to twelve grains of gold per ton.

In the 1979 *Mining Annual Review*, the Indonesian correspondent (Achmad Prijono) states the production figures for the previous year:

> Most of Indonesia's gold and silver, in fact, is produced as a by-product of the copper extraction of the Freeport Indonesia copper mine, Tembagapura, Irian jaya. No official production figures are reported but the average gold and silver content of the copper concentrate indicates some 2000 kg of gold and 26 tonnes of silver.

Forbes Wilson avoided stating outright any gold percentage figures but supplied production figures for the decade. He wrote:

> Between December 1972, when the first token shipment of 10,000 tons of copper concentrate left for Japan, and the end of 1980, the Ertsberg had produced nearly 23 million short tons of ore from which we had obtained 521,000 tons of copper, 6 million ounces of silver and 463,000 ounces of gold. These metals had a gross sales value in excess of $772 million.

From these figures, the gold-silver ratio of 1:13 contradicts the 2:1 ratio in the original analysis. Given this huge discrepancy, it is crucial to remind ourselves that Forbes Wilson's detailed sampling (more than two decades after the discovery of the Ertsberg) *more than confirmed* Dozy's original findings, so fifteen grams per ton is shockingly at odds with the Freeport figures, from the first decade of production.

Yet when the gold to silver 2:1 ratio is applied to the official Freeport silver concentration of .265 ounces of silver, then the corrected estimate of Freeport gold production resumes its original fifteen grams per ton.

This suggests that while the silver has not been removed from the slurry, gold has been removed before the slurry is pumped down the pipeline for export. Not all the gold, of course—but most of it! The gold left in the slurry was sufficient to make a gold concentration of 12 grains per ton—which is an amount one might reasonably expect if the *gr* in the original report was read as grains, but not as grams.

I wanted to draw Dozy's attention to the copper-gold mine in Papua New Guinea, the Ok Tedi mine, which is close to the border between PNG and Indonesian Papua. So I pointed out that at Ok Tedi the initial gold

mining stage had a capacity of 12,000 tonnes (metric tons) of ore a day, and in this copper mine, a gold concentration of 2.86 grams per tonne.

Compared to the Ertsberg, Dozy commented, “Ok Tedi was much less rich.”

“At 15 grams per ton, the Ertsberg is—as you said—‘unusually rich.’”

“Oh, forget those fifteen grams per ton,” Dozy said.

“But the Freeport figures [one to two grams rather than fifteen] are *so* different,” I replied. “There is such a discrepancy.”

“It is not a discrepancy. It is quite logical. You should never work with these figures. They are long outdated.”

“The observed gold properly must be called electrum,” I continued reading from the Report, “but the rather deep yellow color indicates that the silver content cannot be very high. Up to twice as much gold than silver, Au2Ag,” I repeated. “And now Freeport claims they mine thirteen times more silver than gold. Yet this report,” I reminded him, “says there is twice as much gold as silver—”

“But it isn’t, it is not. Oh yes, there is more gold than silver. They get some silver too. That is true. I forget now exactly how much…. There is possibly a discrepancy. But I would forget what is in there. It is outdated, old, just a few hazard samples.”

To which I reminded Dozy, “But they did come to the same conclusion as you did.”

“More or less, yeah. I don’t know how far they investigated it.”

“Put it this way,” I said. “If they came to a different conclusion either you or they were wrong.”

“One thing I am certain about—I was wrong. The rest I don’t know,” Dozy stated.

To which I replied: “But they came to the same conclusion as you did. So you were both right. The problem is the third group that came—Freeport, when the mining began—they described it differently.” Staring at us both was the conclusion that gold was being removed before the official figure was being stated.

“But the third group, they were the real chaps who could do it,” Dozy responded, pleased that Freeport had invested money and expertise to bring his 1936 discovery into production, although for decades this may have seemed unlikely because of the remote location.

“When they had this ‘discovery,’ fifteen grams per ton, it certainly would have influenced them,” I suggested.

“That is correct. It did interest them. Don’t forget, it is not the ore content—or rather, the gold content—which makes you decide to start a project or not, it is the economy.”

The other factor Dozy neglected to mention was politics. With the advent of turbine-engine helicopters in the 1960s, the reach of technology made development of the Ertsberg possible for Freeport, but not without the political reach of Allen Dulles.

Zijlstra was Killed

Some determined Dutch officials genuinely worked for development of Papua in order to benefit the local inhabitants, and wanted to pursue this approach, with or without help from the Americans. In the Dutch government Geological Foundation, G. Zijlstra was one such person who foresaw that exploitation of the Ertsberg could be of great benefit to the Papuan economy because of the gold-bearing copper ore. The foundation suffered from a chronic lack of finance and was beset by delays. For example, in 1958 the American company (Freeport) joined with a Dutch company (East Borneo Company) to gain a mining permit on the Ertsberg site. This effectively blocked access for others such as the foundation. After the sovereignty dispute was ended with the signing of the New York Agreement in August 1962, Indonesian control of the territory was to start officially in May 1963—just when the East Borneo/Freeport mining permit expired. So for the last five years of Dutch control of the territory, during which there was a concerted campaign from many quarters to wrest control of the territory from the Dutch, all access for mining or exploration in the Ertsberg area was blocked by the Freeport/East Borneo company.

Nevertheless, the United Nations still maintained a presence according to the New York Agreement, so Zijlstra announced he was going to continue mineral exploration after the departure of the Dutch colonial government, working through the Geological Foundation but acting under the authority of the United Nations. Furthermore, he intended to continue with the work of the foundation up to 1969 when the Papuans (as stipulated in the agreement) were to decide in an "act of free choice" whether to accept or reject continued Indonesian rule. In other words, the continued work of the foundation posed a distinct threat to the other party withholding information on New Guinea's natural resources during the sovereignty dispute. This late chance for Papua to construct a viable industry as part of an independent economy was ended by the sudden death of Zijlstra. Back in the Netherlands in 1962 with the intention of resuming in New Guinea in 1963, he and his wife attended a Christmas party—so Dozy told me—with some geologically minded associates. Returning home late in the evening after the party on November 23, 1962, Zijlstra and his wife were crossing the narrow road along the top of the Aufsluitdijk when a very large truck, heading south in the opposite direction, ran over the car, killing the driver but not the passenger.[51] His tragic death is but another example of how the history of New Guinea and Papuan people has been *prevented* at great collateral cost.

#

For those who were unaware of Dozy's gold discovery, Gerbrandy's plea in the 1950s not to let the territory fall into the hands of "the enemies of the West" seemed no more than emotive nationalism. Yet Gerbrandy's appeal for American help to maintain Dutch sovereignty, similar to the appeal by Foreign Minister Luns for a joint venture to exploit the gold deposit, could not have been more misdirected or misplaced because they both were, in effect, knocking on the door of Allen Dulles. NNGPM, which was the prewar employer of Dozy, was set in place by Allen Dulles. His awareness of the potential wealth of the Indies, and more specifically his role in ousting the Dutch from the territory of New Guinea, began before World

War II and continued post-war when Dulles' power was greatly enhanced as DCI and when Kennedy was president.

Chapter 3

DULLES, DE MOHRENSCHILDT, AND OIL

Kennedy gained some insight into the extent of DCI Dulles' covert operations in Indonesia when he requested a CIA briefing paper prior to President Sukarno's visit to Washington in 1961. He was shocked by six years of political interference and the funding of antigovernment revolt and assassination. It included special mention of the CIA pilot, Allen Lawrence Pope, apprehended by Indonesian authorities in 1958. He became a bargaining chip in the New Guinea dispute and was released at the same time as the New York Agreement in August 1962 when the Dutch relinquished sovereignty. Kennedy commented that Dulles' interference had cost the United States political credence in Indonesia and that *his* priority was how best to repair the damage to bilateral relations.

The sheer size of the operation Dulles mounted in 1958 was enough to convince any observer of the seriousness of CIA intentions. Tallied in dollars and ranked in cost of post-war operations, Indonesia was the next largest after Vietnam, according to the CIA logistical operator in the 1958 rebellion, Colonel Fletcher Prouty. In personal correspondence,[52] Prouty said that the "Indonesian campaign was the largest special operation the CIA endeavoured [to do], except for Vietnam." He said that Dulles had employed a vast number of operatives and utilized ships, planes, submarines, and even the Pacific Fleet. Most of the funding was on operations for the 1958 rebellion, but in addition there was funding for radical Muslims and for assassination attempts on President Sukarno. The CIA briefing paper admitted to having "identified assets" capable of

carrying out these attempts but denied further involvement. In other words (it goes without saying) they were unsuccessful. For example, on November 30, 1957, hand grenades were thrown at Sukarno in a school yard in Cikini, Central Jakarta. A Muslim extremist group known as Darul Islam was blamed.[53] Sukarno avoided injury at Cikini with only a second to spare when his aide-de-camp pushed the president to the ground and used his own body as a shield. He was promoted for displaying such physical and mental agility, but six schoolchildren and three policemen were killed, and more than a hundred people wounded.

Kennedy realized during his first year in office that much of the advice on Indonesia from DCI Dulles was premised on the belief that Sukarno's leadership was Indonesia's fatal flaw. Sukarno had to be stopped—according to Dulles's argument—because he permitted, if not promoted, communism. "Indonesia's growing vulnerability to communism stems from the distinctive bias of Sukarno's global orientation," Kennedy was advised in the CIA briefing paper.[54] However, Ambassador Jones knew Sukarno personally and had a different opinion. Following a note of congratulations that Sukarno sent Kennedy on his inauguration, Jones a few days later wrote a lengthy, optimistic telegram to the State Department:

> Sukarno is, after all, a warm, magnetic, responsive human being. A personal relationship between the two Presidents, once established, without question will lead to greater US impact on Sukarno's thinking and attitudes and could exert considerable influence on [the] course of events in Indonesia.[55]

Dulles was pursuing regime change primarily to gain unobstructed access to Indonesia's natural resources, whereas Kennedy's strategy was to maintain Sukarno as president. JFK's policy was part of a Southeast Asian regional approach premised on reducing, not increasing, the level of Cold War conflict. Putting a stop to the Malaysian confrontation (Konfrontasi), the period of conflict that started in 1963 between Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta, was an essential step for Kennedy, and this made his relationship with Sukarno and with Ambassador Jones crucial. At the same time, it made

Kennedy's relationship with Dulles untenable. While "the legend" was in office as DCI, his anti-Sukarno stance was just one of several ways (the glaring example was the Bay of Pigs) by which Dulles was in the process of determining, or endeavoring to determine, US policy. His contacts, his influence, and his experience were unmatched. Who else in the 1960s, having entered the intelligence corps a lifetime ago, had such hands-on experience that it could be said he monitored the pulse of the dying Hapsburg Empire? Even when Kennedy had ushered him out of office after only eleven months, Dulles still wielded influence, as succinctly summed up in the plaque later erected in the CIA headquarters in Langley. It is located in the entrance lobby and reads, "His monument is all around us," referring not just to the building he helped design (and never occupied) but also to the very country itself, the United States, which he also helped to design. A small plaque with a big statement, it was acknowledging the central role of Dulles in modern US intelligence from its inception, the extensive influence he exercised as a lifetime achievement, and the central role of intelligence in the modern United States—a role first pursued by Dulles' grandfather, John Foster, in the late nineteenth century.

Kennedy's well-known words on Allen Dulles (quoted by Schlesinger) now carry with them the eerie quality of an epitaph: "Dulles is a legendary figure, and it's hard to operate with legendary figures." When forced to resign, the "legend" surrounding Allen Dulles ensured he stayed in the political limelight, like a national celebrity with a continuing fan club, only in this case the celebrity was a veteran intelligence officer with various networks in which he was the linchpin. To appreciate just how far his networking had spread, it can be said that Dulles started as a prodigy in World War I, dealing with the end of old European empires and the redistribution of political power, and continued right into the 1960s.

Early Days

As a Princeton graduate, Allen joined the diplomatic service in May 1916 and remained with the State Department until September 1926 when he

joined his brother, John Foster, in Sullivan & Cromwell on Wall Street. Allen's first position in the diplomatic corps, just before the United States entered World War I on April 7, 1917, was in the intelligence section of the US embassy in Vienna. He had excelled in university studies, but this rapid appointment had more to do with his uncle, Robert Lansing, secretary of state, who was then in the process of establishing a Secret Service for the State Department, distinct from military intelligence.

In commenting on Allen Dulles' early service, Srodes mentions that

> an active intelligence sharing was going on between Lansing's fledgling intelligence department and the various British services even before the American entry into the conflict. More importantly, at this early episode Allen Dulles was introduced at a very young age [23 years old] to an extremely high level of sophisticated intelligence work. From the summer of 1916 through the next fifty-three years …[56]

Two incidents recounted here, while brief, go a long way to explaining the difficulty JFK encountered in dealing with "the legend," partly because both incidents occurred when Dulles was so young and partly because they give some idea of the shadowy underworld he was already starting to inhabit. The first incident occurred when Dulles was working in the US legation in Berne where he was transferred from Vienna once the United States entered the war. When a Czech girl employed at the legation was found to be passing information to the Germans, British intelligence showed Dulles the evidence and "insisted that she be handed over to them to be liquidated." Srodes adds, "According to the story, Dulles took her to dinner one night and then walked her to a location where he handed her over to two British agents; she disappeared forever."

A second incident shows how closely Dulles was involved in clandestine intelligence while working for Sullivan & Cromwell in Europe as its top lawyer for international business and finance. The actual incident was another abduction and murder, in 1930, but this time in Paris by the Soviet Secret Police. The victim, an émigré from the Russian Civil War,

was Lt. General Pavel Kutepov, the former deputy of General Pyotr Wrangel, who was one of four top commanders of the White Army defeated by the Bolshevik Red Army under Leon Trotsky. (Wrangel's name was more familiar in the West because his father, a famous Arctic explorer, had been the last Russian governor of Alaska before the territory was purchased from the czar. Place names today such as the Wrangel Mountains and Kotzebue Sound are reminiscent of former times.) After the Bolsheviks toppled the czar in October 1917, the White Army, with western support,[57] engaged in a series of horrendous clashes against the Red Army for two years, turning the former Russian empire into a battlefield with a death toll in the millions—from the Baltic in the West to Siberia in the East, and south to the Baku oil fields in Azerbijan. Wrangel, in the South, was the last of the White Army commanders to be defeated, and his surviving troops sought refuge in Turkey.

Dulles first met Wrangel and Kutepov in Turkey, the location of his diplomatic posting after the Paris peace negotiations. Allen and his wife Clover, whom he had married in Baltimore a month earlier, arrived in Constantinople on December 12, 1920. During the previous few weeks, 150,000 starving Russian refugees had also just arrived from across the Black Sea, two-thirds of them remnants of Wrangel's army. Refugee camps were spreading down the Gallipoli peninsula. Both Allen and his wife, who was involved in humanitarian assistance, became well acquainted with Kutepov. Dulles kept in contact throughout the next decade. During this time Wrangel died and Kutepov settled in Paris, as did fifty thousand other White Russians. Many nobles and rich families who had escaped the Bolsheviks moved initially to Germany but then, repulsed by post-war instability, were attracted by the cultural and historical links with France. In Paris, they even started two newspapers, one for daily news and another for the arts. Dulles, however, did more than just keep in contact—he became the financial link for Kutepov to maintain occasional acts of sabotage within the Soviet Union. Although Dulles in 1930 was an employee of Sullivan & Cromwell, he was often hired out to the State Department, so both of his employers might have contributed jointly to these clandestine

counter revolutionary operations. However, Stalin's Secret Police (then known as the OGPU)[58] were drawing the net tighter on saboteurs inside Russia by tracking down anticommunist leaders outside Russia, such as Kutepov, and their sources of funding. Paris was a center of operations in the same way that the Okhrana, the Russian secret police in the days of the czar, had used Paris as a base for foreign operations.

At the time of Kutepov's abduction, Dulles had just arrived by ship from New York to spend one year in the Paris office of Sullivan & Cromwell. The level of previous contact between Dulles and Kutepov strongly suggested they intended to meet in Paris, and the Soviet Secret Police—anticipating such a meeting—moved quickly in a preemptive strike. The abduction occurred on the very day Dulles arrived. A carload of Secret Police, one of them in a gendarme's uniform, snatched Kutepov as he was walking to church on Sunday morning, January 26, 1930. The incident caused an international furor with three thousand protesters outside the Soviet embassy. Dulles, however, remained on the periphery.

George de Mohrenschildt

The Kutepov incident highlighted the need for greater security with contacts, and this became a more refined part of Dulles' extraordinary talent in the world of intelligence. He developed an ability to maintain a viable contact for long periods, sometimes decades, without that link being open to public scrutiny. Some links[59] from the 1920s and '30s he used in the '60s. By maintaining his distance from the link, Dulles had the option of plausibly denying any personal influence. The mental dexterity and level of subterfuge in keeping a contact viable and reliable over a thirty-year period, in the world of Allen Dulles, almost defies the imagination! In this respect, the link between Allen Dulles and George de Mohrenschildt is an outstanding example—even more so because of the importance both persons played in the Warren Commission that was charged with investigating the assassination of President Kennedy and "all matters before and after, that are deemed … relevant."

Using his contacts, Allen Dulles conducted an intense lobbying campaign for himself to be included in the Warren Commission, before the actual request by President Johnson that he join. Thus “the legend” became the first of seven other members who joined Chief Justice Earl Warren in the commission. Dulles was highly influential in the process of reaching the official conclusion that President Kennedy’s assassination was the work of one person, Lee Harvey Oswald. Of the 418 witnesses questioned by the commission, one of the longest was the interview of George de Mohrenschildt in Washington, April 1964. The counsel for the commission was Albert E. Jenner.

At various points of the transcript, the questions and answers read like a cat-and-mouse game. When de Mohrenschildt was evasive, Jenner let him run but sooner or later would return to the point. Never quite sure how much information his questioner already had, de Mohrenschildt sometimes added more detail to a previous question. An example of this was the time spent as an oil “roustabout,” when Jenner seemed unaware or unwilling to explore the decisive influence it had. By returning to a point that Jenner had passed over for its apparent insignificance, and adding something extra of no importance anyway, de Mohrenschildt was trying to indicate his willingness to answer more fully all the questions being put to him. He was uniquely qualified as a witness, Jenner explained, because he was acquainted with both the Kennedy family and the family of Lee Harvey Oswald and because he had admitted to having contact with persons in intelligence. The links that George de Mohrenschildt had with both families were discussed at length, but not the links with Allen Dulles. Even though Jenner’s questioning more than once peeled back history to provide the historical context where there was evidence linking Dulles and de Mohrenschildt, it was never explored.

De Mohrenschildt himself later admitted that he felt threatened during the Warren Commission hearings because Allen Dulles, as a member of the commission, was present when Jenner was asking the questions. During the 1964 hearings when George de Mohrenschildt had wanted to appear open and honest in his answers, for fear of being implicated in the assassination,

he declared to Jenner, “I don’t mind, frankly, when you don’t have anything to hide, you see, you are not afraid of anything.” Nevertheless, he did keep some significant details hidden from his questioner, but these were oil related and linked with Allen Dulles and did not, at the time, seem related to the investigation.

Yet thirteen years later he was far more open. In a book he had written, entitled *I’m a Patsy*,[60] written after Allen Dulles had passed away in 1969, de Mohrenschildt described Dulles’ presence at the 1964 hearings, saying that “Dulles … did not interfere in the proceedings but was there as a distant threat.” George de Mohrenschildt is not suggesting Allen Dulles would have disrupted the questioning had he disliked the answers; rather, he is saying that his answers were compliant, and Dulles’ presence, not just during the questioning, made sure they remained compliant. In 1964, the testimony given by de Mohrenschildt became part of the conclusion the commission reached, but in his manuscript de Mohrenschildt disagreed with the outcome of the Warren Commission, which simply blamed Oswald. This was a Dulles-directed conclusion. In effect, de Mohrenschildt’s book was challenging Dulles’ influence on the commission, and on him. So he was asked as a witness again, this time by the United States House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) which, in 1977, was reexamining the death of Kennedy.

Before the HSCA declared its findings, de Mohrenschildt had already written his manuscript stating that the Warren Commission was wrong about Oswald. Two journalists contacted him. One was the Dutch journalist Willem Oltmans, the other was Edward Jay Epstein, who was interviewing George de Mohrenschildt for *Reader’s Digest* magazine on March 27, 1977, just when the HSCA requested he appear as a witness. Epstein noted that de Mohrenschildt now said he had “done favors” for the CIA, in return for business favors and opportunities for his own oil business, but that he’d never been on the CIA staff or on the payroll. Who knows what he might have admitted as a witness before the HSCA? On this point, Dulles’ own words to Walter Lippman, even though uttered many years earlier, never did ring truer: “The mere disclosure that a particular person is working for us

may destroy an entire operation." Dulles and Lippmann (writer, political commentator, and journalist) both started in intelligence during WWI, but in the 1950s their friendship foundered on the issues of covert political action and the role of intelligence in a democracy.[61]

On the afternoon of March 29, 1977, George de Mohrenschildt apparently shot himself. Dutch journalist Willem Oltmans (whom I interviewed in the Netherlands 1978–79) had known him personally. They had travelled to the Netherlands together. Oltmans always regarded his death as murder, not suicide, to prevent his evidence being heard by the HSCA—and so did de Mohrenschildt's wife.

#

Both George de Mohrenschildt and his wife, Jeanne, were Russian émigrés, children at the time of the Bolshevik revolution. In 1962, they were living in Dallas as part of a Russian community of about five hundred émigrés, drawn together by their culture, anticommunism, and employment in the oil industry. In the 1940s and '50s, George had established his reputation as a consulting petroleum geologist, having started in the oil industry in 1941 as a "roughneck or roustabout," so he explained to Jenner.

In 1962, George and Jeanne de Mohrenschildt "befriended" Lee Harvey Oswald and his Russian wife, Marina. Because the mere name "Lee Harvey Oswald" can evoke so strong a response as the alleged assassin, I should say that the following details on Oswald are included only to set the scene for the involvement of George de Mohrenschildt. Oswald, as a nineteen-year-old Marine, had worked in Japan on a CIA base that handled high-tech U-2 spy planes. In October 1959, he defected to the Soviet Union, living in Minsk, which was a city that George used to know as a teenager. Jenner accepted this as a reason for how George de Mohrenschildt came to know Lee Harvey Oswald without showing clearly that their meeting may have involved some arrangement by the CIA and might be described as one of the favors done for which George was paid, not in cash, but in reciprocal business opportunities. Lee Harvey Oswald married Marina in April 1961 but then returned to the United States with his Russian wife. Oswald

experienced none of the hassles one might have expected after defecting to the other side during the Cold War, then returning home. George and Jeanne de Mohrenschildt first met Lee and Marina when the Oswalds were living in Fort Worth, and later they moved to Dallas, which had better prospects for employment. Lee had not finished high school but was a self-taught radical whose political views did not blend with the Russian community in Dallas, such as his approval of JFK's civil-rights stance. He was fluent in the Russian language, spoken and written, after only two years, and had read many of the well-known Russian novelists. Yet in an unguarded moment in an answer to Jenner, de Mohrenschildt described Lee as a "hillbilly." Jenner was looking for an intelligence link behind the initial befriending of Oswald, but the revelation about the "favors" was not revealed until the interview with Epstein in 1977.

Quite apart from the fact that in November 1963 de Mohrenschildt was in Haiti, a decade later he was still pleading his innocence of any prior involvement in the assassination through his befriending Oswald. George was in the right place at the right time to be tasked with befriending Oswald and his wife, Marina, after they had returned to the United States. Only later did George seem to realize how his befriending of Oswald in 1962–63 implicated him as an accessory, and how Allen Dulles was willing to use him as a pawn, as was Lee Harvey Oswald.

Before de Mohrenschildt went to work in Haiti, a party was arranged in Dallas around Easter 1963 by two of his friends who were Standard Oil employees, as were most of the party guests.[62] It was clear to Jenner, and de Mohrenschildt agreed, the real purpose of the party was to allow others to meet and befriend Oswald and Marina. The Warren Commission transcript revealed that Oswald was on the point of starting a new job in another part of Dallas when, as a result of the party, a job was arranged for him in the Texas School Book Depository, the building from which he allegedly shot the president. This was arranged six weeks before the assassination. Allen Dulles was in Dallas five weeks before the assassination. He had been invited to talk at the Dallas Council on World Affairs (of which George de Mohrenschildt was a member). According to Srodes, Dulles "joked in

private" about the timing of this talk, as if it might later be seen as linking him in some way with the assassination. Dismissing this visit to Dallas as mere coincidence was, of course, a natural assumption by all of Dulles' associates because he was beyond reproach as the icon of US intelligence. His own jocular referral to the possibility of being involved in the assassination is surprisingly like a subconscious admission of the animosity between him and JFK. This was well known, as was Dulles' sense of humor, so his presence in Dallas in that crucial timeframe before the assassination must have seemed a balanced explanation at the time. Nevertheless, if the Warren Commission had been informed about Dulles' link with de Mohrenschildt over several decades, such a link may well have led to his disqualification as a member and, instead, his inclusion as a witness. Yet the Dulles legend won the day and he was appointed to the role of grand inquisitor, giving him (in the now-haunting words of JFK on the day he dismissed Dulles) an "almost unique role."

Prewar Oil Was the Link

The link between Allen Dulles and George de Mohrenschildt began four decades earlier, so we need to turn the timeframe back again to Constantinople in 1920–21, where Dulles, twenty-seven years old, was appointed first secretary:

> His orders were to work on getting a peace treaty signed with the Turks, to help American oil interests (particularly Rockefeller's Standard Oil) to secure concessions held by the Turkish National Oil Company. He was also to keep watch on the Russian border with Persia and Turkey.[63]

Rockefeller oil interests in the Russian empire were in jeopardy after the Bolshevik takeover. The most productive oil fields were at Baku on the shores of the Caspian Sea, in Azerbaijan, relatively close to Constantinople. Baku had long been a source of wealth for the Russian royal family, generating a throng of local oil magnates, and by the start of the twentieth

century more than half the world's supply came from Baku. Pitted against Rockefeller were two European industrialist families, the Rothschilds (one of Europe's most prominent Jewish families) and the Nobel brothers. As well, Henri Deterding, the head of Royal Dutch Shell in the Netherlands East Indies, appeared in Baku in 1913. From his oil rivalry with Rockefeller in the Far East, Deterding had grown stronger after staving off Standard Oil takeover attempts.

The time was propitious for some big oil deals. Rothschilds, in exchange for their Baku holdings, became one of the largest single shareholders in Royal Dutch Shell (along with Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands, then the richest woman in the world). Similarly, even as Red and White Armies clashed, Standard Oil increased its holdings by adding half of the Nobel oil interests in Baku. Both Deterding and Rockefeller were gambling that the czar would retain power; they transplanted their old rivalry from the Indies to a new location at Baku. After control of Baku changed from Turkish troops to British, Standard Oil (then) Vice President Walter C. Teagle had purchased half of Nobel's holdings in Branobel Oil, Russia's largest oil company. The purchase had started in 1919 but continued even after April 1920 when the Bolsheviks took Baku and nationalized the oil fields. Rockefeller and Teagle still regarded the Russian Revolution as a temporary setback.

Allen Dulles' task of lobbying for Standard Oil involved negotiations with the director of Nobel interests in Russia, Baron Sergius Alexander von Mohrenschildt. Born in Russia, of German and Swedish ancestry (the inherited royal title from Queen Christina of Sweden, 1633–54), Baron Sergius was one of a few special appointees responsible for mobilizing the czar's army. This important role further highlights the fact that oil discussions with Dulles were inseparable from strategic military concerns, and neither had promising prospects despite western support for the czar, at that time numbering a quarter of a million men.

Working in Baku with Sergius was his older brother in an executive position, and living with Sergius in Baku was his wife and ten-year old son, George, born in 1911—the same person who befriended Lee Harvey

Oswald in 1962–63. George's brother Dimitri, eleven years older, was already in the Russian Navy. Dimitri emigrated to the United States in 1920, escaping with his life[64] during the course of the revolution. Sergius too was arrested but, before being transported to Siberia, he escaped to Poland with his wife and son George. They stayed on a family estate (as George later described to the Warren Commission), which was "a wooded area of Poland, right on the border [with Russia], maybe 5,000 or 6,000 acres…. So we were not completely penniless refugees." George's mother died soon after they arrived in Poland.

After completing school at eighteen years of age, George volunteered to join the Polish cavalry for eighteen months at "a famous military academy … where the Polish nobility displayed their ability to ride horseback." Endeavoring to get the record straight, or perhaps with a touch of arrogance, he added, "And I was the best, if I may say so." It was mid-1930 (not 1931, the date Jenner had offered) when George went to Belgium for university study, just after the furor in Paris caused by the abduction of Kutepov. Stalin's Secret Police were then headed by V. R. Menzhinsky, a former member of the Polish nobility who had lived in the United States, Belgium, and France. At first, George studied in Antwerp "in one of the oldest commercial institutions of higher learning … founded by Napoleon." There he did four years of study, and each year he visited his father in Poland. Sergius was well known among the émigré community (and no doubt by Menzhinsky too) as a former appointee of the czar and one who had mobilized the army. Personal security was an abiding concern for Russian émigrés during the 1930s. It is well known that Trotsky was murdered in Mexico in 1940 but less well-known that many of his family, including his son, were murdered in Paris in the late 1930s. This was the time of the terror under Stalin when millions of Russians were liquidated inside the Soviet Union. Beyond Europe, the Russian Revolution spread an émigré diaspora far and wide—to China, Canada, the United States, South America, and Australia.

One can understand how George and his father, more than most émigrés, must have held a lingering fear about Menzhinsky, not knowing

whether he'd ever attempt to recapture Sergius to serve the prison sentence in Siberia he had so narrowly escaped. While George was studying, he also set up a business selling ski clothes and sports clothes, which involved traveling. "Did you then travel through Europe?" Jenner asked, and de Mohrenschildt replied that he did. Of course, Paris had a ready market with émigré customers who knew Sergius, but this was just a preliminary job before 1938 when he too emigrated to the United States where he changed the *von* in his surname so it became *de Mohrenschildt*. He would have had little trouble gaining entry to the United States because one of his early ancestors, as Jenner pointed out, was born "somewhere in Pennsylvania." More than that, he was "a lieutenant or captain in the American Army of Independence," and then went back to Europe and died there.

So Dulles and de Mohrenschildt each had a forebear involved in the same historic struggle against the Redcoats, and now the Reds were the common enemy again as both Dulles and de Mohrenschildt were twentieth century, archetypal anticommunists. Once in the United States, it soon became apparent how George's study in Antwerp (in finance and maritime transportation) and then Liege (where he wrote a dissertation dealing with the effect of the United States on the economy of South America) had prepared him for employment. As he told Jenner, "Well, then … having had that background of the oil industry in my blood, because my father was the director of Nobel Enterprises … I decided to come and try to work for an oil company."

When we look more closely at George's employment in the oil industry in the 1940s and '50s, and how it was linked with Allen Dulles, it raises the possibility that a helping hand was given earlier by Dulles, during the 1930s. At the same time as George was completing his university studies and running a sports business with the help of his girlfriend, Allen Dulles was based in Paris. As the Sullivan & Cromwell representative in Europe, he also became a director, or established a close association with the board of directors, of some German banks and companies such as Schroeders and IG Farben, which had American subsidiaries. During the decade before World War II, Dulles was establishing many such contacts, which he

utilized during the war for intelligence purposes. In the 1930s, when George de Mohrenschildt was in Antwerp and Liege, Dulles was building his networks. He was already in the process of constructing the foundations of "the legend." Between 1928 and 1936, Dulles went to many parts of Europe for numerous international conferences such as Naval Disarmament, Arms Limitation, or business-legal conferences. His roles remained interchangeable between the State Department and Sullivan & Cromwell, still the front desk of Standard Oil. John Foster Dulles was now running the Wall Street legal firm.

Allen Dulles often travelled from Paris to London or Geneva, or to Berlin or Budapest. In Paris, which was only a few hours' travel from where George was staying, Allen frequently went to "a kitschy Montmartre bistro, the Scheherazade, a favourite haunt for the Russian noblefolk."[65] When Allen and Clover with three children stayed in Paris for a year, from May 1930, Grose comments that "Allen would often take Clover or other companions" to the Scheherazade, and years later he was still in the habit of visiting the same bistro and mixing with the Russian émigré community. Because of the rapport he had established in the 1920s with some of the leading Russians in the White Army such as Wrangel, Kutepov, and Sergius von Mohrenschildt, Dulles had credibility with the Russian émigré community in Paris. While Dulles was listening to Cossack songs in the Scheherazade, he was also cultivating friendships. Although there is no documented or photographic evidence of any meeting at the Scheherazade between Allen Dulles and George de Mohrenschildt, it certainly provided an excellent opportunity for this to occur.

Another Russian émigré Dulles befriended was (Count) Paul de Kotzebue, who had served as an officer in the czar's imperial guard before the revolution. Two previous generations of his family line had attained the rank of general in the Russian Army. While living as an émigré in Paris in 1934, Kotzebue was officially bestowed with Russian nobility as a count. He was fifty years of age and still single, but a year or so later, in March 1936 in Geneva, he was married to Allene Tew, the richest woman in the United States, and two years later emigrated to live with his wife. The count

and countess arrived at Palm Beach on January 12, 1938. For eleven years until 1953, he was president of the Russian Nobility Association, founded in New York City two decades earlier.

The uncle of Count Kotzebue had been the Russian ambassador in Washington when Allen's grandfather, John W. Foster, was secretary of state. Previously, Foster had been the US ambassador in czarist Russia, based in St. Petersberg.[66] With Count Kotzebue's family background and his former position in the czar's Imperial Guard, he would have known the person responsible for mobilizing the czar's army: Sergius von Mohrenschildt. Furthermore, as a result of émigrés establishing their own networks after the Russian Revolution, Count Paul de Kotzebue would have known that both Sergius and George were among those who had managed to escape. Allen Dulles was well placed to make these connections. Even the Paris residence where he and Clover were staying was in close proximity, several hundred meters, to the residence of Kotzebue.

Allene Tew

In the period leading up to war in Europe in 1939, Allen Dulles carried out the business of Sullivan & Cromwell. In addition to Standard Oil, he was the European representative of a host of worldwide companies such as the US subsidiary of IG Farben and General Electric.

Colonel Fletcher Prouty commented on this German link:

> The Sullivan & Cromwell offices had the major US legal contacts in Germany during Hitler's period. We couldn't say they were essentially pro-Nazi, but they didn't close their offices in Germany until well after the start of World War II. The fact that they were still there during the war became quite an embarrassment to the US government. To think that here we were, very anti-Hitler, anti-Axis, and yet this major US law firm was still operating there. This law firm was in a sense dominated by these Dulles brothers whose idea of international affairs and international business was shaped by the law firm's clientele and by their own global activities.

One of Standard Oil's main goals, as shown by the constant proposals for oil-exploration permits since World War I, was to gain access to the East Indies and especially the untouched territory of Netherlands New Guinea. Within a decade of Allen Dulles' joining Sullivan & Cromwell, he had successfully secured Dutch agreement for NNGPM, the 60-40 US-Dutch company, to begin oil exploration in New Guinea. Before World War I, Standard Oil of New Jersey had wanted concessions in Sumatra, but the Dutch did not want to let in Rockefeller. Even when Jersey established a Dutch company, NKPM, the Dutch continued to shun all applications until 1928 "thus ending Jersey's battle of a third of a century to obtain direct grants of concession in the Dutch East Indies."[67]

Seven years later, Dulles' NNGPM deal was even better for Standard Oil. Although it had a Dutch name, it was not a Dutch company. The key to achieving this had been Dulles' political intelligence, but rather than rest on his laurels, he began to work on various ways of achieving unfettered access for Standard Oil into the Indies. Dutch authority throughout the archipelago had become culturally embedded, to various degrees, over three centuries. One result of this long colonial presence was that official Dutch representatives in the Indies were comparatively few in number. Yet even small villages in Java celebrated official Dutch occasions, such as the Queen's birthday, or a special occasion such as the marriage of Princess Juliana. [68] Official announcements were heralded by the blast of a trumpet from a Dutchman on horseback. The message in Dutch, read out by another in a magnificently plumed hat, served to remind all that ultimate colonial authority emanated from a faraway place called Den Haag (the Hague).

Dulles' expertise on monarchy and regime change had begun with his very first appointment in the State Department. A decade and a half later, he was still dealing with European empires and monarchical power, now focusing on the Netherland East Indies. He fully appreciated how power was equated with royalty and, more important, how a change in ruler can effectively achieve a quick and effective transformation of power.

Dulles' network included Allene Tew—or rather, Countess Kotzebue—especially in the 1936–38 period when she was still in Paris, before she and

her husband moved to the United States and bought the residence of Vincent Astor on nine acres at Newport, Rhode Island, in October 1940. Allene Tew's wealth came mostly from her third husband, who had been a top executive in General Electric,[69] then in the top level of the world's largest companies (as it still is today). Sullivan & Cromwell had been an integral part of General Electric since its inception half a century earlier. In addition, Allene Tew's fourth marriage, 1929–35, (which ended in divorce) highlighted an aspect of Dutch politics that coincided with Dulles' specialized area of interest. Her former husband, Prince Heinrich XXXIII Reuss (who was related to the German husband of Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands) was, for a time, considered heir to the Dutch throne. Only after eight difficult years that included several miscarriages and a still birth was Wilhelmina's first and only child born, Juliana, who became the heir apparent. She replaced Heinrich as the person in line to become the next Dutch monarch.

A generation later, however, a young German prince named Bernhard from the region of Lippe-Biesterfeld reawakened the possibility of marrying into the Dutch throne. After World War I, Bernhard was living with his parents near the Polish border, the family fortune lost and their title the only remaining vestige of the former claim they had to dynastic privilege. After completing language studies at Berlin's Humboldt University, with a special interest in state affairs and politics, Prince Bernhard briefly went to England in 1935, the year after his father died, then began working for IG Farben. By the following year, in the Paris office in Avenue Hoche, he was the secretary to the board of directors that was headed by Dr. Willibald Passarge.

As a distant relative of Kotzebue (husband number five of Allene Tew), Bernhard became the relative-in-residence of the newly-married couple and was virtually adopted by Countess Allene, now sixty-four years of age. For whatever reason, she treated him as her son. Bernhard was twenty-five years old, the same age as Allene Tew's first son when he was killed as a pilot in WWI by one of Germany's top air aces. Bernhard had distant family connections with Allene Tew's fourth husband, Prince Heinrich, who also

was linked with Lippe-Biesterfeld, so her role could be described as a distant aunt. Whether she saw her role as aunt or mother, her wealth permitted Bernhard on his fixed salary to live the life of a playboy. His age, his good looks, and the fact that Bernhard had already been trained as a pilot, which seemed to complete his role as the lost son, all contributed to Allene Tew's willingness to lavish money on him. When Dr. Passarge expressed admiration for a state-of-the-art Mercedes Benz belonging to the King of Spain, Bernhard purchased it (with Allene Tew's money) and then arranged an exchange for the Chrysler that Passarge used in Paris. While it might have seemed as though the prince from a nearly forgotten corner of Germany had aspirations above himself, this level of social extravagance helped only to promote Bernhard's eligibility in terms of the woman he was soon destined to meet—Juliana, daughter of Wilhelmina.

As Sullivan & Cromwell's representative of IG Farben operations in the United States, Allen Dulles was directly linked with IG Farben's Paris-based operations. Whether Dulles' acquaintance with Prince Bernhard was through his own links with IG Farben or through Count Kotzebue and Allene Tew, the link between the two strengthened as World War II grew nearer. It was a strange coincidence that (until the birth of Princess Juliana) Allene Tew's former husband was first in line for the Dutch throne, and now she was the surrogate mother for Prince Bernhard, who was to marry that same Dutch princess!

Juliana and Bernhard were first brought together by means of an arranged meeting that occurred at the Winter Olympics of 1936 (February 6–16 in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany). Despite reports at the time that the person responsible for this match making was either Ambassador Loudon from the Dutch Embassy in Paris or the director of IG Farben in Paris, the person who really was in a prime position to arrange such a meeting was Allen Dulles in Paris. Juliana and Bernhard were married in January 1937, and Allene Tew was the godmother of their first child, Beatrix.

"Vichy Viceroy"

The emergence of Bernhard on the political stage at this time needs to be seen in the context of the proposal that he should be "Viceroy of the Netherlands East Indies." This never came about but can be seen as a moment in Indies history whereby Allen Dulles attempted what now is termed "regime change."

Anticolonialism in the Indies had been forcefully subdued in the 1920s, and in the '30s the colonial authorities had exiled the prominent Indonesian nationalists to remote parts of the archipelago. Sukarno was sent to Flores and then Bengkulu on the southwest coast of Sumatra; Hatta and Sjahrir went to the Boven Digoel camp in Netherlands New Guinea for one year and then to the small island of Bandaneira. As well as this internal pressure on the authorities to implement change, there was also external pressure in the 1930s from Germany and then Japan. The respective governments in both countries expressed strong interest in Netherlands New Guinea.

The significant development that occurred in 1935, in direct response to the Japanese, was when Allen Dulles secured Dutch agreement for NNGPM to begin oil exploration immediately. While helping to assuage Dutch concerns over their inability to assert sovereignty of the territory when faced with unauthorized incursion by Japanese oil exploration, the deal with Dulles was like letting in a wolf to act as guard dog; it was only a matter of time before it attacked the owner. Although the Dutch had already granted smaller leases to a Japanese company to harvest forest products, in February 28, 1937, the Japanese Diet (Parliament) openly discussed leasing the New Guinea territory in its entirety. Had news about the gold discovery by Jean Jacques Dozy somehow leaked further than NNGPM? The Japanese, whether deliberately or inadvertently, highlighted the Dutch claim to sovereignty as fragile and specious, at a time when actual control over the vast territory was minimal.

There were two important American expeditions into Netherlands New Guinea, one in 1937-38 and the other in 1938. In the first, the Denison-Crockett ornithological expedition, Sidney Dillon Ripley was the zoologist. During the early war years, he worked with Allen Dulles in the Rockefeller

Centre in British Security Coordination. During the war he was in the OSS in charge of intelligence in the New Guinea-Indonesia region.

The other expedition, in 1938, was led by Richard Archbold, grandson of a former president of Standard Oil. He had visited the eastern half of the island twice before attempting the western half, which was totally unknown territory. The US Navy provided the most modern PBY Catalina flying boat available, and this allowed exploration of the West New Guinea highlands by landing on various large lakes. Archbold described the landscape and people from the Dani tribe in an idyllic setting, dubbing it "Shangri-La." Papuan men, women, and children worked "acres of highly cultivated fields" until mid-afternoon.[70] When the women returned to the village to cook, the men took care of the children, washing them in the river and providing several hours of school, before returning to the village for the evening meal.[71] Sponsorship for the expedition was by the American Museum of Natural History with prominent names such as Aldrich, Bunker, Ellsworth, Morgan, and Rockefeller (the latter having already gained entry to the territory through NNGPM).

Apart from the Japanese and American interest, there was a long-standing German interest in Netherlands New Guinea. This was reactivated on September 26, 1936, by a leasehold enquiry that involved a close friend of Dulles. The US ambassador to Berlin, William E. Dodd, noted in his diary that he had discussed a German lease over Netherlands New Guinea with Hjalmar Schacht, the German economist who was Hitler's minister of economics and president of the Reichsbank. Dodd neglected to mention, or was not aware of, the close link between Schacht and Allen Dulles (and his brother John Foster), which had existed since the Versailles Treaty. When Dulles had spoken with Adolf Hitler in April 1933, Schacht, as the key financial advisor for the Third Reich, was one of the German banking friends whom Dulles had also visited while in Berlin.[72]

Still focusing on Netherlands New Guinea, Dulles had influence in a UK-based group known as the Cliveden Set, which was formed around the wealthy Astor family, the British wing of the same American family of which Vincent Astor was a prominent member. The Cliveden Set, the name

coming from their country residence, was well represented in the British parliament and strongly in favor of appeasing Hitler's demands by offering him colonial territory. The Netherlands East Indies and parts thereof were specifically mentioned. In February 1938 the British Foreign Secretary and former Viceroy of India Edward Wood (also known as Lord Halifax) expressed support for the German claim to Netherlands New Guinea. Closely allied with the Cliveden Set, Wood had just returned from visiting Hitler and Goering. Prince Bernhard too had met with Hitler after his engagement to Princess Juliana, which placed the German prince in a position of extraordinary power in relation to the Netherlands East Indies. The Indies contained all the resources Hitler declared the new Reich needed, and similarly, for the Japanese, the Indies oil production was then eight times the volume of Japan's annual usage—and increased oil for Japan was of strategic importance to supply its imperial army, at war in China.

Pro-Nazi political sentiment in the Indies was rapidly gaining popularity in the immediate prewar period. The possibility that this new political force would soon have sufficient power to take control of the Indies government was given a distinct boost by the marriage of Bernhard and Juliana. An enormous diamond was given as a wedding present from "the people of the Indies." It was Governor-General B.C. de Jonge who organized the gift. Eighteen months earlier the same governor-general had welcomed Anton Mussert, leader of the Dutch National Socialists, the pro-Nazi party in the Netherlands known as the NSB. Mussert's visit to the Indies received not one but two official welcomes, which made de Jonge's political sympathy clear to all. He and Mussert wanted to clamp down further on Indonesian nationalism, and so did the Dutch and German business community of the Indies. The actual strength of pro-Nazi support in the Indies can be judged by a 1940 Australian intelligence report.[73] It was written when war with Japan seemed inevitable because the US embargo on oil exports jeopardized Japan's strategic position in the war in China. The report noted that the government in Batavia considered the likelihood of a coup d'état by pro-Nazi supporters an even greater threat than the impending Japanese move

southward.[74] This possible coup was nipped in the bud as soon as Germany invaded the Netherlands on May 10, 1940. The Australian Government Commission in the Netherlands East Indies reported that four thousand Nazi followers, mainly Dutch National Socialists, had been interned. Lt. Colonel Chapman of Australian Military Intelligence explained that a coup was prevented only because Dutch security took swift action as soon as they received news of the German invasion, before the Nazi followers in the Indies had time to act.

This brief period in the Indies when the NSB was strong enough to seize power has largely been forgotten because war soon began in the Pacific, effectively marking the end of 350 years of Dutch presence in the archipelago. Dulles was monitoring events as they occurred, sometimes making them occur, in contact with the political and military hierarchy in Germany, Japan, and the United States. Compared with Dulles' activities during and after the war, his activities before the war have not been so well documented. His role leading up to World War II has a notable lack of transparency, particularly his association with Prince Bernhard before and after the marriage to Juliana.

It was during this time before the war, or before Nazi Germany occupied the Netherlands, that a proposal to make Bernhard viceroy of the Indies was floated. Yet some Dutch researchers[75] claim it was after the war that Bernhard sought American assistance, Dulles in particular, as part of an ambitious plan to become viceroy of the Indies. This needs closer inspection because it could have been achieved before the war, but not after the war, and certainly not after the struggle for Indonesian independence, as such a role then would have been utterly incongruous. Bernhard's covert backing of anti-Indonesian activities after the war may have become entangled (as far as he was concerned) in a renewed viceroy proposal, but from the American perspective his plan was never going to happen.

His viceroyship before the war was a distinct possibility only because pro-Nazi sentiment in the Indies was so strong. Any "supporting documentation" for a post-war viceroy for *all* the Indies must be regarded with extreme scepticism; in the post-war context, this was utterly

impracticable and contrary to the American stance demanding decolonization. Even if the viceroy suggestion was referring to the (former) pro-Dutch region of Maluku, bordering New Guinea, it was still utterly impracticable. Bernhard's subsequent role in the Bilderberg group, set up in 1954 and focused on ending Dutch sovereignty of Netherlands New Guinea, suggests there may have been a wilier strategy behind the viceroy episode that Dulles disowned.

Only months after the Netherlands transferred sovereignty of the Indies in December 1949, Indonesia changed its initial format, which was a federation, into a unitary state. There was adverse reaction in the Republic of South Maluku, which wanted to secede, and this led to armed rebellion. The rebels there mistakenly believed they had the support of Prince Bernhard not because of his aspirations to be viceroy but because he offered the rebels weapons. It seems more a case of one thing leading to another. Arms were supplied by Allen Dulles, of course, coming from the nearby Philippines and transported via NNG. So-called support for the rebellion was a political ruse: as soon as the weapons arrived, US sources informed Jakarta. The reaction from Sukarno was to curse the remaining Dutch colonial presence in West New Guinea, giving the decade-long campaign a kick-start, and the loss of lives in the Republic of South Maluku was to no avail.[76] From the British perspective, as recorded in the archives, this incident involving Prince Bernhard "greatly influenced Indonesian claims to West New Guinea."[77]

Had Bernhard's aspiration to become viceroy of the Indies proceeded before the war, rather than after the war, it would definitely have had a chance of success—that is, if the alleged plan to be viceroy has any legitimacy at all. Dulles may well have been grooming him for that purpose. Replacing the Dutch colonial government in the Indies with a viceroy would have been a coup for Standard Oil, making the Indies the Dutch equivalent of the Vichy regime in French Indochina or French Morocco. This would have opened the Indies not only to Standard Oil but also to Japan and Germany, thus avoiding war in the Pacific but utterly changing the political profile of the Southwest Pacific.

The problem is the scenario that never occurred involved Allen Dulles as much as the scenario that did occur. This gives some idea of the extraordinary person we are dealing with here. Once Hitler's armies invaded the Soviet Union, President Roosevelt's priority was for the United States to enter the war or else be confronted by one or other of the victors of the Hitler-Stalin conflict. Allen Dulles (and John Foster Dulles even more so) became conspicuous in the late 1930s for continuing to channel American investment into German industry. In 1941 this resulted in the US Justice Department launching a court case in which John Foster Dulles defended Standard Oil and the American subsidiary of IG Farben for cartel practices. Falling just short of "dealing with the enemy," the fine was only $50,000.[78] In the legal challenge mounted, it became known that Allen Dulles had arranged for Vichy France to import oil from Standard Oil, effectively selling oil to Germany when at war with America's European allies. As this case also involved George de Mohrenschildt, as far back as World War II, it highlights Allen Dulles' duplicitous role in the Warren Commission.

Jenner Questions George

George de Mohrenschildt and Prince Bernhard were the same age, both had claims to noble lineage in the European tradition, and both were readily influenced by Dulles' world experience and access to power. Prewar, George still considered himself in exile, a scion of Russian and Polish nobility. The surname was held in high esteem by the émigrés in Paris and by Dulles, and also in Washington where the name "Mohrenschildt" was respected in diplomatic circles. As an indication of how well known the name was, the *New York Times* (May 16, 1917) described the wedding in Washington of George's uncle Ferdinand, who was second secretary of the Russian embassy, as one of the weddings of the year. He married into the family of the secretary of the treasury: the bride was Miss Nona McAdoo, a nursing sister who had worked in frontline hospitals in France and Belgium.

President and Mrs. Wilson attended, as well as the vice president and Secretary of State Lansing, who was Allen Dulles' uncle.

By 1938 Allen Dulles' prewar contacts were already extensive, and George's personable nature and multiple skills were a valuable addition—fluency in ten or so languages (including Flemish or Dutch, which is spoken in Belgium in addition to French), self-disciplined from his experience in the Polish cavalry as well as postgraduate study, and with natural verve for the oil industry. George de Mohrenschildt was an ideal candidate for recruitment by Dulles. This pre-dated any involvement of de Mohrenschildt with the CIA (which George admitted only years after Dulles' death). This was recruitment into the world of oil intelligence, the same as Dulles himself was involved when he first met George's father, Sergius, in Baku.

After arriving in New York in 1938, George de Mohrenschildt lived for a while there with his brother, Dimitri, at 750 Park Avenue. His first job was selling perfume, as George explained to Jenner in the Warren Commission hearings[79]:

> **Mr. de Mohrenschildt:** I think as soon as I arrived we went to spend the summer on Long Island, Belport, Long Island.
> **Mr. Jenner:** And at Belport, you made what acquaintances?
> **Mr de Mohrenschildt:** Lots of people, but especially Mrs. Bouvier.
> **Mr. Jenner:** Who is Mrs. Bouvier?
> **Mr. de Mohrenschildt:** Mrs. Bouvier is Jacqueline Kennedy's mother, also her father and her whole family. She was in the process of getting a divorce from her husband. I met him also. We were very close friends … we still see each other, occasionally—Mrs. Auchinloss[80]—and occasionally correspond …. Well, then, I realized there was no future selling perfume … and I decided to come and try to work for an oil company.

It was through Standard Oil that a link existed between Dulles and de Mohrenschildt, and this should have been brought to the attention of the Warren Commission; but of course, with Dulles playing so prominent a role it was unlikely it would be made public. During World War II, there were

two examples of de Mohrenschildt's involvement with oil and intelligence, and a third example in the 1957–58 period when his work involved a stint in Yugoslavia. At this time, he was representing the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), and Jenner was fully aware of the role of the ICA in the Cold War. Established in 1955 with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and DCI Dulles both directly involved, it was responsible for all US foreign assistance programs except military assistance and refugees. Its activities were sometimes indistinguishable from intelligence activities, and this is precisely what concerned Jenner. A letter from Allen Dulles to ICA Director John B. Hollister in December 1955 illustrates Jenner's concern. It clearly records (a year before de Mohrenschildt joined the ICA, so it does not refer to him) that a person on the CIA staff was included in the ICA. In the letter, DCI Dulles wrote that he was "willing to release [here the CIA staffer's name was censored] on a reimbursable detail to the International Cooperation Administration for a period of approximately two years. This decision is made with the understanding that [name redacted again] will return to this Agency upon completion of his temporary tour of duty with your organization."[81]

Jenner prefaced his question to de Mohrenschildt with a deliberate choice of words: "In your 1957 venture—as an agent of the International Cooperation Administration." And to the question "Tell us what ICA is," de Mohrenschildt replied, "International Cooperation Administration here in Washington … wanted an oil and gas specialist to go to Yugoslavia." He denied he was an intelligence agent, but he did admit he was shot at when he was in Yugoslavia. In 1958 his work there involved arranging Yugoslav oil workers for a job in Egypt using American equipment. Similarly, in the next country where de Mohrenschildt worked, which was Mexico, he said he was "competing with the Russians." He was ideally suited for this Cold War activity, being a Russian anticommunist, but to admit to being politically involved in any way, or an agent, would have implicated him, and any intelligence group he was linked with, in the Kennedy assassination.

In the second example of employment in the oil industry, George de Mohrenschildt admitted to Jenner that he had been linked with French intelligence in the United States, "but never an official member of it." George was employed by the oil company, Humble Oil, that was working together with French intelligence, so technically what George said was correct. For this job, it was not only his language ability that helped. He was ideally qualified as a result of his study in Antwerp. He was involved in buying and transporting oil from Baytown, Texas, to Casablanca in French Morocco, before the United States entered the war. Here was a link with Allen Dulles, Standard's top international lawyer, but it escaped detection by Jenner, perhaps because Allen had taken care to maintain his distance. At that time, the part of France and its territories[82] not directly under Nazi military control was known as Vichy France, and the French intelligence in which George de Mohrenschildt worked was Vichy. Until the British Navy intervened on May 21, 1941, Standard Oil and Vichy were helping to supply the German war machine: "Nothing can conceal the fact," announced the *Mercury* newspaper one day later, "that Vichy has become Hitler's willing tool," and the *Spectator* declared, "Vichy is now completely subservient to Hitler."[83] The oil tanker *Scheherazade*—by coincidence, the same name as the Parisian bistro used by Dulles as a meeting place—was stopped by a British cruiser in the Atlantic and brought to Bermuda where it stayed for a month before being rerouted to Dakar.

Standard Oil director William Teagle and Standard's lawyer, Allen Dulles, were both involved, working together with George de Mohrenschildt and Pierre Fraiss, the French intelligence agent. De Mohrenschildt admitted to Jenner that Fraiss was the "chief of export of (the) Schumaker & Company connection with the French Intelligence in the United States." Teagle took the brunt of accusations that Standard Oil was "trading with the enemy"—not that the United States was at war with Germany yet, but of the American ships torpedoed accidentally by German submarines, not one was a Standard tanker. Accusations were flung at Allen Dulles too, because of his continuing links with Schroeder Bank and IG Farben (but, by 1945 when his German contacts had proved so useful in

wartime intelligence, such controversy merely added to "the legend.") After the *Scheherazade* incident, de Mohrenschildt was followed by FBI agents, and later, he explained to Jenner, his car was stopped by the FBI, which accused him of being "a German spy." Because of this, he was even deported back to the United States from Mexico.

"If we didn't have a sad story to discuss, the death of the president, you could laugh about some of the activity of the FBI," he commented to Jenner.

What George does not explain, or Jenner does not pursue, is how George—after being personally involved in the Vichy oil-tanker scandal—avoided court proceedings. George's father was then living in Germany, and George himself still used a Polish passport (and Hitler had already taken half of Poland), so George's involvement with Vichy was bound to attract adverse publicity. His high-profile family background would only exacerbate the problem for Standard Oil. Working with Vichy intelligence, in George's case, would easily be construed as working for the Nazis, so George de Mohrenschildt, despite his many attributes, suddenly became a weak link in Standard Oil's defense against any charge of dealing with the enemy. Moreover, at this precarious stage of the war when FDR was unofficially siding with the British, still eight months or so before Pearl Harbor, an adverse court decision might have imposed restrictions on Standard Oil when the United States was on the verge of entering the war. Supplying oil for the American civil war, it should be remembered, was how the Rockefeller empire began.

George de Mohrenschildt's very presence would have been regarded as incriminating evidence in such a court case, and the cost for Standard Oil of an adverse decision would have been incalculable. George needed to go into hiding to avoid being accused of collaboration with the Germans or working in the United States as a German spy. The fail-safe response for Standard Oil to avoid a catastrophe in court was for George temporarily to leave the United States. His disappearance for "three of four months" is explained in Warren Commission transcripts as the period when he worked as a "roughneck or roustabout" on the Louisiana oil fields. "I worked in

Terebonne Parish, on a rig," he stated. George may well have worked at this location for a short time to familiarize himself with the machinery but effectively he disappeared. Had he remained in the United States, he might have jeopardized Standard Oil's court case, so a decision was probably made by the company rather than by George himself. There is calculated confusion in the Warren Commission transcripts at this point, mixing up the start of war in 1939 and the start of war in 1941, as George reappeared just before the Pacific war started, whereas his first arrival had been just before war started in Europe.

Just when George needed to disappear, Humble Oil was providing an oil-exploration team to be subcontracted by NNGPM—the company Allen Dulles had set up five years earlier to work in Netherlands New Guinea. Because of their joint involvement in the Vichy oil-tanker scandal centered on Humble Oil, a Standard Oil subsidiary, Dulles himself may have been the one to suggest that de Mohrenschildt could temporarily vacate the United States and go oil-drilling. Humble's chief geologist, Morgan J. Davis, had previous experience "with a Jersey affiliate in the Dutch East Indies," so it was possible that he too suggested the Indies as a place for de Mohrenschildt to work.[84] Oil drilling was "in the blood," George told Jenner. George's eight years in Belgium and his skill in languages had given him fluency in Dutch, which he would need in this location. George always kept his Polish passport with a reentry permit to the United States. Avoiding adverse publicity about his role in selling oil to Vichy France was the main priority, so for George a three-month oil-drilling adventure in remote Netherlands New Guinea would have been a timely and strategic exit. While circumstantial evidence suggests George temporarily departed from the United States, documentary or photographic evidence in the form of a ticket on the trans-Pacific clipper, or name on the passenger list, remains unavailable, but this was how he would have gone to the oil fields in NNG. From San Francisco across the Pacific to Manila, and from there to Babo oil headquarters in NNG, was one week's travel.

George de Mohrenschildt explained to Jenner how the oil-drilling job involved "lifting pipes, cleaning machinery"—the pipes were steel stems,

connected one by one, after pressuring or drilling into the earth.[85] Jenner commented on the physical strength needed for such work, and de Mohrenschildt was "six foot one, and weighed about 180 [pounds]." It was, he said to Jenner, "a very well-paid job, but very tough." De Mohrenschildt was given a $10,000 bonus when he returned, which was said to have been an inheritance. This bonus and the return airfare, in terms of today's dollar value, is the equivalent of $200,000. Moreover, he became a long-term friend of Mr. Blaffer, who was the chairman of the board of Humble Oil. What did George do, or what did he find in Terebonne Parish—in terms of oil—that warranted this exceptional treatment? The real question, of course, is what was discovered in NNG.

Without saying it was anything more than just a well-paid job, George explained to Jenner that he was with Humble Oil for "three or four months" until he was stricken with amoebic dysentery and returned to the United States. Upon his return, apparently still seeking anonymity or perhaps a completely different landscape after the equatorial excess of the New Guinea jungle, the first job he applied for "after my experience with Humble Oil Company" was polo instructor at the Arizona Desert School. He went to Mexico for nine months and then resurfaced in New York to get married. Jenner reminded him of the date: "on the 16th of June 1943." De Mohrenschildt had a string of marriages and divorces until he met Jeanne Fomenko in 1956. He replied: "The dates of my marriages are very vague now in my mind." Officers from the Immigration and Naturalization Service finally caught up with him in February 1945. He was interviewed several times, but the war was nearly over, and the court case was in the past, and George had friends in high places. After his brief stint with Humble Oil, he used the $10,000 to complete a two-year master's degree in Petroleum Geology at the University of Texas, finishing his study just as the war ended. He explained to Jenner that he was inspired to do this study from his experience with Humble Oil. He was on a first-name basis with the vice president and other top executives of Humble—for example, Prescott Bush, who held a major interest in the company and whose lawyer was Allen Dulles.

There is no doubt George's family connections and his study in Belgium had helped him in the first place, and the coincidence that he was born the same year that Humble Oil first began as a company seemed to augur well for his future. More than this, it seems that George had amazingly good luck. In his brief period of employment in oil-drilling with Humble Oil, George de Mohrenschildt was instrumental in the discovery of a highly productive oil well in Netherlands New Guinea. At twenty-six thousand barrels per day, it was the largest single well ever discovered in Southeast Asia, and the record still stands today.

De Mohrenschildt achieved instant fame among his geological peers in the world of oil exploration, but the discovery itself remained unannounced—a repetition of the Ertsberg gold discovery. The oil that was discovered in 1941 was not announced because war in the Pacific was imminent. As I will explain, however, there was official evidence that oil *was* discovered. Up to 1949, when sovereignty of the Indies was relinquished, it still was not announced. After 1949, when the Dutch colonial government retained the New Guinea territory, it still remained unannounced—because oil of this quality and quantity would have helped the colonial government in the territory to entrench its hold on the territory. And when the Dutch were forced to relinquish sovereignty of NNG in 1962, it still remained "undiscovered." Only when Suharto came to power was the same oil field "rediscovered."

Utter secrecy was required when George de Mohrenschildt was giving evidence before the Warren Commission in April 1964. At this time, Netherlands New Guinea was already under Indonesian control. Most Dutch citizens had returned to the Netherlands, some to Australia and others to Papua New Guinea, the eastern portion of New Guinea still under Australian control. In 1964, troops from the Indonesian army had moved into the former Dutch territory and were in the process of stripping the hospitals, government buildings, wharves, and some private dwellings—even bicycles were taken away. Anything of value was being removed, unscrewed or ripped out and then sent back to Java like the spoils of war. A rubber plantation that had been planted to provide income for the local

Papuan people was completely destroyed. The oil found in 1941, however, was not yet being exploited. NNGPM had exited from the territory, leaving its former concession area and the "undiscovered" oil field lying dormant.

President Sukarno had officially arrived in the territory on May 1, 1963, and had then allocated an oil area—unbeknownst to him it was precisely the area where the "nonproductive" 1941 exploration had been conducted—to the Indonesian oil company, Permigan. Permigan was under the control of the Indonesian Communist Party. The army had an oil company, Permina, under General Ibnu Sutowo, and the Indonesian government oil company was called Pertamin. (Present-day Pertamina comes from the latter two joining forces.) The PKI did not learn of the existence of the oil field in the concession given them by Sukarno. Neither the PKI nor Sukarno was aware of the "unannounced oil field." Had de Mohrenschildt mentioned it in the evidence he gave in 1964, they most certainly would have learned of the oil. By this silence, the PKI were denied the economic benefit of this huge windfall that (when it was developed a few years later) proved to be a multi-million-dollar-a-day bonanza.[86]

The PKI undoubtedly would have set about exploiting the oil field, had it ascertained its existence; so, de Mohrenschildt's silence was actually an issue of strategic importance to avoid public disclosure. April 1964 was still eighteen months before the mass killing of the PKI that occurred after September 30, 1965. Although George de Mohrenschildt was largely unaware of Indonesia—he was busy in Haiti—he was tight-lipped with Jenner about his venture with Humble Oil, and for more than two decades already he'd have grown accustomed to the secrecy surrounding the 1941 oil discovery. No doubt, Dulles had forewarned de Mohrenschildt of the political implications that depended on his remaining silent, but this would have been pitched as being quite removed from the Kennedy investigation —when, of course, it was not. We should remind ourselves that JFK's intervention in 1962 in the New Guinea sovereignty dispute had largely been on information from the CIA—from DCI Dulles—that the territory did not contain any worthwhile deposits of oil or minerals. Yet the Japanese, as confirmed by Nishijima who told me during my interview with

him in Tokyo in 1983, had already taken steps to ensure the PKI did not gain control over a highly productive oil field in former Netherlands New Guinea.

Dulles wanted George to maintain his silence about the oil of 1941 for two reasons—the oil information was part of the strategic planning for regime change in Indonesia, and Dulles also needed to maintain his distance from de Mohrenschildt in the Warren Commission Hearings. To achieve the second aim, he needed only to inform George that providing details about 1941 would effectively provide millions of dollars in funding for the Indonesian communist party. George himself would have regarded his oil-drilling escapade in 1941 as far removed from the 1964 investigation into the assassination of President Kennedy. The entire focus of the Kennedy investigation would have shifted had the commission become aware of the forty-year link between Allen Dulles and de Mohrenschildt.

Oil

The 1952 report to the United Nations, prepared under the direction of Dutch Foreign Minister Luns who took sole responsibility for New Guinea matters up to the 1962–63 climax of events—indeed, up to 1969 when Indonesia officially took control of the territory—stated that the future of the territory depended on revenue from oil: "It is the extraction of petroleum on which emphasis is laid for the economic structure of the country."[87]

Crude-oil exports from Netherlands New Guinea in 1952, from oil wells that were discovered before the war and brought on stream after the war, reached a total of 8.6 million Netherlands Guilders (NLG). Oil comprised three-quarters of the territory's exports that year, along with some native produce and scrap-iron left over from the war. The importance of the "undiscovered" oil field as a political determinant in the future of the New Guinea territory can be calculated in terms of the revenue it would have contributed at the price of oil in 1952—more than four times the revenue from the two producing postwar wells, Klamono and Mogoi-Wasian![88] Had

this “undiscovered” oil field been made available, rather than concealed, the total oil revenue would have provided much-needed capital and transformed the sovereignty dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands. The Dutch had suffered an unprecedented sea disaster in January 1953 when the North Sea broke into land protected by dykes—more than 1,800 persons drowned, 10 percent of all Dutch farmland was covered by seawater, and the damage was calculated in billions of dollars.

Neither Kennedy nor Sukarno was informed about the presence of this large oil field in Netherlands New Guinea. From Sukarno’s point of view—even though he unwittingly handed the oil field to the PKI in 1963—it played no part in his argument why Indonesia should be given sovereignty of the western half of the island of New Guinea. When oil production in the territory declined alarmingly in the 1950s, it disadvantaged not just the Dutch colonial government but also the Papuan people. The declining oil production further detracted from any argument that a viable economy was possible, so independence for the indigenous inhabitants of West New Guinea was scarcely considered until the sovereignty dispute was all but sealed as a Cold War settlement.

Soon after Luns delivered his UN report, output from the known oil fields began to decline rapidly. Combined with the continued “nondiscovery” of the 1941 oil field, the oil decline led to a lack of revenue and seriously hampered the Dutch government plans to develop the territory in the 1950s. After the devastation of the Japanese occupation in New Guinea and then General Douglas MacArthur’s three major battles to retake the territory, the housing, health, and educational improvements in the main urban centers seemed immense. Hospitals and wharves were built, but the handful of urban centers still had no roads and bridges linking them—indeed, this problem is far from resolved even today. Most of all, the lack of funding severely restricted further mineral exploration. The decline in oil production was a symptom of the political malaise afflicting the Dutch colonial presence in the territory, but this only became obvious later, after the Dutch had departed from the territory, when the oil production from the

same location rose again after the temporary decline, reaching and at times exceeding the previous output.

NNGPM, the oil company on which Foreign Minister Luns so publicly pinned his hopes as the economic savior of the territory, was a Standard Oil company operating under a Dutch name; but even the Dutch oil interests that held 40 percent interest in NNGPM were complicit in the sudden depletion in oil output in the 1950s and in the failure to proceed with exploitation of the 1941 discovery. Many large Dutch companies operating in Indonesia supported the Indonesian claim to the territory because they feared—and their concern was well founded—that their assets might one day be seized by Jakarta to force the issue. Company directors such as Paul Rijkens of Unilever, who were attempting to apply pressure on the Dutch government to accede to Indonesian wishes by relinquishing sovereignty of the New Guinea territory, began meeting together in 1954 under the leadership of Prince Bernhard. Known as the Bilderberg group, the annual meetings started by this group expanded in later years to become a who's who of the business world.

From an initial oil concession that was three times the area of the Netherlands, NNGPM needed to identify the most promising oil sites in the vast New Guinea territory, within a period of ten years. Then another concession would be granted for forty years to cover the most promising areas. From the start, there were indications of oil in the Vogelkop (the bird's head at the western tip of mainland New Guinea). Geological reports were to have been submitted to the Dutch government, but none was put at their disposal before Europe erupted into war. Then, when the separation of New Guinea from the Indies began to fester politically after 1949, the delay in submitting the first report continued until 1962, in the final months of Dutch colonial administration in New Guinea. A letter, dated January 19, 1962, and addressed to the Dutch minister of Internal Affairs from the NNGPM management, was included with the first comprehensive report by NNGPM in nearly three decades. The level of duplicity in this letter has had far-reaching implications:

Your Excellency,

In the course of its exploration activities the petroleum industry accumulates a great deal of geological knowledge. Such knowledge is regarded as a valuable commercial asset in the highly competitive sphere of this industry, because sooner or later it may form the basis of far-reaching decisions.

Once full use has been made of the information acquired there is seldom a valid reason for withholding from the public such of it as may be of scientific value. It is of course a great disappointment that the results of the work performed have eliminated any reasonable chance of discovering oil in considerable quantities.[89]

Humble Oil

As soon as NNGPM was formed in 1935, the concession area was photo-geologically mapped, a process that was 90 percent complete by the end of 1936. The aerial surveying was done initially by three planes from the Royal Netherlands Indies Airways under the guidance of W. Schermerhorn, then the leading world figure in this science. The ground surveying was done by Geophysical and the exploration drilling by Humble Oil & Refining Company, on a contract basis. Humble, the largest of the Texan producers, had been purchased secretly by Standard New Jersey sixteen years earlier. News of any discoveries that were made thus stayed "within the family," for both exploration and production were under the one roof.

Reported oil seeps at Klamono in the Vogelkop resulted in drilling there less than a year after the concession was signed. Oil was struck almost immediately. Two other seepages first located by a Dutch geologist in 1924 led to the discoveries in 1939 and 1941 at Mogoi and Wasian. The quality of this oil was unprecedented in terms of lightness and Sulphur-free content, an advantage calculated in terms of savings in refinery costs. It was an auspicious beginning. Further westward, adjacent to the deep-water Sele Strait, where another Dutch expedition in 1920 had found more oil seepages, was the locality known as Sele, where NNGPM had conducted

exploration shortly before the Japanese invasion. It was at this most westerly point of New Guinea the presence of an oil field was revealed, far larger than either Klamono or Mogoi-Wasian. It was this oil field that would remain untapped, "undiscovered," until the early 1970s. From 1938 to mid-1941, there had been twenty-nine geologists engaged in oil exploration in the territory, but, with war in the Pacific imminent, only two remained: G. F. Th. van Lingen (who died during the war) and R. F. G. R. Gheyselinck (who died in 1956).[90] Both were persistent in the search for oil around the far western reaches of the Vogelkop in the area known as the Sele region. All supplies for this prewar exploration at Sele were shipped from Babo to Kasim, a natural deepwater port. Humble Oil constructed a nine-mile road inland from Kasim.

Along this road two holes were drilled, Sele 1 and 2, otherwise known as Sele 39 and Sele 40, respectively. After thirty-eight preparation holes, Sele 39 was drilled to three thousand meters, a record depth at that stage of New Guinea exploration. War was imminent, and Sele 39 was to have been the last concerted effort before the storm broke in the Pacific. The enthusiasm at that time was demonstrated by the record attempt. Evidence favored a strike, but the oil proved elusive. However, at this time geologists began to leave because the Japanese army had already moved into the southern portion of (Vichy) French Indochina and was ideally positioned to advance southward. Only van Lingen and Gheyselinck remained. (The latter left in October, the former stayed until the Japanese arrived, and he was killed, as were 90 percent of the Dutch inhabitants of New Guinea.)

The second hole, Sele 40, was about halfway back along the road to Kasim, five miles inland from a deepwater port. It struck oil at 1,256 meters. Unlike the previous hole, it had no geophysical preparation and no well-velocity survey.[91] There was none of the scientific help to determine the location of the hole, as in the case of Sele 39. Sele 40 seems to have been more on impulse; it might have been sited simply on the intuition of the roustabout who was conducting the drilling, George de Mohrenschildt. It was a wildcat discovery, the same as the famous Spindletop gusher that had started the oil business in Texas at the turn of the century; Sele 40 was a

quarter of the size, but still a big discovery! Having lived in oil areas as a child, George might have recognized a faint odor of oil in the area where the decision was made to start drilling Sele 40, or physically detected seepages in the ground, as occurred in the discovery of both the Klamono and Mogoi-Wasian oil fields. Oil seeps had been attracting geologists to the Vogelkop since the 1920s. As George spent only three or four months as a roustabout, his arrival would have been after Sele 39 was drilled, possibly when the drilling gear was being transported back along the road to Kasim. Sele 40 was drilled outside the seismic profile that determined the drilling location for its predecessor—but this only added to George's subsequent fame. Whatever the reason for choosing the site, it was a bonanza, but officially, Sele 40 was described as unsuccessful. Closer scrutiny (see the included map) of Sele 40 reveals that its location coincided with the Kasim-Jaya discovery in 1972–73, the hole that created a Southeast Asian output record of twenty-six thousand barrels per day.

During World War II, despite the political decision that was made to conceal the 1941 discovery, both the Japanese and the Americans—or their respective wartime armies—provided evidence that oil in significant quantity existed at the Sele 40 location.

The Japanese Account

The main objective in the early stage of the Japanese military advance southward was to capture oil production areas intact. Oil technicians supplied the war machine. The Tarakan and Balikpapan refineries in Borneo were taken on January 12 and January 23, 1942, and Japanese parachutists took Palembang in South Sumatra on February 15. The NNGPM headquarters at Babo was first bombed in December 1941. In accordance with an agreement between the Japanese Army and Navy made one week before Pearl Harbor, the Navy was allotted control of West New Guinea, "to be retained in future for the benefit of the empire."[92]

Rear Admiral Maeda was in charge of West New Guinea. Working alongside Maeda were two political-intelligence officers, and they assisted

Sukarno, Hatta, and a school of Indonesian nationalists prepare for independence. Seconded into Japanese naval intelligence before the war, they had worked underground in the Netherlands East Indies in contact with Indonesian nationalists. Both officers were highly skilled. One was Yoshizumi Tomegoro, who died during the Indonesian war of independence. The other, whom I interviewed in Tokyo, was Nishijima Shigetada.[93] Japanese troops landed in strength along the northern coastline of Netherlands New Guinea, but vast swamplands along the southern coastline prevented similar landings any further east than Kokonao. The front line in the south was said to be along the Eilanden River, where a fifteen-mile-wide estuary separated the Japanese from Australian forces on the eastern side. In reality there was no front line, as either side engaged in constant patrolling and occasional skirmishes. The stronghold of the Dutch and Australian forces was the coastal town of Merauke, which four decades earlier had been established with three hundred Dutch soldiers, four gunboats and a general store as well as a butchery, bakery, and hotel built by the Australian company, Burns Philp, from nearby Papua New Guinea. In 1942, the Japanese did not proceed with any development in the south of the territory other than an airstrip built on the Mimika coastline, near the prewar discovery of a gigantic gold/copper deposit, termed the Ertsberg, which extruded from the southern side of the central range, below the snowline.[94] The Japanese airstrip on the Mimika coast helped gain access to the Ertsberg, and an attempt was made to conduct further exploration during the war, in accordance with the priorities of the wartime Japanese administration. As stated in the army manual,

> New Guinea consists of primitive, undeveloped virgin land … [and] its interior is rich in promising natural resources … urgent development projects, which should be undertaken as quickly as possible, shall generally proceed in the following order:
>
> 1. Fresh food supplies
> 2. Development of copper mines
> 3. Exploratory development of oil fields

4. Development of lumbering
5. Expansion of existing enterprises[95]

An Allied wartime intelligence report indicated that the Japanese had located a readily accessible supply of oil from somewhere in the Vogelkop. The 1944 report was compiled from information received from Shell Oil in London and the Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service, some members of which remained in the Vogelkop for the duration of the war, using guerrilla tactics. The report noted that the aerodrome at Babo, which the Japanese had bombed and then repaired, was being surfaced using oil and that the source of this oil should be identified as a target for bombing. Klamono was suggested as one possibility because the Beraoer River was navigable by two hundred ton vessels to a point only one kilometer from the oil field. Access to Mogoi-Wasian was more difficult. Significantly, the report did not limit the possibilities to these known oil fields, which NNGPM had discovered before the war.

The Allied Intelligence report [96]noted the following:

> It is possible that the Japanese might be using the old terminal [*sic*] near Kasim…. Kasim was the terminus for the two big test wells, Sele 1 and Sele 2…. The two Sele test wells themselves have not been photographed since the evacuation; however, the terminal of the road from the wells to coast has been photographed several times. At this terminal there is a fair-sized settlement with a jetty built by the Dutch, apparently for ships. When first seen, the settlement seemed devoid of personnel. At some time between June and September 1943 it was occupied and, when the last photographs were taken, on 27 January 1944, traffic was noticeable in the direction of the wells.[97]

This account of Japanese wartime activity at the site of the 1941 oil discovery confirmed what Nishijima explained, at times reluctantly, during our interview. Rear Admiral Maeda was aware of the huge oil potential there. He was still involved with the 1941 discovery site long after the war

years. According to the figures compiled by Sritua Arief on the output from this area after "rediscovery" in the mid-1970s, the production level of 170,000 barrels per day was the equivalent of an annual output of sixty-two million barrels. Compare this with the prewar oil production of the entire Netherlands East Indies, 61.58 million barrels, making the Indies the fifth largest producer in the world! The need for oil was the main reason driving the Japanese invasion in 1941–42. According to a Dutch intelligence report, Rear Admiral Maeda Tadashi, the link between the Japanese Imperial Navy and the Jakarta headquarters of the Sixteenth Army, was one of the decisions-makers in "the move south" ("Nanshin-ron") as an area of expansion, rather than westward into China. Clearly, before the end of the war, Maeda and both his political-intelligence officers realized the importance of the Sele 40 oil area in Netherlands New Guinea. As Nishijima explained in the interview, it was he who convinced the Indonesian nationalists to include Netherlands New Guinea as part of the territorial extent of the new nation-to-be, Indonesia, when Sukarno declared independence. Hatta did not want New Guinea to be part of Indonesia, and Sukarno agreed only because Nishijima insisted. As Sukarno and his supporters were in the majority of the nationalists present, West New Guinea was included. Nishijima was well aware that, if not included, the Dutch would recolonize the territory and, sooner or later, exploit the oil and minerals he knew the territory contained.

Admiral Maeda was a familiar figure among the Indonesian nationalists linked with the independence study group (Asrama Merdeka) set up by Yoshizumi and Nishijima. One of the young Indonesians was D. N. Aidit, who later became leader of the PKI. After Indonesia had ousted the Dutch from New Guinea, Sukarno and Aidit accepted the offer of Maeda in 1963 to form an oil company to assist the PKI in oil exploration. Sukarno had just allocated the Vogelkop (bird's head) area of New Guinea to the PKI; Maeda, in offering his services as he did, was exploiting the goodwill generated during the war. Friendly relations had continued after the war too, for example, in the 1958 Outer Islands Rebellion. Just when Sukarno had needed support, Nishijima and Maeda (in the Kobayashi group) organized a

shipment of Indonesian crude oil as part payment for a $53 million loan. Nishijima himself explained his actions as rekindling or strengthening the camaraderie from wartime days. As well, the good reputation he acquired within the Navy group, which was regarded as left-wing, assisted him in reestablishing contacts and friendships in the PKI. On July 5, 1961, when the PKI formed its oil company, Permigan, and took control of small, landlocked Tjepu oil field in Central Java, Maeda did not rush in to help. But when the Dutch colonial government relinquished sovereignty of Netherlands New Guinea, and the PKI was handed the Vogelkop, Maeda did not hesitate. He formed Ceram Oil, and the PKI accepted his offer to conduct exploration on their behalf.

From the perspective of the PKI, or indeed anyone without the hands-on experience of Maeda in that remote region, there seemed little prospect of finding productive oil. The dramatic decline in output from the known fields, Klamono and Mogoi-Wasian, was well documented. NNGPM had apparently been unsuccessful in this area for the last twenty-five years, and most of their exploration budget of $200 million had been spent on the Vogelkop. Why, then, should the Japanese company Ceram Oil, in which Maeda was one of the leading figures, want to join with Permigan, the PKI company, in such an obviously unproductive area?

Permigan was assisted by the Indonesian Air Force with transportation but lacked sufficient oil expertise and capital to mount such an operation on its own. Consequently, the PKI readily signed an agreement with the Japanese team headed by Maeda Tadashi—no longer Rear Admiral but returning to familiar territory. Whatever reasons motivated Sukarno to offer the PKI this highly unproductive oil region, his action could only have caused extreme agitation for the Standard Oil executives who were waiting to exploit the area themselves, biding their time before the political conditions in Indonesia were suitable—and extreme agitation also for Allen Dulles, whose Indonesia strategy was premised on economic havoc preceding regime change. Moreover, when Maeda was standing in for the PKI in the Vogelkop, Dulles at the same time was participating in the Warren Commission. The political tension in Indonesia was Maeda’s main

concern, but his action there also ensured that the 1941 oil discovery was not regurgitated through the official hearings in Washington, as this may well have linked Dulles with de Mohrenschildt. Maeda's role was vital to ensure the continued nondiscovery of the most productive oil well in Southeast Asia. With this link exposed between Rear Admiral Maeda and US oil interests, we should also ask how far back it extended. The Japanese card had been played before,[98] but as an unwanted alternative, not in an alliance like this where oil and anticommunism were common bonds—the same link shared by Dulles and de Mohrenschildt.

Had the PKI accidentally "rediscovered" Sele 40, the political fallout would have been immense, but Maeda stepped into the breach, into the public eye, to prevent this happening. His actions were duplicitous insofar as he was exploiting the wartime camaraderie, and at the same time politically risky if someone investigated why Maeda was interested in such an oil-depleted region. Inadvertently he also prevented exposure of the long-term fraud perpetrated by NNGPM, and, at the same time, the link between Dulles and de Mohrenschildt, which sooner or later would have become known. Another interpretation of Maeda's actions might label the risky position he took as brave but, to my surprise, Nishijima did not.

Interviewing Nishijima, I asked him about this public presence of Maeda in Ceram Oil, together with the PKI on an unproductive concession —adding that both he and I were well aware this same locality was where Japanese technicians during the war were accessing a supply of oil. In addition, both Nishijima and I were aware of the abundance of the oil "discovered" here in the early 1970s. The elephant in the room—as Maeda and I sat looking at each other—was the undeniable conclusion that Maeda (and NNGPM before him) had merely been sitting on this locality to prevent others from discovering the oil. Nishijima had organized the Permigan-Ceram Oil agreement but apparently disagreed with Maeda's involvement in so public a position. The outcome of the Ceram Oil deal, after all, was the continued nondiscovery of oil at Sele 40 until more favorable political conditions in West New Guinea. The implication here is

that Maeda's job in the Vogelkop was waiting for regime change, a post-Sukarno era.[99]

Suddenly, Nishijima exploded in a brief but surprising rage. He condemned not me, the interviewer, but his former superior, Maeda, whom he thought should never have so publicly attached his name to this venture. Nishijima went so far as to describe Maeda as "politically, a naive person." This remarkable outburst in response to the direct link with New Guinea oil was followed by a long moment of silence while Nishijima composed his thoughts. From that point on, when the subject of New Guinea was mentioned in the interview, it met with no response at all. I remember thinking, *He's the same age as my father, and I've got no Plan B*. By the time of the third interview, we'd reconciled, and he walked me to the railway station wearing flip-flop sandals and a Javanese hat. He arranged for me to meet Adam Malik, the Indonesian vice president who had just retired.

The American Account

Dutch historian Loe de Jong has recounted that in September 1942 the Dutch chief of naval staff visited Admiral King, US Navy, to inform him that oil discovered in the Vogelkop was of such high quality that it could be used without refining.[100] Was this a reference to Sele 40, one year after its discovery, or to Mogoi-Wasian? Both had oil with no sulphuric impurities and needed no refining. There was compelling evidence to indicate Sele 40, discovered but not announced publicly before the Japanese invasion, had been brought to the attention of the Allied commander of the Southwest Pacific Area, General Douglas MacArthur.

The Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (based in Australia for the duration of the war) followed in the wake of General MacArthur's advance through New Guinea. MacArthur's headquarters in Hollandia, NNG (near the site of his first landing at the deepwater port, Depapre), became the official Dutch governor's residence in the new capital, replacing Manokwari. The second landing, in May 1944 on the island of Biak, also

left its legacy of war—an international airport—and the third landing in July on the Vogelkop at Sausapor was not far from Sorong, which was becoming the oil town on the westerly tip of the island.

Accompanying the US Army under MacArthur was a contingent of geologists who set about compiling data on West New Guinea, and they continued doing so until the early 1950s. An Australian intelligence report noted the symbiotic link between American military and mining interests: "United States oil and metal interests intend to demand to share in disposal of the petroleum, metal and mineral resources of Axis controlled areas."[101] Karl C. Dodd, the official military historian of the American Corps of Engineers, has noted that the US Joint Chiefs of Staff gave special consideration to the westerly tip of New Guinea.[102] During late 1943 and early 1944, MacArthur's planners had centered their attention on the Japanese base at Sorong on the westerly tip of the peninsula, and in the United States, the Army Service Forces, with the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, likewise did a good deal of planning.

MacArthur's men surveyed the area around Sorong, and within three months they had produced a provisional map of the region in October 1944. On it, clearly annotated, was the Sele oilfield, adjacent to the Sele Strait on the westerly tip of the Vogelkop. It was precisely where the road had been constructed coming nine miles inland from Kasim. On the area close to the narrowest part of Sele Strait was the information "Reported Old Oil Surfaced," indicating that oil had once flowed to the surface from a discovery site that was then sealed.[103]

Having confirmed the location, the expected output, and the quality of the oil, MacArthur proposed to bring a contingent of 3,300 men of the Engineer Petroleum Production Depot from California to Sorong in order to produce oil for the American military advance on Japan. Because the expected output was well beyond Mogoi-Wasian capacity, this large-scale operation was clearly focusing on Sele 40. When the plan was abandoned in July 1944, it was not because the potential for oil there had suddenly dissipated. On the contrary, the change in plans was the beginning of a concerted effort to conceal the Sele oil field; it was the beginning of the

battle over sovereignty of Netherlands New Guinea, which continued into the 1960s. A second official history of the US military provides an accurate estimate of the expected oil output, accurate because it matched the eventual Sele output when it was "rediscovered" in the 1970s: "With limited effort, the wells could be expected to bring in some 16,000 barrels of crude oil per day; with additional development, about 25,000 barrels."[104]

The Netherlands suffered from a shortage of oil during the 1945–49 Indonesian war of independence, particularly in the early stages, and this made the Dutch more vulnerable to external political pressure from Washington. Oil in southern Sumatra was not available until after the first police action (July 1947) and in central Sumatra until the second police action (December 1948). Further delays in achieving production from war-damaged oil sites in Dutch-occupied eastern Indonesia made US oil imports imperative. New Guinea oil remained unavailable until the last week of 1948 when Klamono came on tap, a heavy oil producing at 4,700 barrels per day without the advantage of being free of sulphur. The thirty-six-mile pipeline (fifty-eight kilometers) from Sorong to Klamono took two years to construct, twice the estimated time. Previously, access was by barge, and Klamono oil was transported to Australia to alleviate the post-war shortage. The oil companies declared themselves powerless to effect any change favoring the Dutch struggle to hold Java, or any part of the former Netherlands East Indies. Because oil was exported to Australia, the oil companies managed to widen the diplomatic gulf between Australia and the Netherlands. Another important effect of this oil-company strategy was to isolate the Australian-controlled eastern half of New Guinea from the western half, Netherlands New Guinea.

Another effect of the agreement to export oil from Klamono to Australia was that it stressed the presence of the known oil fields in the Vogelkop but deliberately avoided mentioning the proposed 25,000 barrels per day wartime level of exploitation. Klamono and Mogoi-Wasian, which came onstream in the mid-1950s, remained the only recognized fields in Netherlands New Guinea. The Kasim-Jaya area of discovery in 1972–73 had been of intense interest to the oil-exploration teams before the war and

during the 1950s. This area was known as the Sele region, but in the 1950s the same name was used to describe an area fifteen miles away from the previous exploration area. Six unsuccessful wells were drilled here, on what came to be known as the Sele Dome. The Sele area—which was extremely prospective in 1941—lost its early reputation only because another drilling area that proved unproductive was given the same name in the 1950s. Helicopters were used for the first time in oil exploration work in 1952, but neither these nor US Army aerial trimetrogon photographs, which were made available to NNGPM in the same year, helped to locate the elusive Sele oil. When the decline in production from the known oil fields began to take effect, it deprived the Dutch of revenue either to colonize further or to decolonize adequately.

In March 1956, the Petroleum Press Service reported the following in its monthly bulletin:

> Already so deeply committed in the territory, the company [NNGPM] is faced with the problem of determining its future course of action. In that part of its present concession area in the Vogelkop peninsula, exploration activities are nearing their end, while beyond the peninsula exploration will come to an end within a relatively short time.

The decline in output from both Klamono and Mogoi-Wasian greatly contributed to the political demise of the Dutch colonial administration in West New Guinea. Klamono production, which was estimated prewar at 7,500 barrels per day actually began at 4,700 barrels per day, and by March 1961 (after twelve years) had dropped to 3,960 barrels per day. When the Dutch-Indonesian dispute was reaching its climax, oil output declined again alarmingly, with a sudden 33 percent drop. These statistics tended to confirm the claim that the territory was economically nonviable, so that participation in the sovereignty dispute simply to gain access to the natural resources seemed to have no basis. Moreover, as we have seen, the absence of natural resources was used to denigrate the proposal for an independent Papuan state on the grounds of nonviability. Ten days after the New York

Agreement in August 1962, NNGPM announced that the field would be abandoned in 1967. But Klamono did not stop. Indeed, by 1967 it was producing more than it was at the height of the crisis in 1961. Klamono in 1949 produced 265,000 tons. By 1961 this total had dropped to 167,000 tons, but, in 1967, shortly after Sukarno had been overthrown, this figure had more than tripled.

The Mogoi-Wasian field did not start producing until 1954. Its sixty-eight wells were located in an area that was far less accessible than Klamono. Tucked below the Vogelkop in Bintuni Bay in an area that was very difficult to access, the decline when it started was free from public scrutiny. Although the initial output was twice that of Klamono, in five years Mogoi-Wasian had reduced its production by 90 percent. NNGPM claimed that the heavy expenditure in providing facilities to operate Mogoi-Wasian "proved to be more than the two fields could economically carry." Nevertheless the facilities, which comprised a thirty-one mile (fifty km) road and pipeline, a terminal, a further seven mile (twelve km) pipeline across a mangrove swamp to a tanker berth, as well as living quarters, offices, a hospital, and a school, were not dismantled, nor were they reclaimed by the jungle in the absence of NNGPM staff. Instead, when Mogoi-Wasian was officially terminated in 1961, and Dutch administration exited from the territory the following year, the oil-company premises were occupied by Japanese oil technicians as part of Maeda's operation. Production was only temporarily stalled at Mogoi-Wasian and, after 1965 when the PKI concession was replaced by Pertamina, Indonesian troops utilized the former NNGPM facilities. In 1974, one of Indonesia's largest discoveries of gas occurred in this region—sixty million cubic feet per day—when the average find in Indonesia was less than one third of this. (Two decades later, another even larger discovery placed the territory gas deposits among the largest in the world.[105])

After President Sukarno was ousted in 1965–66, NNGPM handed over all the former geological reports compiled during the years of exploration to Pertamina, who occupied the Sele site until its rediscovery by Petromer Trend in the early 1970s. Petromer Trend's contract with Pertamina was

dated October 15, 1970. Trend was controlled by Oppenheimer of South Africa, and the wholly owned subsidiary (Petromer) was operator for a group of companies,[106] including US interests, payoffs for Japanese participants, and European insiders.

Petromer Trend and six other companies had signed contracts in West New Guinea (Irian Jaya) before the end of 1971. Indeed, two companies signed in 1968, even before the 1969 Act of Free Choice, and their concession areas were vast tracts of land. When compared with the much smaller portion chosen by Petromer, the outrageous success of the Petromer concession is clearly evident. The concession area for one of the two pre-1969 companies was 125,580 sq. miles (325,250 sq. km) or three-quarters of the size of California. Petromer's area was 1,957 sq. miles (5,070 sq. km). Petromer's concession was just one percent of the combined area of the other two companies, yet it was a bonanza. Seven companies began oil exploration in West New Guinea after the end of Dutch colonial rule, but Petromer Trend was the first to strike oil, and its 100:1 chance scooped the biggest prize of all. It goes without saying that Petromer Trend's contract area covered the original Sele 40 and nearby oil field generously. The ratio of holes that struck oil to the total number drills was fourteen to seventeen (or 1:1.2), which was unprecedented.[107] An American engineer working on the prolific Kasim-Jaya field declared in *Newsweek*, "There's so much oil around here that we even struck oil in one of the geological holes."[108]

Michael Fomenko

There is a bizarre side story to the Sele 40 saga, centred on Russian-born Michael Fomenko, a close relative of George de Mohrenschildt's wife, Jeanne (Eugenia) Fomenko. In 1959 he paddled a canoe from Australia to Netherlands New Guinea, a prodigious feat, only to be placed under house arrest by the Dutch officer in charge of internal affairs at that time, Raphael den Haan. In Brisbane in 2012, I interviewed den Haan (who was ninety years old) to find out why Michael Fomenko went to NNG in 1959. Did he

know about the still-unannounced oil discovery made by his uncle, de Mohrenschildt, in 1941?

Den Haan lived in Brisbane because he had married an Australian woman whom he had met in Port Moresby (the capital of Papua New Guinea) when he was the Dutch officer appointed to liaise with Australian authorities in neighboring PNG. He remembered the incident in 1959 when the lone adventurer, Michael Fomenko, twenty-nine years of age, traveled by canoe from Australia to Netherlands New Guinea. His presence remained unknown for almost three months, but finally he was apprehended by Dutch authorities and flown to Hollandia. A check on his background showed he was of Russian descent from royal lineage, and it was decided that the young adventurer from Sydney would stay in den Haan's house before being repatriated. Then Fomenko caused another controversy by wandering into the jungle, walking for three weeks, and meeting many Papuan village people. "He was the most fit human being I have ever seen in my life," den Haan said.

Despite the half century that had passed since last seeing Michael Fomenko, den Haan still expressed surprise and admiration for the young man's daring and sheer physical strength. Den Haan himself as a young man was a long-distance swimmer and readily acknowledged the canoeing incident as an unparalleled feat of endurance—paddling a canoe from Australia, across Torres Strait and westward along the coast of New Guinea, traveling for several months.

Michael Fomenko had grown up in postwar Sydney as a teenager, and in the 1950s his all-round sporting prowess marked him as a likely contender for the Olympic decathlon. He had other ideas, however, partly inspired by Johnny "Tarzan" Weissmuller but possibly also by Jeanne Fomenko. Den Haan did not comment on the possible motivation underlying Michael's visit to New Guinea but was willing to talk about the film star from the 1950s, Johnny Weissmuller, who definitely had inspired the young Michael. Having won Olympic gold medals and broken world records in swimming, Weissmuller became a Hollywood success as Tarzan and Jungle Jim. Weissmuller was born in Romania, at the western end of

the Black Sea, and Michael Fomenko was born at the eastern end of the Black Sea, in Georgia.

The Fomenko family was part of the great diaspora of Russian émigré population. Rather than being under Stalin, they settled in all corners of the earth. Eugenia was already married when she first went to New York. She kept her family name, Fomenko, rather than her married name, and changed her first name from Eugenia to Jeanne. In the fashion industry, she excelled, flying often to Europe and fashion centers of the world. As she explained to Jenner (after he'd finished interviewing George) she met de Mohrenschildt in 1956 and married him in June 1959.

Michael's father, Daniel, who also was a champion athlete, settled in Sydney with his family before World War II, and Michael's elder sister, Inessa (now in her nineties), recalled those days fondly when she spoke to me about her athletic brother. The canoe that he paddled to New Guinea, she said, was one that he had made himself, carved out of a tree. Michael Fomenko was first in the news for making his way by canoe hundreds of miles along the coast of North Queensland. In the *Canberra Times* (July 30, 1959) it was reported, "Michael Fomenko on Horn Island [at the very top of Cape York, Australia, the closest part of the mainland to PNG] living with about 100 natives. Fomenko was surprised at all the fuss about his canoe journey and said he was sorry if he had caused any inconvenience." From there he paddled over to Netherlands New Guinea. Den Haan explained that once apprehended, he was flown to the capital, Hollandia [now Jayapura] to be repatriated back to Sydney. His adventures by canoe had lasted three years.

In April 1964, at the same time as George de Mohrenschildt was facing the Warren Commission, Michael Fomenko decided he wanted to return to West New Guinea—no longer Netherlands New Guinea, because by this time the Dutch had been ousted and Indonesia was in control. Any publicity regarding Sele 40 could have changed history. Just his name, Fomenko, might have attracted attention because Jeanne was the wife of the key witness of the Warren Commission, which was in session at that very time. It was at this moment—according to Inessa Fomenko, Michael's sister—

that Frank Bischoff intervened. He was the officer from 'Special Branch' in Brisbane (a political wing of the police force). He had training in Scotland Yard in the United Kingdom, and was known to be in contact with intelligence agencies in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Bischoff was notoriously corrupt but only half a century later is the general public, now aware of his misdeeds, inclined to label him as evil. Why did Frank Bischoff arrange for Michael Fomenko to be admitted to a mental hospital for six months, where the young man was subjected to electroconvulsive therapy? In the media, it was incorrectly claimed Michael's mother was responsible for this, and when informed of this, Michael refused to speak with his family for the rest of his life. Even his sister Inessa was unable to communicate with him. The *Canberra Times* (April 29, 1964) simply announced that "Michael 'Tarzan' Fomenko will be detained at the Ipswich Special Mental Hospital at least for six months."

When he was released, Michael Fomenko went to live in the jungle of North Queensland where he remained for the next fifty years. He lived in the wild, always moving from place to place, often catching his food as he went. He did this for decades and became known as Tarzan, although in later years he was helped by having access to a disability pension. Few reporters were ever able to locate him, but, in 2011, Frank Robson[109] met him. "He was shocked to learn," Robson wrote, "that Johnny Weissmuller had died [in 1984]." In 2016, Michael Fomenko, eighty-six years old, already two-thirds of the way walking from Cairns to Sydney (1,500 miles) suffered a knee injury that caused him to stop in Gympie. He was admitted into the Cooinda Aged Care Centre, where I visited him briefly. Whether it was Bischoff's directive that caused his mental fragility or fifty years of solitude as a consequence of Bischoff's directive, I cannot say.

We can only surmise why it was deemed necessary in 1964 to stop Michael Fomenko from returning to West New Guinea after the Dutch administration had been replaced by Indonesian. For those persons (not Indonesians) who *were* aware of Sele oil field's potential to benefit the PKI, could Fomenko's presence have undermined Maeda's role in preventing the 'discovery' of Sele? Bischoff's 'Special Branch' were diehard anti-

communists, willing to follow instructions in line with their political precepts. On the other hand, if Michael Fomenko had gone to West New Guinea in 1964, inevitably he would have stirred public interest with his unusual family name in the ‘news’. Was the threat he posed simply from the possibility that his name might have been linked to Jeanne Fomenko, the wife of George de Mohrenschildt? Both were important witnesses in the Warren Commission. Hidden behind this linking of names, an investigation could easily have uncovered the fact that George and Allen Dulles had first met forty years ago, and undoubtedly would have started new lines of enquiry in the Warren Commission.

Michael Fomenko died in 2018. Romanticized in North Queensland where he roamed for half a century as a Tarzan, he was a tragic figure, another fatality of West New Guinea.


PLATES



Attempting reconciliation, 1964: Defense Minister General AH Nasution and DN Aidit, PKI Chairman, photographed outside the Soviet Embassy in Jakarta by Professor Drugov (now deceased). The Soviet initiative for this meeting was an attempt to gain the upper hand in the Sino-Soviet dispute.



Untung (circled) with Suharto and wife, Ibu Tien; and Untung under arrest. The other co- founder of the September 30 Movement (with Untung) was Latief, who told me, “Suharto was one of us.” Major- General Suharto, commander of the Mandala campaign to oust the Dutch from West New Guinea in 1962, gave Untung the ‘Bintang Sakti’ (‘sacred star’), one of the highest awards in the Indonesian army.




Makassar, April 30, 1945, the day after the Emperor's birthday: the nationalists' anthem and flag received Japanese approval. This announcement was made simultaneously throughout Indonesia. From left: Dr G.S. Ratulangie (from Menado), Kenichi Hayashi (coordinated espionage in prewar Indies), **Rear Admiral Maeda**, Ichiki (Naval Civil Administration), Captain Masuzo Yanagihara (Chief of Political Bureau), Mitsuhashi (Naval Area Governor), **Shigetada Nishijima, Sukarno,** Sumanaig (Japanese Military Administration), Tadjuddin Noor, **Tomegoro Yoshizumi**, A. Subardjo. *Photo courtesy of Nishijima*.




Pen at the ready, Robert C. Hills (president Freeport Sulphur) signs Indonesia's first foreign contract with Ir. Slamet Bratanata, Indonesia's representative under Acting President Suharto Jakarta, April 7, 1967. Seated next to Hills is Freeport geologist/manager, Forbes K. Wilson, and standing behind is US Ambassador Marshall Green. The contract for the 'Ertsberg copper mine' did not mention gold. (AFP).




Mulinabua (1999): the author and Theys Eluay (Papuan leader assassinated Nov. 10, 2001). The poster of JFK and Sukarno was in his house in Sentani, Papua.




Jean Jacques Dozy (1908-2004) at 87 years of age. *Courtesy of Kal Muller*.



The 1958 Outer Islands Rebellion was in Sumatra (see inset) and Sulawesi (formerly Celebes).



Map of Indonesia, from Sabang to Merauke.



Map showing ‘Sele 40’, drilled in 1941; and ‘rediscovered’ in 1972.

Chapter 4

1958 REBELLION PRRI

> The U.S. Indonesian intervention athwart the equator on the other side of the world … has remained one of the the most zealously guarded secrets in the history of U.S. covert overseas operations.
>
> —George Kahin[110]

Part One

When the Netherlands relinquished sovereignty of the East Indies without its New Guinea territory in December 1949, Indonesia, the world's longest archipelago, became the federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI). The vast island geography and ethnic diversity favored a federation, but, for many Indonesians, the structure and even the concept of federalism was tainted with colonialism. Eight months later in August 1950, it became a unitary state. However, Vice President Hatta (from Bukittinggi, in resource-rich Sumatra) foresaw problems arising in the Outer Islands if Jakarta's centralized administration was more hindrance than help. By the mid-1950s, the Outer Islands (particularly Sumatra and Sulawesi) were supplying 70 percent of Indonesia's export revenue for a 30 percent return from Jakarta. By late 1957, the percentage had worsened, according to US Ambassador Allison, then in Jakarta. He drew attention to "the dissatisfaction of the regional leaders over the domination of the Central Government by the Javanese and the fact that while the regions, particularly Sumatra and Sulawesi, produced the vast majority of the foreign exchange the nation received, only slightly more than ten percent of it was spent in the regions."[111] Allison listed the Outer Islands' disaffection

with Jakarta as one of three serious problems facing Indonesia; the other two were the rising power of communism and the Indonesian demand that the Dutch return the New Guinea territory (NNG).

President Sukarno's abiding concern all his political life was the unity of Indonesia's archipelagic peoples, and this was the subtext when Hatta dutifully pointed out how disaffection over revenue might raise the question of Jakarta's right to rule. At the same time, Jakarta's dispute with the Netherlands over the New Guinea territory, renamed West Irian, was unsuccessfully brought before the United Nations three times in the 1954–57 period. The dispute raised many questions relating to decolonization, among them the territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia, similar to the core issue raised by the discontent in Sumatra, which was questioning the extent of jurisdiction by Jakarta. Sukarno opted to campaign more rigorously for the return of West Irian. His reasoning was that Indonesia, pitted against the same Dutch colonial power, would regenerate the same nationalist sentiment and camaraderie of the 1945–49 independence struggle, reigniting a sense of unity and thereby reducing the Outer Islands' talk of separation.

On the world stage in the 1950s, with decolonization jostling for space with the Cold War, Sukarno became the voice of Indonesia in the non-aligned movement. At the 1955 Bandung Conference, representing two-thirds of the world's population, twenty-nine Afro Asian countries declared themselves neutral, in line with principles outlined by UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld. As well, Indonesia's first general elections in 1955 produced results showing the PKI, the largest communist party outside the Sino-Soviet bloc, had grown to be the fourth largest political party in Indonesia, having benefited from the presence of Zhou Enlai at the Bandung Conference. The anticolonial campaign against NNG attracted support from both the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, and the PKI began to pursue the campaign under the aegis of the president. "Now distancing itself from both the Soviet Union and China, the PKI was able to establish itself as a nationalistic Communist party"[112] by espousing the West Irian issue. A leading member of the PKI central committee, M. H.

Lukman, had spent 1929 to 1938 (starting at nine years of age) in the Dutch detention camp in Boven Digoel in New Guinea. His father, a Muslim scholar, had been sent into exile there with his family.

In the Outer Islands, when dissatisfaction with revenue distribution started to crystallize, various political leaders in Sumatra and Sulawesi joined with local army commanders to demand more revenue from the central government. Heightening the tension, on December 1, 1956, Vice President Hatta resigned.

When the domestic dispute over revenue distribution came to the attention of DCI Allen Dulles, he used its anti-Jakarta focus for its anti-communist potential. The bulk of PKI electoral support was in Java, mostly landless peasants, impoverished rice farmers, hoping for the promised land reform. In addition to the New Guinea issue, the main PKI policy was addressing the continuing burden of land rent, which had simply continued from colonial times. DCI Dulles was alarmed by news that at the next general election the PKI would achieve a much higher percentage of votes than the 16 percent it received in 1955. Because of the Dulles-inspired disruption that led to the 1958 rebellion, the election due in 1959 was never held. As chairman of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, Allen Dulles in March 1957 delivered a report on Indonesia, with a special handwritten memo stressing its importance, to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and various State Department officials. Dated March 5, it dealt with news from Indonesia that on March 2 the commander of Territory VII in Eastern Indonesia, Lieutenant Colonel Ventje Sumual, had proclaimed martial law in four provinces—Celebes (Sulawesi), Moluccas, Lesser Sundas (string of islands east of Bali), and West New Guinea.

West New Guinea was under Dutch control, so Dulles' report, in effect, was saying that as strong as the differences are between Jakarta central government and the Outer Islands, they are not as strong as overall Indonesian opposition to the Dutch colonial presence in West New Guinea. The report continued:

> In addition to greater regional autonomy and the retention of seventy percent of the revenues of the provinces … he [Lieutenant Colonel Sumual] demanded that Prime Minister Ali resign and stated that Communists would not be tolerated in the government.… Partly in answer to growing disaffection and perhaps influenced by impressions gathered during a visit to the Soviet Union and Communist China during the fall of 1956, President Sukarno made public on February 21 his "concept" of a new organizational form for Indonesian democracy.[113]

Sukarno's concept later became known as "Guided Democracy." Dulles outlined how Sukarno wanted a national council to represent all parties in the parliament, with delegates from functional sectors of society such as veterans, laborers, and the armed forces. He continued:

> The council would give "advice," apparently mandatory, to Parliament and to the cabinet, which again would be representative of all elements in Parliament. In outlining his plan, Sukarno, obviously harking back to the nationalist unity which prevailed during the independence struggle, held that opposition was the key to the failure of parliamentary democracy in Indonesia and that elimination of an opposition by inclusion of all elements in the government would ensure its success…. Because the Indonesian Communist Party would have official status in the government for the first time since Indonesia became independent in 1949, Sukarno's plan has had a mixed reception.

Army Issue

In parallel with the ongoing dispute between two of Indonesia's most prominent politicians, Sukarno and Hatta, the two most prominent officers in the Indonesian army also were in dispute, General Nasution and Colonel Zulkifli Lubis. Both were Sumatrans who became leading figures in the Outer Islands Rebellion, albeit on opposite sides. A State Department memo commented:

> General Nasution was born on December 3, 1918 in the Tapanuli area of North Sumatra. Like many senior Indonesian Army officers, he is a Batak, and like his first cousin and bitter enemy, Col. Zulkifli Lubis, he is a devout Moslem.[114]

Lubis had been Indonesia's intelligence chief since the end of World War II, but in 1952 he replaced Nasution for four years as chief of staff after an attempted coup on October 17, although Nasution always denied this accusation. Sukarno's response was swift; single-handedly facing troops and tanks, he delivered a tour-de-force of nationalist rhetoric and sent them home peacefully.[115] His response was to send some commanders to far-flung posts and reduce army funding, and he encouraged joint financial and administrative arrangements between regional army commanders and regional civilian authorities. So by 1957, the Indonesian army command across the archipelago was a fractured system, a patchwork of regional commanders fending for their troops. General Nasution was head of the army but had less control over remote battalions than the respective colonels in the Outer Islands. The CIA exploited this "tyranny of distance" by fomenting rebellion, the PRRI/Permesta[116] or Outer Islands Rebellion. It was engineered on a grand scale during the second Eisenhower administration.

The world (and especially Moscow) perceived the Outer Islands Rebellion in 1958 as an attempt by the CIA to help Sumatra and Sulawesi break away from Java. Allen Dulles had informed Washington that Java was going communist, but his real aim was to achieve a centralized army command in Jakarta. Without a centralized army command in Jakarta, Indonesia had no chance of ousting the Dutch colonial presence in NNG, no chance of ousting Sukarno, and no chance of containing the rising power of the PKI. Dulles could see the need for a centralized army command, and attaining this aim became an initial step in his Indonesia strategy. He used Singapore-based CIA Operational Commander Frank Wisner, who brought with him a reputation of failure, having fomented rebellion two years earlier in Hungary,[117] which was quashed by Soviet tanks. While Wisner in 1958

genuinely pursued the declared aim of assisting the rebels in Sumatra to break away from Java, Dulles did not. Those in the CIA, like Wisner, who were visibly involved in this covert operation (and later sacked by Vice President Richard Nixon) really believed in what they doing, but from Dulles' perspective the operation was more like a sacrificial lamb, part of a larger scheme.

When I interviewed Lubis and Nasution in August 1983, I wanted to find out how the 1958 Outer Islands Rebellion had led not to greater regional autonomy but to the opposite outcome, the formation of a strong, centralized military command. Lubis's acerbic response was "the Americans tricked us." I did not realize when conducting the Jakarta interviews in 1983 that both Lubis and Nasution, twenty-five years earlier, had been interviewed by Guy Pauker (RAND Corporation researcher/CIA advisor and close associate of Allen Dulles), who was assessing political prospects in Indonesia well before the 1958 rebellion. (RAND is a think tank for the US Armed Forces.) Pauker explained to me in personal correspondence that he had spoken with both of them. A year before the rebellion, Pauker had visited Indonesia and observed developments in the Outer Islands. He noted how local military commanders were openly supporting the smuggling of commodities abroad, denying the central government the payment of export duties that would otherwise have been paid.

The preliminary analysis that formed the basis of Allen Dulles' strategy of fomenting rebellion included Pauker's private consultancy outlining the political contours and potential for the army to become a force opposing the rapidly expanding PKI. In his correspondence with me, Pauker unreservedly claimed kudos for being the first person to see the future role of the Indonesian army and, in the same breath, claimed that his associate Allen S. Whiting in the RAND Corporation was the first to ascertain the split in the Sino-Soviet bloc. Pauker's advice before the rebellion had flared in February/March 1958 helped to shape Allen Dulles' strategy but was openly acknowledged only *after* April/May, as if promoting a centralized army command was the option after the rebellion had apparently failed in

its objectives. His emergence as "CIA advisor/RAND researcher" rather than his earlier Indonesia persona as "Berkeley research professor" occurred just when Washington was in the process of changing its allegiance from the Outer Islands rebels back to the central government.[118] His professional approach seemed like a new voice at the right time, yet Pauker was not saying anything different from what he had advised earlier —that the Indonesian army was the only force capable of standing against, controlling, or neutralizing the organizational capacity of the PKI. It was Allen Dulles who devised a way to utilize Pauker's perceptive analysis. For his claim to be recognized as the first person to see the future role of the Indonesian army,[119] so too would his earlier consultation with Allen Dulles need to be recognized. To do this would show even more clearly that Dulles' intention from the start was for the PRRI to fail, but had observers (i.e., Moscow) realized this at the time, they would surely have foreseen that if Dulles was capable of deliberately creating a centralized army command his ultimate goal was regime change. This is why it was necessary for CIA support for the PRRI to be seen to fail.

At this time, Dulles was at the height of his career in intelligence, and the level of his duplicity gives insight into his subsequent contact with Kennedy. Both British and US intelligence agencies in the early and mid-1950s were reeling with the shock that Soviet agents had penetrated their ranks. The genius of Dulles was that he took this into account and devised a covert operation in Indonesia that seemed to fail, but its very success depended on the perception that it had failed. Indeed, Moscow misinterpreted Dulles' large-scale covert operation as a failure and followed up with the massive arms deal for the Indonesian Air Force and Navy just prior to Kennedy's inauguration.

Before the rebellion flared and failed in February 1958, the army commanders in the Outer Islands were displaying rebelliousness with a long list of economic grievances. Lubis had been one of the rebels' military links with outside intelligence sources, principally the CIA, to provide arms for the rebellion to proceed. The other main CIA link was Jakarta-based Minister of Finance Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, who joined the rebels in

May 1957, based in Singapore. A close associate of Guy Pauker, Sumitro achieved even greater fame after 1965 for his economic expertise in the group that came to be known as the "Berkeley Mafia." In 1957, he did much to convince the rebels, and Washington too, that their principal disagreement with Jakarta should be over the PKI, rather than disaffection over revenue.

"Permitted to Wither"

To convince a sufficient number of civilian politicians and military commanders in Sumatra to rebel against the central government, so as to constitute a rebel force which Jakarta could not ignore, Allen Dulles needed to convince them of US government support. He did this by supplying plentiful small-arms via an extravagant delivery service. This involved submarines and US air support, and even the presence of the 7th Fleet—or rather, Task Force 75, which comprised a formidable group of warships from the 7th Fleet, including an aircraft carrier with two battalions of marines, a heavy cruiser, and two destroyers "drawn from several points in the Western Pacific."[120] In answer to the rebels' request for actual planes, Dulles arranged for two B-26 bombers, with a crew gathered from the small community of London-based, mostly unemployed, post-WWII Polish pilots. However, as George Kahin explained, "the two planes exploded in mid-air and never reached Padang," [121] the main city in West Sumatra that was the site of the rebels' headquarters. Kahin added in a footnote: "It is unclear whether the explosions that destroyed the planes were from antiaircraft fire as they were leaving or from timed explosives that had been placed on board."

Kahin is using this footnote to suggest both planes might have been sabotaged but does not explore this line of argument any further. Nevertheless, sabotage in this instance is entirely consistent with the recurring theme of covert intervention à la Allen Dulles. He wanted only to create the impression of helping the rebels without creating a rebellion beyond his control. This was confirmed by yet another incident, just when the rebellion in Sumatra was starting to gain momentum. It involved the

main weapons drop that was intended to be the rebels' arsenal to counter Jakarta's air superiority. How was the entire weapons drop captured by Nasution? From whom did Nasution gain the timely intelligence to strike, just as the weapons were being parachuted onto the US oil site at Pekanbaru by four-engine planes? Nasution explained to me how his troops captured the huge cache of arms, including antiaircraft weapons, large-caliber machine guns, and a vast amount of ammunition. I relate his story subsequently, in the context of the unfolding rebellion.

This weapons drop prompted the action from Jakarta that led to a central army command. The rebellion was virtually over as soon as it had started, but the rebels in Sumatra (and later Sulawesi) still received a small but steady supply of weapons, just enough to be a problem for the central government. The rebellion in fits and starts continued for several years and so did martial law. This allowed firm control over the PKI and prevented the 1959 elections from being held. The trickle of support seemed to confirm Allen Dulles' protestations of wanting to help the rebels, yet the decision by the US government to change from the rebels to the central government had already occurred, soon after the capture of the huge weapons cache. It's worth repeating the characteristic euphemism Dulles later used to inform President Kennedy that the rebellion was "permitted to wither from lack of sustenance,"[122] an explanation that held more than a trace of arrogance and omnipotence. The entire involvement of the CIA was perceived as a failure. Yet it achieved precisely what Allen Dulles needed for his larger Indonesia strategy. To see this more clearly, we need a forensic examination of Allen Dulles' moves and motives.

From Failure, Success

The PRRI, when described as a CIA failure, has the dubious historical distinction of being one of the largest. Yet it is not a prime example of the often-quoted comment by Richard Nixon (vice president at the time of the rebellion) that "the public never hears of CIA successes, only their failures." So little information on the PRRI was ever divulged that Kahin says "the American public and nearly all of its Congress never saw more

than the well-shrouded tip of the iceberg."[123]Although it seemed a failure to the Cold War observers and participants at that time, the key to seeing its strategic success is to interpret it through the eyes of the person who set it up: not John Foster but Allen Dulles. CIA assistance for the rebellion was designed not to help Sumatra or Sulawesi break away from Jakarta, not to achieve greater autonomy, but to provoke a military response from Jakarta in order to unify the Indonesian army. This counter argument to the perception of the PRRI as a gigantic CIA failure focuses on the centralized army command, the end result actually achieved.

Even more than six decades later, media analysis of the goal of the Outer Island rebels is still portrayed as secession, as covert US support for "rebels in the Outer Islands that wished to secede from the central government in Jakarta."[124] Dulles was able to deceive, or was capable of deceiving, friend and foe alike, all those who were monitoring the covert operation with secession in mind as the stated goal. In the opinion of Howard Jones, reviewing the years when he was the US ambassador in Jakarta from 1958 to 1965, "to the outside world, the conflict was pictured as anti-Communist rebels against a pro-Communist government in Jakarta. In fact, it was a much more complex affair, involving anti-Communists on both sides!"[125]

There were two main reasons why Allen Dulles wanted to achieve a centralized army—Netherlands New Guinea and regime change. The Indonesian army was seen as the best way to keep political power throughout the rich Indonesian archipelago out of the hands of the PKI, the only way to oust the Dutch colonial administration from NNG, and the optimum replacement for Sukarno. Once the central army command was deemed a viable structure, a top-secret flow of US funds began, according to Kartono Kadri (who later headed the largest intelligence agency in Indonesia, known as BPI, under Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs Subandrio).[126] Millions of dollars were provided by this covert funding for the Indonesian army (as opposed to the navy or air force) during and after the campaign to reclaim Netherlands New Guinea. It was anticipated that

the PKI would attract even more popular support from an anticolonial victory in the New Guinea sovereignty dispute, and both Kennedy and Dulles factored this into their respective Indonesia strategies. In the 1964–65 period, the Indonesian army crucially maintained a political edge with the sheer potential of its armed force, once under a central command, to be brought into play at any moment. This was not the case before the PRRI in 1958.

Audrey and George Kahin stated the following in the Introduction to *Subversion as Foreign Policy*:[127]

> It should be evident what an abysmal failure this essentially covert operation was and why the American government has been so reluctant to release the most important documents that bear on it. Presumably the CIA and other involved components of the US government have concluded they would lose face and diminish public support for further covert activities if Americans were to become aware of their egregious debacle in Indonesia. And so for American citizens the CIA still treats this episode of thirty-seven years ago as just as "covert" as if it were occurring today.

In the process of identifying the person who should take responsibility for the CIA failure, the Kahins state that "both the available documentary evidence and the consensus among State Department and CIA members interviewed indicate that, among the top leaders of the Eisenhower administration, John Foster Dulles was the most aggressive." However, in this instance, labelling someone as "most aggressive" should not imply culpability for the CIA failure, nor should John Foster Dulles be apportioned most of the blame simply because the secretary of state outranks the director of Central Intelligence. Clearly, the PRRI operation was the work of Allen Dulles, and culpability rests with him, even though the records show Allen as less ebullient than his brother. At one point, the Kahins even referred to Allen as "myopic,"[128] but this does not take into account the way that Allen was utilizing John Foster's trenchant anticommunism as part of an Indonesia strategy in which the PRRI was

only a segment. Allen knew in 1956 that his brother had been diagnosed with cancer; that he lived as long as he did (until May 24, 1959) was due more to John Foster's extraordinary will than anything his doctors could do to help.

The 1956 CIA operation in Hungary under the operational control of Dulles' deputy, Frank Wisner,[129] had provided lessons for Allen that he re-applied in the PRRI operation. When Soviet tanks in Hungary quashed the 1956 uprising, the entire CIA operation there was sacrificed on John Foster Dulles' instructions because his strategy in the Suez Crisis had priority. Hungarians who had been "armed and urged to fight on for their freedom were left to fight by themselves."[130] Frank Wisner shouldered responsibility but was known to have suffered mental and emotional trauma as a result of his failure in Hungary. This was included in Allen Dulles' calculations when he sought Wisner's involvement in the PRRI and Frank Wisner's persona of failure was utilized by Allen Dulles. In other words, what John Foster Dulles did reluctantly in 1956—cause the CIA operation run by Wisner to be a dismal failure—Allen Dulles did deliberately in 1958. After the CIA failure in the PRRI, Wisner suffered a nervous breakdown, was removed from office by DCI Dulles and later committed suicide. While his death has never been described as the only American fatality in the PRRI, it should be.

The CIA failure in Hungary was acutely personal for Allen too. He had personally taken part in the formation of Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia when the Hapsburg empire was reapportioned under the Versailles Treaty. The repudiation of the CIA operation in 1956 by John Foster Dulles was a stark statement of power wielded by the secretary of state, and as a lesson in intelligence it served as a reminder in 1958 when Allen again was the prime mover in fomenting the PRRI rebellion. DCI Dulles ensured the size of the operation came within the ambit set by John Foster Dulles, and this to a large extent was determined by his anticommunist aggression and the intelligence data fed him by Allen. On both counts, Allen succeeded in firing up John Foster on a personal crusade against Sukarno, all the time keeping his own goal paramount, that is, the

goal of achieving a centralized army command. So when the time came, as the Kahins say, for the Eisenhower administration "to acknowledge that its Indonesian intervention had failed … cut its losses … and try to get along as best it could with the government it had just been trying to overthrow," the Kahins term this change as an "opportunistic switch" and ultimately a CIA failure.[131]

From this failure came Allen Dulles' success. The reversal was not opportunistic but a strategic move planned from the start. Doubtless, the extent of deception this entailed impacted on his colleagues, with the Wisner tragedy being the most obvious. The mammoth size of the covert operation, the disenchantment of many CIA personnel, the involvement of the secretary of state, the nature of the covert operations in Indonesia—all were factors that added to the perceived failure. Yet the greater the failure—and here Allen Dulles' modus operandi for this intelligence operation lifts the lid on his evil genius—the greater the success. This is not the paradox it seems when we realize his primary target was the principal Cold War opponent, the Soviet Union, the major power in the Sino-Soviet bloc. The perceived failure of the CIA in the PRRI, from Moscow's point of view, led directly to the game-changer in the New Guinea sovereignty dispute, the huge arms deal for Jakarta. Then in 1963 came Malaysian Confrontation, the penultimate strategy, steadily moving Sukarno and Indonesia toward regime change. There was an utter ruthlessness in Allen Dulles to achieve his military-industrial goals. The few Polish pilots otherwise unemployed in London, for instance, were just collateral damage. The PRRI debacle was but one stage of a larger Indonesian scenario extending from 1956 to 1965 and should be calculated in terms of the damage inflicted on many peoples and places in the world, but especially Indonesia and the United States of America.

Part Two

Ad Hoc Committee

Hugh S. Cumming was the US ambassador in Jakarta for three-and-a-half years before his posting ended on March 3, 1957. He was replaced by John Allison, from Tokyo, who described himself as the "ambassador from the prairie (he was from Lincoln, Nebraska). In the Kahins' view, Allison was "at that time probably the senior Foreign Service officer in Asia," and his experience was evident. For example, in Jakarta in 1957 when three months of local elections were held throughout Java, Allison commented on the strategically timed visit by the head of the Soviet government, Kliment Voroshilov, just before the elections started in June because it added considerably to PKI popularity. As well, Allison wrote in his memoir that he had spoken with "Professor Guy Pauker, then of the University of California at Berkeley and later of RAND Corporation, [who] was in Indonesia also observing the elections."[132] Pauker's expertise in Indonesian affairs clearly put him head and shoulders above the staff in the US embassy, and Allison explained why:

> At that time we were operating with an Acting Deputy Chief of Mission, the regular Deputy being on extended sick leave, an acting head of the Political section, an acting head of the Economic section, and an administrative officer, all of whom had less than one year's experience at the post. In all of Indonesia we had only two language officers, one in the Embassy and one in Surabaya…. There were numerous other deficiencies.[133]

As US ambassador in Jakarta, Allison, in contrast to his predecessor's three years in Jakarta, lasted only eleven months. Allison had spent four years as ambassador in Tokyo, so what went wrong in Jakarta? Allison himself said, "My eleven months in Indonesia [were] … the most fascinating and frustrating period in my thirty years in the Foreign Service. The people in Washington were on an entirely different wavelength from President Sukarno."

The people in Washington were also on an entirely different wavelength from Allison, particularly from his reports that spoke realistically but approvingly of President Sukarno. Unfortunately for Allison, his position in

Jakarta placed him in the middle of Allen Dulles' Indonesian strategy. It took the ambassador several months to realize there were two channels for dealing with the Indonesia situation. One through the Jakarta Embassy was the official channel, while the other, used by the CIA station within the US embassy, was designed to bypass the ambassador. Allison named Val Goodell as the CIA station chief.

Before Dulles' 1958 covert operation in Indonesia could start, US Ambassador Allison had to be transferred because he was classical, and too honest to cope with Dulles' underhanded methods of using murder and mayhem to achieve his goal. Writing fifteen years later, John Allison recounted his experience as US ambassador in Jakarta in 1957: "One of my chief complaints," he revealed, "was the tendency in Washington to accept CIA reports in preference to those from the Embassy." Many of these CIA reports, he added, were "contradictory … [and] later proved incorrect."[134] The assistance Washington provided for the rebellion in Sumatra in 1958 was based on a compilation of CIA reports that did not accurately reflect the situation on the ground. Dulles' PRRI provoked a response from Jakarta. And merely starting a rebellion was enough to provide the required impetus, and then he withdrew support or rather, continued it on a drip feed. To give some idea of the raw power that Dulles had at his disposal, he was able to call on the 7th Fleet to play a role in the rebellion that he engineered.

Cumming returned from Jakarta to Washington to become director of a newly created bureau called the Bureau of Research and Intelligence and chaired the Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Committee, which was formed to assess the Indonesia situation. From this committee came the policy momentum (driven by distorted intelligence reports) that led to State Department support for the PRRI. The summary of intelligence gathered by this committee was passed on by Cumming directly to John Foster Dulles. Although Cumming's position covered general intelligence issues, Audrey and George Kahin comment that these were "disproportionately preoccupied with Indonesia," so much so that he became known as "Assistant Secretary in Charge of Indonesian Affairs." Three of Cumming's own agents were sent to Indonesia to report independently of the US

embassy, and their reports consequently reflected the CIA perspective. Cumming was also the State Department's liaison with the CIA. In other words, Allen Dulles had a direct means of influencing his brother through the type of intelligence conveyed via Cumming (without any suggestion of complicity on Cumming's behalf). The Kahins report that once Cumming settled into his Washington role he became "one of the most ardent of those pressing for aggressive interventionism (to forestall Jakarta central government adopting a pro-communist policy)." This was opposite to the advice he'd given as ambassador in Jakarta. Illustrating this point is a memo by Cumming to the State Department, advising on the Indonesian Army's request for weapons and training, shortly after the PKI's success in the 1955 election:

> In view of existing preference, Indo Army for American training methods and weapons and Army's key role as an obstacle to Communist entry into government, I strongly favor giving sympathetic attention to Indon request, if made. Extension United States influence in Army and strengthening it as anti-Communist force would definitely help attainment of United States objectives this area and is specifically in line with NSC policies.[135]

Why did John Foster Dulles want Cumming as his private Indonesia consultant when his own brother Allen was readily available? In effect, John Foster was seeking a second opinion. Cumming's role was a double-check or intelligence filter to prevent Allen Dulles simply feeding his own Indonesia scenario to the secretary of state, a reflection of the passive-aggressive rivalry that had existed between the two Dulles brothers since childhood. In this instance, Allen got around the problem by stacking the deck of the committee that provided Cumming the advice he passed on to John Foster. The Kahins comment:

> The core working group of this committee included Admiral Arleigh Burke, chief of Naval Operations, and Howard Jones, deputy assistant secretary of state for the Far East. Deputy Assistant

> Secretary of Defense Karl G. Herr, Jr. [*sic*] was appointed to represent the Department of Defense, and Colonel Joseph Harrison of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Plans Group.

"Herr" was a typographical error in the Kahins' book; the surname written as "Herr" should be "Harr"—Karl Gottlieb Harr. As a result of his youthful wartime stint in special intelligence and his success as a Rhodes scholar and Yale law graduate, Karl G. Harr entered the Dulles' legal firm of Sullivan & Cromwell. From 1954 (according to his private papers now in the Dwight Eisenhower Library) he was in correspondence with DCI Dulles and the Rockefellers. Karl G. Harr was under Allen Dulles' influence. As well, DCI Dulles' close associate, Admiral Arleigh Burke, held sway over Colonel Joseph Harrison. So, the opinions expressed and the decisions reached by most of those in the Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Committee merely reaffirmed Allen Dulles' strategy of painting Sukarno as procommunist and morally dissolute. By this means, Allen Dulles was able to convey to John Foster via Cumming a scenario that was primarily suited to Allen's own Indonesia strategy.

Another example of Allen Dulles stacking the deck was his choice of sending Alfred Ulmer Jr. for the preliminary work in Indonesia in early 1957, soon after Allison had arrived in Jakarta as the new US ambassador. Ulmer was then forty years of age, and during the 1955–58 period was the CIA head of Far East operations. As a 1939 Princeton graduate, he had served in Navy Intelligence during most of the war before joining the OSS and then the CIA when it was first formed. He was a close friend and associate of Allen Dulles. To ascertain DCI Dulles' reason for sending Ulmer to Jakarta, Audrey and George Kahin interviewed Joseph Burkolder Smith (at that time on the CIA Indonesia/Malaysia desk). Smith said Ulmer was dispatched because Allen Dulles wanted "to strengthen the case" for a "more vigorous policy" against Sukarno.[136]

Ulmer's report was followed throughout 1957 by reports from the cohort of CIA agents in Indonesia, intentionally skewing the available data so that Indonesia, or Java at least, looked as though it was on the brink of

going communist. Smith explained to the Kahins that the overall purpose was to justify covert action as recommended by the National Security Council's Special Group "to diminish or even destroy Sukarno's power." He also added that Dulles first used the colorful metaphor later attributed to Singapore CIA chief Wisner: "I think it's time we held Sukarno's feet to the fire." The underlying meaning, he explained, was that no written orders would be issued.[137]

Ulmer's meeting with the newly appointed US ambassador had yet another ulterior motive, as Allison revealed in his book:

> I spent a long and fruitless afternoon with him [Ulmer] and the local CIA Station Chief on the verandah of the Embassy residence. I do not know what his qualifications were for assessing Asian affairs, but he had served in Paris before assuming the position he then held and apparently had been brainwashed by the French as to the imminent Communist danger in Asia. When he returned to Washington I heard, at second hand, that he had reported that Sukarno was beyond redemption and that the American Ambassador seemed confused and was inclined to be soft on communism.[138]

Allen Dulles was steadily constructing a profile of Sukarno that would stir John Foster's virulent anticommunism to the core. Describing Allison, as being "soft on communism" would only have made John Foster Dulles more susceptible to the CIA reportage that did not reflect the real situation in Indonesia. The CIA reports concocted the scenario that led to the PRRI. Allen even arranged for a pornographic movie to be made purportedly showing Sukarno and a blonde Soviet intelligence woman. The movie was clearly a fabrication. The Kahins say that "the product was so unconvincing that it was apparently never shown to the secretary of state." However, the real point here is not how good or how bad the blue movie was, in terms of clarity or resemblance between the actor and the Indonesian president: Allen already knew that his devoutly Presbyterian brother would never take the time to view such a movie. Yet having this ridiculous movie made,

Allen's real target was John Foster, in keeping with the comment Winston Churchill made about the secretary of state: "dull, duller, Dulles."[139] John Foster's religious zeal and fervent anticommunism Allen knew all too well, and he wanted to create a political reaction that he knew would then translate into approval for the covert policy he was seeking for the PRRI. The real issue in Ambassador Allison's brush with Al Ulmer is not that the CIA man through lack of experience presented Washington with the wrong impression of Indonesian political trends, but rather that he did this deliberately according to his instructions from Allen Dulles. The impression one might get when reading the Kahins' account of the ambassador's response to Ulmer is that Ulmer simply was inexperienced and mistaken:

> Ambassador Allison ascribed the CIA's warped view of the situation in Indonesia not only to its operatives in Indonesia but also to "the head of the Far Eastern Section of the CIS (Al Ulmer), a young man with no experience in the Far East," who was dispatched by Allen Dulles "to look into the situation on the spot." Allison stated that he learned that when Ulmer returned to Washington he reported that "Sukarno was beyond redemption" and that Allison "seemed confused and was inclined to be soft on communism."[140]

To obtain the warped view of Indonesia that would win him Washington's approval to proceed with the PRRI, Allen Dulles first had to contend with the new ambassador in Jakarta. John Allison's diplomatic experience added weight to his personal assessment of President Sukarno as "truly a remarkable man," which was at odds with the skewered CIA assessments conveyed to John Foster Dulles. Allison had been assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs in 1952–53, before his ambassadorial appointments to Japan and then Jakarta, yet Allen Dulles was able to manipulate the diplomatic line of communication between him and the secretary of state. This ensured Allison's positive reports on Sukarno were ineffectual, but he realized this only much later. As a consequence of "the long and fruitless afternoon" he had spent with Ulmer, the description of Allison as being "soft on communism" (even though the worst of the

McCarthy era was over) was clearly a setback and baseless denigration that led to wildly exaggerated CIA reports having priority over US embassy Jakarta reports. Allison commented, "It is a great shame that Washington decided too soon that he [Sukarno] was beyond redemption." And the Kahins write:

> The unreliability of the CIA's portrayal of the political situation in Indonesia became starkly evident in the meeting of the National Security Council on March 14, 1957, in which Allen Dulles gave the astonishing report that "the process of disintegration has continued in Indonesia to a point where only the island of Java remains under the control of the Central Government. The armed forces of all the outlying islands have declared their independence of the Central Government in Jakarta."[141]

Allen Dulles was embellishing the situation in Indonesia to promote his own strategy of fomenting the PRRI, which would still take another eleven months to construct. Dulles' short-term forecast for the NSC was that events in Indonesia in March 1957 "could not be described as an irrevocable revolt." He was seeking NSC support for the revolt in anticipation of Jakarta's wrath; yet at the same time, he was predicting that the differences between the rebel army commanders and Jakarta army headquarters were not irrevocable. This is a template for events in 1958, or how Washington in the blink of an eye changed from supporting the PRRI to supporting a central army command.

In March 1957, Allen Dulles was depicting in dire terms the communist threat in Indonesia, describing Java as if it were on the brink of going communist and the Outer Islands as breaking away in rebellion. So determined was he to pursue this strategy, having nullified reports from the US embassy in Jakarta, he was able to grossly overstate his case to convince the NSC and the State Department.

In his memoir, ambassador from the prairie John Allison openly declares that Washington was ignoring his reports, or they did not seem to be reaching John Foster Dulles. Editorial note 270 in volume 22 of *Foreign*

Relations of the United States comments that neither the letter Allison wrote on September 25, 1957, to Walter S. Robertson, assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs, nor the reply from Robertson two months later, has been found in Department of State files.[142] Allison recounts the incident in his book:

> There was but little evidence that Washington had paid much attention to my comments on the Ad Hoc Committee report and this, coming on top of other Washington actions, or lack of actions, during the past month or two, was so discouraging that on September 25 I wrote a long letter to Walter Robertson detailing the causes of my discontent and stating that if the Department no longer had confidence in my judgment, I was prepared to resign as Ambassador and request retirement from the Foreign Service. One of my chief complaints was the tendency in Washington to accept CIA reports in preference to those from the Embassy.[143]

If letters, reports, and advice coming from the US ambassador in Jakarta were not reaching either Secretary of State Dulles or his deputy, Robertson, where was the blockage? It is highly likely that Allen Dulles had a hand in this blockage, utilizing his network between the US embassy in Jakarta and John Foster's desk in Washington. Could this block have been Marshall Green, John Foster's assistant, who was closely aligned with Allen? Allison says there were two channels of communication with Washington and openly declared the one that had preference was being run by the CIA. This was the work of Allen Dulles setting up a rebellion that (had the Embassy reports been received intact) might well have been averted.

Those in the CIA Jakarta station lived in and around Jakarta, some working within the embassy and others not. Kahin and Kahin refer to "the CIA station within the US embassy in Jakarta" that utilized a special "Roger Channel" for the purpose of bypassing Ambassador Allison. Both the CIA station chief in Jakarta and the head of the ICA (Aid) Mission in Indonesia, Val Goodell and Jim Baird, respectively, agreed with Allison that he should go back to Washington to participate in the Ad Hoc

Interdepartmental Committee, but nothing ever came of this suggestion. Allison's ambassadorial role at this time was little more than a cardboard cutout, fulfilling his duties as an official representative, while Allen Dulles was endeavoring to kindle an anticommunist revolt in the Outer Islands. Kahin and Kahin refer also to one CIA officer who preferred the cooler mountain air of the Puncak, a few hours' drive from Jakarta, and there were CIA operators on-site in Padang, one of whom was thirty-three-year-old military expert Anthony Poshepny (known as "Tony Poe"), openly promoting rebellion. When interviewed by European journalists in Padang, those linked with the operation declared in a startlingly blatant fashion that the CIA was "covertly assisting Sumatra against the communist-leaning central government in Jakarta." Allison's Asian expertise was recongnized in Jakarta in a positive light, but negatively by Allen Dulles. The planning for rebellion in Sumatra might not have proceeded without first ensuring Allison's expertise was sidelined and then arranging for his reappointment on January 4, 1958, to Czechoslovakia. The ill feeling between the two was mutual. Allison commented, "Unfortunately, the head of the CIA at that time was the younger brother of the Secretary of State…. I had great regard and considerable affection for both Foster and Allen Dulles…. But they did not know Asians well."[144]

Sukarno the Key

When Allen Dulles was informing an NSC meeting about the gains made by the PKI in the 1955 elections, Eisenhower asked "whether there was anything that we could do."[145] Dulles replied that President Sukarno was "the key to any solution of the problem, and he wished it were possible for the United States to exert influence on him." Allen Dulles' reply can be interpreted as wanting to exert a positive political influence on Sukarno or, at the other extremity, he might have been euphemistically referring to a CIA assassination plot. According to revelations made in the Rockefeller Commission Report two decades later, a CIA attempt to kill Sukarno had been prematurely disbanded earlier that same year, 1955. President Eisenhower took Allen Dulles' words in a positive light and responded by

suggesting Sukarno be invited to visit the United States. Voicing his approval was Vice President Richard Nixon, who had personally met Sukarno a few years earlier. He regarded the Indonesian president as an ardent nationalist, not a communist. John Foster Dulles then sent a memo to Eisenhower:

> As the leader and personification of his people's struggle for independence, President Sukarno occupies a position of unique power and influence in Indonesia, the largest and most populous nation of Southeast Asia. He has often expressed a desire to visit the United States and was very hospitable to Vice President Nixon in 1953 when he visited Indonesia. Neither President Sukarno nor any other high-ranking Indonesian has ever been accorded state or official visit courtesies by the United States. President Sukarno speaks of familiarity with important American writings such as those of Lincoln, Jefferson, and Madison, but he has no first-hand familiarity with America (nor with any European country).[146]

Secretary Dulles still expressed doubt, pointing out "that the danger in inviting him would be that he would get us hooked to the Indonesian position with respect to New Guinea." He was concerned because years earlier he had given Dutch Foreign Minister Luns verbal assurance of US support in the event of armed conflict with Indonesia. This was never revealed publicly because it would have added to UN criticism of Washington as procolonial, but was discussed in the Dutch parliament after John Foster Dulles had passed away. The only written version was on a serviette at a dinner party.[147] Luns was embarrassed by the news that his defense treaty had been written on a table napkin and slightly embarrassed again when he explained to me how it happened. At a dinner party, he and John Foster Dulles made a verbal "gentleman's agreement" that the secretary of state did not want linked with the issue of decolonization in the United Nations. Luns insisted, however, and the deal was signed on the nearest serviette. Nevertheless, the agreement remained in place until John Foster Dulles passed away and the agreement with him. When the issue of

US support for the Netherlands was subsequently raised in parliament, Luns declared that he "had it in writing" but later had to admit it was scribbled on the nearest serviette during a dinner party.

There were moments of doubt, such as in 1956 when the Dutch expressed concern that the invitation for Sukarno to visit the United States might be an indication of wavering US neutrality, especially because the secretary of state himself hand-delivered the invitation to Sukarno. Of 117 visits to foreign destinations made by the secretary of state during his time in office, the twenty-four hours he spent in Jakarta on March 12–13, 1956, was his only visit to Indonesia.

Some reports described the sale of $96.7 million of surplus agricultural commodities as a bribe to ensure his brief visit was well received. On the way home, he informed Eisenhower from Bangkok that he had a generally favorable reception:

> Dear Mr. President, I gave President Sukarno your informal invitation to come to the US. He was much gratified…. The big issue is whether or not the new government will be formed through alliance with the Muslim parties or whether the national party will try to form a government with the Communist party support …. The public demonstrations were overwhelmingly favorable, and a very minor incident of throwing a Communist propaganda sheet into my car is totally unrepresentative.[148]

The US Embassy in the Netherlands later telegrammed Washington that the "Dutch Government did not agree with Secretary's view that he did [the] world a great service by his visit to Indonesia by influencing formation of new government without Communist participation."[149] Six months earlier, the Dutch explained, they had correctly predicted the very same parties that formed the new government, so they suspected John Foster's visit to Sukarno might actually have been Washington's first step in changing allegiance in the New Guinea dispute.[150] The US role in forcing the Dutch out of the Indies in 1949, by threatening to withhold postwar reconstruction aid, no doubt heightened political sensitivity, but this incident only

accentuates how prominent and precarious the New Guinea dispute was in the respective foreign policies of the Hague, Jakarta, and Washington, as well as Canberra.[151] Two months later, Secretary Dulles spoke frankly with Indonesia's ambassador in Washington, Moekarto Notowidigdo, and visiting Foreign Minister Roeslan Abdulgani:

> With respect to West Irian the Secretary said that we would continue to adhere to our policy of not taking sides. He stated that in our view the legal case is not clear and the moral case is not clear. The inhabitants are not of the same race as the Indonesians, and from their standpoint the choice appeared to be between Dutch or Indonesian Colonialism. He said that it was our belief that the inhabitants of West Irian had not developed sufficiently to enjoy self-rule and that they were not ready for self-government or independence.[152]

Hovever, one year later in 1957, like a "road to Damascus" political conversion, John Foster Dulles reversed his opinion to be in favour of Papuan independence.

Part Three

John Foster Dulles and a Trusteeship for Papua

By August 1957, Allen's campaign of vilification of Sukarno was so convincing that it threatened to influence John Foster's opinion of Sukarno in a way that was quite the opposite of what Allen had intended. If Sukarno was pushing Indonesia into the orbit of communism, the secretary of state reasoned, the United States should reconsider its stance of neutrality in the New Guinea dispute. Without any forewarning, out of the political wilderness he suddenly picked the issue of Papuan independence and put it on the table. The irony was that John Foster's reaction up to that point had supported Allen's strategy by providing the authority of the secretary of state to proceed with PRRI planning. But now John Foster's reaction to the plight of the Papuans, caught in the crossfire of the New Guinea dispute,

was unforeseen. His volte-face was politically inspired, but, at the same time, as a devout Presbyterian he was showing sudden concern for humanity, the Papuan people. This was not an attribute that usually carried much weight in his political decisions but may well have been prompted by more somber thoughts of his own mortality; whereas in Allen Dulles, the search for any sign of similar concern would be long, indeed. John Foster's unexpected response, which was like a thumbs-up or thumbs-down on the future existence of the Papuan nation at that time, threatened to undo Allen's Indonesia strategy. The secretary of state called for a review of the stance of US neutrality in UN voting on the New Guinea issue. John Foster announced that he was considering this remarkable change in policy in a memo to Howard Jones, who was then deputy assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs:

> I think we should carefully reconsider our UN policy. It seems to me that in view of the pro-Communist trend of Sukarno—the fact that their own government is now extra-constitutional and the unrest in their own country—it is almost absurd to be neutral toward the extending of the Indonesian authority to a new area.[153]

This memo by John Foster Dulles on August 21, 1957, sparked departmental activity in Washington throughout September. The Bureau of International Organization Affairs (responsible for State Department participation in the United Nations) and the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs prepared responses. When these were handed to John Foster Dulles on October 2, the overall recommendation was "that United States interests for the time being at least would be best served by continuance of our policy of neutrality."[154] What was Allen's role in defusing his brother's initiative?

The person who delivered this response to John Foster Dulles was Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Robert Murphy, a close associate of Allen Dulles. They had begun working together during World War I, starting in Berne with Murphy arriving only two weeks after Dulles in April 1917, and in World War II, they had been together in the OSS and again in occupied Germany. It was Murphy's promotion in the

State Department that had led to Allen assuming the top position in Central Intelligence, despite Eisenhower's concern with having the two Dulles brothers together.[155] Murphy had preceded Allison in Tokyo before coming to Washington. He personally recommended that John Foster Dulles desist from any change to the policy of US neutrality and, as a compromise, Murphy handed John Foster Dulles a proposal that the New Guinea crisis be settled by means of a trusteeship. "During the balance of 1957," Kahin and Kahin comment, "there was a growing belief within the Eisenhower administration that Communist control of Java was indeed 'imminent.'" Within a few months after first being mentioned, this trusteeship proposal was superseded by the political tumult that occurred in Indonesia in the closing weeks of 1957. On November 29, the UN resolution on Indonesia's "West Irian issue" failed to receive the required two-thirds majority, and the very next day came the timely assassination attempt on Sukarno in a school yard in Cikini, Jakarta, using five hand grenades. It was the school where two of Sukarno's own children attended. Closely following this pandemonium came the seizure of Dutch business interests in Indonesia, hugely benefitting the army, and five weeks later the PRRI was declared.

In retrospect, the trusteeship proposal (although never officially launched by the State Department) should be seen as a high point of US empathy for the indigenous Papuan population. It took a State Department official of the caliber of Murphy to put a hold on John Foster's impulsive decision to review US neutrality in the sovereignty dispute. The momentous proposal put forward, the trusteeship proposal, is an indication of how serious a counter argument was required to divert the secretary of state from his course of action. "The Department has re-examined the problem of West New Guinea," Murphy began, "raised with you in August by the Netherlands and Australian Ambassadors … [and it is recommended that you] inform them of our intention to speak at the GA [UN General Assembly] in favor of trusteeship …. It is my own thought … that United States interests for the time being at least would be served best by continuance of our policy of neutrality." He continued:

> On the basis of agreement that US interests would not be served by transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesia, we sought to find a US position on the West New Guinea problem that meets the need to advance the welfare and interests of the Papuans, maintains peace and security in the area, and is defensible as fair and just. Such a position would permit the US to abandon its hands-off policy.… It would permit an affirmative pronouncement of US policy focusing primarily on the unassailable objective of the welfare of the Papuans, while at the same time recognizing without any prejudgment that a dispute does in fact exist between the Dutch and Indonesians. By inference such a policy would exclude the possibility of extension of Indonesian control to the territory and [such a policy would] place continued Dutch administration in the Charter context of trusteeship, thereby eliminating any plausible basis for charges the United States is defending "colonialism." … The Papuans would eventually exercise their right of self-determination.[156]

US neutrality in the New Guinea dispute was high on the agenda of all parties concerned in 1957. It was predicted that the Afro Asian bloc would swing the UN vote to two-thirds of the total, as required to initiate full UN discussion on the Indonesian claim. At the ANZUS Council meeting in Washington on October 4, Secretary of State Dulles brought along DCI Dulles to inform the Australian and New Zealand delegations about the US political rationale for maintaining neutrality. It was the secretary who first explained Allen's argument why change at that time was inadvisable:

> Those who are trying to keep Indonesia from going communist or to present some alternatives would lose such alternatives if we were to change our position…. Our people are concerned with the reaction in the outer islands, upon which we might wish to fall back in case of communist take-over in Java. They feel if we change our position it might militate against our ability to work with those elements in the outer islands.[157]

The State Department trusteeship argument for effecting no change in US neutrality was not mentioned. Only two days had elapsed since Murphy had presented it on October 2, making the timing of its presentation a crucial element of departmental politicking, and additional time would be required to inform the Dutch as the primary party involved. Aspects of the trusteeship may have ruffled diplomatic feathers and jeopardized the ANZUS support that was being sought for the PRRI. DCI Dulles' anticommunist crusade took preference, and he was there in person to explain strategic priorities to the twenty-six-member ANZUS delegation:

> [The proposed] change in our position would weaken our chances of working with the anti-communist elements. The elements in the Outer Islands feel as strongly about the matter [the New Guinea dispute] as Sukarno and any change would impair our chances of working with the anti-communist elements on those islands.[158]

Allen Dulles needed the support of the Outer Islands because the PRRI was almost ready to launch. His Cold War scenario won over again. Final confirmation of continued US neutrality did not come until November 8. US diplomats proceeded to lobby other countries, fully aware of John Foster Dulles' opinion. "If, but only if," he had telegrammed, "it can be done without becoming public, I would suggest that we would not be heartbroken if there were no two-thirds majority seeming to favor Indonesia's claims."[159] The UN resolution failed on November 29. And the trusteeship proposal disappeared in the mayhem that followed, leading up to the PRRI.

Allison, A Threat to Dulles

Allison was unaware that US neutrality in the Indonesia-Dutch sovereignty dispute had been reconfirmed on November 8. Just four days earlier, as he reveals in his book, he had sent Washington a telegram from the Jakarta Embassy outlining a suggested plan to end the sovereignty dispute. Allison's plan supported Sukarno as president, so he incurred John Foster's disapproval immediately. On the other hand, both Allison's plan and the

long-term strategy of Allen Dulles wanted the Dutch out, but the key difference was that Allison's plan simply handed over the Dutch territory to Sukarno. Allen's long-term strategy (which took place under President Kennedy) similarly handed over the territory to Sukarno but only once the Indonesian army was a consolidated political force, so then the handover was a prelude to regime change rather than in support of Sukarno, as Allison's plan was.

There were other differences between DCI Dulles and Allison. While the latter ensured all parties renounced the use of armed force, an integral part of Allen's strategy was to utilize Cold War tension. Allison envisaged the Dutch retaining the New Guinea territory for another five years and increasing the Papuan training program in readiness for a Papuan-controlled province in the Republic of Indonesia, whereas Allen was heading toward a military solution, firstly to oust the Dutch then to bring regime change. Cutting short the Dutch presence in New Guinea was also important in Allen's strategy, as it restricted further mineral and oil exploration by the Dutch colonial government of the mineral and oil deposits already discovered but not exploited. And finally, Allison was proposing a large-scale US aid program for Indonesia (the same as President Kennedy did after he intervened in the dispute in 1962). Allen Dulles' approach did not entail winning the hearts and minds of the Indonesian people by eliminating the poverty from which the PKI drew most of its membership. In any case, the suggested plan (which Allison referred to as "our proposal" because it was the product of those supporting him within the US Embassy in Jakarta) was doomed because planning for the PRRI, an anti-Sukarno operation, had already begun in September.

"I never did receive a direct reply from the State Department commenting on our proposal," Allison notes in his book. He continues:

> The degree of support we [USA] have throughout Asia may be measured in part by our attitude toward colonial issues. Our propaganda, our claims to be the champion of freedom and right will fall on deaf ears if in our actions we consistently support the

> vestiges of colonialism. This is not a question of giving full and complete support to either Indonesia or the Netherlands for sovereignty over West New Guinea. It is a question of whether we will oppose a request for the UN to offer its good offices to settle an international dispute.[160]

Inviting UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld to become involved in the New Guinea dispute was the last thing Allen Dulles wanted. At the same time, Dulles fully realized Allison's argument about the disadvantage for the United States of siding with colonial rule (i.e., supporting the Dutch in New Guinea) was a cogent argument. Although Allison telegrammed his suggested plan on November 4, he had started months earlier discussing the New Guinea issue with Indonesian officials, and he had telegrammed some of this material to Washington. More than one week before the secretary of state's important notice on August 21, 1957, about changing US neutrality in the New Guinea dispute, Allison was expounding his view that settling the dispute was the key to containing the growth of communism in Indonesia and improving bilateral relations. This same approach was taken a few years later by President Kennedy.

During the 1950s, the CIA was transformed into an unprecedented global structure with Allen Dulles wielding immense power. In the corridors of Washington, he was even able to disrupt the line of communication between the US ambassador in Jakarta and the secretary of state. Because of this, we cannot be sure of the effect that Allison's New Guinea initiative had on John Foster Dulles. Allison was unaware John Foster Dulles not only had thrown open the question of UN neutrality but also was on the point of adopting a decidedly anti-Indonesia stance. So both Allison and John Foster were looking at the New Guinea dispute at the same time. John Foster was looking into the prospect of dropping neutrality and supporting Papuan self-determination from a Dutch perspective, while Allison saw the need for Washington to dispense with neutrality and support either the Dutch or the Indonesians in the dispute. "The middle course will fail," he declared.

For months, Allison had been having discussions with various Indonesian government ministers about the New Guinea dispute and formulated his suggested plan. His solution, implicitly favoring the Indonesians rather than the Dutch, was sent to Washington. After two months without any response, he was notified on January 4, 1958 that he was being removed from his position as US ambassador in Jakarta.

At face value, Allison's suggested plan was the opposite of John Foster's proposal, but in reality, both were a threat to Allen Dulles' strategy. One left Sukarno in charge of Indonesia, while the other left the Dutch in charge of the New Guinea territory. As soon as the secretary of state officially requested a review of the neutrality policy, things moved quickly. The response from the Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Committee came in half the time it took for the State Department's response. Less than two weeks after the secretary of state was mulling over US neutrality on August 21, a report was submitted on September 3 to the National Security Council from Cumming. In essence, it was the political impetus to start the revolution that Allen Dulles had been planning, and it was entitled: "Special Report on Indonesia: The Implication for U.S. Security of Recent Developments in Indonesia, Especially Communist Political Gains in Java." Its political bent is evident in these few extracts:

> Should the Communists eventually gain control of the Indonesian archipelago … the Communist bloc would benefit from the exploitation of Indonesia's oil, rubber, and tin…. The Army on Java is rapidly becoming less reliable politically because of the removal, in many cases calculated, of anti-Communist officers from positions of influence, particularly control of troop units.
>
> Recommendations:
>
> - strengthen the determination, will and cohesion of the anti-Communist forces in the outer islands, particularly in Sumatra and Sulawesi … to provide a rallying point if the Communists should take over Java.

- Induce within Java a psychological awareness of the menace of Communism on Java by utilizing, among other things, the following themes as appropriate:

  (1) Identify the PKI with the Sino-Soviet bloc and in this connection stress the roles of the Soviet and Communist Chinese Embassies.

  (2) Emphasize the extent of Communist influence and control of Sukarno.

  (3) Identify the PKI, Sukarno or both as the cause for the growth of tension between the outer islands and Java.[161]

The report was in effect a template of the rationale used by Allen Dulles to generate the PRRI, consolidating opposition to Sukarno. It was designed with the PKI in Java as an extension of the Cold War enemy. Cumming followed up the special report with a warning that "if the current of anticommunism of the outlying islands were to lose its present momentum, it could lead either to 'an inevitable creeping extension of Communism to the whole country or perhaps to civil war.'" Three days later, on September 23, the National Security Council, with the president and both Dulles brothers present, met to discuss and decide on the recommendations in the special report on Indonesia."[162]

The level of covert activity was ramped up quickly. Both John Foster Dulles' proposal to change US neutrality and Allison's proposal to settle the New Guinea dispute created an urgency for Allen Dulles, but this would be recorded nowhere—other than the frequency of Allen's recurring gout. At moments of tension, the medical operation performed on Allen's club-foot soon after he was born led to or contributed to severe gout, an ailment that reoccurred throughout his entire life. It was like a barometer of political tension.

Jakarta was racked by a series of political events in quick succession: the UN rebuttal of Indonesia's quest for a hearing of the New Guinea dispute, an attempted assassination of Sukarno, and then nationalization of Dutch business interests. Ambassador Allison, who was already partly

isolated from his own department, was further isolated by the extreme tension in Jakarta, particularly as a result of the attempted assassination. (Apart from a brief reference in the Church Committee investigation by the US Senate, decades later, nobody has publicly revealed whether or not the CIA "asset" to conduct assassination was the same Muslim group responsible for the grenade killings in the Cikini school yard. It is highly likely Sukarno's would-be assassins were radicals from the Darul Islam group that the CIA had been funding for several years to destabilize the Jakarta. government.)The PRRI was still two months away from flaring into action in February 1958.

Allison's Dismissal

Less than a week before Allison was given notice on January 4, 1958, to move to Prague, he informed the State Department that the Indonesian cabinet was discussing the possibility of seeking arms from the Soviet Union:

> Usually reliable source who claims to have discussed Indonesia's international position with Minister of Justice Maengkom recently told Embassy officer that entire cabinet, including all non-Communist Ministers, agree on seeking Soviet assistance in struggle against Dutch. Source stated that according to Maengkom, opinion prevails in cabinet circles that Dutch incapable assuming present firm stand on Irian unless assured of full NATO support. In view of this "prima facie" evidence of western opposition to Indonesia's national claim, government has no choice but to turn to Soviet Union.[163]

Neither the name of the source nor the name of the embassy officer is revealed in the telegram, yet this is one of Allison's telegrams that did reach the intended recipient, John Foster Dulles. Doubtless, this news made the secretary of state uncomfortably aware that if the Jakarta cabinet were to investigate, they would soon replace rumor with reality to uncover the secret assurance he had given Dutch Foreign Minister Luns of US support.

The assurance did not involve NATO, although the United States was the principal party in that alliance. For Allen Dulles, who since his prewar days in Standard Oil had always wanted to end the Dutch colonial presence in New Guinea, the assurance given the Dutch by his brother only added to the complicated workings of his own Indonesia strategy at the level of DCI. For John Foster Dulles, a possible revelation about US support for the Dutch, at this time when the PRRI was about to erupt in Indonesia, had immense complications. This was in addition to the consequences in the UN where the verbal assurance of US support given to Joseph Luns at a NATO dinner party, not to mention the written assurance Luns had insisted upon and that the secretary of state had written on a table napkin—would have left the United States open to criticism. The entire Afro Asian bloc would have seized the opportunity to describe the United States as being hand-in-hand with European colonial powers, and John Foster would have faced condemnation from critics at home over an issue of national strategic concern committed with such informality. Mere mention of this topic would have weighed heavily upon John Foster Dulles. But was this information from Allison's informer genuine or concocted?

The continuing official stance of US neutrality in the Indonesian-Dutch sovereignty dispute meant a continuing (but not total) restriction of US arms to Indonesia. All three armed services were pleading for updated equipment and modern arms. Jakarta's argument was that if the West could not help, Eastern bloc countries would. The most prominent Indonesians who were involved in seeking arms were Djuanda as prime minister; General Nasution, the Jakarta-based army commander; and his deputy chief of staff in charge of weapons purchasing, Colonel Ahmad Jani (the spelling of his name later changed to match the pronunciation, as "Yani"). All three were unequivocally pro-United States and so all the more frustrated by Washington's refusal to approve the sale of arms and spare parts. The US refusal was exacerbated by the tension increasing in the Outer Islands. "During the second half of 1957," Kahin and Kahin noted, "Nasution repeatedly and unsuccessfully requested such material from the United States." A request from Colonel Jani who had only just returned, one year

earlier, from the Command and General Staff course at Fort Leavenworth, was relayed in a telegram[164] from military attaché Robert Collier at the US embassy in Jakarta: "Indonesian army needs equipment, army now has money from government for some equipment and army wants US equipment. Jani said that only US equipment will hold up here in the tropics." Collier wrote in the telegram that the Indonesian Army had been forced to replace windshields in all Russian jeeps because the tropical heat had caused the glass to become "wavey," and he added that on December 19, the Indonesian Cabinet had approved spending $250 million for military equipment. The Indonesian army was pleading that the United States should "permit some country, any country, to sell US-made equipment to Indonesia." In the same telegram, Collier included a direct quote from Jani saying, "Americans are 'funny people' and never do something half-way," adding that Jani said he could foresee a "very angry Congress cutting Indonesian aid in other fields, ICA, USIA, military schooling—right to bone because of Indonesian-Soviet bloc arms deal."

Collier provided the US Department of the Army information obtained by his assistant attaché, Major George Benson, who had established a close alliance with Colonel Jani. Washington was informed that three Indonesian teams, one from each of the Armed Forces, would depart on December 27 to purchase weapons from Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. "Benson had developed the reputation," according to Conboy, "as the embassy's leading conduit with the TNI."[165] Following Jani's return from Fort Leavenworth, Benson had established close ties with the Indonesian Army deputy chief of staff, but Benson was not sharing this information with Ambassador Allison; he was operating on a different channel than the US Ambassador.

A telegram from Collier on December 23 informed his superiors in the US Department of the Army about the political sympathy of the Indonesian prime minister. According to Collier, Djuanda told Colonel Jani that he would be called home, back to Indonesia from his weapons-purchasing trip in the Eastern bloc countries, if "the Americans came through with something in the meantime." Collier added that, in Jani's opinion, Djuanda

did not expect this to happen. “Notwithstanding the continued unfavorable atmosphere for Indonesia in reference to US aid—the door has been left open.”[166] Collier’s telegram described the newly acquired political power of the Indonesian army, after General Nasution had declared martial law in response to the threat from the Outer Islands, and a cabinet reshuffle had brought together General Nasution and Djuanda as the two most powerful figures under Sukarno. Martial law provided the army with sweeping power to control the PKI at will. After the nationalization of Dutch business interests, the PKI at first seemed to have benefitted, but, within a week, the army had resumed control of almost all businesses, and this gave the army a new-found economic base that it would use for decades. Collier wrote,“Present Cabinet will continue ‘have good life,’ says [name deleted]. Reason for this is fact that now Nasution and Djuanda have the strength to operate. Cabinet is the ‘Army’s doll,’ at moment.”[167]

The US historical records have names redacted, but it is clear that the information from Collier’s source about the destination and details of the arms purchasing, which did take place, is superior to Allison’s source. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of Collier’s telegram was that (in the same telegram 333) he concluded “the present Nasution–Djuanda Cabinet relationship will survive present crisis which is in variance with theory that composition present government will change in near future.” This information sent by Collier was an accurate prediction contrary to the anti-Sukarno rationale being used by Allen Dulles to promote the PRRI, the planning for which was then fully underway.

By describing Sukarno’s Cabinet as “the Army’s doll,” Collier was saying that the political strength of the pro-US army in December 1957 was actually the real source of power within Sukarno’s government. Yet at the same time, Allen Dulles was misinforming his audience in Washington that Jakarta was on the verge of turning communist. And the official declaration of the PRRI was still more than a month away.

Allison’s “usually reliable source,”[168] three days after the Indonesian arms-buying team had actually departed, finally passed on the information that their destination was the Soviet Union. Why did Collier and Benson

one week earlier inform Washington *but not Ambassador Allison* of this arms-buying delegation? The reason for this information delay remains open to conjecture—was Allison's "usually reliable source" acting on his own or someone else's initiative, or had incomplete or incorrect information been deliberately given to the embassy officer who reported the insider's information to Allison? In Washington, both the earlier imprecise destination and the delayed timing were ready-made evidence for those in the CIA who wanted to depict Allison as incompetent. Washington was already in possession of the correct version of the same information because it had been supplied by the army attaché at the embassy.

This incident finally provided Washington justification, or rather, opportunity, for reappointing Allison to Prague a few days later, effectively removing him before the PRRI started. It has never been ascertained, of course, whether Allison's informant supplied belated information at the request of CIA officials who had been trying to sideline Allison since he first arrived in Jakarta. Nor was it made clear if either Collier or Benson was the embassy officer alluded to in Allison's telegram to Washington. While there is no doubt both of them failed to inform the ambassador when they should have, thereby undermining his veracity in Washington, if either of them actually was the "Embassy officer" referred to, the level of their deception entails far more.

Allison states in his memoir that it was "the first and only time in thirty years in the Foreign Service that I experienced this type of backbiting."[169] He was referring generally to the way his position had been undermined by authorities in Washington, and his comment was prompted by a confession from another attaché. This occurred when Allison had called in the staff one by one into his office to announce his transfer to Prague. The naval attaché, a lieutenant colonel in the Marine Corps Air Force, told him that during his briefing in Washington before coming to Jakarta, he had been instructed that Ambassador Allison "was only a second-rate officer," and as a consequence there might be some differences between the ambassador's reports and those prepared by the attaché. But after six months in Jakarta,

the colonel explained, he could see that Allison was correctly assessing the Indonesian situation.

DCI Dulles targeted Allison even before he set foot in Jakarta. His removal was a necessary prerequisite before the PRRI. Despite Allison's good rapport with Indonesian leaders, the official reason for his transfer was his inability to communicate with Indonesians. In reality, his links with various Indonesian leaders gave him the potential to disrupt Allen's own Indonesia strategy. Two weeks after his position was terminated, Allison respectfully informed Washingtonthat he was given no opportunity to discuss this matter personally with the department. His recommendation that the United States support Indonesia in the New Guinea dispute had stirred a hornet's nest but was not the stated issue underlying his dismissal. Glaringly obvious with the benefit of hindsight was that if Allison had remained as US ambassador in Jakarta, the PRRI would not have proceeded as it did.

Writing his memoirs in 1973 when Indonesia was under President Suharto, Allison could see the wisdom in not unloading his criticism on the department. He had "right" on his side, but this was no advantage when dealing with Allen Dulles. The vendetta against him had culminated with an intelligence ploy to embarrass Allison in his position as US ambassador. This was the Blitz telegram affair. Two telegrams said to be from the US Embassy in Jakarta were "found" in the US Embassy in Taipei (after rioters ransacked it in May 1957). It was alleged these telegrams were from Allison and that he was requesting arms and troops for the dissident Sumatran rebels, and even for the ongoing Darul Islam rebels, to fight the central Jakarta government. We know now, of course, this was precisely what Allen Dulles was doing, his deviousness simply astounding!

The accusation against Allison first appeared in *Blitz* magazine in Bombay on September 28—"American Plot To Overthrow Sukarno"—but before the headlines were repeated in Jakarta by three left-wing newspapers, Allison talked with Indonesian officials. He recounts the incident: "On October 9, Acting Foreign Minister Hardi called me to his office to discuss the *Blitz* story. He obviously did not believe the story, but

he needed something to tell Sukarno and the local press."[170] Defending his integrity, Allison pointed out that the numbering on the *Blitz* telegrams was inconsistent with those from the embassy to Taipei, and also noted certain words and spelling showed the writer was English rather than American. He totally refuted the *Blitz* telegrams, but the main problem was not Jakarta but Washington. Unnamed persons there wanted Allison removed. While it seemed to many that the *Blitz* scandal was probably launched as a communist intelligence ploy to target the US ambassador, and was proven false, Washington argued it still resulted in the Indonesian ministers shunning Allison. John Gordon Mein, a young State Department officer[171] who was a friend of Allison's, was sent to talk over the problem with the ambassador. It was during this visit Allison realized how precarious his position was. He gave Mein a written message to deliver upon his arrival back in Washington, but (as declared in the historical records) it "has not been found in Department of State files." During his visit, Gordon Mein made it clear that Allison's fate was imminent. At this crucial moment, Washington would have viewed the arms-purchase telegram as evidence confirming Allison's noncommunication with Indonesian officials. He was dismissed without any diplomatic decorum. The official telegram arrived on January 4, as he was reading on the verandah of his weekend cottage in the Puncak (the mountain retreat behind the Jakarta) sipping a gin and tonic. Washington wanted him in Prague posthaste. Two days after he had been officially notified of the decision, Allison tried to recoup some of his professional dignity and replied to Washington. He offered to resign, rather than simply depart in ignominy after being jettisoned from the Jakarta Embassy:

> I told Mein it would be extremely difficult if not impossible for me to carry out such a policy and the government would undoubtedly be better served if there were another Ambassador here…. Mrs. Allison and I have seriously thought over whether I should accept Czechoslovak post if offered. While neither of us is happy about it,

> we agree that as a career officer I should be willing to go where the Department desires.[172]

On February 24, a month or so after Allison's departure, his temporary successor, Sterling Cottrell, informed Washington that an embassy officer had met with Sukarno, Djuanda, and three deputy premiers and they had

> talked at length regarding relations with US. Sukarno said that during (his) visit to Delhi, Indian officials assured him *Blitz* story regarding plotting of Ambassador Allison was false. Sukarno expressed high regard for Allison and asserted, "Allison was removed because he attempted to understand Indonesia."[173]

Cottrell had been selected by Hugh S. Cumming to be the interim head of the embassy before the arrival of Howard P. Jones as ambassador on March 7, 1958.[174]

Part Four

The Start of the PRRI

The PRRI counter government was declared on Radio Bukittinggi, February 15, 1958, by Colonel Husein, who announced that Jakarta had failed to meet the five-day ultimatum set the previous Monday. The Padang rebels and their advisors had demanded the resignation of the Djuanda government, so they were setting up a counter government. Sukarno was not due to return from Japan until Sunday the 16th, one day after the expiry of the deadline, so it was an ultimatum never to be met.

During the previous twelve months, Nasution had been attempting to negotiate a solution, but now he reacted immediately. Four of the rebel military leaders were dishonorably discharged and warrants issued for their arrest. The five-day limit on the ultimatum gave a "better than even chance" (to use an expression Allen Dulles often liked to use) that no decision would be made in Sukarno's absence. Achieving the PRRI declaration was the culmination of planning by DCI Dulles over many months. Jakarta had only two choices, capitulate or commence military action, so (as the Kahins

noted) “the crisis had reached the point of no return.” Sukarno’s absence overseas had provided an opportune moment to launch the PRRI.

Washington had been informed about Sukarno’s planned trip overseas in a telegram from Allison, one week before his untimely telegram (mentioned above) about the arms-buying delegation. Allison had sent very relevant information about the president’s plan to travel overseas. Jakarta was keeping the trip low-key and unannounced, Allison explained, because the attempted assassination at Cikini had left Sukarno on the verge of a nervous breakdown. According to information from Djuanda, Sukarno was a “very sick man” even though he still gave the impression of being well. It was very uncharacteristic of Sukarno to forget his thoughts mid-sentence or repeat himself, explained Djuanda. Passing this information on to Washington, Allison wrote: “[Jakarta] Government has therefore agreed that he should take vacation, travelling unofficially and incognito to undisclosed country … at least 3 or 4 weeks and perhaps longer.”[175]

Because Allison was excluded from all planning and preparation for the PRRI, he did not fully appreciate how crucial this information on Sukarno’s absence would be. In the strategy of Allen Dulles to launch the PRRI rebellion, it was an opportunity to be seized. Nor did Allison realize the full implications of the vendetta the CIA had been running against him. Because he was a straightforward diplomat, as he explained in his book, he did not question the “good intentions” of DCI Dulles. Yet at the same time it was well known in diplomatic circles Allison was averse to Dulles’ style of covert operations. Performing diplomatic duties in the Jakarta embassy, Allison had more experience and competence in Asia than any of his peers, but this was precisely the problem for Allen Dulles. Neither the PRRI nor the personal strategy of Allen Dulles could have occurred as they did had Allison remained as US ambassador. So, when Allison informed Washington of Sukarno’s planned trip overseas, he was in effect handing over information that would soon result in his dismissal, but *not from any shortcomings*; on the contrary, it was because he was efficiently performing his ambassadorial role and, as such, a political obstacle to be removed before Allen Dulles’ strategy was able to operate. He was unaware of *all*

the political implications of sending the message about Sukarno's trip overseas. His diplomatic experience straddled World War II, and his slightly unorthodox approach helped him to adjust quickly to Indonesia during his short stay there. Had he known that the telegram he was sending to Washington would determine the timing of his own dismissal, he nevertheless might have sent it anyway, with an appendum. In the same quirky way his memoirs (subtitled *Allison Wonderland*) included a chapter on Indonesia called "Advice from a Caterpillar," Allison might also have included another quirky message in his telegram to Washington, such as "don't shoot the messenger."

Allen Dulles announced the news about Sukarno's trip overseas when he addressed the National Security Council on December 23, 1957. With only a hint of ruthlessness evident in his words, he said the Indonesian president had "to some extent at least, lost his nerve since the assassination attempt." Sukarno's absence from Indonesia would create political opportunities for those wanting to replace him, and Dulles was aware of this, as was Subandrio. Dulles knew that Allison had said it was on the advice of the Indonesian cabinet that Sukarno was going overseas for a rest, but he still cast aspersion on Sukarno's motive: "He may yet double cross them," he warned. "The troublesome questions were whether he was plotting and whether he was actually working with the Communists." The Editorial Note in the US Historical Records paraphrased Allen Dulles' comment as follows:

> It was the Communists who wanted Sukarno to stay at home, on the grounds that if he left, a thoroughgoing non-Communist government might be organized in Indonesia…. Mr. Dulles expressed the belief that the Kremlin did not want an overt Communist take-over in Java today because such a development would mean the fragmentation of Indonesia.[176]

Unfailingly duplicitous, DCI Dulles was painting a picture of communist power sweeping across Java, if not the archipelago. He did not draw attention to the contents of the other telegram from the military attaché at

the US embassy in Jakarta, sent the same day, describing Sukarno's cabinet as "the army's doll"—completely under the control of the army. It would have made a mockery of his Kremlin warning and shown him to be a fearmonger resorting to Cold War hyperbole. The other evidence DCI Dulles might have used for fearmongering was the outcome of the local elections in Yogyakarta, one month earlier, which showed an increase in PKI electoral support. However, any talk of seizing power in Java, at this time, can only be described as highly exaggerated. It was out of the question not only because of the political power wielded by the army but also because Sukarno steadfastly refused to allocate any PKI representative a position that actually wielded power in the government.

The argument Dulles attributed to the Kremlin about *not* wanting the fragmentation of Indonesia was precisely the same as he himself was pursuing—that is, Allen Dulles' larger Indonesia strategy. The PRRI counter government plan that he had pursued throughout 1957, and which CIA field staff were promoting in Sumatra, was but one part of his own larger strategy.

In the PRRI, the political and military aspects were combined as a tactic, and in military terms this tactic might be described as a feint—designed to provoke a response from Jakarta. The PRRI was not designed in favor of the rebels in Sumatra, as Colonel Zulkifli Lubis discovered later, when he had time to rue the day that he became part of Allen Dulles' operation. The PRRI strategy had started a year earlier as a move directed by DCI Dulles against Sukarno and his government. Not only was Allen Dulles urging Washington to make a move, but he would then motivate further response from the Sumatran rebels once Washington's support was there for the rebels to see. Dulles was balancing both. The response in Sumatra was then used again to impress the NSC with the potential of the rebels to constitute an alternative government to Jakarta. DCI Dulles had started with Sumatrans who were dissatisfied with the revenue return from Jakarta central government and by February 1958 he turned it into an anticommunist rebellion. In this process of constructing friends and enemies in an Indonesian Cold War scenario, DCI Dulles had to minimize

the input of the ambassador. Allison's telegrams from the US embassy in Jakarta always threatened to inform the State Department of political events in Indonesia as they actually were, rather than a distorted version through the lens of DCI Dulles.

Allen began by constructing an Indonesian scenario with reports and statements to the NSC about the growth of communism in Indonesia. Typical of these reports was his March 6, 1957, statement to the NSC promoting federalism with the argument that "the Communists in Indonesia desired a centralized government because it made it easier for them to effect control."[177] Allen's own larger goal involved neither federalism nor fragmentation. On the contrary, his goal was the centralized military command covering the entire resource-rich archipelago, including Netherlands New Guinea, not just a portion. A National Intelligence Estimate on August 27, 1957, was another example of the type of report that Dulles was presenting to further his strategy, in complete contrast to the report by Robert Collier, military attaché in the Jakarta embassy, saying the army was in such a powerful position that Sukarno's cabinet was like an "Army doll." Dulles claimed, "Over the next twelve months, the prospect is for a continued increase in Communist influence over the central government. Although we doubt that the PKI will achieve effective control of the government during the next year, this possibility cannot be excluded."[178] Input for this report came from the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff, with whom he (as America's legendary intelligence figure) enjoyed a close relationship. Dulles continued with his dire claims so that the facts, which he sometimes included (as highlighted in statement below) seemed to be of no consequence.

> The Communist Party (PKI) is the only political group which proposes a clear cut solution to Indonesia's problems and possesses an industrious and effective political organization. In the central and most populous island of Java it polled 20.8 percent of the vote in the 1955 parliamentary elections. It has shown large gains in local

> elections since that time. Though *the PKI has as yet had no official representation in any Indonesian government*, there are four Communist sympathizers in the present cabinet, as well as 18 extreme leftists in the 45-man National Council, a key element in Sukarno's "guided democracy" concept.[179] (emphasis added)

If either Allen or John Foster Dulles had listened to Sukarno's reasoning behind his Guided Democracy, they would have heard him explain that, with Indonesia's forty-seven political parties, government could not function. The 1950s had left a trail of unworkable coalitions. "This is nonsense," Sukarno explained to Allison's successor, military attaché Sterling Cottrell, who took control of the US embassy in Jakarta briefly, just when the PRRI started. He informed Washington that Sukarno explained to him the problems arising in Indonesia from the profusion of political parties: "No government can act." wrote Cottrell, repeating what Sukarno had told him."[The] concept of Guided Democracy was one which could correct some of these evils, reducing the number of political parties. It was designed to correct evils in the body politics, not destroy democracy."[180] Yet Allen Dulles often described Guided Democracy as if it were a Sukarno dictatorship.

Allen always spoke disparagingly of Sukarno, and of the Indonesian people themselves he was only marginally less critical. When in the secure setting of an NSC meeting in December 1957, for example, the transcript of Dulles' answer to a question from President Eisenhower contains an irreducible tinge of racist "Dulles-talk":

> The President then asked whether we had achieved any success in getting the two big Moslem parties in Indonesia to work together. Mr. Dulles answered that we had enjoyed some measure of success in this enterprise, but the pace was slow. The Indonesians were a slow-moving people, living in a very hot country; they were not very vigorous.[181]

Dulles' reply might have been made with reference to President Eisenhower's colonial Dutch ancestors, but, because this comment with racist overtones was made during an NSC meeting, it was "contained". In any case, the enquiry from the president was little more than a token question, as after his first heart attack in September 1955 he had surrendered much in foreign affairs as well as security and intelligence to John Foster and Allen Dulles, respectively. The political and military power Allen Dulles acquired during this decade came not just from his own extraordinary ability, coupled with unprecedented access to the ailing secretary of state, but also from the fact that President Eisenhower's health, as Sukarno's, was in serious decline. Foreign Minister Subandrio[182] confirmed Sukarno's intention to go overseas in a meeting with Allison, and during the conversation he commented that the president's absence would provide political opportunities. He asked Allison if he was "the master-mind of any anti-Sukarno plot, [and] whether America was going to take any action against [the] President during his absence." This telegram by Allison, as a record of the conversation, is the epitome of Subandrio-style Javanese diplomacy, extending the hand of friendship but within an ineffable limit defined only by social decorum. The question was not so bold and audacious as it might seem, coming from the master craftsman of intelligence in Indonesia. Subandrio, without mentioning the subject, was referring to the *Blitz* telegrams and, in his own way, confirming that he knew the US ambassador was wrongly accused. His prediction about the move against Sukarno during his visit overseas was totally correct, but by observing Allison's response he probably confirmed for himself that the ambassador was well outside the CIA-circuit; dissembling did not seem to be part of Allison's character. In the next breath, Subandrio informed Allison about actual threats to Sukarno. Many Indonesian embassies had received threatening letters, he explained, Switzerland in particular. (Perhaps Sukarno had considered convalescing there.)These threats had come from both Indonesian and foreign sources, warning Sukarno that if his itinerary included Europe, he would never leave there alive. Sukarno had stated that he would travel Pan American to show that he was not

prejudiced. His choice of possible destinations, starting on January 6, 1958, would include India, Egypt, Pakistan, Ceylon [Sri Langka] Burma, perhaps Thailand, and finally Japan.[183] It was during Sukarno's time in Tokyo, by which time he had rested and recuperated, that he met Naoki Nemoto, an eighteen-year-old night-club girl who worked in the foreigner-friendly Akasaka district of Tokyo. The meeting was arranged by Nishijima,[184] the former wartime naval spy. When she took the name Dewi and married Sukarno, her brother committed suicide. Once in Jakarta, according to the British Foreign Office, she became "the foremost spearhead of Japanese diplomacy towards Indonesia."[185]

#

The CIA started to provide funds for the rebels in Sumatra in October 1957, and by November and December, a limited but steady supply of US weapons was being delivered. Kahin and Kahin have shown that a US Navy submarine used the small port of Painan just south of Padang, and a freighter from Taiwan brought some heavy machine guns, but the rebels still needed to be convinced that the US government would support them against the central government of Jakarta. Later, some weapons began to arrive "less discreetly delivered by airdrops," the planes calling in to Singapore to refuel for the return journey to the Philippines. On December 8, Allen Dulles contacted Under Secretary of State Herter to inform him that the British in Singapore were taking a very negative attitude. When British Foreign Secretary Lord Selwyn-Lloyd[186] was informed of the American "covert" involvement in Sumatra, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan sought clarification of US motives from John Foster Dulles at a NATO Heads of Government meeting in Paris, taking place on December 16–19. The British feared that US policy in promoting Outer Island defiance of Jakarta would lead to "fragmentation of the country."[187] The US response was that their Indonesian policy had a two-part approach. The first part was designed to bring about new government on Java by

encouraging non-and anti-Communist elements to cooperate with each other in the face of PKI threats.

The second part was described as a "fall-back position should Java be lost,"[188] but in reality the second part was the plan-in-progress for the PRRI. This two-part clarification for the British was the outcome of the initial meeting in Paris and was followed by several other meetings that involved British, American, and Australian officials, between December 19 and 23, 1957. These meetings were aiming to obtain the "maximum accommodation" for US operational requirements for the next stage of PRRI. In the official reference to this clarification in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, eight lines of source text have not been declassified in a top-secret memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Howard Jones to Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Robert Murphy. Still unavailable from official records are the details relating to the "fall-back position"—that is, the planning for the PRRI. Nevertheless, Kahin and Kahin produce the missing eight lines of details with the explanation that they became available briefly when Jones was writing his book, *Indonesia: The Possible Dream*. Jones provided the missing information without comment on the duplicity involved in gaining British cooperation. The extensive planning by Allen Dulles for the PRRI was euphemistically described as "giving some support to dissident Colonels in outer islands," hardly a fitting description or explanation for this CIA operation that Was the largest in the postwar years up to the Vietnam War. Jones supplied the missing lines as follows:

> Explanation seemed reassuring to British, and we were promised the maximum use of Singapore for operations, keeping in mind no arms shipments to dissidents would come thru that port, that knowledge of British consent to our operations be tightly held, and neither it nor our operations become subject of pol. comment in Singapore.[189]

The main issue here was that Allen Dulles secured the use of Singapore by describing his "support for the colonels" as a "fall-back" position. Of course, Allen needed the use of Singapore, for planes and for ships from the

7th Fleet in his planning for the PRRI, so this might have been regarded as deception. On the other hand, however, it could be argued that changing the government in Java was his ultimate goal. Undoubtedly the British were aware that the clarification contained deception because they had an agent in the PRRI. Colonel Lubis's close associate, E. S. Pohan,[190] not only was the PRRI contact in Singapore but also was working for British intelligence, MI5 (and possibly still the Japanese, as he had worked with the Kermpeitai during the war years). Pohan was also in contact with Allen Dulles' top man in Singapore, Frank Wisner, who was aware of Pohan's link with the British. So, the agreement for the use of Singapore was more than an example of Allen Dulles' forward planning; it showed his intelligence methodology was in fact working two or three stages ahead of the present. He achieved what he wanted in Singapore despite failing to inform the British of the planned PRRI operation, but both parties to the agreement (the Americans and the British) were aware that the other party knew the PRRI was gathering momentum. The British applauded any move against Sukarno, who was a thorn in their side, making it considerably more difficult to retain British influence during the process of arranging decolonization. The arms shipments did not technically come through Singapore, but the US planes that dropped arms in Sumatra needed to refuel in Singapore for the return journey to the Philippines. The main reason Allen Dulles was ensuring Singapore's readiness to assist in the PRRI operation was that access would be needed to Singapore harbor. In the PRRI saga, DCI Dulles' tour de force was having the 7th Fleet on call and still having the operation labelled as "covert." Colonel Fletcher Prouty commented in a similar vein about the PRRI, "The vast number of guns, the bombers and heavy air transport aircraft dropping hundreds of tons of arms and equipment, as well as submarines supporting beach operations were just too sophisticated to be anything but major power ploys." When requested to deliver forty-two thousand US rifles, he said an operation of this size is "well beyond covert…. I was asked to obtain the services of two US Navy submarines…. In my nine years providing support for the CIA that was a rare request."[191]

In mid-January 1958, however, PRRI rebel leaders whom Allen Dulles was now referring to as "the Padang group," were still hesitant to take the plunge. An airdrop of weapons by the CIA provided more evidence to convince them of top-level US support. Then on January 31, Allen Dulles informed the president, the secretary of state, and a host of intelligence representatives from the Armed Forces of the "probable developments in Indonesia."[192] It was delivered by DCI Dulles himself. He noted that rebel leaders in Padang were "still reluctant to take the final step of breaking with Java and, possibly, causing a civil war … [but] if the central government begins to receive large quantities of Bloc arms, the chances are better than even that the Padang group would break with Java and establish a 'Provisional Government of Indonesia.'" Speaking about "Reaction of the Sino-Soviet Bloc," Dulles said, "The Bloc has already made generous offers of assistance to the central government." There was another aspect to the arrivel of bloc arms, crucial for Allen Dulles' plans, but he did not mention it in his address on January 31. Jakarta had obtained seventeen MiG planes from Czechoslovakia. As mentioned in a footnote in the "Probable Developments" memorandum, CIA Deputy Director Charles P. Cabel had told those at an NSC meeting the previous day about the MiGs. This snippet of information would have also have helped determine Dulles' timing of the rebellion. Had Jakarta used MiGs instead of the US planes that they did use against the rebels, it could only have detracted from Washington's willingness (a few weeks after the rebellion started) to abandon the rebels in favor of Jakarta, the ultimate strategy that Allen was keeping close to his chest.

There was gross distortion in DCI Dulles' outline of the situation in Indonesia, as shown in the "Probable Developments" memorandum. It did not reflect the actual situation on the ground at that time. His words now read like a flight of fantasy but should be seen for what they are: deliberate deception of those who had no other way of verifying or disproving what he was saying. DCI Dulles was painting an unreal Cold War scenario of Moscow's hold on the PKI, a rebel guerrilla capability that lacked

authenticity and ties with Darul Islam based on mercenary deals. Dulles' words from the Memorandum read as follows:

> If a full break should occur between Java and the outer islands, and if hostilities should begin before the Jakarta government had obtained substantial supplies of military equipment, the Padang group would have a better position in the outer islands than would the central government…. At a minimum, the Padang group could probably launch fairly widespread guerrilla warfare on Java…. Support for the Padang group would probably increase considerably, even among the Afro-Asian neutrals, if the Communists should attempt to seize control of the government on Java…. The Bloc has already made generous offers of assistance … [and might] order the PKI to launch a major effort to seize control of the Indonesian government.

The military assessment of rebel forces provided by DCI Dulles for his brother and for the NSC and JCS and all levels of intelligence in the armed forces was a concoction of half-truths and deliberate exaggeration. It gave the impression that rebel forces had an excellent chance of succeeding militarily and this positive spin was intended to promote further US support. Additional support would also come, Dulles claimed, from other dissident sectors of Indonesian society, so the rebels would probably also have the support of the Atjehnese (Aceh) in northern Sumatra, the Darul Islam forces in South Celebes (Sulawesi), the Amboinese, groups in the other Moluccas that support the East Indonesian Republic movement, and some elements in Borneo. What Allen Dulles is feeding his audience here is just fanciful, so well had he whet their appetite for anticommunist action during the preceding twelve months. He even suggests that the rebels may invade Java when he adds: "We are unable to estimate the outcome of an effort by the Padang group to defeat the central government on Java." Clearly a legend in his own lifetime, Dulles had his audience in the palm of his hand. Such was the absolute power of persuasion he displayed during this briefing that he could literally get away with murder.

Aceh and Darul Islam joined in 1960, two years after the United States had changed allegiance from the rebels to the central government, and only when the CIA provided a token supply of weapons as added incentive to join. In terms of participating in the PRRI, it was a futile gesture, and the Darul Islam leader in Borneo was soon captured by troops from the central army. So, this CIA gesture, claiming to be widening the PRRI, actually helped consolidate the power of the central army command.

When DCI Dulles described possible conflict in Indonesia as a "civil war of the Spanish variety," he was deliberately misleading the recipients of his memorandum—first, by inferring that the opponents of the rebels were communist (when in fact the central government's army was anticommunist) and, second, by inferring that the PRRI would succeed militarily with US support. Once the rebels delivered an ultimatum to the central government, DCI Dulles then had five days to convince the rebels to take the final step. In a very carefully crafted memorandum that bordered on being a complete and utter lie, he provided various reasons why he thought "the chances are better than even that the Padang group would break with Java and establish a 'Provisional Government of Indonesia.'" But in explaining this, Allen Dulles' inferred meaning was: if the United States is willing to support the rebels, they will be successful. Had Dulles truthfully explained the reality of the situation in Sumatra, he would have said that the rebels simply did not have the military capacity he was claiming they did. Nor did they have the tactics or strategy, according to Colonel Simbolon, one of the main rebel army leaders whose opinion was noted by one of the CIA advisors in Padang.[193]

Allen Dulles' own strategy was for the Sumatran rebels to declare themselves a provisional government of Indonesia separate from Jakarta. This would provoke a military response from the central government, whose overwhelming military capacity would soon decide who was in command, with sixty-nine battalions against "less than 20 scattered throughout much of Sumatra and Sulawesi."[194]

The crucial point for DCI Dulles was to ensure there was an armed response from the central government. This required a suitable level of

provocation by the Padang rebels, who would not proceed without the assurance of gaining US support. Once this point was reached—as it was on February 15, 1958, with the declaration of the PRRI—Allen Dulles needed to ensure the rebellion stayed at a limited, manageable level. His main aim was for the central government to unify the Indonesian army—that is, defeat the rebels—so when the United States changed allegiance to Jakarta he was dealing with one army rather than the previous string of commands across the archipelago.

US forces, when they could have joined with rebel forces with a valid excuse of rescuing US oil personnel, did not. This was the political démarche that history has described as a "CIA failure." The subsequent officer-training program for the Indonesia army in the United States, which had started slowly after the Bandung Conference, was expanded into an anti-communist bulwark, and this occurred at the height of the Cold War. It was DCI Dulles' purported "failure" that led to a strong central command for a newly politicized Indonesian army—both of these strategic components were necessary ingredients for regime change.

Meanwhile, Allen Dulles during the remaining two years of the Eisenhower administration continued to drip-feed the PRRI rebellion, mainly in Sulawesi, with the addition of some CIA pilots, merely to prolong the conflict without further serious challenge to the central government. This ensured martial law was maintained and all elections postponed, while CIA funding covertly assisted the Indonesian army in Sukarno's quest to "unify Indonesia" with the return of West Irian.

Task Force 75

In early 1958 before the PRRI declaration, the Padang group and on-site CIA agents knew that rebel forces were outnumbered militarily but proceeded with the knowledge that US support would more than make up the leeway, provided the rebels were willing to declare themselves separate from Jakarta. Kahin and Kahin describe the situation:

> American agents were suggesting to the rebel colonels that, once they precipitated a break with Jakarta, they could expect to be

> accorded belligerent status and at least de facto American recognition—a status that would permit open assistance by the United States, Taiwan, and the Philippines.[195]

These agents were not attempting to deceive the rebels; they earnestly believed that US forces would enter the fray when the rebels in Sumatra and Sulawesi declared themselves separate from Jakarta. Once the die was cast, however, the rebels would not be in a position to change their mind, much less their allegiance, but Allen Dulles was.

Richard Casey, the Australian minister for External Affairs, was another who misread this regional conflict. Far less wary of Allen Dulles than was his British counterpart, Casey wanted to involve SEATO[196] in support of the rebels, but Allen Dulles did not want US troops involved in actual fighting against the Jakarta central government.

His strategic reason was that DCI Dulles did not want this rebellion to gather momentum. On the contrary, he wanted the central government forces to deal with the rebels by military force soon after the declaration of a counter government; otherwise, if it showed itself to have a "reasonable prospect of permanency," it would soon have gained official recognition from other countries. The United States was the largest member of SEATO, which, as an organization, had no armed forces of its own, so there was a flurry of accusation in Jakarta when a submarine (described as a "SEATO submarine") was photographed off northern Sumatra.

Step by step, Kahin and Kahin have described the moves toward the declaration of a countergovernment, noting that a rift appeared in the PRRI rebels, but not a clear dividing line, between the military and the civilian leaders. There was hesitation because some rebel leaders feared that the original struggle for greater regional autonomy had been commandeered by outsiders with a political agenda. Having US military support appealed to the rebel colonels, but the prospect of civil war over what began as a dispute over distribution of oil revenue was less enticing to rebel civilian leaders.

On February 6, Allen Dulles discussed Indonesian developments during a meeting of the NSC; the following is an extract from the official record of his discussion:

> Mr. Dulles said that if there was going to be a climax in Indonesia, we were on the point of reaching it; but one has to be very skeptical about the Indonesians and about any climax. As a people, the Indonesians often do a lot of talking, accompanied by very little action; but it seems that the dissidents will join in submitting an ultimatum to the Jakarta government on the 7th of February…. Mr. Dulles concluded by predicting the possibility that, whatever happened, the outer islands would split off from Java.[197]

The ultimatum was delayed a few days because of disagreement among the rebel leaders. The PRRI military leaders and Sumitro, who himself had far stronger links with the CIA than Colonel Zulkifli Lubis did, pressed for a provisional government rather than negotiations. Kahin and Kahin have noted it was "the military leaders and Sumitro … [who] decided to pursue a confrontation with the central government."[198]

The ultimatum shocked many, both on the rebel side and the central government, by its culturally atypical approach. One day later, however, on February 11, there was a follow-up shock when Secretary Dulles delivered a stinging rebuke of the Jakarta government. His probable intention was to keep up the momentum of the Padang group, which he did, but at the same time he angered Jakarta with his comments:

> We would like to see in Indonesia a government which is constitutional and which reflects the real interests and desires of the people of Indonesia. As you know, there is a kind of a "guided democracy" trend there now…. We doubt very much that the people of Indonesia will ever want a Communist-type or a Communist-dominated government.[199]

The ultimatum supposedly had put on the table the option of pursuing negotiations, which was regarded by many on both sides as how the dispute

would proceed. That it led directly to the declaration of the PRRI on February 15 was an unexpected outcome for many Indonesians on both sides. Yet when (in Kahin and Kahin's words) the "tactlessly partisan" statement of the US secretary of state followed the rebel's ultimatum the very next day, it greatly reduced the possibility that negotiations might continue.

Economic retaliation rather than armed conflict was the first move by the prime minister and minister of finance of the PRRI counter government, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (who was a former finance minister in Jakarta and, before joining the rebels, governor of the Bank of Indonesia):

> Sjarifuddin ordered the American oil companies in Sumatra to end the flow of oil and oil revenue to Jakarta and cabled the Federal Reserve Bank in New York and the Bank of England to freeze Jakarta's assets…. [He] sent envoys to establish diplomatic relations in Western countries and to seek financial aid and credit, as well as to arrange for currency to be printed in London.[200]

But a week after the PRRI declaration, the Indonesian air force bombed the radio communications in Padang and Bukittinggi, and Menado in Northern Sulawesi, where rebels in support of the PRRI had formed a "charter of inclusive struggle" (Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam) known as Permesta. The move by Sjafruddin to stop the oil flow to Jakarta may have seemed a logical step but, because of this declaration, the Caltex oil fields and the American personnel working at Pekanbaru were politically caught between the PRRI and Jakarta. Their plight highlighted the need for US intervention to protect US lives and property. Allen Dulles had already arranged for the 7th Fleet to be available for just such an emergency.

Colonel Zulkifli Lubis told the Kahins that the rebels believed US support would "intimidate the Jakarta government." He was referring to Task Force 75 from the 7th Fleet. In and around Singapore and the Malacca Straits, a stone's throw away from the Sumatran coast and the Caltex oil fields at Pekanbaru, the US ships began to arrive on March 7. The evacuation of US oil personnel was a stated concern, yet Task Force 75,

merely by its presence, had crucial influence, and its impact was decisive. As much as this US support seemed to work in favor of the rebels, it also worked against them because of the reaction of the central government. Jakarta foresaw that if the evacuation of Caltex oil personnel were to involve US troops, they and the rebels might join forces. To preclude this adverse outcome, and to secure the oil fields as a principal source of revenue, Jakarta resolved to use military force to ensure the US oil personnel were adequately safeguarded. In other words, the presence of Task Force 75 was crucial in securing a rapid response from the Jakarta military, which nipped the rebellion in the bud (although Allen Dulles ensured it lingered on for two years). This resulted in a centralized military command and Washington's change of allegiance back to Jakarta.

#

The decision to send Task Force 75 was the result of a discussion on February 21 involving Under Secretary of State Christian Herter,[201] the Dulles brothers, and CNO Admiral Arleigh Burke (chief of naval operations[202] and a close associate of Allen Dulles). Burke was actually implementing policy that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) *had already agreed to three months earlier*. The JCS expressed their views on the implementation of US policy in Indonesia and wanted "specifically to point out to the NSC how the JCS viewed the situation in Indonesia." The imprint of Allen Dulles on their assessment was clearly evident, whereas Ambassador Allison would have explained that Java was *not* on the verge of a communist takeover, which was the premise of the JCS five-point summary. Points A and B were not incorrect, but neither were they applicable to current events in Indonesia. Point D, however, is Orwellian double-talk about helping the army in Java, but not before they defeat the rebels in the Outer Islands—which is precisely the plan. Even without the NSC making a request, the Joint Chiefs prepared this five-point memorandum just as the PRRI storm was breaking in February 1958, clearly supporting Allen Dulles.

a. The loss of Indonesia to the Communist Bloc would do irreparable and catastrophic damage to the position of the US and its allies in the Far East.
b. A Communist-controlled nationalist government, once established in Java, would … [spread] Communist control throughout the island chain.
c. The United States must … assist in the creation of a non-communist nationalist government.
d. An immediate token military aid program, with particular reference to the Indonesian Army, is necessary to forestall direct Communist Bloc influence … but should not enhance to a significant extent the mobility of forces under the control of the central government with respect to their possible employment in the outlying islands.
e. Increasing influence of Communist elements on the Central Government of Indonesia must be countered.[203]

What really stands out from these five points is how Allen Dulles could rally the 7th Fleet on specious intelligence, making the Cold War and his own strategy one and the same—a precedent that again should sound warning bells for the future influence he wielded in relation to President Kennedy. Minerals and oil were hardly ever mentioned as a goal for gaining control of the archipelago or including the New Guinea territory as a step in the process of ousting Sukarno. In terms of influencing the Joint Chiefs, DCI Dulles' word on Indonesia was taken as political gospel. Point D helped in the post-PRRI transformation of the Indonesian army, over the next seven years, which was largely achieved by officer training in the United States. It shows that at a very early stage in the PRRI, when the time came to switch allegiance from the Padang rebels to the central government, the door was already ajar, as far as the JCS were concerned. An existing understanding with the Indonesian army meant that Allen Dulles already had his foot in the door, waiting for the right moment to enter.

Even as Task Force 75 was taking shape in the waters off Singapore, according to Kahin and Kahin, "the Eisenhower administration was still groping for the most plausible excuse for using it on behalf of the Sumatran rebels." This statement needs some qualification because those in the Eisenhower administration who had been swept along in zealous anticommunism in an anti-Jakarta context certainly included John Foster Dulles but not Allen. From many statements by DCI Dulles about anticommunism, it seemed he and his brother were painting with the same brush, but in the context of Indonesia it was Allen who had set the profile and chosen the paint. A closer look at the flurry of diplomatic exchanges that took place, while Task Force 75 lingered menacingly off the coast of Sumatra, shows how direct contact between US and Indonesian forces was avoided and also shows the role of DCI Dulles in achieving that outcome. Had there been any conflict between Jakarta and the nearby US military forces, it would have meant an end to Allen Dulles' larger Indonesia strategy.

#

Part Five

In the impending conflict between the PRRI and central government, American and British oil-company personnel and installations in Central Sumatra acquired a pivotal role. The Caltex oil field in central Sumatra was first successfully drilled by the Japanese during their wartime occupation; apart from Netherlands New Guinea, the Caltex site was the first piece of real estate reclaimed after the Japanese surrender, and not by the British who took control after the surrender but by American oil experts. While Indonesia had oil fields across the archipelago, the Caltex oil field around Pekanbaru was the only one comparable in size to the Middle East giant oil fields. With its own airfield, Pekanbaru was located on the Siak River that emptied into the Malacca Straits just opposite Singapore; while Padang on the West Coast of Sumatra was not far from Pekanbaru as the crow flies, travelling by road took many hours along a mountainous route. As the PRRI

day of declaration was approaching, the Caltex supply of oil to the central government did not stop. (Throughout the entire PRRI civil war, only ten days' production was lost.) Jakarta designated the petroleum storage dumps at Padang a target because they could supply rebel forces, so it was decided to bomb them. But at the same time, Jakarta did not want to incur the wrath of the Americans or force them to side with the rebels.

To Bomb (or Not) the Oil Depot

On the morning of Tuesday, March 4, 1958, Secretary General Kusmowidadjo Suwito of the Indonesian Foreign Office contacted Sterling Cottrell, the US military attaché who was acting as counselor after the departure of Allison. Cottrell was a graduate of the US Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, and with his skill in intelligence he later became political advisor to Admiral Felt, commander-in-chief of the Pacific Command. Then, in the Vietnam Task Force established by President Kennedy, Cottrell was director with General Lansdale serving under him. Cottrell was then appointed deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, and by January 1963—only five years after his role in the PRRI—he was coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the Department of State. Clearly, his rise was meteoric after his role in the PRRI. What did he do so right?

When Suwito spoke with Cottrell that Tuesday morning, he informed him that the Indonesian Air Force was planning to bomb an oil depot in Padang. It was possibly being used by the rebels. Suwito politely pointed out with expert legal finesse that Jakarta wanted to ensure that American oil company personnel were warned. He did not want anybody injured during the bombing. By issuing such an official warning and offering compensation to the owners of the depot, Jakarta was utterly in compliance with the UN Charter. The bombing operation was "absolutely necessary," he explained, and would be carried out without loss of life. However, Cottrell rang the Stanvac depot manager, Colonel Jack Berlin, and discovered there was only a paltry amount of kerosene and gasoline left in the tanks.

At 11:30 a.m., the US military attaché went to Suwito's office so the secretary general himself could verify what the Stanvac manager had said. Later that same day, Cottrell conveyed this information to Washington, reporting that Suwito had said he was hopeful the bombing would now be called off, after both of them had talked on the phone with Colonel Jack Berlin. The crisis seemed to have been averted, Indonesian-style. The points Suwito had first brought to the discussion satisfied international law requirements to the fullest degree and, accordingly, annulled the right of US retaliation. Of course, in Cottrell's message to Washington he had clearly taken pains to compile Suwito's points with some legal precision but did not draw any conclusions in terms of international law. His telegram drew attention to the fact that he had expressed concern about the need to "protect American citizens and American-owned property."[204]

Because of the eleven-hour time difference between Jakarta and Washington, the telegram arrived overnight and prompted an early morning (March 4) staff meeting in the office of the secretary of state. Of the two methods of communication available at the US Embassy, one to the State Department and the other to the CIA, it is not known whether Cottrell used both. Allen Dulles was not present at the early morning staff meeting. The question John Foster Dulles did not know how to answer was, should US troops use this threat by Jakarta to bomb oil installations as a pretext to send in US troops immediately?

During the meeting he cautiously recommended the State Department legal advisor, Loftus. E. Becker, to find out whether the US had rights under international law to intervene on behalf of US citizens and property interests. It was not the legal aspect of the question that was causing John Foster to hesitate. After all, he had been one of the world's top international lawyers for the last few decades and had written the peace treaty with Japan after World War II, not to mention his role at Versailles. Not the legal but the political unknowns had caught him unawares. He wanted to know the opinion of the driver of this PRRI project, so he immediately phoned Allen when the meeting had finished. Notes of the phone call were taken by the personal assistant to the special consultant to the president.

The rough notes from the phone conversation at 10:16 a.m. were the following: "The Secretary said then you don't think it desirable to send forces in to protect American lives and property. A [i.e., Allen Dulles] said no, he is inclined to think it good if they did it [i.e., proceed with bombing] —then we have a good basis for yelling and screaming."[205]

Allen Dulles' reply was obviously not what John Foster expected. First, it shows the gulf between the two Dulles brothers, and second, it shows Allen's callous nature, a purported willingness to risk the lives of American oil personnel simply for the purpose of justifying the presence of US troops. John Foster recognized the opportunity this incident presented to land US troops to protect the lives of Americans. With this opportunity, it would have been possible to achieve what he and his brother had been working toward for the last few months. With this legitimate excuse for entering Indonesian territory, John Foster would have been able to provide support for the Padang rebels against the procommunist government that CIA Indonesia experts claimed was about to form in Jakarta. But Allen said "No."

Loftus E. Becker, the State Department legal advisor, was at pains to produce a memorandum the next day claiming that the precautions taken by Jakarta—a valid warning and the offer of compensation—left Washington no right under international law to intervene. But Becker was simply papering up the cracks that appeared between Allen and John Foster. If Washington had seriously thought the lives of American oil workers were in danger, and the nearby presence of Task Force 75 provided a way to evacuate these people, it would have proceeded. Lest we forget, there were two communication channels operating from the US Embassy. One of these went straight to Allen Dulles. It is certainly within the realm of possibility that Cottrell as military attaché had access to the CIA channel and was in regular communication with DCI Dulles. But no State Department historical record is available to show Cottrell contacted Allen Dulles on March 4 about Jakarta's threat to bomb the oil depot in Padang. However, Allen Dulles' words recorded at a March 6 staff meeting of the secretary of state were noted as follows:

> Mr. Allen Dulles continued by pointing out that the Jakarta government had informed our attaché [Sterling Cottrell] of its proposal to bomb the oil installations of the US-UK oil companies in Sumatra. It now appears that they have probably been talked out of this proposal, though Mr. Dulles rather wished they had gone through with it without telling our attaché in advance.[206]

DCI Dulles could afford to be flippant because he knew that the crisis had already been averted. The additional quip was merely repeating the same sentiment he had expressed to John Foster on March 4, but now for a wider audience. It was characteristically an Allen Dulles comment; that is, having secured what was needed for his personal strategy to succeed, he then seemed to indicate his preference for a policy that was the exact opposite and, moreover, one that put at risk US lives and property.

Pursuing his personal strategy, Allen Dulles did not want US troops involved in actual fighting, either against the central government or in support of the rebels. The covert operation clearly had US support, and this made a mockery of the claim that it was covert, but (as the Kahins pointed out) as long as there were no US fatalities it was possible the American public would remain unaware—and even today these US military operations in Indonesia remain largely unknown. In a similar vein, Secretary Dulles contacted the US Embassy in Jakarta, concurring with Cottrell that the "destruction of installations would receive considerable publicity in US (and) would likely evoke critical US public reaction and would certainly not help promote good Indo-US relations."[207]

Secretary Dulles' concern for good bilateral relations was not evident three days later in the statement he made before the American House Foreign Affairs Committee. In Kahin and Kahin's opinion, it left no doubt as to "the United States partiality for the rebel cause." On March 9, dealing with Indonesia, John Foster Dulles declared:

> We would be happy to see non-Communists who are really in a majority there, the Moslem elements, the non-Communist parties, exert a greater influence in the affairs of Indonesia than has been the

> case in the past, where Sukarno has moved toward this so-called "guided democracy" theory which is a nice sounding name for what I fear would end up to be Communist despotism.[208]

This statement both helped the rebels and rallied the government. First, the statement bolstered the rebels' conviction (as it was intended to) that they had the US government on their side. Second, for Cold War friends and enemies, it provided the hallmark of Washington's approval in relation to the PRRI. And third, it bolstered the conviction of the central Jakarta government to move quickly against the rebels.

With the advantage of historical hindsight, more than sixty years after the event, we can see that the secretary's pro-PRRI statement was a clever strategy, but for those immersed in the turmoil at that time, events seemed more scrambled. From the perspective of John Foster, his statement provided additional moral support for the Padang rebels because it would also help his own aim of defeating the Jakarta government; but from the perspective of Allen Dulles, it not only did what the secretary anticipated it would, but also helped to galvanize Djuanda and Nasution into military action, which was precisely what Allen's larger strategy required.

The secretary's statement was made just before he departed for Manila to attend the SEATO foreign ministers meeting, March 11–12, and it had a flow-on effect, boosted by his presence. The additional support SEATO offered was "leaked from the conference's 'secret' sessions … and it was widely known that a PRRI representative had flown to Manila to be present at the meeting."[209]

Not leaked from the SEATO meeting was the breakfast conversation between the US secretary of state and President Garcia of the Philippines, accompanied by his acting secretary, at the president's residence. John Foster was informed that "President Garcia and Secretary Serrano … appeared convinced from their information that Sukarno would succeed in crushing the rebellion by military force in a relatively short period of time."[210]

President Garcia had sent a Filipino observer to Padang, and this person had familiarized himself with the rebels and their advisors and visited Jakarta to assess the situation there too. This person was in a unique position to assess the real potential of the PRRI. The name of the observer was Benigno Aquino Jr. He witnessed the entire spectacle of CIA assistance, which seemed to him responsible for leading the Sumatrans into civil war, then deserting them and instead backing Jakarta and the regime change that followed. Later, when another military ruler emerged in the Philippines, President Marcos, similarly having close links with the CIA, his political archrival was the same PRRI witness from 1958, now senator, Benigno Aquino Jr. In order to stay alive, he left the Philippines. On August 21, 1983, returning after three years of exile in the United States, Benigno Aquino Jr. was assassinated minutes after arriving at Manila airport.

Part Six

The new US ambassador, Howard Jones, arrived in Jakarta on March 6 and became involved even before officially presenting his credentials four days later. On the evening of March 7, Jones sent a telegram to the State Department regarding the crisis about possible bombing of the oil depot, first brought to the attention of Sterling Cottrell by Suwito on March 4. The secretary specifically requested that Jones refrain from stepping into this issue. Jones's first official days at the embassy, March 10, 11, and 12, were absolutely crucial for implementation of Dulles' PRRI plan, as he did not want Task Force 75 actually to become involved. Cottrell, doing what Allen Dulles requested, was given preference over Jones. When the secretary of state requested Jones to allow Cottrell to complete what he had started, before Jones assumed full ambassadorial duties, Allen's influence is detectable: "Believe it preferable," John Foster urged Jones, "this be done by Cottrell so as to give the impression that is follow-up his discussions [*sic*] and indication Department approval his actions rather than new approach by Ambassador."[211] It was Allen's preference that John Foster

was conveying because Cottrell, in the next few days, still had a vital role in Allen's larger strategy to achieve a centralized army command.

As far as John Foster Dulles was concerned, it was normal for Jones to start diplomatic duties on his first day in office, but for Allen it was preferable that Sterling Cottrell continue a few days longer, to tie up loose ends. One of these concerned Admiral Roy Benson in command of the menacing Task Force 75, nearby in the Malacca Straits, and the other was a massive arms drop for the rebels that was about to happen.

These few days were the turning point in the PRRI. With the arrival of Jones in the wake of Allison, diplomatic communication would resume with Washington—but not yet—and the stark truth would be out that the fate of the PRRI was doomed. Then would come the "realization" that dealing with Jakarta rather than Outer Island rebels was the way forward. This did not happen yet for some weeks, but when it did, Jones was the man who repaired bilateral relations.

For Jones to have stepped in to assume control on March 10 was normal procedure. It would have been the equivalent of Subandrio stepping in, as he did, to add the finishing touches to an agreement Suwito had already made. Cottrell had resolved the crisis already to ensure there would be no bombing of the oil depot. Formal discussion continued with the help of an aide-memoire, which Cottrell composed, needing only the final, official stamp of approval. This kept the "bombing issue" in the pipeline for an extra forty-eight hours, while Cottrell attended to the two remaining issues. There was no reaction from Jones, on file, to being officially sidelined for his first few days in the embassy. Although Cottrell was mentioned in Jones's telegrams to Washington, in Jones's memoirs of his role as US ambassador in Jakarta, Sterling Cottrell as his immediate predecessor is never mentioned.

The crisis about possibly bombing the Caltex oil depot was not officially over until Foreign Minister Subandrio informed Cottrell that the bombing was canceled, and Washington regarded it as a crisis until officially stamped by Subandrio. But in reality, Cottrell had already ended the crisis. It was not a valid reason for excluding Jones, but there were other

reasons! It was not obvious at the time, but the link between Allen Dulles and Sterling Cottrell was crucial, as shown the morning after the largest weapons drop during the entire PRRI operation, on March 11, onto the Caltex airfield at Pekanbaru.

Four Calls by Cottrell

As US ambassador in Jakarta, it was Jones, not Cottrell, who pursued the issue of evacuation of oil personnel. He visited Prime Minister Djuanda in his office on March 8:

> I was accompanied by Arnold of CALTEX and Cottrell and Foreign Minister Subandrio was also present…. I underlined serious risks involved to dependents and consequently to US-Indonesian relations in leaving dependents in area which might become battleground…. After conference with Djuanda both Arnold of CALTEX and Berlin of STANVAC dispatched instructions to carry our evacuation plan in accordance with GOI [Government of Indonesia].[212]

It was during this visit he was informed that Jakarta was planning a military action and was intending to occupy the Caltex oil fields. The various sites there included the airfield at Pekanbaru and an accommodation site at Rumbai camp where there were about six hundred Americans and seventy-five British, Australians, Canadians, and South Africans, and one New Zealander. Of the Americans, 150 persons were later evacuated to Singapore. There were some rebels among the local people but few in number. Earlier, when arms had been dropped at night by parachute on February 26, the local rebels had lit flares on the airfield to assist. (This was merely a practice run for the large arms drop to come on March 12.) Jones told Washington, "I said [to Prime Minister Djuanda] my government found it very difficult to understand why Pakanbaru [*sic*] had been singled out as target for first military action against the rebels."[213] Perhaps this was Jones's way of expressing concern for the US personnel caught in the proposed action, but it goes without saying the strategic value of the Caltex oil fields was immense.

Jones and Djuanda were talking in private at this stage, in a room separate from the others. In response to the query about Pekanbaru being the first target, Jones said that Djuanda "launched into long exposition of central government philosophy."[214] The main reason was the psychological boost this would give the central government, and the sense of defeat it would be for the rebels. Jones informed Washington that, according to the central government, as soon as they occupied Pekanbaru, the PRRI was as good as finished. (Again, with the advantage of hindsight, we can say now this telegram should have been seen as a diplomatic bombshell because this was exactly as events turned out; this prediction was a reflection of the actual Indonesia scenario rather than the one Allen Dulles had constructed.) The central government knew that the PRRI rebellion would be nipped in the bud by this action—as it was.

General Nasution had acquired a reputation as an astute military strategist, but he also had some help and advice from outsiders, such as the military attaché at the US Embassy in Jakarta. In my interviews with General Nasution, he indicated strongly that Sterling Cottrell had prior knowledge of the arms drop in the early morning hours of March 12. The evidence Nasution provided for this was the ever-increasing sense of urgency Cottrell displayed when he contacted Nasution repeatedly on Tuesday, March 11. Four times, Nasution explained, Cottrell phoned him, the fourth time extremely tense and anxious, urging him to send troops immediately to the Pekanbaru airfield. Nasution arranged for paratroopers to be on stand-by, so when he received reports of the presence of a four-engine plane in the vicinity of the Caltex oil fields, he moved quickly. From the troops he had already sent to Bengkalis, an island off the coast of Sumatra just across the Malacca Straits from Singapore, he picked paratroopers who landed on the airfield and captured the arms that had just been dropped. The four-engine plane, not identified at the time, was a Douglas DC-4 (also known as the C-54 Skymaster).

Allen Dulles informed the NSC on March 13 that Jakarta had issued a statement from the Indonesian Army saying it had captured weapons and

ammunition from a foreign country that it did not specify. Some of the details were filled in for Washington two days later by Howard Jones:

> On March 12, 4-engine unidentified plane dropped 20 cases of arms by parachute including Browning 50 calibre machine guns, Sten guns, Bazookas and 75 millimeter rifles. Some of arms still bore stamp of manufacturer in Plymouth Michigan. I pointed out that American arms are available for purchase on international market, particularly older types, and observed that indeed bombing operations of central government against the rebels were carried out by Indo Air Force using American planes.[215]

When Cottrell had contacted Nasution well before the DC-4 appeared, his ostensible concern was the safety of American citizens, but only after ten tons of cargo was captured did the Indonesian general realize the military attaché at the US Embassy had prior knowledge of the arms drop. That being the case Cottrell must have been in contact with Allen Dulles through the CIA channel of communication at the US Embassy. From Nasution's perspective, this level of assistance to defeat the PRRI rebels was very welcome. He recounted to me this historic episode of receiving vital information in his usual manner, steady and precise, but then, with a knowing look and a wry smile he commented in a self-mocking way, "It must have been God's will."[216]

Cottrell clearly was not acting in unison with the embassy. Even on March 11, one day after Jones presented his diplomatic credentials, Cottrell's first priority should have been to consult the ambassador instead of individually urging Nasution to get paratroopers onto the Pekanbaru airfield. Weapons and ammunition from the arms drop at Pekanbaru on February 26 were still piled in unopened boxes around the airfield—on-site evidence of a dysfunctional rebellion—but these weapons were just a fraction of the size of the March 12 arms drop. Cottrell's advice to Nasution ensured the largest arms drop ever attempted for the PRRI rebels was captured by the central government. Nasution told me these weapons were later used in the campaign against the Dutch in New Guinea.

During this hectic period involving the possible bombing of Caltex oil sites at Padang, the apparent urgency to evacuate oil personnel from a potential battleground, and the hue and cry that followed the main arms drop on Pekanbaru, Task Force 75 remained in Malacca Straits with the potential to move in any direction. This massive fighting force also had the curiously divisive effect of toning down direct criticism of Washington from the central government but stimulating criticism from the PKI. They were vociferous in their accusations after the Pekanbaru arms drop. Sukarno adopted a compromising position. While the evidence of outside influence was undeniable and even though the identity of the accused country was obvious, it was not explicitly stated. Jones said the following to the Department of State on Friday, March 14:

> Sukarno is still speaking of rebellion at Padang and Menado being used or manipulated by foreign powers, as yet unidentified. Also presence US naval vessels nearby and US concern for safety of Americans and American property in Central Sumatra have been widely noted.[217]

For one week, Task Force 75 did nothing and performed magnificently doing nothing; then on March 13, one by one starting with the aircraft carrier, the warships returned to Subic Bay in the Philippines. "Admiral Roy Benson, commander of Task Force 75," in the words of Kahin and Kahin, "somewhat gratuitously announced in Singapore that his forces would not act in Sumatra without permission from the Jakarta government."[218] This was the turning point.

As predicted by the president of the Philippines in his private talk with the US secretary of state, the Padang-based rebel forces provided very little military opposition to Nasution's troops. By early April, Jones reported that the "rebels are losing ground fast militarily." After Pekanbaru, the rebels were disinclined even to defend their capital city, Padang. In their book *Feet to the Fire*, Conboy and Morrison[219] have said the US deputy military attaché, Major George Benson, even supplied maps of Padang from the US Embassy to help government troops under Colonel Jani. His maritime

invasion of Padang was the classic movement that would be required in Netherlands New Guinea. Jones commented on the remaining options for the rebels:

> This leaves guerrilla warfare as their only resort … prospect of developing alternative government by military and economic pressure on Jakarta seems almost to have faded out. Although main center rebel military strength in Menado area has not yet been tackled, insurgent movement has not proved successful enough to attract open support from other dissident outer island areas and appears to have lost its momentum."[220]

The course the rebellion took made a mockery of Allen Dulles' intelligence assessments, but he achieved what he was actually seeking, a unified army command. The rebels in Menado were then assisted by Allen Dulles with a limited supply of weapons and some planes with CIA-funded pilots. This kept the rebellion smoldering, and the emergency law remained in place so that Indonesian elections were not held.

Ambassador Jones was well suited to initiate the change of allegiance from the rebels back to Jakarta. On April 8, he "recommended that the United States reassess its attitude toward Indonesia's armed forces"[221] and a few days later was arguing that the "time may have arrived to make some positive gesture of support toward Indonesian military if we are to preserve pro-American anti-Communist loyalties among top officers there."

General Maxwell Taylor of the JCS sent a message to the secretary of defense urging that the United States now "ally with Nasution … (in accordance with) the recommendations of Ambassador Jones."[222]

The PRRI-Permesta rebellion continued after April 1958 only because Allen Dulles wanted to continue it, and the main reason for this was to keep the Indonesian military as a driving force in Indonesian politics. The longer the manufactured unrest continued, the greater the central army command in Jakarta would be able to consolidate its political gains. By maintaining the emergency, martial law ensured the PKI would not raise their hands too high demanding an election. Allen Dulles was not clinging to some hope of

retrieving a rebel counter government. He did not have that illusion in the first place.

Permesta

On May 5, 1958, the new rebel capital shifted to Menado on the northern tip of Sulawesi, and the Permesta rebellion was reinvigorated with additional CIA funding. About five thousand rebel troops comprised the bulk of Permesta around Menado.[223] Rebellion in Eastern Indonesia was a continuation of PRRI, yet some aspects were quite different. It was a testing ground for the central command achieved through the PRRI. The seaborne landings and air strikes against Permesta forces were precisely the types of operations—looking ahead—required to threaten the position of the colonial Dutch administration in Netherlands New Guinea. The CIA officially withdrew support for Permesta on May 20, 1958, two days after the Allen Pope incident,[224] but unofficially the rebellion was maintained until the early 1960s and spluttered to an official halt in 1961.

The Allen Pope incident needs to be further explained, not least because of the human suffering and profligate destruction. Permesta received even more funding than the PRRI because the CIA used mostly B-26 aircraft piloted by a handful of Americans.[225] (The same B-26s were later used by Allen Dulles in covert operations in Cuba.) The pilots were employed by a wholly owned CIA subsidiary known as Civil Aviation Transport (CAT). Flying from Clark Field Air Base, they were based in Menado. Some of them bombed targets within a radius of 850 km or so, including Balikpapan, Southern Sulawesi, and Ambon in the Moluccas, while other pilots were used solely for logistical support.

Taiwanese army and air force officers were also involved in assisting the rebels, a reflection of how Chiang Kai-shek's rabid anticommunism become part of Allen Dulles' operations. The participation of these Nationalist Chinese was brought to the attention of the Jakarta government by remarkably complete documents obtained from one of the American pilots, Allen L. Pope, who fell into the hands of government troops. When the US weapons captured at Pekanbaru were found to have come out of

Taiwan, suspicion and blame in Jakarta turned against Indonesian Chinese, but when the captured American pilot provided further incriminating evidence, the anti-Chinese reaction in Jakarta turned even more hostile.

The American pilot, Allen Pope, bombed a church and marketplace in predominantly Christian Ambon, causing civilian casualties (according to Jones) "in the vicinity of 700."[226] Documents he was carrying implicated both the CIA and Taiwan, but it was Indonesian Chinese of any political persuasion who took the brunt of retaliation. Antigovernment Chinese who supported the PRRI were the initial targets, but soon all Chinese were included, even those in the PKI whose party policy favored the central government. Subandrio welcomed the opportunity to force thousands of Chinese out of rural areas. Many left Indonesia—so many, in fact, the PRC had to send ships to help the mass evacuation back to China. This was an example of how the Indonesian army, with its political standing and centralized power, greatly enhanced as a result of putting down the PRRI rebellion, was able to strike at the PKI. On April 8, Jones discussed with Subandrio the new political scenario with regard to the rise of the PKI, which he summarized as follows:

> [Indonesian] government beginning to reach conclusion Communists could not be beaten by ordinary democratic means in elections. Program of gradual elimination of Communists by police and military to be followed by outlawing of Communist Party was not unlikely in comparatively near future, he said.[227]

Subandrio's prediction of the fate awaiting the PKI proved remarkably correct, looking ahead to events in 1965. This telegram is remarkable evidence of Subandrio's political duplicity, considering he was later accused of being a communist, so much so that it could be said he and Pope shared a similar ideology. The Allen Pope incident also illustrates how willing Sukarno was to negotiate with the United States despite the glaring evidence of US involvement in the rebellion. Allen Dulles, however, wanted to replace Sukarno with a military regime because Sukarno always put Indonesia first, to the extent of allowing titular representation of the PKI

in government. Dulles simply wanted to exploit the archipelago, which a military regime (after he had installed it) would enable him to do. Conboy and Morrison described Allen Pope's credentials as impeccable:

> Brave and dynamic, the thirty-year-old Pope came from a family with past links to Indonesia. One of his ancestors had designed the U.S. consulate building in Jakarta during the Dutch colonial era, while another, a lieutenant commander in U.S. Navy intelligence, had spent time on the archipelago during World War II…. [Allen Pope] had been sent to Korea during the height of the war … [and] in March 1954 was back in Asia. Hired by CAT … [he was] making supply drops to French forces around the beleaguered garrison at Dien Bien Phu.[228]

In the opinion of Colonel Fletcher Prouty, who organized flights for pilots like Pope in the PRRI/Permesta rebellion, the only reason Pope would have had so many documents with him was that he intended to bail out. This suggests there was an intelligence ploy aimed at the Chinese. Because of Fletcher Prouty's important role at that time in CIA clandestine operations, in logistics and liaison between the Department of Defense and the CIA, his opinion on how Pope came to be carrying such important papers is particularly relevant. Prouty compares Pope with Gary Powers, the pilot of a U-2 high-altitude spy plane that came down in May 1960 over the Soviet Union. Prouty himself was responsible for arranging such U-2, flights but he did not supervise Gary Powers' flight.

Prouty pointed out that some pilots deliberately carried their ID papers to safeguard themselves in the event of being captured. With American identification, both Powers and Pope became pawns in the Cold War and were later sent back to the USA. However, Pope had far more than his personal identification papers in his possession.

In addition to a flight log—which detailed all his previous strikes—he had his CAT identity card, his military separation file, and a copy of his secret orders for temporary duty on the Indonesian operation. In total, he was packing some thirty different items.

Similar to Prouty's suggestion that Gary Powers' U-2 was not brought down simply by enemy fire but included a degree of malfeasance to deliberately bring the plane down, Pope's Indonesian lawyer presented evidence to show the pilot, carrying the documents, parachuted deliberately. When I interviewed Sukardjo Adidjojo, SH,[229] who defended Pope in court, he told me the evidence presented in court was that the plane was brought down by a single rifle bullet. The Indonesian soldier who claimed responsibility for shooting down the B-26 brought his rifle along to court to prove the point. Was it shot down or not? The official version was that ground fire brought down Pope's plane; another version, concocted some years later, that a government pilot named Captain Ignatius Dewanto, in a Mustang, shot down Pope's B-26. In Kahin and Kahin's opinion, "anti-aircraft fire" brought it down, while Conboy and Morrison opted for the Mustang account, but neither of these two spoke with the lawyer. Pope's testimony in the Indonesian court was that a bullet struck the 125-gallon internal fuel tank "and flames appeared in the cockpit."[230]

Pope and his Indonesian companion, Harry Rantung, who was in the rear gunner's compartment, parachuted to safety, however, only after Pope took the B-26 higher, to six thousand feet. This contradicts Captain Dewanto's account where the B-26 was engulfed in flames in seconds, and began a "slow, final dive." Prouty offered no comment on how Pope's plane came down, apart from the general observation in private correspondence with me: "It seemed that the more the CIA failed, the more it grew and prospered."

#

Permesta was able to be more tightly controlled than the PRRI in terms of instantly turning off the bulk of CIA funding as soon as Allen Dulles made that decision. Transferring the rebellion to Sulawesi still prolonged martial law. Sulawesi operations gave Nasution's troops an excellent opportunity to conduct more beach landings, which were seen mainly in terms of propaganda value for the coming campaign to oust the Dutch from NNG.

The official end of Permesta on May 20 came two days after the Allen Pope debacle. Conboy and Morrison recount that a simple message from Allen Dulles to cease operations was sent to Menado via Clark Air Base, which was then the US stronghold in the Philippines. “This is the most difficult message I have ever sent,” it began. “The end of the message bore the personal call sign of Allen Dulles.”[231] The last Permesta rebels to surrender under Lt. Colonel Kumontoy were immediately sent on boats to infiltrate the most westerly tip of Netherlands New Guinea around Sorong.

Colonel Fletcher Prouty agreed that for the next operation “New Guinea was in mind,” and it was not just the Indonesian military who were turning the attention to West New Guinea.

On March 14, 1958, Robert Murphy (deputy under secretary of state for Political Affairs and Allen Dulles’ long term associate) had received an answer to an earlier request about the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the importance of New Guinea to the United States. The answer contradicts the claim that West New Guinea was worthless in terms of natural resources, without being too specific. The assistant secretary of defense for International Security Affairs, Mansfield D. Sprague, in his reply to Murphy on March 14, 1958, wrote:

> In consideration of current US military plans, there are no specific US military requirements in Indonesia or West New Guinea. However, encroachments by the Sino-Soviet Bloc would disrupt the United States policy on Communist containment in the Far East, and would partially isolate Australia. Domination of this area by the Sino-Soviet Bloc would deny to the United States and make available to China and the USSR certain rich national resources.[232]

Chapter 5

DULLES AND HAMMARSKJÖLD

Evidence showing a tragic clash of policy occurred between UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld and DCI Dulles, resulting in the death of the former, has come mainly from two sources. The first is an interview I conducted in the United Kingdom in 1982 with Hammarskjöld's right-hand man, George Ivan Smith, and the second, an envelope containing some letters brought to light in 1997 by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). These letters indicated Allen Dulles was involved in the assassination of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld in 1961.

George Ivan Smith told me that the secretary general was about to intervene in the long-running dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia over sovereignty of West New Guinea. Hammarskjöld was "an outspoken advocate for the economic development of poorer countries."[233] He had started a developmental-assistance program called OPEX (operational executive) to be staffed by skilled UN personnel. Their expertise would be utilized to help establish state bureaucracies in newly independent countries. It was a radical move to design such a state-building tool, in effect treating Cold War tension with disdain. At first, OPEX was intended for newly independent African countries, and sixteen new states there had joined the United Nations in 1960, but now (as George Ivan Smith told me) Hammarskjöld wanted OPEX to be implemented in West New Guinea. "The Secretary General," as Eva-Maria Muschik has noted, "was determined that the UN, as the most democratic and broadly based international organization of the post-war landscape, should play a major

role in the economic development of the less prosperous regions of the world."[234]

The problem was that Hammarskjöld's approach, so open and idealistic, was the antithesis of Dulles' approach, as can be seen from an address given by the secretary general at the Economic Club of New York on March 8, 1960. Hammarskjöld was outlining how newly independent countries of a special category would benefit from a UN Special Fund he had devised. He said UN staff would become "officials of the governments to which they have been assigned … with the full duties of loyal and confidential service to those governments." In the welter of decolonization that was taking place in the wake of World War II, the UN secretary general explained that he was giving special attention to indigenous peoples and the obstacles they faced in achieving statehood. This approach completely undermined the argument of those opposed to Papuan political independence on the grounds that they were "not ready," but Papua was not mentioned specifically. OPEX, Hammarskjöld explained, involved sending UN officers for up to six years to work in the government departments of newly independent countries in this special category.

Dag Hammarskjöld was planning to use OPEX to end the New Guinea sovereignty dispute and wanted to announce this at the General Assembly upon his return from the Congo in September 1961. The UN involvement had come about through President Kennedy. When DCI Dulles had presented the new presidentwith the sovereignty dispute, JFK saw the invidious choice facing him was between a NATO ally, the Netherlands, and Indonesia, a newly independent country that Kennedy would need on side in the Cold War. Even before Kennedy became president, he had met Hammarskjöld several times, and both soon saw that OPEX was ideally suited to West New Guinea.

On April 28, 1961, together with Adlai Stevenson, his newly appointed UN representative, Kennedy spoke with Hammarskjold in the presidential suite of the Waldorf Astoria Towers. On his desk in the Oval Office, JFK always kept a coconut as a memento of his wartime experience in the navy in the Solomon Islands—the same location that James Michener, as a naval

historian, gathered the data that later became *Tales of the South Pacific*. After Lieutenant Kennedy's patrol torpedo boat, PT-109, was sliced in two by a Japanese destroyer, he and his crew were rescued by some Solomon Island people—culturally and racially linked with the Melanesian people in the western half of New Guinea, NNG. Before his meeting with Hammarskjöld, President Kennedy wanted a regional update, so he arranged a private meeting with General Douglas MacArthur, the former commander whose wartime headquarters were in Netherlands New Guinea.[235] For an hour or so before meeting Hammarskjöld in the Waldorf Astoria Towers, Kennedy and MacArthur talked in Suite 37A, then JFK went directly to the presidential suite, endeavoring to keep both meetings on this matter as discrete as possible. But Kennedy's attempt to have the United Nations intervene in the sovereignty dispute in 1961 was thwarted when the UN secretary general was assassinated in September that year. Allen Dulles had a key role in this tragedy, according to evidence unearthed by the TRC. The death of Hammarskjöld left JFK no choice but to deal directly with the sovereignty dispute.

Hammarskjöld was planning for the Papuan people, as the indigenous inhabitants of the territory, to gain their independence by removing both parties (the Dutch and the Indonesians) who claimed sovereignty over them. Having discussed the issue with Kennedy, Hammarskjöld also talked this over with his long-time UN assistant, George Ivan Smith. It was he who explained to me that the UN secretary general was planning to announce this at the UN General Assembly as soon as he returned from the Congo assignment. Hammarskjöld departed for the Congo in September 1961 to mediate a dispute over the breakaway province of Katanga but never returned. Addressing the UN General Assembly, September 25, 1961, upon the death of Hammarskjöld, Kennedy displayed the same anticolonial eloquence Allen Dulles had noted during his many conversations with Kennedy as a young senator. He spoke of "the exploitation and subjugation of the weak by the powerful, of the many by the few, of the governed who have given no consent to be governed, whatever their continent, their class, or their color."[236]

Hammarskjöld's approach to the Cold War had drawn criticism from both sides, yet in characteristic style he refused to be daunted. A year before Hammarskjöld's death, Nikita Khrushchev as premier of the Soviet Union had addressed the UN General Assembly, September 23, 1960. His proposal was that the role of the UN secretary general be replaced by a "directorate of three":

> The Soviet Government has come to a definite conclusion…. The conditions appear to be ripe for abolishing the post of the Secretary-General, who is at present the sole administrator of the apparatus, the sole interpreter and executor of decisions of the Security Council and of the UN General Assembly.

Khrushchev's words were quoted by Adlai Stevenson,[237] in a written report to President Kennedy, dated May 27, 1961. Stevenson explained how evidence from recent history helps to explain why the leaders of the Kremlin regard the West with suspicion, why new suspicion unavoidably is created by such events as the Western volte-face in 1955 from their own disarmament proposals, after Russia had accepted them; Suez, 1956; Lebanon, 1958, when US and Britain acted in defiance of Hammarskjöld; the U-2 episode; and Cuba, 1961.

The U-2 episode referred to the Gary Powers incident, when a spy plane over the Soviet Union was brought down and the pilot captured. The incident caused Khrushchev to walk out of the Paris disarmament conference in 1960 when the superpowers were on the verge of agreement. Who or what caused this dramatic reversal? Colonel Fletcher Prouty has drawn attention to this incident because covert flights were part of his CIA activities under DCI Dulles. He said the only reason that Powers's U-2 had been forced to a lower altitude, where it became a target for Soviet fire, was because of the delicate fuel-system of the plane, an adjustment possibly done before departure. The result was that disarmament talks were disbanded, and the Cold War went to a higher level. Détente had no place in Allen Dulles' plans. The U-2 incident and then Cuba helped admirably to ramp up tension, as did the Soviet detonation of a fifty-megaton bomb said

to be more than 1,500 times more powerful than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined. Stevenson commented to Kennedy that when Khrushchev had visited the United States in 1959 and went to the Garst farm (a farm in Guthrie County, Iowa, owned by Roswell and Elizabeth Garst) Khrushchev had quietly told Stevenson that as soon as disarmament talks were concluded—and Khrushchev was keen for them to be concluded—Moscow would be more favorably disposed toward the US proposal regarding the role of the UN as "international police." This role was precisely what caused difficulties for Hammarskjöld in the Congo. From the Soviet perspective, Hammarskjöld was not strictly neutral, and had Khrushchev known about the deal between Kennedy and Hammarskjöld over New Guinea, it would have added to his suspicion. Stevenson wrote to Kennedy that soon after his conversation with Khrushchev on the Garst farm, the UN was called into the Congo. A UN International Force was created; it was responsible to Hammarskjöld, virtually alone, and he and his agents made decisions in the Congo that Khrushchev did not like.

Kennedy was aware of Khrushchev's concern but unaware that in the event of Hammarskjöld's OPEX plan for the Papuan people being implemented—the joint plan, that is, with Kennedy—it would jeopardize Allen Dulles' Indonesia strategy. I should stress that my interview with George Ivan Smith was fifteen years before the TRC documents that Desmond Tutu brought to light, implicating Allen Dulles. Yet my reading of Indonesian history and the fact that a US Senate investigation in the mid-1970s found Allen Dulles responsible for the death of Patrice Lumumba in 1961, three days before Kennedy's inauguration, suggested a possible link with the death of Hammarskjöld. This was why I had decided to contact George Ivan Smith.

In and around the Congo in 1961, various parties were already objecting to UN interference, but this decisively took the direction of eliminating UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld only with the involvement of Allen Dulles. Because my meeting with George Ivan Smith was still a decade and a half before Bishop Tutu's papers revealed Dulles was involved in

Operation Celeste, the planned assassination of Hammarskjöld, Dulles' actual involvement and the idea that the Congo might not have been his primary motive seemed mere conjecture. Smith pursued his investigation into the death of Hammarskjöld by focusing on how it actually occurred, the means rather than the motive. Any extraneous motive for Dulles' involvement seemed superfluous, particularly when it was on the other side of the world!

George Ivan Smith commented how surprised he was at Hammarskjöld's preoccupation with solving the sovereignty dispute over Netherlands New Guinea. After all, by resolving potential conflict between the superpowers, his intervention (ignoring Khrushchev's complaint) seemed to embody the very ideal of the United Nations. Smith, from the time he retired from the United Nations to the rest of his life, continued his private investigations into the death of the secretary general in the Congo. He saw no reason to look any further than the environs of the Congo because the presence of the United Nations had stirred such enmity among the various mercenary groups there, Belgian, French, and British. When he visited the Congo after the UN plane had crashed, he too was nearly killed. Interviewed in 1982, he did not see how Netherlands New Guinea could be linked with the death of Hammarskjöld, and, at that time, I did not have sufficient detail to convince him otherwise. However, from the vantage point of the twenty-first century, the present-day reader will focus more on Allen Dulles because of Archbishop Tutu's announcement and, as a result, realize how previously neglected information has acquired new significance —such as the presence of a CIA communications plane, stationary, but operating at midnight on the airstrip just when Hammarskjöld's plane was due to land.

Had the plan of Hammarskjöld (and Kennedy) to intervene in Netherlands New Guinea been carried out, it would have decimated Dulles' Indonesia strategy in a way that was similar to the way that Kennedy's proposed visit to Jakarta also threatened to end Dulles' strategy. This similarity of motive makes Dulles' involvement in the death of Dag

Hammarskjöld far more significant when considered as a precedent for his involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy.

By 1963, Dulles' strategy—in addition to New Guinea gold and regime change in Indonesia—included the Sino-Soviet conflict. Would Allen Dulles have resorted to assassinating not only the UN secretary general but also the president of the United States to ensure his Indonesia strategy was achieved? This is for the reader to decide—which is why I have written this book—but, as a ghastly precedent, the death of Hammarskjöld in 1961 can now be linked with Kennedy in 1963.

Allen Dulles' global reach was a reflection of his vast experience. From World War I to the Warren Commission, Allen Dulles' life was immersed in the world of intelligence, dealing with issues that ranged from empire to armaments, national security to regime change, oil, military, and many other matters. In Berne during World War II, the assistance he provided the Allied war effort from contacts within Germany and his own expertise was nothing less than extraordinary—so much so that in the following decade, Dulles was regarded as an icon of US intelligence, and any accusation to the contrary was readily dismissed. However, six years after his death in 1969, a US investigation chaired by Senator Frank Church produced a different profile of Allen Dulles. As part of fourteen reports on US intelligence activities, the Church Committee revealed that some of the activities former DCI Allen Dulles engaged in were nefarious in the extreme, and these included the assassination of foreign leaders.

The Church Committee found that the death of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo, three days was mentioned above… was directly instigated by Allen Dulles. A memorandum to the Office of Congressional Affairs, by the CIA, on how the death occurred was left undated and unsigned but with a note initialled by Allen Dulles saying "memorandum is attached and I am not sure whether you intended to send it to the President or not."[238] In arranging for an agent to kill Lumumba, Dulles had left a paper trail in the form of a telegram to Leopoldville, September 24, 1960: "We wish [to] give every possible support in eliminating Lumumba from any possibility [of] resuming governmental position."

The Church investigation found that two days later the Congo CIA station officer (Hedgman) contacted a CIA go-between named Joseph Scheider (alias Joseph Braun) who did not himself kill Lumumba but was responsible for the group of persons who did. Answering a Church Committee question, Hedgman replied:

> It is my recollection that he [Dulles] advised me, or my instructions were, to eliminate Lumumba.
> **Question:** By eliminate, do you mean assassinate?
> **Hedgman:** Yes.[239]

The Church Committee report (page 50) found that "the Station Office [Hedgman] clearly had prior knowledge of the plan" to transfer Lumumba to where it was "probable that he would be killed … and the place was known as the 'slaughterhouse.'"

Lumumba and Hammarskjöld

The killing of Lumumba, before he had served three months as the first prime minister of the Congo, involved much brutality and torture. This was public knowledge at the time; later, when added to the heinous role of Dulles, it shocked the nation—indeed, shocked the world.

The death of Lumumba fueled even more political instability in the newly independent Congo after the unrest caused by its mineral-rich province of Katanga, which was threatening to secede. The mining industry there was controlled by Western interests. In September 1961, in the wake of the violence that erupted after Lumumba was eliminated, UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld became involved in mediation between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Katanga. A few minutes after midnight on Sunday, September 17, 1961, as the UN plane carrying the secretary general and fifteen others was approaching the Ndola airstrip in Northern Rhodesia (today Zambia), it crashed, killing all.

The second of two Rhodesian enquiries in 1961–1962[240] concluded "pilot error—a misreading of the altimeters" had brought down the DC6,

known as the Albertina. The US government noted that some doubt was emerging after the second investigation in 1962:

> In a report dated March 8, 1962, a U.N. Commission of Investigation into the circumstances of the Secretary-General's death stated that it could find no evidence of sabotage, attack from ground or air, aircraft failure, or pilot error but could not exclude any of those possibilities.[241]

The Church Committee in 1975 did not make any links between Dulles and Hammarskjöld, and a 1992–93 investigation and publication by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs concluded the pilot had made an error in judging altitude.[242] Persistent investigation by George Ivan Smith, who was the secretary general's spokesman and close friend, unearthed a disturbingly vital clue that the plane was forced down as a result of interference by hostile aircraft. Whether this caused the crash remained inconclusive.

In 1997, more documentary evidence emerged as part of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), and since then the death of Dag Hammarskjöld has been reinvestigated. The chance discovery of relevant documents by the TRC provided the impetus for a new enquiry, which was started in 2012 by the Hammarskjöld Commission. It examined the TRC documents and letters in some detail to decide if the new evidence justified reopening another investigation into the death of the secretary general. The report of the Hammarskjöld Commission was published in September 2013, fifteen years after the TRC documents had first emerged, and a report tabled in the UN.[243]

In August 1998, the TRC Chairman, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, had called a press conference, releasing eight documents and explaining their chance discovery in a folder from the National Intelligence Agency. A member of the TRC had requested a folder with information on a 1993 assassination in South Africa, and the additional material happened to be in that same folder. The additional sheets of paper were letters that referred to an Operation Celeste, a plan to assassinate Dag Hammarskjöld. These

letters showed Allen Dulles was involved. The documents bore the letterhead of the South African Institute for Maritime Research (SAIMR) and the name of Allen Dulles was specifically mentioned: "UNO [United Nations Organisation] is becoming troublesome and it is felt that Hammarskjöld should be removed. Allen Dulles agrees and has promised full cooperation from his people."[244]

Information from Dulles included the type of plane the UN secretary general would use and the date he would arrive. More important, even though the letter was signed by a person at SAIMR, it was directly conveying the words of DCI Dulles. When Dulles initiated the killing of Lumumba, the evidence brought before the Church Committee was written by Dulles: "We wish [to] give every possible support."

The wording here seems relatively innocuous but in the context of the Church Committee investigation, the sinister import in Dulles' euphemism acquires a meaning far more significant. It is the order to kill—but not read as such without the explanation from the CIA station chief in the Congo that Dulles requested to kill Patrice Lumumba. Otherwise the euphemistic expression "give every possible support" might well have been interpreted as Dulles playing a secondary role when, in fact, he initiated the action that led to the assassination of Patrice Lumumba. In the case of Hammarskjöld, the TRC document states that Dulles promised "full cooperation." but this was written by a "commander" of SAIMR, the intelligence organization mentioned in the documents. The same commander then states: "I want his [Hammarskjöld's] removal to be handled more efficiently than was Patrice."

This sentence links SAIMR with Dulles, whom we know already initiated the killing of Patrice Lumumba. Up until the Church Committee proved otherwise, Lumumba's death had been regarded as the tragic outcome of violence initiated by local tribespeople, but the order to kill Lumumba was given by Dulles and carried out by SAIMR. Local people were involved only in the final act. Using the similar euphemistic term of "promising full cooperation," an equivalent scenario for Operation Celeste would have Dulles (from his office in Washington) initiating the killing of

the UN secretary general, and for the operators, SAIMR (as revealed in the TRC documents) to carry out the assassination using locally based European mercenaries, including a pilot or two in the final act.

The Operation Celeste documents were examined in 2011 by Susan Williams in her book *Who Killed Hammarskjöld,* with extensive research into SAIMR. She concluded that it was involved in covert action over many years, and that its structure was in cells, which operated independently. Williams raises the possibility that Operation Celeste involved SAIMR cells for three separate actions against Hammarskjöld's plane: hostile aircraft, a six kilogram bomb to disable the steering mechanism, and the altimeters.

While I had not previously considered the first two possible actions (although George Ivan Smith did mention the hostile aircraft), there was a strong possibility that the altimeters were sabotaged. The 2013 Hammarskjöld Commission presented reliable evidence that incorrect barometric readings (QNH) were given by Ndola air-traffic control to the Albertina (Hammarskjöld's plane). Attention was drawn to the fact that the voice recordings of the air-traffic controller at Ndola were turned off, possibly deliberately. As well, before the Albertina departed for Ndola, where it crashed, there was a four-hour period when the plane was left unattended. If altimeters in the cockpit of the Albertina were sabotaged, how was it possible that sabotage was not detected in subsequent testing of the altimeters? In the "Comments from the United Nations" (attached to the 1962 crash report) it was stated there could have been a "misreading of the altimeters"[245] as the DC6, just after midnight, descended to five thousand feet and was doing a procedural turn in preparation to land when it clipped trees and crashed at 4,357 feet. The action of a small fighter plane, which began to harass the DC6 in the final few minutes of descent, made the advice coming from Ndola air-traffic control vitally important because the pilot at that moment would have been relying entirely on air-traffic control and his own reading of the altimeters.

Immediately after the crash in September 1961, one of the first actions was removal of the altimeters. There were two CIA planes waiting at Ndola airport, ready to offer assistance. The altimeters were checked in the United

States, and the all-clear was given by none other than J. Edgar Hoover. In the findings of the 1962 UN Crash Report, paragraph 6.5 stated, “Although it has been suggested that a false QNH was given to the Albertina on its approach to Ndola, all three altimeters were found after the crash to be correctly calibrated.”

The Hammarskjöld Commission tended to dismiss reliable evidence that the Albertina was given a false QNH on its approach simply because it did not consider the possibility that J. Edgar Hoover’s check on the altimeters might have been fraudulent. His affiliation with Dulles (in relation to being reappointed in the Kennedy administration) has already been mentioned; FBI director Hoover himself had previously clashed with Hammarskjöld in the 1950s in New York, during the McCarthy era, when Hoover’s men were evicted from the UN building.

Because Allen Dulles was in Operation Celeste to assassinate the UN secretary general, the reliability of J. Edgar Hoover’s check on the altimeters must be seriously questioned. Any sabotage to Albertina’s altimeters would have been done during the four hours the plane was left unattended in Leopoldville before departure for Ndola, so the last technician who accessed the plane would probably also be part of Operation Celeste.

George Ivan Smith

In the United Kingdom in 1983, I interviewed two UN officers, Conor Cruise O’Brien, who was in the Congo at the same time as Hammarskjöld, and George Ivan Smith, who was there soon after the crash. Both UN officials expressed their belief that the secretary general was assassinated, despite the inconclusive evidence of the official investigations. Three times I visited George Ivan Smith,[246] who lived at Stroud in Gloucestershire. He had at first worked also alongside Hammarskjöld’s predecessor, Trygve Lie, a Norwegian. The first secretary general of the United Nations resigned in 1953, making way for Dag Hammarskjöld from Sweden. He and George Ivan Smith worked together over a period of eight years, becoming close

friends. Ivan Smith was a trusted associate of Hammarskjöld, at times taking on a dual role as spokesman and confidant. While discussing hopes and aspirations, Smith explained to me, the secretary general referred to an impending UN announcement that Hammarskjöld had been formulating for several months preceding September 1961. He fully intended to implement his plans upon his return from the Congo, but he never did, and the announcement died with him! The secretary general arrived in Leopoldville on September 13, 1961, a few days before the fatal flight to Ndola where the plane crashed in the early morning hours of September 18, just after midnight.

Before Dag Hammarskjöld departed on the mission of mediation that claimed his life, George Ivan Smith noted that the secretary general was very much focused on the plan he was intending to launch at the UN General Assembly. Hammarskjöld had been conducting private talks with President Kennedy about the long-running dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over sovereignty of West New Guinea. Leading up to the General Assembly meeting in 1961, these talks had crystallized into new UN policy in relation to settling the decade-old New Guinea sovereignty dispute in favor of the Papuan people.

Harry S. Truman

At the same time, Kennedy had also engaged in confidential discussion on this and other issues with former President Harry S. Truman (who one year earlier had doubted whether the youthful JFK had the foreign-policy experience needed in the White House). During his first year in office, Kennedy and his wife, Jacqueline, so much won the approval of Mr. and Mrs. Truman that they were known to stay overnight with the Kennedy family in the White House.

In terms of wending his way through Cold War issues, Kennedy's understanding with Hammarskjöld over the proposal to resolve the New Guinea dispute, which now held the potential for conflict with Moscow, no doubt had Truman's support. Hammarskjöld's resolve to implement a policy

of Papua for the Papuans was in effect a countermeasure to rising Cold War tension, an example of his Swedish-style third way proposing a form of "muscular pacifism."[247] His plan was to annul all claims to sovereignty other than the indigenous inhabitants and to announce this at the UN General Assembly in October/November 1961, but his death occurred in September. Surprisingly, Harry S. Truman, expressing his opinion on the tragic news to reporters of the *New York Times* on September 20, 1961, commented enigmatically, "Dag Hammarskjöld was on the point of getting something done when they killed him. Notice that I said, 'When they killed him.'" The report in the *New York Times* continued: "Pressed to explain his statement, Mr. Truman said, 'That's all I've got to say on the matter. Draw your own conclusions.'"

The Hammarskjöld Commission in 2013 commented on the statement to the press made by Harry S. Truman:

> There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of the *New York Times*' report. What we consider important is to know what the ex-President, speaking (it should be noted) one day after the disaster, was basing himself on. He is known to have been a confidant of the incumbent President, John F. Kennedy, and it is unlikely in the extreme that he was simply expressing a subjective or idiosyncratic opinion. It seems likely that he had received some form of briefing.[248]

The UN secretary general had Kennedy's support in formulating a plan to make the UN a central player in the sovereignty dispute over Netherlands New Guinea. From Kennedy's perspective, Hammarskjöld was proposing a welcome initiative because it would preclude the inevitable criticism of the alternative decision Kennedy himself would be forced to make: that is, if the UN did not assume full responsibility for the Papuan people in the disputed territory of West New Guinea, then Kennedy would be forced to choose between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Hammarskjöld no doubt was aware there would be opposition to his planned intervention in the Dutch-Indonesian sovereignty dispute, not only from the two principal

disputants, the Netherlands and Indonesia, but also from the Soviet Union and China, both of whom supported Indonesia's quest to expel Dutch colonial power from New Guinea. While it cannot be said that the UN secretary general and President Kennedy were oblivious to the personal and political risk they were taking in pursuing this approach to the New Guinea sovereignty issue, neither of them seemed fully aware of how high the stakes were—or rather, how high the stakes were for others who were involved, such as Allen Dulles. The battle for sovereignty of Netherlands New Guinea, from Dulles' perspective, involved far more than the plight of the indigenous inhabitants. Kennedy had been grappling with the New Guinea issue for less than one year, whereas Dulles first encountered it twenty-five years earlier. Now as DCI he had engineered a scenario in which the acquisition of the territory—by Indonesia—was a key to his larger strategy of regime change in Indonesia. Hammarskjöld's radical initiative to solve the sovereignty dispute by assigning it to the Papuan people themselves was a step in the process of upgrading the status of the United Nations to protect indigenous peoples. Such a move would have totally disrupted Allen Dulles' regime change. Hammarskjöld's plan in 1961 and later JFK's proposed visit to Jakarta both unknowingly threatened Dulles' Indonesia strategy. Because of this similarity, Dulles' alleged involvement in the death of Hammarskjöld (through Operation Celeste) can be seen as a precedent for Dulles' involvement in the death of Kennedy.

OPEX

Hammarskjöld's planned intervention to settle the New Guinea dispute peacefully was following unchartered UN guidelines but generally came within the ambit of the 1960 UN Declaration. This was a call for "the speedy and unconditional granting to all colonial peoples of the right of self-determination." There were still eighty-eight territories under colonialist administration waiting to become independent national states. Had the UN secretary general succeeded in bringing even half of these countries to independence, he would have transformed the United Nations

into a significant world power and created a body of nations so large as to be a counterweight to those embroiled in the Cold War. Cameroon, for example, situated in what might be called the armpit of Africa with a land area the same as West New Guinea, had formerly been under French and English administrations. Its population included the fabled pygmies, and Hammarskjöld was especially concerned about indigenous tribes people. In March 1961, the people of Cameroon conducted voting under the auspices of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner for Cameroons. The people of the Northern Cameroons decided to achieve independence by joining the independent Federation of Nigeria, whereas the people of the Southern Cameroons similarly decided to achieve independence by joining the independent Republic of Cameroon.

Hammarskjöld's intention was to declare invalid both Dutch and Indonesian claims to sovereignty of the New Guinea territory. He proposed to assist the Papuan people by declaring a role for the United Nations alongside or inside an independent Papuan state, using UN officers to advise the main government departments. Although issues of payment from a UN Special Fund had not been fully resolved, as the officers would not be reporting to the UN, he explained this revolutionary approach was already being implemented in some former colonial territories in Africa: "OPEX officials have already been requested by, and assigned to, several newly independent countries, and I hope that we may be able to use the scheme much more widely in the years to come."[249]

West New Guinea was not mentioned, but as Williams has noted, "The activities of the UN in New York were vigorously scrutinized by the CIA."[250] Applying OPEX in the New Guinea dispute, Hammarskjöld was threatening to take the territory and its natural resources out of the hands of all aspiring colonial powers and out of the hands of Rockefeller Oil that had first staked its claim before World War II. The motive to prevent him from implementing OPEX in West New Guinea, quite apart from Sino-Soviet Bloc opposition, was immense. Hammarskjöld was constructing a solution for the Papuan people that would remove the contentious issue of colonialism. Because of this, he could anticipate support from newly

independent states and many others in the slipstream of the Cold War simply because this OPEX intervention had Kennedy's support. Once announced in the General Assembly, Kennedy would have given it explicit support.

Criticism of Hammarskjöld, visible opposition, came not just from the Sino-Soviet Bloc but also from former colonial powers such as Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom; but it was the invisible opposition that was his undoing. Hammarskjöld was unaware of Allen Dulles' long link with the New Guinea territory. The CIA was working conjointly with British intelligence, according to the Celeste documents. Given the political situation in mineral-rich Katanga, there was no shortage of mercenaries, but the overriding motive was that ultimate responsibility for the (Irish) UN troops who were pitted against Katanga lay with the UN secretary general rather than Conor Cruise O'Brien, who was on-site.[251] The killing of Lumumba had already displayed a willingness to resort to murder and mayhem, and no doubt the radicalized mercenary element was capable of taking the life of the UN secretary general. Two mercenaries (according to the 2013 Hammarskjöld Commission report) were at the Ndola airport in the group awaiting the arrival of Hammarskjöld on the night of the crash.

However, the primary motive for Dulles' participation was not the same as other participants in this tragic episode. While Belgian and British interests were more directly tied to the Katanga dispute, Dulles was seen more as a Cold War participant and slightly removed from direct involvement. Dulles' motive to stop Hammarskjöld for interfering in the New Guinea dispute was far greater than any apparent motive in the Congo. He was so far ahead of his contemporaries they did not suspect him of pushing a button, or causing a death, on one side of the world to benefit a covert strategy of his on the other side of the world.

When I spoke with George Ivan Smith, he raised two important points in the context of Operation Celeste that now link Dulles to Ndola. The first was Hammarskjöld's aforementioned pending announcement at the General Assembly in New York regarding West New Guinea sovereignty. Second, there was a CIA plane full of communication equipment, its engines

operating but stationary on the Ndola airstrip, the same night that Hammarskjöld's plane was due to land. Two such planes had just arrived at Ndola but only one of these was operating on the night, its engines running to provide power for the communications equipment that the CIA personnel were using inside the plane. The Hammarskjöld Commission report drew attention to the CIA communication planes:

> Also on the tarmac at Ndola on the night of 17 September were two USAF aircraft. Sir Brian Unwin's recollection, in his evidence to the Commission, was that one had come in from Pretoria and one from Leopoldville, where they were under the command of the respective US defence or air attachés. Of these aircraft he said: "Those planes we understood had high powered communication equipment and it did occur to us to wonder later, whether there had been any contact between one or other of the two United States planes with Hammarskjöld's aircraft, as they had, we understood, the capability to communicate with Hammarskjöld's plane…. I do recall that when we saw these two planes on the ground we were…. saying "Wonder what they're up to."

One of the conclusions of the Hammarskjöld Commission report was to seek the voice transmissions from the cockpit of the Albertina in the minute or so before the fatal crash. The CIA communications plane on Ndola airstrip had the capacity to communicate with the Albertina and may well have made a record of the final words coming from the Albertina. On the other hand, it is highly unlikely that self-incriminating evidence would ever be made available.

Kennedy, as a senator, had first met UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld several years earlier, then again as president-elect and then as president, when they met to discuss the problems of the world. During 1961, to solve the unwanted dilemma that JFK was facing with intervention in the New Guinea sovereignty dispute, the preferred solution was for the United Nations rather than the United States to be involved. Hammarskjöld agreed. As he was then in the initial stages in Africa of molding OPEX to

meet the needs of indigenous people, OPEX implemented for the Papuan people would prevent any superpower standoff between Moscow and Washington. OPEX meant Kennedy would not be forced to decide between the colonial administration of a NATO ally or supporting Indonesian administration over the Papuan people, against the wishes of a NATO ally. With Hammarskjöld's death, the pro-Papua plan was abandoned.[252] So, the Papuan people in the western half of New Guinea, who were on the verge of becoming an independent state under the auspices of the United Nations, were left hanging in history. Hammarskjöld's death left Kennedy one of two options: either the Dutch or the Indonesian option, but Dulles' preparation ensured Kennedy chose the latter.

Hammarskjöld positioned himself (and the role of the United Nations) between or above the Cold War blocs. He intended implementing OPEX to resolve the New Guinea sovereignty dispute but did not take into account the extent of covert involvement by Standard Oil under Rockefeller supervision and their right-hand man, Allen Dulles. At the funeral of Dag Hammarskjöld, September 29, 1961, Kennedy described him as "the greatest statesman of the twentieth century."

Chapter 6

1962–63

JFK, New Guinea, Malaysian Confrontation

Cold War tension was rising. President Eisenhower closed the US Embassy in Havana, January 3, 1961, the same day that General Nasution in Moscow was discussing the Soviet arms purchase that led to Kennedy's intervention in the Dutch-Indonesian dispute. DCI Dulles was personally involved in the Cold War crises brewing in both locations, Cuba and Indonesia. In Moscow, the list was impressive: TU-16 long-range bombers, fighter planes, motor torpedo boats, submarines, and warships, including a Skoryi-class cruiser transferred from the Soviet Navy. They were to end Dutch sovereignty of the New Guinea territory. Sukarno claimed the long-range bombers had nuclear capability. The willingness of the United States to support their NATO ally in a colonial outpost was now in the spotlight.

A National Intelligence Estimate was prepared on this arms deal by Major General Edward G. Lansdale (secretary of Defense deputy assistant for Special Operations) and was approved by the US Intelligence Board[253] on March 7. Lansdale was a close associate of Allen Dulles who was head of the Board. Lansdale wrote:

> The Soviet effort to capture Sukarno and Indonesia through personal diplomacy and military and economic assistance has reached substantial proportions and appears to be making significant progress. Indonesia is looking to the Communist Bloc for important contributions to its economic and military development, and the

> Bloc appears willing to meet most Indonesian requests. Total Bloc loans offered to Indonesia now amount to about $1,103 million—$593 million for military aid and $510 million for economic assistance.[254]

President Eisenhower had previously turned a deaf ear to repeated Indonesian requests for arms from the United States, but nothing on this scale. The deal was concluded just after Kennedy's election, so Lansdale's report was like a clarion call presenting Indonesia as another front in the Cold War. Other reports with the same theme were prepared by Guy Pauker, the Indonesia expert from RAND Corporationwho had been active in Indonesia for the last few years. He adopted the same approach, endeavoring to influence the path taken by President Kennedy. Pauker submitted three reports in quick succession and a widely distributed journal article, all of which led the reader to believe that Nasution himself was being unduly influenced by the Soviet arms deal. It was the size of the arms deal that was so spectacular—ships and planes for the navy and air force, rather than the Indonesian Army, which was more allied to the United States than either of the other two armed forces, despite the presence of the high-profile army general, Nasution. Pauker's report, titled "Indonesia Today," was sent by the RAND Corporation to the White House on March 27, 1961. With the New Guinea sovereignty dispute now reaching its penultimate stage, Lansdale and Pauker were deliberately misrepresenting the territorial quest shared between the Indonesian army and the PKI as shared political terrain.

The reports by Lansdale and Pauker were trying to create a misleading impression that the Indonesian army and General Nasution were being corralled by the PKI. At the same time, they were correctly saying that Kennedy's options for political maneuvering to solve the sovereignty dispute were now reduced. US support for the Dutch in the event of Indonesian aggression seemed increasingly to be out of the question, as this might now result in a clash of two superpowers. Pauker outlined the lack of options available:

> In case of an Indonesian attack on the Dutch in West Irian [Netherlands New Guinea], if the United States supports the Dutch, this will add weight among anti-colonialists to the statement of the 81 Communist parties issued on September 6, 1960, in Moscow: "US imperialism is the chief bulwark of world reaction and an international gendarme, that it has become an enemy of the people of the whole world."
>
> If the United States does not support the Dutch, in a case involving the use of force against them, this can only reinforce the doubts of those in NATO and SEATO who question the determination of the US to protect its allies.[255]

Although they found out soon enough, neither Lansdale nor Pauker was then aware that Nasution, on March 22, 1961, after hearing reports that he was now "influenced by the Soviets," had secretly contacted the US secretary of state to reaffirm his pro-US political stance. He first contacted Ambassador Jones in Jakarta and asked him to inform Dean Rusk that the trip to Moscow "involved no change of GOI [Government of Indonesia] policy either external or internal."[256] Nasution remained staunchly anticommunist. During an interview with Nasution, I brought Pauker's accusation to his attention, and he became visibly annoyed, as he did years before when he had first heard Pauker's claim. Nasution explained that he had written directly to Rusk. Pauker had spoken with Nasution many times starting in the 1950s, so he knew how impervious Nasution was to communist ideology. The lack of ambiguity about Nasution's political affiliation highlighted the deliberate bias of Landsdale and Pauker. Doubtless, Nasution's position in the Indonesian power structure and his political preference were taken into consideration when JFK began to formulate his strategic response to the crisis created by the Moscow arms deal.

Nasution

The possibility of dispensing with the colonial boundary dividing West and East New Guinea under Australian control had been broached during the 1950s. An early Australian initiative to join both halves seemed to vex the Dutch as to the actual motive, but at no time during the sovereignty dispute did Australia show awareness of the massive mining potential of the Dutch territory. This was in spite of Richard Casey, who was Australian Foreign Minister for most of the 1950s, being a mining engineer who had specialized in gold. Indeed, Casey's background had probably made the Dutch even more suspicious. However, once the Soviet arms deal was done, the military and political difficulties facing Australia received glaring publicity in Australian media—so glaring that it seemed as if Armageddon was not too far away and somewhere to the northwest. Nasution had made arrangements for a press statement to be released by Antara on January 5, 1961, as he passed through Rome en route to Moscow. It read: "We hope that Australia will refrain from military interference in any military clash between Indonesia and the Dutch in West Irian, if such might happen." The eastern half of New Guinea island was a UN Trust territory under Australian administration and was known as Papua and New Guinea (PNG). Like the western half under the Dutch, PNG was moving slowly toward independence in accordance with UN principles and, while this was ongoing, Canberra wanted the Dutch presence in the western half of New Guinea to continue.

When Nasution visited Australia in April 1961, news of the arms deal was still reverberating in the corridors of Canberra. Nasution said his visit was "to create better understanding" and requested Australian neutrality in the sovereignty dispute. In the next breath, he said that Indonesia's claim to the territory had "full and unconditional support from Russia and Communist China." In other words, Nasution was willing to use the communist front tactics when it helped to achieve his own goals as well.

While Nasution's pro-US stance was conveyed in confidence to Jones and Rusk in March 1961, it probably came also to the notice of the CIA, judging by the careful wording in the briefing prepared for Kennedy prior to Sukarno's visit in April: "We are awaiting more conclusive data before

associating ourselves fully with Professor Guy Pauker's thesis that the Moscow talks may have forced General Nasution into a de facto alliance with the Communist Party."

If the CIA already knew that Kennedy had been informed about Nasution, then the CIA briefing would have lost credibility altogether had it stood by Pauker's thesis. The briefing, titled "Indonesian Perspectives" had direct input from Allen Dulles but was signed off by Richard Bissell, CIA deputy director for plans. (His predecessor was Frank Wisner). Part analysis and part intelligence estimate, the briefing was clearly anti-Sukarno and advised Kennedy against placing any trust in the Indonesian president.

Robert Komer, from the National Security Council, disagreed with much of the briefing and bluntly expressed his opinion to the president's assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy: "The thesis is that Sukarno, the devil incarnate, will take Indonesia so far down the road as to make it a pushover for the PKI in (the) predictable future." For Kennedy's best option, Komer said that he preferred the same as Jones was recommending, that is, shifting to a "pro-Indonesian policy on West Irian plus more 'political' aid."[257]

The Moscow arms deal forced Washington to rethink its role of backing up the Dutch in the event of Indonesian aggression. Australian support for a continued Dutch presence compounded Kennedy's dilemma because of ANZUS, the Australian–New Zealand–US alliance. Furthermore, if the United States supported the Dutch, the prospect of a majority of members of the United Nations decrying the United States as procolonialist placed another restriction on Washington's choice in the sovereignty dispute. Pauker warned that success in West Irian might convince the army to accept the PKI as a full partner, but this was implicitly contradicted by Nasution's stance.

JFK, Luns, and Sukarno

When Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns visited JFK two weeks before President Sukarno was due on April 24, 1961, Kennedy and Luns did not

mention natural resources. They discussed Dutch input for political and economic development of the territory, and the military capacity currently available—three destroyers, eight patrol boats, ten landing craft, a squadron of jet planes and some helicopters, two battalions, and an antiaircraft unit. Kennedy had no intention of letting the dispute degenerate into a bare contest of military power, but others, such as Prince Bernhard, took advantage of the political tension by pocketing the commission when twelve Lockheed Neptune planes were added. JFK expressed puzzlement as to "why the Dutch were so concerned about this faraway island which was really a great burden for them."[258]

The Netherlands had invested over one billion guilders ($3 billion today) in educating and preparing the Papuans for self-determination. Luns reminded Kennedy that the government and people of the Netherlands were filled with disappointment and shock at "the United States' withdrawal of its previous acceptance of the invitation to participate in the inauguration of the local self-government councils in West New Guinea."[259] This decision by Kennedy not to support the Dutch preparation for a Papuan independent government had more to do with avoiding the clamor of criticism that would come from US participation being seen by Afro Asian countries as endorsing colonial rule. Luns said that the decision was "contrary to what the United States stands for in the world." The five to ten year time-frame Luns suggested for Papuan self-government simply did not match the need for urgent action (as perceived by Washington) to stem the growth of the PKI in Java and the likelihood of Indonesia going communist. Kennedy simply repeated that he "could not understand why they wanted to continue…. It appeared that the question was one of engaging us in possible hostilities on the political and maybe even on the military level over a very costly, primitive area of no strategic significance."[260]

On April 10, 1961, in a long conversation with Dean Rusk, Dutch Foreign Minister Luns said that he was going to "talk to Hammarskjöld about this whole problem."[261] He wanted the United Nations to send a visiting mission to West New Guinea. Kennedy, four hours earlier, had

informed Luns that he had been in touch with Hammarskjöld since 1958 "and a number of times since" but gave no details of the more recent meetings. Luns obviously had heard whispers that JFK and the UN secretary general had been discussing the future of the Dutch territory. In the opinion of the UN secretary general, JFK explained, only a bona fide trusteeship arrangement would be approved. Without mentioning gold, of course, Luns wanted the Dutch presence to continue as part of a trusteeship, but this would not have been bona fide in UN terms. Hammarskjöld intended to remove both the Dutch and the Indonesians, but this important detail Kennedy refrained from mentioning. At this crucial moment when Luns and Kennedy were discussing the future of the sovereignty dispute, both leaders had more urgent primary concerns that took precedence over their concern for the Papuan people. Luns was taking care not to allude to the El Dorado in natural resources that he knew the territory contained, just as Kennedy was taking care not to allude to the UN secretary general's interest in taking the sovereignty issue altogether out of Dutch, Indonesian, and American hands—or the hands of the US government, to be more precise. Hammarskjöld's solution would not be to the liking of either the Dutch or the Indonesians, although Kennedy strongly approved because it would remove from his desk a serious Cold War issue.

#

When President Sukarno arrived, Kennedy asked him, "Why do you want West Irian?"[262] Melanesians were a different race, Kennedy said. Moreover, he added, it was costing the Dutch more money to administer than they could get out of it.

"It's part of our country; it should be free,"

President Sukarno said. President Kennedy then pointed out that the Solomon Islands and New Guinea seemed to be of the same race and shared a common culture and history. (Sukarno did not comment here about Kennedy's wartime experience in the Solomons, although Kennedy by mentioning this might have been leading in that direction.)

Instead, Deputy First Minister Leimena interjected. He was a doctor from Ambon, in nearby Maluku, very pro-Sukarno and keen to impress his own president as much as he was Kennedy. The culture of West Irian is derived from the Molucca Islands (Maluku), he claimed, but neglected to add that Maluku, the Spice Islands, was the first area colonized by the Portuguese. Had Dr. Johannes Leimana known his history he might have explained to Kennedy that it was the Papuans who held back the Portuguese for ten years before they captured Maluku. Nor did Leimena explain that "Amberi" (as the Papuans called the people from Ambon) were the first people in the entire archipelago colonized by the Dutch. Three centuries later when Dutch colonial power finally came to New Guinea in the first five decades of the twentieth century, Amberi were used as go-betweens employed by the Dutch. This is the period Leimana was referring to when he said "much of the culture of West Irian is derived from the Molucca Islands."

In 1961, of the total eighteen thousand Dutch people in the territory, half were in administration. A virtual caste system was established with the Dutch at the apex, and beneath them the "Amberi," with the Papuans at the bottom of the social ladder. Dutch colonial rule in Java used a similar structure, only the bottom level were Javanese, above them the Chinese, and everybody was below the Dutch. In the early days, the police force employed by the Dutch were tall, black-skinned people from Dutch colonies in the West Indies, their physical resemblance and frizzy hair not unlike the coastal Papuans. "Amberi" were able to access medical care, education, and other aspects of the urban society of the colonial master, but only very few Papuans even had contact with the Dutch until the late 1930s. Apart for the mostly post-war Dutch development in the coastal urban locations, and an outpost or two in the highlands, most Papuan inhabitants of the territory still had never been colonized. The extent of the isolation of some Papuan communities, because of the forbidding terrain, was difficult for outside observers to grasp without visiting the territory. It made a mockery of all claims to sovereignty, whether Dutch or Indonesian, not to mention the others who tried and failed at one time or another—the

Portuguese, Spanish, and English. This merely highlighted the need in 1961 to approach the sovereignty dispute from a fourth-world perspective as UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld was doing.

Kennedy asked Sukarno, "What would the people of West Irian themselves choose?"

"Indonesia," replied Sukarno emphatically.

"Then why not hold a plebiscite to determine this?" President Kennedy asked.

Sukarno's response was to wonder "why the use of this device was necessary since the territory had always been Indonesian."

It is ironic that only a few years earlier, during the PRRI Sumatran rebellion, Kennedy's predecessor had placed so much faith in Indonesia's former Vice President Hatta, rather than Sukarno, and it was Hatta who did not want the land of the Papuans to be part of Indonesia. Sukarno might like to have thought that all the Papuan people preferred to join with Indonesia rather than stay Dutch, but this was true only in some cases. Papuans, just as the Indonesians did under colonial rule, wanted their independence—that is, those coastal Papuans who were under the Dutch were prepared to follow the ten-year path to independence that Dutch authorities were in the process of preparing. Most indigenous inhabitants of the territory had never lost their independence because they'd never yet been colonized! Most Papuans (then and now) live in the highlands, and only very few of those in 1961–62 had been educated by the missionaries. Apart from the few, most were not even aware that Indonesia and the Netherlands were in dispute over sovereignty of their land. Some educated Papuans had formed political parties, and a small number had adopted a pro-Indonesia stance.

Of these, the most vocal was Fritz Kirihio, whom I met in the Netherlands ten years after Indonesia had officially taken control of the former Dutch territory, and we met again in Jakarta in 2018, a few months before he passed away. His political outlook in the early 1960s was full of hope, and he traveled with Sukarno to visit different areas of Indonesia. He was with the president in Sulawesi once, he told me, when there was an attempted assassination using a bomb. The takeover by the Indonesian army

in 1963 involved force, and some fatalities, but after 1965 and leading up to the 1969 Act of Free Choice it became a nightmare. So many Papuans were killed for no reason other than being Papuan. Kirihio departed for Europe, where he completed his PhD.

The main reason why there seemed to be a delay in Kennedy's response to the problem of the sovereignty dispute in 1961 was because he had handed it over to Dag Hammarskjöld. By joint agreement this UN avenue remained unannounced and was to remain so until the solution was presented to the UN General Assembly, but 1961 was plagued by delays for the UN secretary general with trouble in the Congo leading to criticism from all sides. When Hammarskjöld was assassinated in September 1961, the United Nations approach to solving the problem closed in a flash. So the solution that Kennedy was hoping to see implemented, thus avoiding the need to choose between Indonesia and the Netherlands, went unacknowledged and unresolved. Kennedy himself had to step into the fray.

The solution put forward by Robert Komer of the National Security Council was forthright to the point of being blunt. On November 30, 1961, he declared:

> The time has come to take the gloves off and adopt a frankly pro-Indonesian stance while there's still time to get some political capital out of it. We, the Dutch, and Australians must face up to the fact that in time we'll have to accept Indo hegemony over West Irian anyway and might as well roll with the punch. Continuation of our present policies won't stop the inevitable; indeed it will only result in greater likelihood of losing Indonesia itself to the Bloc. With $833 million in military and $600 million in economic aid commitments, does anybody doubt that Bloc regards this key piece of real estate as a very choice target? … West Irian or even all of this neanderthal island under Indonesian sovereignty would be an infinitely smaller threat to Australia than if Indonesia as a whole went behind the Curtain [i.e., became a communist country]…. If we are to use this time wisely, however, we have to get the President

> [Kennedy] personally to weigh in on State. Now that UN gambit has failed, time has come.[263]

Komer was referring to the catastrophe that lay ahead if nothing were done about the sovereignty issue, but at the same time he was referring to an earlier catastrophe with his use of the word "Neanderthal." He was referring to an incident that had occurred in Netherlands New Guinea two weeks earlier.

The Disappearance of Michael Rockefeller

Michael Rockefeller, the twenty-three-year-old son of the governor of New York, Nelson Rockefeller, disappeared off the southern coastline on November 18, 1961, while collecting New Guinea artifacts for his father's museum. In the same vein as Komer, when President Kennedy later commented on the absurdity of "going to war over cannibal country," he was referring to the Rockefeller incident. It was claimed in media around the world that cannibals had eaten Michael Rockefeller, that he had been eaten on the beach with sago.

This accusation was first made by an oil-exploration team that was operating in the same area where Michael had disappeared. The oil team, a subsidiary company of the Rockefeller oil group, was in daily contact with Michael Rockefeller. He and a young Dutch anthropologist named Rene Wassing, from the Bureau of Native Affairs in Hollandia[264] (now Jayapura, the capital), were making their way along the southern coastline by boat, accompanied by two Papuan policemen. The four of them traveled on a boat Michael had constructed out of two canoes joined by a platform, with a sun-roof and an outboard motor. They were collecting carvings from the Asmat people, one day to be displayed in the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York. At night, Michael and his three companions slept in local villages, sometimes staying for days, traveling slowly along the coast. Missionaries had set up permanent settlements five years earlier, then anthropologists and linguists had arrived, and Michael had met some who were conducting long-term research in the area. By prior arrangement with

oil-company officials and the local oil-exploration team, each day a helicopter would deliver lunch to the four travelers. Michael recorded this meticulously in his diary, at times musing what special treats would arrive by air for lunch the following day. He was enjoying himself, being at the pinnacle of open-air dining, but was inexperienced in traveling in this remote location, and his thick-lensed glasses only added to his difficulties.

When Michael Rockefeller first arrived in NNG in mid-1961, he had been in the highlands accompanying the Harvard-Peabody group making a documentary on "native warfare" among the Dani people—the same area Richard Archbold had explored in 1938, calling it "Shangri-La" because of the peaceful agricultural scenes. In 1961, the purpose was to depict the people as unfit for independence, as warlike primitives. As part of the Harvard-Peabody group, it was Michael Rockefeller's own inexperience (as he himself admitted) that had created problems in the making of the documentary, vigorously urging some of the natives to show more aggression for the camera recording. At the request of Dutch authorities, young Rockefeller left the Dani people of the Baliem Valley and briefly visited the southern coastline. Here he was inspired by the idea of collecting indigenous carvings. So he accompanied the documentary team back to the United States but returned soon after to Papua, determined to collect carvings. For the second visit, Dutch authorities insisted he accept the help of Wassing and the two Papuan policemen.

I interviewed Rene Wassing in the Netherlands in 1981. He described the boat that he and the three others were travelling in, constructed of two canoes strapped together with a platform added across the top. This made the craft unwieldy because of weight distribution, Wassing said. While crossing a fifteen-mile-wide estuary, they were within a few hundred meters of their destination when the boat overturned. Their crossing of the estuary had been delayed by Michael's bargaining over the price of a pig, and this delay made the final stage of the crossing much more dangerous because the tide had turned. An incoming wave angled the boat awkwardly against the swift, outgoing current of the river. The two Papuan policemen decided to swim for the shore to raise the alarm rather than drift out to sea because

the river current was rushing them out to sea. Leaving Michael and Rene helplessly clinging to the upturned boat, the two Papuans struggled with the strength of the Eilanden River and its treacherous current. Hours later, when Wassing and Rockefeller were steadily drifting out to sea, they saw the two policemen scramble ashore. All afternoon and all night the upturned boat continued to drift into the Arafura Sea. The next morning, Michael panicked. Wassing pleaded with him not to leave the boat, trying to reassure him that the Papuan policemen would inform Dutch authorities. He stressed the need to stay with the boat.

"We could not see any land in any direction," Wassing told me. The coastal land was flat—a vast swampy area of mud and rivers stretching inland for more than eighty miles before the first foothills.

Because Michael Rockefeller's decision to leave the boat had led to his death and, as a consequence, brought such tragedy to the Papuan people, Wassing—the only person who could have stopped him—felt additional responsibility. Anguish and fear showed in his face as he recalled their isolation. With his arm outstretched and his fingers spread, Wassing in a desperately slow arc, left and right across the same horizon, said again, "There was no land anywhere."

World media converged on the remote site, and the oil-exploration team spread the rumor that cannibals had eaten Michael Rockefeller. The boat had overturned while crossing a river, so the story was told, and it was understood that the occupants had only to swim to the side of the river to reach land. Michael Rockefeller was a good swimmer. In reality, the current in the estuary gave them no chance of reaching the riverbank. The policemen swam to get out of the current and then swam ashore from the open sea. Even though their destination was only a few hundred meters away when the boat overturned, the policemen took four hours to swim to the coastline, otherwise the current would have carried them far out to sea. They were not interviewed by the media and neither was Wassing,[265] who was overwhelmed by the tragedy.

Wassing was full of remorse. He regretted not having stopped Rockefeller from paddling off into eternity with an empty red fuel tank

under his arm, and he also regretted not having corrected the cannibal story before it irretrievably became world news. The detrimental influence it had on the fate of all Papuans was certainly evident in the words of Kennedy and his advisors. In the United Nations, too, it influenced the way members voted, even to the present day, somehow making the principle of self-determination less applicable because of the Rockefeller incident.

Michael Rockefeller was about twenty miles out to sea when he left the upturned boat. The petrol tank from the outboard motor was intended to help with flotation, but instead, when it was found a week later washed ashore far down the coastline, the solitary red tank highlighted the absence of Michael Rockefeller, heir to the Standard Oil fortune. It merely added to the worldwide furor surrounding the purported "death by cannibalism" that became a political tool to deny self-determination. Wassing said he pleaded with Rockefeller not to go, that rescue craft would soon come, but panic seemed to be driving Michael's actions, and he started paddling. His only plan was to swim against the current, thinking it was still the river-current, and in that direction, he hoped to find land. His poor eyesight made him even more reliant upon the feel of the current for the direction to swim. Neither he nor Wassing, at that time, realized the offshore current was parallel to the coast. From sea level, the horizon is visible within a fifteen-mile radius. Land was nowhere to be seen beyond the vast stretch of water, in all directions, surrounding Wassing in the upturned boat.

That afternoon, about nine hours after Rockefeller swam off, rescue aircraft located the sole Dutchman and dropped a life raft. Wassing explained that he had to swim away from the upturned boat in the open sea to reach the life raft, but his strength was failing. He only just managed to haul himself into the raft, propelled by his fear of sharks. The following morning, after drifting even farther out to sea, a Dutch vessel was alongside the life raft, but Michael Rockefeller was never seen again. On the way back to shore, Dutch authorities by chance retrieved the upturned boat, which still contained Rockefeller's diary in a watertight pack. His disappearance became a media event that was closed off to any other

explanation, and the political implications of his disappearance became an ongoing tragedy for the Papuan people.

Trikora

On September 26, 1961, following the death of Hammarskjöld, Dutch Foreign Minister Luns announced in the UN General Assembly that the Netherlands was proposing to transfer control of the territory to the United Nations. He proposed an UN-supervised plebiscite to determine Papuan self-determination in accordance with the terms of the UN Charter, calling for the United Nations to replace the Netherlands as the trusteeship authority responsible for administration and economic development. Dutch financial aid would continue at the same level, and he suggested Dutch officials remain as UN officials. The Luns Plan, as this proposal was called, was rejected by the UN vote. It contained elements of what Hammarskjöld would have proposed, but clearly Luns intended Dutch interests to be in a position of advantage when the time came for development of natural resources.

Kennedy sent a personal letter to Sukarno, writing “as a friend and one deeply interested in Indonesia maintaining her respected place in the family of nations.” He asked Sukarno to avoid the use of force.[266] The position taken by the United States on two recent UN resolutions (support for a French-African resolution and opposition to an Indian resolution) left Indonesian leaders in doubt about US support. US advisor noted that the Indonesians were “convinced that only extremely strong pressure against the Dutch, including the use of force” would bring the result they were seeking. Kennedy’s letter was written on December 9, and nine days later came Sukarno’s reply (paraphrased in Foreign Relations of the United States). He was expressing his desire for “close co-operation and friendship with the United States, but admitted that Indonesia was at ‘the boiling point’ over the Netherlands’ separatist policy in West Irian.” according to ___. The next day, December 19, 1961, Sukarno issued the Trikora (three commands) to all citizens: crush the Dutch colonial effort to build a puppet

Papuan state, raise the Indonesian flag in West Irian as part of Indonesia, and prepare for general mobilization. On January 2, 1962, a campaign for the liberation of West Irian was launched—known as "Mandala"—under the command of Major General Suharto (the same person who would replace Sukarno as president in a few short years).

The political pressure created by Trikora was enough to bring together the Dutch and Indonesians to start bilateral talks. Although newly appointed acting UN Secretary General U Thant was notified, he was not yet involved. When Subandrio was asked if he'd agree to U Thant stepping in, he replied, "Not yet." He did not want him to become involved until "formal talks" began. As well, Subandrio wanted Indonesian Vice President Adam Malik to be involved in bilateral talks with the Dutch.[267] Van Roijen represented the Dutch government in negotiations. He was strongly in favor of self-determination but unlike Luns, not driven by the motive of maintaining Dutch influence in the territory. He also showed how much he was misreading the political priorities of the US president when he suggested a "tactical move by the 7th Fleet" would be a real deterrent for the Indonesians.[268]

Both Jakarta and Washington were concerned their respective interests would be thwarted if mediation was directly in the hands of the United Nations, as this scenario would lead to self-determination for the Papuans. The Dutch did not realize the extent to which Washington had already shifted toward a pro-Indonesian solution. Kennedy's advisors were hoping to provide the Dutch a way to "save face" while entering into negotiations with Indonesia, without discarding their belief that Washington was still on their side. In other words, Washington wanted to end the sovereignty dispute quickly, and follow up with an aid program in Indonesia that would curtail Soviet Bloc aid and prevent Indonesia from turning communist.

The scene was set for negotiations to begin between Indonesia and the Netherlands in early January 1962, but still several US advisors suggested caution because of the UN focus on self-determination. According to Komer, if talks proceeded in this direction, their plan to side with the Indonesians and follow up with economic aid to maximize the political

momentum would be frustrated. Something had to happen, he said, before the "clamor about self-determination boxes us all in."[269] The views on self-determination expressed by NSC staffer Robert Johnson set the tone for this willingness to regard the UN principle as an obstruction to the best outcome for US interests in the sovereignty dispute. Johnson wrote to Bundy:

> Luns has employed our general endorsement of the principle of self-determination as a means of pushing us into the Dutch corner. But how valid is the principle when applied to this territory? West New Guinea is one of the most backward areas of the world…. The population is largely illiterate; the educational system has been severely limited and has consisted almost entirely of mission schools…. It seems unlikely that the Papuans can decide the future of the territory in any meaningful sense for years to come. The problem will not sit still that long…. In order to accomplish this objective, we must make very clear to the Dutch that we are not taken in by the idea that self-determination principle has any reality when applied to West New Guinea.[270]

Dead or alive, the Rockefeller name was exerting considerable influence. Even more remarkable was the fact that Kennedy's reduced options in the sovereignty dispute (largely the result of Allen Dulles' covert operations) had led to the presidential advisors being in favor of the pro-Indonesia choice. Up to this point, Allen Dulles (even though now removed as DCI) had prepared a path of least resistance that, predictably, US Indonesia policy as formulated in the Kennedy administration would follow.

Nuclear disarmament was a key topic in Kennedy's current talks with the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, so if Washington were to take a stand over the New Guinea issue to support the Dutch colonial administration—according to the reasoning of some presidential advisors—it would seriously detract from the US position in disarmament talks. Kennedy and Sukarno had established some personal rapport, and, at this stage, the future aid program that Kennedy would adopt was still being prepared by Professor Don. D. Humphrey of Georgetown University. The team under

him had gone to Indonesia in August 1961 as first suggested by Kennedy during Sukarno's visit in April.

The MTB incident

Even though the Luns Plan had been rejected in the United Nations, the proposed framework of promoting Papuan self-determination still had momentum. A template for negotiations was put in place after the Trikora, but it would have proceeded in the direction of self-determination had there not been the Indonesian military intervention that occurred on January 15, 1962. What happened after the military clash was that each disputing party agreed to ask Washington to act as mediator for talks, to be held under the aegis of the United Nations. When an agreement was finally reached (the New York Agreement, August 15, 1962), the United Nations merely rubber-stamped the final result.

Once Sukarno had issued the Trikora on December 19, there seemed to be a persistent threat of Indonesian military attack. On January 12, 1962, even Kennedy asked—according to a memorandum from Komer—how soon Indonesia might actually attack West New Guinea. Kennedy's question can be interpreted, first, as nonspecific, simply referring to an attack in the future. However, a second interpretation of Kennedy's question might be that it shows acute perceptivity in assessing the political moment. Why? Because at that very moment, three Indonesian motor torpedo boats were in the Kei Islands, just south of Netherlands New Guinea, preparing to mount an attack. It is debatable if the second interpretation is the more likely because of what was added by Komer[271] in reporting the question asked by President Kennedy: "Intelligence community has consistently estimated that Indos would not really try for a military conquest (how can you conquer WNG anyway?) but would go for a military demonstration designed to force the issue."

For Ambassador Jones in Jakarta, the first word of the military clash in Netherlands New Guinea on January 15, 1962, came via Washington "from a press report emanating from Hollandia," capital of the Dutch territory.

The clash occurred at 10:30 p.m. when three Indonesian motor torpedo boats (MTBs) were intercepted twelve miles off the southern coastline by two Dutch destroyers. Because the task of maritime surveillance to stop Indonesian intrusion anywhere around the most westerly portion of New Guinea was so vast, we may well ask how two Dutch destroyers (of only three available) were in the right place, at the right time of night. Only if the Dutch had received prior warning could they have achieved such pinpoint accuracy in predicting the intrusion by three MTBs. Who warned the Dutch the MTBs were coming?

Major General Suharto, based in Maluku to the west of Netherlands New Guinea, was in charge of the January 15 operation. Indonesia had two squadrons of MTBs, eight boats in each. One squadron was built in West Germany, four made from wood, and the other four were constructed of steel, known as "Jaguar class." It was one of these steel MTBs, the *Matjan Tutul*, that was involved in the clash. The other two MTBs were also from the first squadron. (The second squadron of MTBs was part of the arms-purchase from Moscow, but these were not yet operational.) More than one hundred Indonesian troops had been flown by Hercules planes to the Kei Islands, where they boarded the MTBs and headed north to the New Guinea coastline. Their orders (according to UN Document S/5062) were "to land in the neighborhood of Kaimana and to wipe out the Netherlands administration there."

According to George Aditjondro[272] (Indonesian author-academic who specialized on Suharto), the precision of the Dutch Navy vessels in meeting the incoming MTBs at night, at the right location, was not due to Dutch radar but because the Mandala commander himself, Suharto, notified the US Clark Air Base in the Philippines. The Americans then notified their Dutch NATO ally who sent two destroyers, the Evertsen and Kortenaer,[273] to await the arrival of the MTBs at designated coordinates.

As the three MTBs were approaching the coast, a Dutch airplane dropped parachute flares, and the MTB at the rear opened fire on the plane. The commander of the three boats was in the forward MTB. The deputy commander of the Indonesian Navy, Commodore Yos Sudarso, was in the

center boat, *Matjan Tutul*. He had been trained by the Dutch, and the captain of the Dutch destroyer that opened fire was Sudarso's former classmate. Sudarso and fifty-seven other Indonesians were killed. The wife of the Dutch captain later visited the widow of Sudarso, and they remained lifetime friends. There has never been any suitable explanation as to why Sudarso was onboard the MTB going into action. It was later claimed that he disagreed with this proposed action and insisted on accompanying his men. Indonesia notified the United Nations the day after the sinking of the *Matjan Tutul*.

It was a Pyrrhic victory for the Dutch. While it seemed that the early warning they were given by the Americans in Clark Base was an indication of pro-Dutch sentiment, in fact, it was the opposite. A Red Cross official was designated to supervise the return of the MTB prisoners as well as some other Indonesians held by the Dutch for subversive activities. Initially, U Thant, the stand-in UN secretary general, stepped forward himself to negotiate. He should have followed this initiative by nominating a suitable UN official in his place to ensure the principle of self-determination was implemented but did not.

On February 12, Adam Malik expressed dissatisfaction with the talks and their location in the Hague. U Thant agreed with his suggestion of "direct negotiations with Holland, if necessary in the presence of a third power, preferably USA." Both sides agreed. The "Dutch indicated that they prefer New York for the site for the conversations, since they desire to have some link to the UN even if U Thant himself does not act as a third party."[274] The following week the United States signed a $92.7 million food agreement with Jakarta (to be repaid in Indonesian rupiah). In the Hague, US Attorney General Robert Kennedy spoke bluntly with Luns, so bluntly that when I interviewed Luns twenty years later he still expressed shock and dismay at the direct language used by the president's brother. I have no doubt he thought it was an outrage, considering the diplomatic etiquette of his training in prewar Berlin. Luns immediately went to see JFK, who disagreed with the intention of strengthening Dutch defense of the territory. Kennedy said that if "Indonesia goes to war" over the dispute, it would be a

disaster for the free world because in Vietnam it would greatly improve "the chances of a Communist take over … and would force us out of [Vietnam]." The President noted that

> we have all the potential wars we need at the moment, and we do not consider it useful to become involved in this dispute. From the strategic point of view, we believe that West New Guinea as such is of little consequence, since if the Communists have Indonesia the additional territory does not alter the strategic position.[275]

Although JFK linked Vietnam and Indonesia in this statement, he rarely did, and it is clear that he gave special importance to solving the Indonesia problem, of which the sovereignty dispute was just the first part. For Luns to have thought it would still be possible for the Netherlands to grant self-determination to the Papuan people, and to retain the status of "most favored nation" (thereby gaining access to the natural resources), he was seriously misreading the US president.

On March 20, Ellsworth Bunker mediated talks between Adam Malik and Herman van Roijen, thirty miles outside Washington on the Huntland Estate. Within a week, Bunker had made clear to van Roijen that negotiations were vital for world stability and peace and that the US government was committed to the idea of a transfer of the territory prior to any self-determination for the Papuan people. The plebiscite, in other words, would be no more than a face-saving device for the Dutch rather than a meaningful expression of free choice by the inhabitants of West New Guinea.

U Thant, acting UN secretary general, took no further part in negotiations and reappeared only for the final two days, before the signing of the New York Agreement on August 15. He was not fully endorsed as UN secretary general until November 30, 1962, three months after Bunker had completed the sovereignty negotiations.

As past-president of the American National Red Cross, the entry of Ellsworth Bunker into the Dutch-Indonesian talks as "neutral mediator" seemed unobtrusive after the initial role of the Red Cross. Allen Dulles had

been a friend of the Bunker family for more than three decades. In fact, the two were so close that when DCI Dulles was first appointed in 1953, he had asked Bunker to be his deputy in the CIA. Bunker had followed in his father's footsteps to become a prominent figure in the US sugar industry, much of the product coming from Cuba, where Freeport Sulphur was mining nickel before coming to Indonesia to start the gold and copper mine in Papua. Best known as a US diplomat in the post-war years, Bunker's first appointment as US ambassador to Argentina was at the instigation of Sullivan & Cromwell.[276]

Not only did Bunker fail to provide a safeguard for the Papuan right of self-determination, but he also brought forward the termination of Dutch administration so that the handover to full Indonesian control occurred on May 1, 1963.[277] This was an historic day in several ways, not the least of which was that it ended the Dutch presence in this region that had started in nearby Maluku about 360 years before. Two other effects are worth noting. Originally, the period between the Dutch departing and the Indonesian taking control of the territory was to be two years, but this was reduced to less than nine months, between August 15, 1962, and May 1, 1963, with help from Nasution. He confirmed that he would restrict PKI infiltration of the Dutch territory and prevent communist activity, provided the interim period before the takeover was not too long.[278] This was a farce, given the complete power that the Indonesian army wielded once they occupied the territory, but it highlights how the threat of the PKI was used to manipulate political objectives, not just to oust the Dutch from the territory but also (to the bitter end) to expedite their departure. Bringing forward the Dutch departure to May 1 had involved some bitter negotiations in which Bunker finally forced the issue. What was never mentioned, of course, was that by bringing forward the departure date of the Dutch government by a few months, the expiry date of the official lease on the Ertsberg gold deposit then fell outside Dutch control. The lease document provided Freeport access to the site through their Dutch partner, the East Borneo Company. By making sure the lease expiry date fell outside the period when the territory was still under Dutch control, Bunker prevented Luns and the Dutch

government from taking the gold deposit out of Freeport hands at the last minute. Bunker was exploiting Nasution's known allegiance to Washington and utilizing PKI scare tactics that had dominated the last few years of the sovereignty dispute. During negotiations, it is not known if Bunker was in contact with his old friend Allen Dulles, but, as he was only a short drive away from Huntland Estate, it is quite possible.

Kennedy's Follow-Up Plan

One day after the New York Agreement on August 15, 1962, President Kennedy contacted the respective heads of the State Department, Defense, CIA, Aid for International Development, and the US Information Agency. Now that the sovereignty dispute was settled, JFK issued a National Security Action Memorandum calling for a joint plan of action to be formulated: "With a peaceful settlement of the West Irian dispute … I have in mind the possibility of expanded civic action, military aid, and economic stabilization and development programs, as well as diplomatic initiatives."[279]

Kennedy called for the respective heads to submit a plan of action "no later than September 15th." The Joint Chiefs agreed with the proposal, describing it as "designed to achieve the revival of an Indonesian society oriented to the West."

When Ambassador Jones visited Washington in the second week of October 1962, the president told him that he wanted to seize the opportunity, one that the United States had not had since 1950, "to cement relations between the United States and Indonesia." On the plan for a civic action program, Jones said

> We are pinning our hopes on the [Indonesian] Army in our efforts to curb the power and influence of the communists in Indonesia. The Army, most of whose officers were US-trained, was basically anti-communist…. The next important initiative in keeping close to the Indonesian Army was in the field of civic action. The Indonesian Army recognized it had a political role to play and that assistance in

> rural reconstruction and development was one way to endear itself to the people.[280]

A Civic Action Survey Team was due to report back mid-October, but that month was fully occupied with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy wrote to Sukarno early November, saying that the transfer of West Irian with the UN Temporary Executive Authority was progressing well. Without pressing the point, he opened the topic of economic matters. Developing resources for the benefit of all its citizens was, he said, one of the "measures of the greatness of a nation and its leaders." There has never been anything to suggest that either Sukarno or Kennedy was aware of the immense wealth of gold, copper, and oil in the territory of New Guinea which Kennedy had just handed over for Indonesia to control. Yet from the perspective of those in the Dutch government who were aware of the New Guinea gold, they felt that the territory had been ripped away from their possession by Washington espousing political motives. Kennedy's intervention was regarded as the outcome of a Cold War configuration of priorities, but it stung Dutch pride and was seen as an affront to a NATO ally.

For Kennedy, it was still a job half done. The task ahead was to utilize the good relations with Indonesia, to buy favor with the Plan of Action, the follow-up strategy for the New Guinea dispute. While the prospect of US investment throughout the Indonesian archipelago seemed possible, at no time did Kennedy envisage or even become aware that the largest and most lucrative operation awaiting exploitation would be in the New Guinea territory. Yet from the prospective of Allen Dulles, and those aware of the potential wealth of natural resources in West Irian, the struggle to gain untrammeled access to the territory had just entered another phase, one he had already attended to, and in fact had predicted by way of trying to convince Kennedy not to proceed in that direction. Konfrontasi, three years of low-level confrontation between Indonesian and British troops along the border of Sarawak, was about to erupt.

Roy Henry

In the opinion of some historians, “the Brunei revolt [December 1962] was the spark which started Konfrontasi,”[281] an explanation that assumes Indonesia had a hand in the revolt. Many historical accounts repeat the same story, that Azahari (a friend of the sultan of Brunei) was responsible for attempting rebellion and then fled to Indonesia for the rest of his life. When I interviewed Azahari in 1991, at Bogor near Jakarta, it was not long after he had suffered a minor stroke. I stayed in his house for two months with my wife and son, who was then two years old. Sometimes, on a typical morning when I was interviewing Azahari and taking notes, I’d be giving him a shave at the same time. What he told me I later rechecked with British documents in the London archives, which enabled me to pinpoint, identify, and locate the person who did start the Brunei revolt—Roy Henry of Special Branch, British intelligence.

At the Royal Commonwealth Society in London, on August 15, 1991, Roy Henry and I had lunch together—the anniversary of the day that Japan surrendered in the Pacific War as well as the day Bunker concluded the New York Agreement. More than fifty other well-dressed people were in the restaurant. It was crowded, on a hot summer’s day, and the ceiling fans were turning ever so slowly. It was so hot, in fact, I decided to remove my tie. Then a man at the next table removed his tie, and two more at the next table…. In a matter of minutes, many ties were removed, and when Roy Henry saw what was happening he leaned across the table to say to me, “You colonials are a bad influence.” As evidence of Henry’s involvement in Brunei, I had brought with me some copies of recently released documents from the archives. At one point during the meal, Roy Henry was silently reading some pages I’d given him, and I too was reading something, not looking at him. I did not notice for thirty seconds or so, perhaps longer, that he had something caught in his throat and he was choking. Because of what Henry was reading, he had neglected to chew a piece of meat, and it became lodged in his airway, causing him to stop breathing. Luckily, a waiter saw him struggling for breath and rushed past me to end Henry’s near-death experience with a mighty slap on the back. In that fraction of a second, I looked up to see a distinct color-change had occurred in Henry’s

contorted face and his mouth was wide open, shouting without making a sound. With a solid smack on the back using the palm of his hand, the waiter released the piece of meat blocking the airway and sent it sailing five yards through the air. At this point in the interview, soon after his choking on the evidence I presented to him and the patrons had resumed their hushed calm and subdued chatter, Roy Henry admitted starting the revolt and admitted arranging for Azahari to be blamed. Finally, the truth about the Brunei Rebellion from the horse's mouth!

Accusations of Indonesian involvement in the Brunei rebellion pre-empted accusations of Sukarno's involvement in Konfrontasi. Border skirmishes, however, soon convinced Sarawak to join Malaysia so that British decolonization in this region of Southeast Asia proceeded in the format London wanted. Also at stake were two other issues: British control of Brunei oil and the political fate of Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew (whose close contact with British Intelligence began as far back as his post-war university study in the United Kingdom). After Roy Henry had managed to blame Azahari for the Brunei rebellion and concoct an Indonesian-inspired scenario with communist input, Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore falsely accused his entire political opposition of subversive links with Azahari. For those who refused to submit to Lee Kuan Yew's accusations, their plea of innocence resulted in decades of imprisonment and became known as "Operation Cold-Store." At the same time in Brunei, the sultan was led by British intelligence to sever links with Azahari, and the self-serving decision not to join Malaysia meant vast offshore oil reserves were shared between British oil interests and the Sultan, rather than as part of Malaysia. Similar to the involvement of British intelligence in the Brunei revolt, Konfrontasi would not have started as it did, when it did, without CIA involvement.

A Simple CIA Covert Operation

When Kennedy in 1961 had requested CIA expertise to resolve Indonesia's anticolonial dispute with the Dutch, Allen Dulles advised him that any

follow-up plan proposing economic assistance favoring Sukarno would be futile. Dulles told Kennedy that Sukarno was likely to start yet another anticolonial campaign once the New Guinea dispute with the Dutch was resolved. “Indonesia’s success in this particular instance,” Kennedy was advised, “will set in train the launching of further irredentist ventures.”[282] Of course, Kennedy was unaware how much Dulles knew what he was talking about—because Dulles arranged for political kindling to be set in place in Sarawak, precisely where confrontation started.

A key figure was William Andreas Brown (later US ambassador to Israel) who was a Singapore-based CIA agent, operating out of Kuching before a US consulate was established there, which occurred after Konfrontasi was underway. Brown’s actions contributed significantly to the start of Konfrontasi by providing arms for a Sarawak communist group, dubbed the Clandestine Communist Organization, CCO. This group of several thousand, mostly Chinese, was comprised of young adult males, including teenagers. In my book *The Genesis of Konfrontasi,* I have described how a CIA gunrunner, Frank C. Starr, known as “Starr of Texas,” landed small arms in Sarawak for the CCO and how its members fled in fear when seven hundred British troops “mistakenly” landed in Kuching in response to the outbreak of the rebellion in Brunei,[283] a distant four hundred miles north. The arrival of HMS Albion, a troop-lift helicopter ship carrying the 3rd Commando Brigade Royal Marines under Brigadier Barton, was actually the spark that started Konfrontasi.

CCO members sought refuge in neighboring West Kalimantan, an Indonesia province. This prompted a response from Jakarta, initially from the far-left party Partindo but mainly from Foreign Minister Subandrio[284] and led to the beginning of Konfrontasi. Some members of the CIA were working with British counterparts in MI6 to achieve a desired outcome, albeit with different agendas. Because of policy differences with their own respective governments, these two might tentatively be described as “renegade intelligence units,” yet both were under the aegis of Security Intelligence Far East, a joint intelligence group set up in Singapore. The “renegade units” had previously worked together to achieve a desired

outcome in the Congo, September 1961, when the plane carrying UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld crashed.

Dulles' failure to inform Kennedy about CIA covert action in Sarawak, arming the CCO and thereby helping to start confrontation, led to Kennedy's NNG follow-up plan being derailed by a cabal of congressmen. The border conflict between British and Indonesian forces was deliberately arranged, solving the problem of Sarawak's hesitancy to join Malaysia *and* setting Indonesia on the path to regime change.

The new state of Malaysia was an amalgam of former British colonial possessions in Southeast Asia—Malaya, Singapore, and (five hundred miles to the east across the South China Sea) three more former colonies, Sarawak, Sabah, and Brunei. Sarawak's population was an ethnic mix comprised of several indigenous groups, Malay, and Chinese. Numerically, the Chinese were about one-third of the total, and there were also Chinese on the Indonesian side of the border. Many had arrived during the previous century after working the goldfields in Australia.

Confrontation destabilized Sarawak's border with Indonesia. By dispelling Sarawak's previous reluctance to agree to the format devised in London, it hastened decolonization as the British desired. Arming the CCO was a joint US-UK effort after MI6 tried and failed, but on the agenda of the American participants, who had a similar Cold War focus on anti-communism, Indonesia was paramount. Confrontation was an integral part of the economic warfare that led to Indonesian instability, increased tension between Moscow and Beijing, and increased tension between the Indonesian army and the PKI (which culminated in 1965–66 with regime change in Indonesia). Dulles' failure to inform Kennedy about his role in starting Konfrontasi was an example of the covert action that had already caused President Eisenhower serious concern, and by 1963 it had become a crucial step along the path of treason.

Indonesian Economic Aid

The team under Professor Humphries, Kennedy's team to assess the Indonesian economy prior to the proposed US aid as follow-up to the sovereignty dispute, found that Indonesian inflation was severe. The money supply doubled in the year ending July 1962, largely because of a government deficit nearly as large as revenues. The Jakarta price index rose by 67 percent during the last half of 1961 and another 85 percent in the first five months of 1962. After the New York Agreement, it steadied but was about to skyrocket. A memorandum titled "Background to Plan of Action for Indonesia" outlined the economic problem:

> The Bloc has given more aid to Indonesia than to any other non-Communist country, approximately $1 billion military and $650 million economic credits. By attempting to tie up future Indonesian exports through trade agreements and acceptance of economic and military credits, the Bloc is seeking to shift the Indonesian trade pattern from the West to the Bloc … and may eventually gain control of Indonesia's resources and the PKI may seize power.[285]

Recommendations to fix the Indonesian economy included raising the prices of state-produced goods and services, stabilizing the money supply, devaluing the rupiah, increasing taxes, cutting government expenditure, reducing smuggling, and centralizing the control of foreign exchange. The New Guinea campaign was seen as an anticolonial success by the people of Indonesia, but the Indonesian economy was straining with the victory. Just when Sukarno and Kennedy put their sights on economic stabilization in the first half of 1963, Malaysian confrontation began to gather momentum. Kennedy's Plan of Action became increasingly difficult to implement.

On March 1, Ambassador Jones told the State Department that the "next few weeks may be critical ones for Indonesia." Jones was thinking of the US reaction to the skirmishes reported along the Indonesian border with Sarawak. General Lucius D. Clay of the Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World was one of the first voices to be heard. He declared Indonesia to be of special concern but added that "we do not see how external assistance can be granted to this nation by free world

countries until it puts its internal house in order and refrains from international adventures."

Lucius D. Clay was the general in charge of post-war Berlin, where Allen Dulles was working with Henry Kissinger in the tense period immediately after the war ended. Clay and Dulles set up the Crusade for Freedom in 1950 linked with CIA-funded Radio Free Europe as a Cold War broadcaster. Another person whose name stands out as one who very early jumped on the bandwagon of critics, demanding that no assistance be given to Indonesia, was Congressman Gerald Ford (later thirty-eighth president of the United States).[286]

Jones was adept in monitoring political events in Jakarta, and it was clear to him that Sukarno himself was not involved in instigating Konfrontasi. Subandrio's intelligence group, BPI, was involved from the start, and soon after, both the PKI and the army, in rivalry, were also participants, drawing Sukarno along in the political slipstream. Jones was at pains to emphasize for Washington that the need for concentrating the country's attention on economic reforms has been "repeatedly stressed by all principal government officials including President Sukarno since the West Irian settlement."[287] A group of Indonesian leaders led by Djuanda went to discuss the economic stabilization program with the IMF and the US government. Jones said that the issue was "enormously complicated":

> Vying for First Minister Djuanda's position (like jackals that are expecting his early political, if not physical, demise) are principally Chaerul Saleh and Subandrio, although Ruslan Abdulgani not out of the running, and even Ali Sastroamidjojo has hopes lightning will strike. All are playing for PKI favor and support to further their own ambitions.[288]

The Indonesian most capable of repairing the economy was Djuanda. He was one who believed (in Jones's words) "in US sincerity toward Indonesia and who would re-emphasize cooperation with US." Because of the economic situation, Jones explained, the PKI was able to exert "enormous pressure" on the government, even though not represented in government.

Jones recommended that the United States do all it could to prevent Malaysian confrontation from worsening. At the same time, he suggested that if the United States could respond to the $600 million that Indonesia needed over the next three years and resume the flow of military supplies, the situation could be brought back under control. But confrontation did not stop. Jones observed that Sukarno, while not responsible for starting the dispute over British decolonization, was also unable to stop the dispute by himself.

Initially, in 1963 when Sukarno became embroiled in the conflict not of his doing, his public statements were designed to steer a course through dangerous political currents beyond his control. He was not then espousing the same level of aggressive foreign policy toward Malaysia as he did in 1964–65, after Kennedy was gone. He and Kennedy had been trying to achieve an economic package that would have had political benefits for both Kennedy and Sukarno.

Ganjang

When the people of Sarawak, Sabah, and Brunei were finally given an opportunity to vote, to express their opinion on being part of Malaysia or not, the prime minister of Malaya, Tengku Abdul Rahman, did not even wait for the official results. He announced the formation of Malaysia too early, showing contempt for Sukarno's interference. And Sukarno was furious, labeling him a puppet of the British. Of course, the Tengku was well aware that Sukarno would have lost face in Indonesia without suitable retribution. Konfrontasi may have started as a diplomatic slinging match but ended with regime change.

Konfrontasi entered a new phase in 1964–65, with more military clashes, only after it was clear that the planned US economic package that Kennedy had been promoting would be completely disbanded. It was the 1964–65 period that subsequently was used to characterize, as well as caricature, Sukarno's role in Konfrontasi—a grimacing figure in dark glasses, wearing the traditional Indonesia black cap, the peci—with

accompanying media comments that the "irrational, irresponsible leader of Indonesia … wants to swallow Malaysia."[289]

Yet Sukarno for most of 1963 was much more politically restrained than he was in 1964–65, when his public announcements were filled with vituperation for the British role in Malaysia and critical of Tengku Abdul Rahman. This change in Sukarno was reflected in the way that the expression "ganjang Malaysia" was used, popularized in Western media as "crush Malaysia." The Indonesian word "ganjang" has two levels of intensity, one being "crush" and another milder version simply meaning "chew," without the inherent aggression. "Swallow" was just an emotive, US news-media addition. By 1965, the same way that the West employed "ganjang," so were Indonesians using the expression that had become a slogan. It had become a pop song and was even performed by a choir and orchestra, as noted by Steven Farram, who wrote the following:

> In 1965, Australian writer Maslyn Williams spent several months in Indonesia. Wherever he travelled he noted "an obsessive condemnation of Malaysia." It began early in the morning with the radio playing first the national anthem and then the "hate song" *Ganjang Malaysia* (Crush Malaysia).[290]

Farram translated the words of the pop song:

> Be prepared Tengku, I am coming to obstruct your plans. Face up Tengku, I will block your intentions. The enthusiasm of my nation will set alight every corner. We fight to defend justice in the world. We demand independence for every nation. Rise up [together] Africa and Asia.

Indonesian nationalism was fired up by the recent victory over Dutch colonial power in New Guinea. The tragic irony in that dispute was that the unitary state of Indonesia was the dominant issue, rather than the welfare of the Papuan people. As far as independent Indonesia was concerned (without anybody paying much attention to what the Papuan people themselves were saying), "independence" for the Papuan people was one and the same as

victory over the Dutch. Despite the paradox, the same noble principle of ending colonial subjugation was now being applied to the British presence in Malaysia. Over a three-year period, from 1963 to 1965, it underwent a distinct change. What began as principled rhetoric became aggressive, anticolonial diatribe that was all too readily misinterpreted as a quest for territorial acquisition. This change was reflected in Sukarno's use of the word "ganjang." In 1963, when initially showing his intention, he conveyed the milder meaning and disagreed when the word was interpreted as "crush." Always expressing himself in an extravagant style, he performed for the media to demonstrate his meaning. Ganjang, he explained, was like nibbling food in your mouth to check it for taste, as would a politician checking for any disagreeable taste of colonialism, then spitting it out!

Territorial acquisition was not on the menu in Malaysian confrontation. Nevertheless, Western critics of Indonesia readily depicted confrontation as expansionism because it came hard on the heels of Sukarno's sovereignty dispute over Netherlands New Guinea, a dispute in which President Kennedy's role had proved crucial.

"Unblock Aid": JFK's Indonesia Quest

Sukarno commanded great respect as the founding father of Indonesian independence, but he was unable to halt confrontation (or had no avenue of redress before arranging the visit by Kennedy) because it was driven by domestic political rivalry. Having finally ousted the Dutch altogether, Indonesia in 1963 was overflowing with national pride, slightly aghast at their achievement and still seething with anticolonial venom.

In its intermittent early stages, the conflict drew criticism from Washington through the US ambassador in Jakarta. Jones explained that the US government agreed the proposed format of Malaysia was the best option for decolonization. US-Indonesian relations became seriously strained in September 1963 after the burning of the British Embassy in Jakarta. Kennedy's aid program attracted criticism from British officials who "told the White House with increasing frequency that UK and US interests

regarding Indonesia were beginning fundamentally to diverge."[291] Republican Congressman William S. Broomfield claimed that Indonesia was misusing US assistance. The call to cut US aid came from a clique of other congressmen including Mathias, Gross, and Findley. "Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon then endorsed the 'Broomfield amendment,' demanding that Indonesia be dropped from the list of recipients of US aid. 'I say we should wipe it off the aid program,' he declared."[292]

Kennedy's planned visit to Jakarta was a radical and daring move, one that could have snatched victory from the jaws of defeat. He wanted to reopen all funding to restart his follow-up strategy after the New Guinea sovereignty dispute. This would ensure his intervention yielded long-term political benefits and vindicate his foreign-policy move that had shown disfavor to a NATO ally. Moreover, he wanted to win another term in the presidency. In Indonesia, Kennedy's intervention had stirred popular euphoria in his favor, which continued into 1963, such was the young American president's charisma. The Bay of Pigs, the Congo, Berlin, Laos, Vietnam, and the Cuban Missile Crisis—the Cold War crises confronting him were making global headlines, which for Indonesian readers kept "JFK news" current, well past the highpoint of the New York Agreement in August 1962. In terms of implementing his follow-up strategy, the ideal time to exploit pro-JFK sentiment was in 1963, yet the proposed date for the visit to Jakarta in early 1964 would still benefit from the kudos surrounding President John F. Kennedy. His "footprint of fame" had been greatly enhanced by intervening in the New Guinea dispute: unresolved since independence in 1949, it had created its own anticolonial niche in Indonesia's collective psyche.

Malaysian confrontation was causing delay in mid-1963; then the Bloomfield Amendment, by cutting almost all the funding for JFK's Indonesia strategy, left him no alternative. He resolved to make the Jakarta visit to employ his charisma as the last political weapon at his disposal. Success for Kennedy's visit to Jakarta depended upon the response of the Indonesian populace, and in late 1963 this was still very positive. So, it seemed a forgone conclusion that he would have achieved his goal because

of the degree of veneration for JFK in Indonesia, combined with the eloquence of Indonesia's President Sukarno for whom there was still widespread adulation. The politics of personality was the only weapon at the disposal of both Kennedy and Sukarno to bring the confrontation to a stop, and it was their intention to employ it jointly, and to the full, once the US president was in Jakarta. During his three years in office, Kennedy's image and reputation had acquired a very positive aura throughout Asia and Africa far surpassing his predecessor, President Eisenhower. The forty-three-year old president was seen as pro-Indonesian. His new political stance and willingness to act decisively, capped off by his intervention in the sovereignty dispute, was in stark contrast to the blatant political interference of his seventy-year old predecessor.

Indonesians and especially Sukarno, whose oratorical skill was well-honed over four decades, welcomed the new style, the new era, as heralded in the inaugural address: "Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans."

JFK's political opponents ensconced in Washington throughout the 1950s were unaccustomed to a president asserting such personal control. It was his forte, especially in foreign policy. "Kennedy's instinctive style which was one of personal and intimate command"[293] took on unprecedented importance and became a threat to the political strategy of his opponents because it meant he was highly likely to implement the aims of his Jakarta trip.

Kennedy was aiming for a seismic shift of Cold War alignment in Southeast Asia by bringing Indonesia "on side." As Bradley Simpson stated (in 2008), "One would never know from reading the voluminous recent literature on the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and Southeast Asia, for example, that until the mid-1960s most officials [in the US] still considered Indonesia of far greater importance than Vietnam and Laos."[294]

Kennedy wanted to ensure that Indonesia was secure before implementing any policy decision regarding the US presence in Vietnam. The two interrelated parts of his action plan after the New Guinea

sovereignty dispute involved utilizing the predominantly pro-US Indonesian army, and large-scale US aid for development projects in Indonesia. Both Kennedy and his opponents in Washington pursued a paradigm of modernization that had emerged in the late 1950s, using the military as the most cohesively organized group in undeveloped countries. Simpson has outlined how the "US government's embrace of military modernization" in the early 1960s followed on from the March 1959 Draper Committee report that called for using the armed forces of underdeveloped countries "as a major transmission belt of socio-economic reform and development."[295]

Admiral Arleigh Burke and CIA director Allen Dulles argued at a June 18 NSC meeting [1959] that the United States ought to expand military training programs in Asia. They wanted to include a wide range of civilian responsibilities and to encourage Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) to "develop useful and appropriate relationships with the rising military leaders and factions in the underdeveloped countries to which they were assigned." A few months later the semi-governmental RAND Corporation held a conference at which Lucian Pye, Guy Pauker, Edward Shils, and other scholars expanded on these ideas.[296]

Admiral Arleigh Burke, Dulles, and Pauker were "promoting Indonesian armed forces as a modernizing force," a strategy linked to Dulles' role in the 1958 Outer Islands Rebellion. Simpson continues, "The army simultaneously pursued a counterinsurgency strategy against internal opponents while greatly expanding its political and economic power following the 1957 declaration of martial law and the takeover of Dutch enterprises."

By the time Kennedy came to office, much of Southeast Asia–related US policy was infused with military modernization theory. Civic-action programs figured highly in Kennedy's strategy in Indonesia, utilizing the army and also the police, designed to counterbalance the attraction the PKI had for impoverished farmers, like moths to a light in the hope of salvation. The infrastructure and poverty-reduction programs were tied to US funding and framed around the assessment made by Tufts University Professor Donald Humphrey. He recommended that US aid to Indonesia starting in

1963 should be in the order of $325–390 million. Europe and Japan were to have contributed almost half of this, but Kennedy's aid program soon encountered difficulties in the Congress.

While acutely wary of policy interference after the Bay of Pigs, an inaugural wake-up call, Kennedy had no way of ascertaining how his Indonesia strategy actually threatened the Indonesia strategy of his opponents. Nevertheless, the fact that JFK insisted on denying the CIA any part in his own negotiations with Sukarno is an indication of the serious distrust he held by 1963.

Earlier in 1961, when President Kennedy had been in office only a few months, a CIA briefing paper advised him that "we should not now entertain any major increases in the scale of economic or military aid to Indonesia."[297] Mindful that Allen Dulles and Guy Pauker were pro–military modernization, Kennedy must have interpreted such advice as hypocritical. Similarly, the CIA advice on whether or not Kennedy should support Sukarno's quest to oust the Dutch from New Guinea offered only a bleak prospect, saying that whichever way the president moved it would not alter the inexorable rise to power of the PKI. The CIA advice was stark:

> It would be gratifying to be able to propose an alternative course of action by the United States which would stand a good chance of turning the course of events in Indonesia in a constructive direction. Unfortunately, this is a situation in which the influence that the United States can exert, at least in the short run, is extremely limited, if (as must be assumed) crude and violent intervention is excluded.[298]

Kennedy chose to support Sukarno's claim to the Dutch territory and follow through with precisely the opposite to what the CIA had advised, an economic aid program to counter the PKI by addressing poverty through civic aid and development projects. When the funding restrictions imposed by Congress brought JFK's follow-up plan to a standstill and he resolved to make a historic visit to Jakarta to restart the US aid project, the threat to Dulles' strategy left no option. In the same way that Dulles had offered

Kennedy no option in the 1961 briefing paper, later in 1963 Kennedy's decision to visit Jakarta left no option for Dulles (whom JFK had already ushered to the political sidelines). We can surmise how the exit of Dulles in 1961 may have seemed a positive move for Kennedy and one that should have helped him in 1963 to implement the Indonesia policy he wanted. Yet Dulles' removal from office did little to diminish his extensive network of contacts and could only have exacerbated the threat created by Kennedy's plan to visit Jakarta. Dulles simply had no answer to counter Kennedy's dramatic personal initiative to visit Jakarta—or to recontextualize the same comment from the 1961 briefing paper given Kennedy, Dulles had no answer in 1963 "if (as must be assumed) crude and violent intervention is excluded."

In two crucial aspects, Kennedy's plan clashed with the ongoing strategy of regime change that DCI Dulles had set in motion six years earlier. First, JFK intended to utilize the Indonesian army as "servants of the state" of Indonesia, not for the army to assume power. And second, Kennedy's intention was to maintain the presidency of Sukarno. Unbeknownst to Kennedy, his plan to use the army was in effect commandeering the same asset intended by Dulles to implement regime change. Not only was JFK usurping the benefits of the transformation occurring as a result of US training of Indonesian army officers—a process that David Ransome labeled with the pithy description, a "creeping coup d'état"[299]—but also by ensuring Sukarno remained president JFK would prevent the full military option. Further, keeping Sukarno as president would have prevented untrammeled access to natural resources, a project which had been many years in the planning. Unlike Dulles, Kennedy's plan to make use of the large number of Indonesian army officers being trained in the United States did not have violent regime change in mind. While both Dulles and JFK intended to use the army as a modernizing force, Kennedy was advocating "civil action programs [that] dovetailed perfectly with modernization theorists' emphasis on the constructive role of the military safeguarding and shepherding the development process."[300] Where Kennedy was starkly at odds with his Washington opponents—reminiscent

of Ambassador Allison's dilemma—was JFK's determination to retain Sukarno as president of Indonesia.

The visit to Jakarta was premised on an understanding between Kennedy and Sukarno to bring Malaysian confrontation to an end, while JFK was in Jakarta. Howard Jones, US ambassador in Jakarta from 1958, was well acquainted with Sukarno and fully aware that the key to achieving this important political change was Kennedy's charisma, combined with the adulation and respect he commanded. Together, Kennedy and Sukarno could bring about a cessation of Malaysian confrontation, but, as Jones observes in his book *Indonesia: The Possible Dream*, "Sukarno could not initiate a settlement of the dispute himself."[301]

Only after several months of negotiation with the Indonesian president did Kennedy agree to the proposed visit, after three requests by Sukarno. The one precondition set by Kennedy was his insistence on achieving a "successful outcome." JFK's Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in private correspondence with me (January 8, 1992),[302] wrote, "President Kennedy made it clear that confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia should be stopped … not merely for the duration of Kennedy's visit but on a permanent basis." It was not confrontation that was stopped but, rather, the visit by Kennedy. For Sukarno, Kennedy's precondition meant declaring a permanent cessation of hostilities during the actual visit of the American president; while for JFK, a successful visit meant ending the hostilities that were jeopardizing the Indonesia strategy he had initiated in 1962 and that threatened to turn the area into just another Cold War fatality.

As part of a wider Southeast Asian tour, the visit was described by JFK as one that would provide a much-needed boost for his reelection. Now with six decades of hindsight, the adverse repercussions of that trip to Jakarta having been prevented from taking place, repercussions in Indonesia at least, are clearly evident in terms of the tragedy that befell the country in 1965–66 In Cold War terms, Kennedy's Indonesia strategy held every chance of success—indeed, the very likelihood of success can be seen as compelling the decision to make the trip as much as the decision to prevent the trip.

Michael Forrestal of the National Security Council had recommended in March 1963 that President Kennedy visit Jakarta. Forrestal himself had visited Jakarta in January, and his suggestion carried additional weight not only because he was the son of the wartime Navy secretary but also because he was doubling the recommendation of US Ambassador Jones. Forrestal reminded the president how US-Indonesian relations suffered when his predecessor, Eisenhower, did not visit. On March 6, JFK wrote to Sukarno again, thanking him for the renewed invitation to visit Indonesia. He explained that before the end of his first term, he was planning a visit to the Far East "and I assure you that I would not contemplate such a trip without visiting a country of the importance of Indonesia." For the moment, economic stabilization was the priority, and Kennedy expressed his support for Sukarno's decision to implement an effective plan to achieve this goal. He concluded with a promise to "be in touch with you about my travelling plans when they become more definite."[303]

On May 26, Secretary of State Dean Rusk informed Kennedy that Sukarno had launched "an economic regime of severe fiscal discipline." Despite the good news, it was counterbalanced by other news about a long-running argument involving Caltex and Stanvac, threatening the $120 million that Indonesia derived annually in foreign exchange from the export of oil. Both Shell and the US oil companies[304] in Indonesia had been negotiating since 1961. Ambassador Jones was instructed "to tell Sukarno that a break with the oil companies would have serious repercussions for US-Indonesian relations."[305] By June 4, there was a production-sharing arrangement of 60 percent for the government of Indonesia and 40 percent for the oil companies, and the problem was solved.

By July, the problem that still threatened economic stabilization was Malaysian confrontation. Nevertheless, Indonesia was complying sufficiently to keep on with the program. Confrontation was a problem because it was fueling what Robert Komer of NSC described as a "Congressional anti-Indo mood." He briefed Kennedy on the situation on July 23, saying, "We think we can beat down Hill amendments [proposing cut to foreign aid to Indonesia] unless Sukarno makes it impossible. Despite

all the pain, our Indo policy is gathering speed in right direction, if we can only stick it out."[306]

In an attached summary of the Indonesian Stabiliszation Program,[307] Rusk explained that explicit warnings had been given to Jakarta—to Sukarno, his cabinet ministers, and the Indonesian negotiating team in Washington—that "continued opposition to Malaysia would reduce the prospect of a sympathetic attitude toward Indonesia." If the OECD Development Assistance Committee stepped back from assisting Indonesia, this would make US aid far more difficult. "The Indonesians are also fully aware," Rusk added, "that overt military activity against Malaysia would entirely foreclose all prospects of US aid." The annual level of proposed US aid was in the range of $125 million to $135 million. JFK spoke out against cutting this aid, as the opposition in Congress to maintaining the current level was getting louder and stronger. Ambassador Jones had stressed the importance of having the bulk of aid work done through the IMF to avoid the backlash from the PKI against direct US assistance, but worse was about to happen.

The Malaysia announcement by Tengku Abdul Rahman on September 15, 1963, led to rioting in Jakarta. Because UN Secretary General U Thant was late in ascertaining the wishes of the people—that is, whether the people in the eastern portion wanted to be part of Malaysia or not—the Tengku announced that "Malaysia" (the British-designed format of decolonization) would proceed nevertheless. From the viewpoint of many in Jakarta, the Tengku was disregarding the United Nations, and this caused rioting in Jakarta. All the glass windows in the newly constructed British Embassy were smashed. On September 16, Malaysia was announced and the next day the embassy was set on fire and other British properties attacked, but without loss of life.

Regarding the formation of Malaysia, the British seemed incapable of being anything other than provocative;[308] but at the same time, Jakarta seemed incapable of seeing the hypocrisy of its concern for ascertaining the wishes of the people in contradistinction to the lack of concern in 1962 for ascertaining the wishes of the Papuan people. Much of the US political

opposition to Kennedy's Indonesia aid program was coming from those who disagreed with handing the Dutch territory over to Jakarta in the first place. Yet their criticism still served the purpose of Allen Dulles!

Dulles' Indonesia strategy had required the exit of the Dutch, but the proposed follow-up plan that Kennedy was endeavoring to implement risked making Sukarno president for life. Such an outcome would undermine plans for regime change and block the access to Papuan gold that would be available only through the Indonesian army, not Sukarno. JFK's Plan of Action was stonewalled in Congress after the embassy incident. The US response was evident in the *New York Times* (September 19, 1963), which declared "10,000 in Jakarta Attack and Burn British Embassy."[309]

Adam Malik, the key figure in the Soviet arms deal and the negotiations that led to the New York Agreement, was now the Indonesian minister for trade. In response to the formulation of Malaysia, and with Malik again playing a key role, Indonesia on September 21 instituted an economic blockade. This jeopardized Indonesia's largest single earner of foreign currency, rubber. Three days later, the IMF and the US government announced the Indonesia aid program was to be discontinued. The stabilization program was at the point of no return. Kennedy continued to push for a solution, resorting to a presidential prerogative to muster $70 million per year, but he realized this would ultimately be futile unless confrontation ceased. He needed $135 million. JFK argued against cutting foreign aid, saying the amount in question was relatively small compared to other expenditures:

> Now, we spend $51 billion or $52 billion on defense. We spend $2.5 billion on the atomic energy program. We spend $5 billion on space, of which as least a good percentage has a military implication in the sense of our national security. We spend all this money and yet we are going to deny the president of the United States a very valuable weapon in maintaining the influence of the United States in this

> very diversified world. I can't imagine anything more dangerous than to end this program….
>
> I am asking the Congress of the United States to give me the means of conducting the foreign policy of the United States.[310]

In a style typical of Kennedy, he resolved to deal directly with the blockage of aid funding, using whatever resources he had to overcome the problem—and here the advantage he held was the one-to-one relationship he had with Sukarno. On November 4, when Jones was talking with Sukarno, the Indonesian president raised the issue of CIA activities in Indonesia. Jones said the following:

> He had been given evidence of CIA plan to topple him and his government … [one-and-a-half lines not declassified]. I denied this categorically and asked Sukarno what evidence consisted of…. [eight and a half lines not declassified]. I pointed out that Sukarno had had ample evidence that President Kennedy and present administration in Washington were interested in helping not hurting the Government of Indonesia…. Sukarno acknowledged that President Kennedy and US Ambassador were not working against him. However, he was aware from the past that CIA often participated in activities of which the Ambassador was not aware and which even the White House was not aware…. He was counting on Pres Kennedy coming to Indonesia. He repeated that he would give him "the grandest reception anyone ever received here."[311]

Initially, JFK's follow-up plan had the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but this disappeared after Konfrontasi led to the burning of the British Embassy in Jakarta. JFK's decision to visit Jakarta to stop Konfrontasi was not well received by the JCS principally because the visit would stabilize and consolidate Sukarno's presidency. There had already been disagreement between JFK and members of the JCS, especially General Curtis LeMay, whose approach to Indonesia Kennedy had already experienced in the way he scoffed at JFK's approach to Cuba.

Forrestal of the NSC staff saw looming problems in Congress dealing with Indonesia's 1963 balance of payments deficit. It would total $295 million, but, he said, the main problem was that $170 million of this total "represents repayment of outstanding foreign debts which are largely Soviet." He pointed out "the political repercussions of even indirectly paying off debt incurred for military equipment in the Soviet Union would be deafening."[312] Indonesia had stepped into political quicksand, a mix of foreign debt and Cold War. This form of economic warfare by financial implosion (after the New Guinea campaign and now Konfrontasi) Indonesia seemingly had brought on itself with its rabid nationalism, yet it was as much the outcome of centuries of colonial rule as it was the result of selective or restrictive sale of US armaments to Indonesia. Those members of Congress who were not especially enamored of Sukarno, or for that matter of Kennedy, used this criticism relentlessly against funding the follow-up plan that JFK was planning for Indonesia. He could see the avenues to pursue *his* foreign policy closing down.

Addressing the Congress on foreign aid and attempting to counter the prohibition on assistance to Indonesia, JFK did not announce that he was planning to go to Jakarta to deal with the problem in person. Instead, he questioned the point of stopping aid to Indonesia "because of its attitude toward Malaysia when three months from now it may or may not be the same as it is today."[313] What he is actually saying here is that he is determined to make a success of his proposed visit to Jakarta that he had been discussing, planning, and arranging for months, but still not had announced officially.

It was when Jones outlined how Sukarno himself was unable to stop Konfrontasi that Kennedy accepted the invitation to visit Jakarta. Already JFK's reputation in Indonesia was accorded hero status for resolving the dispute with the Dutch. Because of this, Kennedy and Sukarno together would have the presence, the impact, and the political charisma to bring confrontation to a halt. Former US Secretary of State Dean Rusk confirmed by letter to me that this was Kennedy's main reason for the visit to Jakarta scheduled for early 1964, the visit that did not take place.[314]

The president's rationale included wider considerations also, such as a decision on the US role in Vietnam. This decision may well have been put into effect after Kennedy's reelection in 1964. Indeed, his reelection depended on the success or failure of his Cold War policy in Southeast Asia, and this hinged on the region's largest country by far, Indonesia, which he wanted to bring on side. So by October 1963, Kennedy was hoping to stop Konfrontasi in order to restart his follow-up plan for Indonesia, an overall strategy that quite possibly could have led to the Nobel Peace prize and reelection for a second term. The seriousness with which he was preparing his Jakarta visit, deliberately avoiding CIA involvement in the arrangements, suggests he was downplaying the political ramifications more than his later comments would suggest. Kennedy may have been a relative newcomer to the tangled politics of Indonesia, but his highly personalized approach to the problem, in this instance, already bore the hallmark of success. JFK's planned visit to Jakarta would unknowingly have eliminated seven years of Allen Dulles' planning for regime change and deprived Rockefeller mining interests of being the sole operator to access an "El Dorado."

Ambassador Jones commented on more than the arrangement between JFK and Sukarno, when he said the following:

> I used to argue that the Malaysian dispute could be settled if we could give Sukarno something by which he could save face. Those who disagreed with me had no intention of providing Sukarno with an out. I felt that an exit for the Indonesian president could be provided that would benefit the entire region. But this was not to be.[315]

Did Jones intend the same palpable meaning as President Sukarno, who spoke more directly than the ambassador, when he said, "Kennedy was killed precisely to prevent him from visiting Indonesia"?[316] Both Jones and Sukarno may yet prove to be correct.

In the same way that French President de Gaulle miraculously survived thirty-one assassination attempts from his political predators (one of whom

was Allen Dulles[317]), President Sukarno too lived a charmed life, having survived more than half-a-dozen attempts on his life. Not all were CIA, Audrey and George Kahin have explained, but starting in the mid-1950s Sukarno was on Dulles' list of leaders to be liquidated. Both Sukarno and Kennedy had political predators and sharing the same one was to be their ultimate historical fate. Aware of the dangers of holding high public office, JFK had already chosen his own plot at Arlington, responding to his own words that now read like an eerie premonition: "Domestic policy can only defeat us," he used to say. "Foreign policy can kill us."

Chapter 7

SUHARTO AND 1965

Once Kennedy had made the decision to intervene in the NNG sovereignty dispute, not favouring the Dutch, he fully intended to utilize the goodwill this outcome generated in Indonesia. He launched a US-aid program, with funding to come mostly from Congress, for large-scale development, infrastructure, and civic aid. This strategy was designed to bring Indonesia on side in the Cold War. Initially the Joint Chiefs expressed approval. There were wider political concerns and sound logic underlying this policy. Kennedy was aiming to reduce the widespread poverty behind the growth of the PKI, comprised mostly of landless Javanese peasants, and promote US investment.

In Cold War terms, there were firm indications of Indonesia siding with the United States, so Kennedy's strategy in Southeast Asia (where there were already mounting problems in Laos and Vietnam) was to give priority to Indonesia. It was by far the largest country in the region and being an ally would place the United States in a more advantageous position to face the remaining problems. When Congress blocked the funding for his economic-aid program after mob-rioting resulted in the burning of the British Embassy and staff housing complex, Kennedy had no choice but to go to Jakarta in order to stop Konfrontasi. Restarting economic aid would salvage his much-criticized Indonesia policy. At the same time, it would secure the Sukarno presidency, an outcome that unknowingly conflicted with a covert plan for regime change in which Dulles had been involved for several years. This regime change involved eliminating the PKI as part of a mammoth Cold War strategy to split Moscow and Beijing. Kennedy's last-ditch effort to support Sukarno was easily misrepresented by his critics and no longer

had support from the Congress or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Sukarno, speaking with Ambassador Jones on November 4, 1963, "raised question of CIA activities in Indonesia and said he had been given evidence of CIA plan to topple him and his government … [but] was convinced that Pres Kennedy and US Amb were not working against him. However, he was aware from the past that CIA often participated in activities of which the Ambassador was not aware and which even perhaps the White House was not aware."[318]

In the Foreword to my book on Malaysian confrontation, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, one of Indonesia's leading writers, commented on President Kennedy's anticipated visit to Jakarta in early 1964: "Kennedy's plans to meet Sukarno in Indonesia never came to pass: that we all know, for he was murdered." Pramoedya drew attention to the planned visit without elaborating, apart from saying that Kennedy and Indonesia's President Sukarno "had to disappear from the stage of history".[319]

Six decades have elapsed since these two leaders "disappeared" and with them the political positivity of the now forgotten plan to visit Jakarta. Instead, in the mid-1960s, a proliferation of violence and military mentality suffused the nation, a consequence of regime change. Indonesia still bears the scars. This outcome was in stark contrast to the "Indonesia strategy" Kennedy was planning in 1963. Working in conjunction with Sukarno, whose perennial aim was to unify his nation, JFK's intended visit was lost in the turgid history of that time. His successor, President Johnson, was notified by Forrestal that "any prospect for increased economic assistance from the Western World will depend upon [Sukarno] abandoning his policy of confrontation … [and that] Ambassador Jones will probably ask for authorization to tell Sukarno orally that you are aware of President Kennedy's hopes for visit to Indonesia early in 1964."[320] Sukarno knew that Johnson had neither the capacity nor the inclination to fulfil Kennedy's hopes and plans to stop Konfrontasi.

Kennedy's planned visit to Jakarta had involved several months of negotiation before he and Sukarno reached an agreement; then on November 20 the visit was formally announced. Because of the tragedy in

Dallas a few days later, the visit did not occur. Howard Jones wrote, "The assassin's bullet put an end to our plans and disposed of the immediate prospects for settlement of the Malaysia dispute."[321] General Nasution told me that as soon as President Kennedy officially announced his intention to come to Jakarta, he arranged an appointment for November 26 to confer with him about security arrangements for the intended visit. Because he was there already, he explained, he attended Kennedy's funeral representing Indonesia.

After Dulles' long-held goal of regime change in Indonesia was achieved in 1965–66, a comment that Richard Nixon made in 1967 throws even more light onto the importance of Indonesia: "The war in Viet Nam has for so long dominated our field of vision that it has distorted our picture of Asia," Nixon declared, pointing out the most important country in the region was Indonesia: "With its 100 million people, and its 3000-mile arc of islands containing the region's richest hoard of natural resources, Indonesia constitutes by far the greatest prize in the Southeast Asian area."[322]

"The Sino-Soviet Dispute Is Genuine"

Dulles, decades earlier, had recognized the importance of Indonesia. In 1960, the PKI was the largest communist party outside the Sino-Soviet bloc. A National Intelligence Estimate in August 1960 declared that the Sino-Soviet relationship, while no longer monolithic, would remain for the next five years "more cohesive than divisive," but secret intelligence was rapidly proving this incorrect. On November 9, 1960, a close associate of Dulles, Sherman Kent,[323] who was director of the Office of National Estimates, wrote in a memorandum "The Sino-Soviet dispute is genuine."[324] Yet official CIA policy remained undecided on whether the split was genuine or not. Allen Dulles knew the split was real and that it was increasing, but when Kennedy assumed office, DCI Dulles did not include him in this intelligence, nor was Dulles' replacement briefed. DCI McCone acknowledged "the differences between the Russians and Chinese are very great, [but] he did not think they were very deep or that a final break

between the two would occur."[325] Harold. P. Ford has explained that by mid-1963 the seriousness of Sino-Soviet estrangement was not reflected in the official position adopted by the CIA; it was becoming widely evident, but the tentative approach, doubt, and disbelief continued. Even for the next few years (Ford has explained) a few CIA officers, predominantly in counterintelligence whose chief was James Jesus Angleton, persisted in the claim that "Sino-Soviet discord was a fraud, deliberately orchestrated by Moscow and Beijing to deceive the West."[326]

Not only did Dulles fail to brief Kennedy on the Sino-Soviet dispute early in the presidency, but he also remained silent about the rivalry between Moscow and Beijing to wield influence over the PKI or win its support. In geographical terms, Beijing regarded Indonesia as in its own backyard, and winning the support of the PKI would give Beijing an advantage in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The numerical growth of the PKI was seen by Moscow and Beijing for its obvious political potential. Dulles was also focused on the PKI, but his peculiar skill in political intelligence turned what seemed inevitable on its head. The size of the party became a factor that he used to his advantage when formulating his wedge strategy—the greater the rivalry between Moscow and Beijing over the PKI, the more intense would be the mutual recrimination once the PKI was eliminated.

Adam Malik in August 1983 was the only Indonesian political figure who ever attempted to explain to me the importance of Indonesia in the Sino-Soviet split, and it was on his initiative rather than any question from me. He had just retired from his position as vice president of Indonesia and was speaking with more than four decades of top-level experience in Indonesia. Only a year later when he passed away from cancer did I realize why he was talking so frankly, perhaps attempting to ease his political conscience. His adjutant, Adhayatman, who was seated beside him during the interview, once or twice urged Malik to refrain from being so candid until I politely requested he let Malik talk without interruption, whereupon Malik, to my surprise, told him likewise.

The importance of Adam Malik in ousting Sukarno cannot be overstated. As chairman of the Indonesian delegation in 1962 for the return

of West New Guinea, Malik was given additional leeway by the US mediator, Ellsworth Bunker, to insist on an earlier deadline, May 1, 1963, for the Dutch departure. While never mentioned during negotiations, the few extra months meant the mining lease held by the US-based company Freeport in Netherlands New Guinea, on the world's largest primary gold deposit, did not expire while the Dutch still controlled the territory.

Enter Marshall Green

In the momentous 1965–66 period when regime change took place, Adam Malik was a leading political figure in Jakarta working closely with Robert J. Martens, the same political officer of the US Embassy in Moscow when Malik was Indonesia's ambassador there. Martens was transferred to Jakarta in September 1963, and they worked together in the ousting of Sukarno. Malik and Martens, as well as the new US ambassador in Jakarta, Marshall Green, who arrived in July 1965 to replace Howard Jones, were a closely-knit trio. Green described Malik as "one of the cleverest men he had ever met."[327] As a young activist, he participated in the Proclamation of Independence and was one of the revered "Generation of 1945." The top Japanese civilian political agent in Jakarta, Nishijima Shigetada,[328] personally assisted Sukarno in preparing the historic *proklamasi* and gave Malik access to Japanese radio to broadcast Indonesian independence to the world on August 17, 1945.

Malik's two American contacts in Jakarta, Marshall Green and Robert Martens, in the May 12, 1987, interview conducted by Martens in Green's home in Washington, DC,[329] have shown that in 1965–66 the Sino-Soviet conflict and Indonesia were tied together more closely, or more gruesomely, than history has recorded.

Indonesia was inexorably moving toward a violent climax with international criticism of "President Sukarno's Konfrontasi," inflation, and food shortages. The price of rice soared in September 1965. The Economic Declaration (Dekon), a prerequisite for Kennedy's visit, was never implemented and now reads like an epitaph for the Sukarno era. The

residential lodge that Sukarno constructed for the planned presidential visit was left empty and today is a museum.

When Malaysia was admitted to the UN Security Council in 1965, Sukarno reacted as if it were a slap in the face, withdrawing from the United Nations. According to Oei Tjoe Tat,[330] a prominent Indonesian of Chinese descent, Sukarno acted impetuously—he simply got out of bed and made the announcement on January 7, 1965. As one of the leading figures in Baperki, a Chinese-Indonesian social-political group, Oei Tjoe Tat blamed "bureaucratic capitalists"[331] and an "economic dynasty" for the failure of Dekon. Rallies of ten thousand people outside the presidential palace called for Adam Malik, minister for trade, to be sacked. Malik was also head of the Murba Party, one of ten political parties under Sukarno's presidential rule, termed "Guided Democracy." Murba was banned and Malik demoted to coordinator for Distribution Affairs. The British Embassy in Jakarta commented that "Malik has been so closely involved in the past with Sukarno's personal affairs and finances that he is not a man who could safely be kicked out of power."[332]

Sukarno kept calling for revolution because he wanted Indonesian industry under Indonesian control. When independence was granted in 1949, Indonesia was free of colonial administration, but every major industry was still in Dutch hands—aviation, shipping, banking, plantations, and manufacturing. In the PKI support for Sukarno in his quest to reclaim Indonesia for Indonesians, there was mutual political advantage.

Malik was also involved in a lobby group known as the Body for Promotion of Sukarnoism (BPS), its real aim to minimize PKI influence on Sukarno. When BPS was banned, the response from the Indonesian Army was restrained, although it had previously been a strong supporter. Malik was denounced by the PKI for not upholding Sukarno's grand vision of "Nasakom." Marshall Green stated the following when interviewed:[333]

> The most important thing to bear in mind … is that Sukarno had been pressing for a Nasakom government, which was a blending of nationalism, religion and Communism. That's how you get the

> Nasakom, the "a" being religion (for the Indonesian word agama). Now at this point Sukarno was favoring the Communists but he had as his principal opponents the Army.

Sukarno had actually devised the "three-strand" Nasakom formula early in his political career to fight Dutch colonial rule. In the 1920s, Haji Misbach was the most prominent Muslim espousing the compatibility of Islam and Communism, and it was his top student, Pak Dasir, who was the wedding celebrant for D. N. Aidit, chairman of the PKI in 1965. Conversant with its philosophical foundation, Sukarno employed Nasakom[334] in 1965 as his presidential ideology, his life's work to keep his country unified and nonaligned. Sukarno readily acknowledged that millions of Javanese were landless, poverty-stricken rice farmers without any hope of improvement unless they could find someone to represent them. The PKI was steadily mustering the support of the landless millions, and by the late 1950s the electoral results were plainly evident. In this Javanese context, Sukarno was willing for the PKI to be an integral part of the Indonesian polity. By using a nonaligned stance, he endeavored to remain outside the Cold War confines of political and economic doctrine. Sukarno's extensive reading in his formative years enabled him to discuss political theory in depth, and he knew well the accomplishments of Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, and Abraham Lincoln. He declared, "I will always feel friendly towards America" and as a mark of recognition founded his PNI nationalist party on July 4.[335] At that time, the communist party in Indonesia, which had started seven years before his own nationalist party—and even before the first communist party was formed in China—was then working closely with the Muslim Party. But the Nasakom union of the three remained illusory. Because of the Cold War in the 1960s, Sukarno faced opposition to having even a smidgen of communist participation. His political opponents took every opportunity to label him as a communist. Kennedy knew he was not, and even Richard Nixon (when vice president) said Sukarno was a nationalist and not a communist, but President Eisenhower saw Sukarno as "a communist and playboy" and five times refused Sukarno's invitations to

visit Jakarta.[336] Allen Dulles and Marshall Green persistently labeled Sukarno a communist or crypto-communist.

While Adam Malik was demoted for disapproving of Nasakom, Foreign Minister Dr. Subandrio saw the benefit of promoting Nasakom. He was next in line to President Sukarno and also in charge of Indonesia's largest intelligence organization, known as BPI or Central Intelligence. Subandrio had made strong ties in London as Indonesia's post-war representative there until 1954, and as foreign minister dined alongside the Queen of England, but by 1964–65 was becoming a strong proponent of befriending Beijing. Yet he was not a communist. Both he and Sukarno benefited from the mass support of the PKI. Promoting Nasakom on the twenty-seventh anniversary of the news service, Antara, on January 16, 1965, Subandrio declared: "If the Indonesian people finally realize the real strength of Nasakom unity, we will doubtlessly become a strong fortress safe from attack from whatever side."[337]

In the opinion of Robert Martens, "Sukarno was totally in league with the communists and was carrying the country in that direction…. Sukarno was a communist." The PKI was described by its opponents as being at the height of power in May 1965, the forty-fifth anniversary of its founding. Sukarno and Aidit addressed a packed audience of more than one hundred thousand at Senayan stadium (constructed for the 1962 Asian Games). But on closer analysis, the strength of the PKI by September 1965, in Sukarno's so-called Dwikora Cabinet, does not justify Robert Marten's claim that Sukarno was carrying Indonesia down the road of communism. The sole PKI figure with ministerial rank in the Dwikora Cabinet was Nyoto, third highest of PKI leaders, whereas the army had fifteen representatives. Both Aidit and Lukman were present but ranked only as deputies in their respective roles. The Navy, Air Force, and police filled another twelve positions. Sukarno's cabinet was still very much an "army doll," as US Military Attaché Robert Collier had described it previously.[338] Cold War pressures had turned Indonesia into a melting pot of opposing ideologies about to explode. When Marshall Green was interviewed about the mass killings, his estimate (more than two decades after the killings) was a

flippant “300,000, give or take 250,000.” Even in mid-1966, some Western leaders were saying “five hundred thousand to one million.” Indonesian investigators now say the death toll exceeds one million people. In a secret session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,[339] Green commented on the death toll: “We merely judge it by whole villages that have been depopulated.” He also used the term “bloodbath.”

In the interview conducted by Robert Martens, Green spoke about Surabaya. He recounted the story of Henry Heymann, a Princeton graduate in 1943, who had two terms as political officer in Jakarta, 1956–58 and 1961–65, separated by two years in Washington as an Indonesia analyst. In late 1965, Green sent him to the US Consulate in Surabaya during the period of mass killings.

Heymann’s own interview in 1993 might help to explain how Washington’s perception of Indonesia seemed so distorted at various times during the Sukarno era):

> It is apparently going down in history that there was a huge massacre of Communists in Indonesia. I forget whether it was supposed to have been a million, or hundreds of thousands. It was probably in the five figures. From my experience in Surabaya, it seems there was a lot of exaggeration and imagination.

Green explained that Heymann investigated reports “that the Brantas River was choked with bodies and he never found a body. It was choked with bodies that weren’t there, although he did tell me that the British Consul that lived on the bank of the river had seen two.”

The Library of Congress interviews were conducted twenty-five years after regime change in Indonesia, but the reluctance of both Heymann and Green to speak about the killings in Indonesia is plainly evident. In 1965–66, between Ambassador Green and his counterpart in the British Embassy in Jakarta, Andrew Gilchrist, there were regular exchanges of information about the ongoing killings. One report from the British Consulate in Surabaya claimed that people “were being murdered and thrown into the compound, heads being thrown into the compound each morning.”[340]

Beyond the annihilation of the PKI, which brought regime change in Indonesia, is a geopolitical significance—human sacrifice on the altar of the Cold War, furthering the split in the Sino-Soviet bloc. Because the PKI was the world's largest communist party outside the bloc, the rivalry to gain PKI support heightened differences between Moscow and Beijing. For those endeavoring to advance the Sino-Soviet split, such as Marshall Green, this rivalry provided an overriding motive to extinguish the PKI, thereby exacerbating the split. From an Indonesian perspective, however, this motivating factor behind US assistance at the time was never discerned, but Adam Malik (in the interview[341] I had with him in 1983) acknowledged that he became aware of it, aware that Indonesia was used as the marshalling yard for big-power politics. Driven by the need to gain advantage in the Sino-Soviet dispute, neither Moscow nor Beijing wanted the other to win the favor of the PKI. Green stated the following in his Library of Congress interview:

> The Indonesian cataclysm was far more momentous than has generally been recognized. It was not only important in terms of Indonesia's size, being the fifth most populous nation in the world, and of its location where two oceans and two continents meet. We must remember the time in which this occurred [the Cold War] … The world never grasped the significance of those times [because the effect was that] … the Chinese and the Russians began to point the finger of blame at each other…. Indonesia in 1965–67 changed the course of world events.

In addition to Green, among the coterie of persons who did grasp the political significance of Indonesia in the 1950s and '60s were Allen Dulles and Henry Kissinger. Both had participated in the 1958–60 Rockefeller Brothers Panel that pointed out the need to "drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing." Indonesia became the wedge in the Sino-Soviet dispute. When Dulles first confirmed the split was genuine, not an elaborate political fraud as some insisted it was well into the 1960s, he informed neither Eisenhower nor Kennedy. As a result, Kennedy's proposed

intervention to end Konfrontasi (his proposed visit to Jakarta in 1964) threatened not just Dulles' strategy to oust Sukarno but also the larger, geopolitical wedge strategy. Consequently, Kennedy's proposed visit was easily misrepresented, misconstrued, and misinterpreted (by the Joint Chiefs, for example) as against the national interest. The outcome of Kennedy's visit would have secured Sukarno's presidency, a leader whom Green described as "definitely procommunist if not a fully fledged communist."[342] Had Kennedy visited Jakarta in 1964 to stop Konfrontasi, Indonesia would not have been impaled on its own economy, hoisted by its own petard.

The Indonesian state had to give at that time [1965] according to some reports, as much as seventy percent of its budget for the maintenance and development of its armed forces. And that very fact, naturally, gave credibility to the complaints that the military "is a parasite and lives in luxury among people's poverty."[343]

Kennedy's aid program, targeting the poverty that fed PKI support, would have succeeded in time. Yet this would have worked *against* Kennedy as the time factor was crucial in the Sino-Soviet split intelligence, because when the split became known far and wide, its intelligence value (insofar as it was applicable to a deteriorating Indonesian context) would also diminish. Kennedy's proposed intervention significantly countermanded Dulles' Indonesia strategy in several ways, the most important of which was the continuity of Sukarno's presidency. Instead, Dulles' goal from the late 1950s—assassination of Sukarno and/or regime change—was without moral compass, and in 1965–66 he knowingly pursued the PKI to the point of physical annihilation to optimize the split in Sino-Soviet relations. And *this* Marshall Green endorsed, turning Indonesia into a place of the "unentombed."

Moreover, regarding the natural resources of the country and especially the world's largest primary deposit of gold, the Ertsberg-Grasberg complex discovered by J. J. Dozy in 1936, the Kennedy-Sukarno approach would not have resulted in complete operational control by a foreign company to the detriment of Indonesia. Nor would it have led—according to one of

Indonesia's top lawyers[344] who informed me he had personally sighted evidence of this occurring—to bank account payments channeled to Suharto, the army general who replaced Sukarno.

Kissinger's visit to Communist China in 1971 can be seen as fulfilment of the Rockefeller Brothers Panel more than a decade earlier. After his role as head of mission in Indonesia, Marshall Green was appointed as a key aide to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and when President Richard M. Nixon visited China in 1972, Green was with him. "The United States was thus no longer seen as the great enemy … [but] as a card to play against the Soviets," Green commented. "The breakdown of democratic centralism in China has been ascribed to China's reversal in Indonesia."[345] Both Green and Martens were formidable Foreign Service experts on China and the Soviet Union respectively, and their specializations were brought together in Indonesia, in 1965–66, not just on regime change but also on the Sino-Soviet dispute.

The dispute involved rivalry over the methods to be employed for world revolution, and a second point of difference was that China regarded Southeast Asia as its own backyard. The huge Soviet arms deal negotiated by Malik and concluded by General Nasution, in terms of the Sino-Soviet dispute, was not only a move against the colonial Dutch presence but also a move against China. It certainly won additional support for the PKI in their anticolonial campaign, but this support generated frustration because national elections were stalled by Guided Democracy. In Beijing, Mao Zedong may have applauded and offered moral support, but in Moscow, Khruschev bit his lip and reminded the PKI that elections were needed to utilize its numerical support to gain the reins of government. Khruschev, during his visit to Indonesia in 1960, told Aidit, chairman of the PKI, "The Communist Party is not a grocer's shop where the more customers you attract, and the more soap and herrings you sell, the more money you stand to make."[346] Although Moscow's criticism of PKI involvement in Konfrontasi was subdued, the Soviet press after September 1965 labelled it "reckless extremism."[347]

Major-General Suharto

The September 30 Movement was the catalyst that led to mass murder in 1965–66, and placing this Movement in the political context of the time—providing "the big picture" before the forensic detail—is my first priority.

In the early hours of October 1, 1965, in the grounds of an old rubber plantation adjacent to Halim Air Force Base about forty minutes' drive from central Jakarta, more than a thousand armed men boarded trucks in preparation for "an action" by the September 30 Movement. Most were troops in uniform carrying standard arms, but some trucks included a small number of persons wearing mufti or street clothes and additional firepower in the form of a Thompson submachine gun. The trucks headed to various locations in central Jakarta. Some of the troops occupied the radio and telecommunications station in Merdeka Square. Other trucks went to the houses of seven generals with the intention of taking the abducted generals to President Sukarno to explain the rumor that they were planning a military coup on October 5.

On RRI, Radio Republic Indonesia, at 7:15 a.m. there was a matter-of-fact announcement about the abduction of the generals as part of thwarting a CIA-backed coup, and at 2:00 p.m. another announcement about the formation of a "Revolution Council." Although the radio station was occupied by troops, both announcements were read by the announcer without suggesting anything but normal conditions persisted at RRI. The typed morning announcement had been signed by the titular head of the so-called September 30 Movement, Lieutenant Colonel Untung Syamsuri, and the radio announcer read, "Signed, Lieutenant Colonel Untung." Yet the typed afternoon announcement was without any handwritten signature, so the announcer simply read what was typed on the page, saying, "signed, Lieutenant Colonel Untung." It was typed but not handwritten; there was no signature, but the radio audience had no way of knowing it was actually unsigned. A distinct difference between the morning and afternoon announcements was that the 7:15 a.m. announcement declared the September 30 Movement was protecting the president, while the 2 p.m.

announcement, unsigned, called for the government to be dismissed and was *the basis of the accusation that the September 30 Movement, together with the PKI* (dubbed "G30S/PKI" by Suharto) *was attempting a coup against Sukarno*.

Reports on the early-morning abductions, as Major General Suharto explained later, led him to conclude by mid-morning that General Yani,[348] head of the army, was one of six generals who had been killed. Suharto himself assumed leadership of the army and before midday took a further fateful step. To the regional military commander in Aceh, a province located at the northern tip of Sumatra, Suharto sent orders to arrest and kill PKI leaders. Remarkable research (published 2018) by Jess Melvin, who accessed three thousand army documents from 1965 to 1966, has produced a startling finding that somehow Suharto anticipated the contents of the 2:00 p.m. radio announcement:

> Although the 30 September Movement did not declare its intention to replace the government until 2pm during the afternoon of 1 October, the military leadership, in its internal correspondence, had that morning already begun to describe the 30 September Movement as a coup movement. But until 2pm, the 30 September Movement described its actions as an "internal" military affair aimed at alerting Sukarno to the generals' alleged plan to launch their own coup.[349]

Suharto's orders sent to Aceh were the start of months of mass murder that occurred across the entire Indonesian archipelago, but mostly in Central Java. By sending those orders *before the 2:00 p.m. radio announcement*, Suharto showed prior awareness of the contents of the radio announcement and prior knowledge that PKI Chairman Aidit was involved in the September 30 Movement. Furthermore, the detailed nature of the orders sent to Aceh showed that Suharto had prepared extensively before the event.

With one hand, Suharto crushed the Movement, accusing the PKI of being the ultimate instigator of an attempt to oust Sukarno, and with the

other hand he feigned to protect the "father of the Indonesian revolution," while actually stripping Sukarno of every vestige of political support.

When the generals' bodies were recovered a few days after October 1, Suharto falsely claimed that PKI women had tortured and sexually mutilated them as part of some primitive political orgy. This heinous perversion of power was the start of the Suharto era. In total control of the media, he manipulated popular wrath to call for revenge.

The death of the generals was not the basis of the accusation that the PKI was attempting a coup. This claim was the result of the 2:00 p.m. announcement on Jakarta radio about the so-called Revolution Council replacing the Sukarno government. In reexamining Suharto's links with the September 30 Movement, two specific events—the killing of the generals and the 2:00 p.m. radio announcement—show that clarification of Suharto's role reveals tragedy in the making. Suharto and US Ambassador Marshall Green shared common ground in promulgating anticommunism, yet over and above what befell Indonesia, starting in 1965–66, the Sino-Soviet conflict was tragically visited upon Indonesia and added unawares to the human toll.

#

A telegram from US Ambassador Marshall Green to the State Department, October 5, 1965, shows how ready he was to exploit the situation:

> Events of the past few days have put PKI and pro-Communist elements very much on the defensive and … we seem to be witnessing what may be the passing of power from Sukarno's hands…. Our posture should be: Avoid overt involvement…. Covertly, however, clearly indicate to key people in army such as Nasution and Suharto our desire to be of assistance…. Spread the story of PKI's guilt, treachery and brutality…. Bear in mind that Moscow and Peking [Beijing] are in basic conflict regarding Indonesia, and that the Soviet Union might find itself even more in line with our thinking than at present. This will be subject of our

> next Country Team meeting and we may have specific recommendations for exploiting this phenomenon.[350]

In a follow-up telegram, Green stated that "the agony of ridding Indonesia of the effects of Sukarno and Nasakom has begun." With Indonesia—or the PKI—as the wedge in the Sino-Soviet dispute, questions need to be asked why the lives of so many Indonesian rice farmers were so dispensable, why mass killing was conducted on such a scale and with such barbarity. Martens' observation is telling: "I might say that I'd had previous experience in Moscow, and at the height of the Cold War in the '50s. I found the terror in Indonesia … through 1965 greater than that in the Soviet Union. People were actually scared to death."[351]

The PKI, according to Aidit in August 1965, had 3.5 million members, and another 27 million[352] closely associated through various groups, such as youth groups, peasant-farmer groups, factory workers, plantation workers, railway and transport unions, writers' groups, women's groups, artists, and so on. Hundreds of thousands of people were imprisoned for many years—decades, some for thirty years, many without even a trial. The terror created by Suharto kept not only the remnant PKI in place, poverty-stricken, powerless, and living in fear for decades, but also the perpetrators and observers. He reigned for the next three decades. The ultimate tragedy was that the participants in this catastrophic bloodletting had unwittingly become part of a larger Cold War sphere. The geopolitical result was that the destruction of the party led to a widening of the split in the Sino-Soviet bloc, and the more complete the destruction, the wider the split.

In 1965 and 1966, while the massacres were being perpetrated, Green and Suharto (when in Jakarta) were careful not to be seen in direct communication. As Green recollects,

> I don't believe I had any talk with General Suharto until May 29th, 1966, which was about nine months later on. I did see Suharto sometimes at a public function; we'd nod at each other…. It was largely through Colonel Willis Ethel, our army attaché, who knew Suharto's aide—they were good personal friends—that I carried on

> a relationship with Suharto for the next nine months. I did meanwhile have a relationship with Adam Malik. I saw him from time to time. It was almost always in a sort of clandestine setting. I would meet him in someone's house, and in that way I had a very clear idea what Suharto thought.[353]

Green has denied that the CIA or the embassy staff, which was reduced to thirty by the time the mass killing started, had anything to do with the events that led to regime change. The army, Green informed Washington on October 20 when the killing had started, was "working hard at destroying PKI and I, for one, have increasing respect for its determination and organization in carrying out this crucial assignment.[354] On the "question [of] how the army, Suharto in particular, dealt with the issue of the military purge, which I think again has never been adequately recognized as one of the greatest things he ever did," Green's reply was enigmatic. Regarding "procommunists in the army," he said, "eleven or twelve army battalions which were procommunist were shipped off to some of the outer islands and never heard of again."[355] There was still a slight chance that Sukarno might regroup his support and somehow stop the army from conducting its rampage of killing. Green expressed concern that some compromise might be reached.[356] Compromise would have led to cessation of the killing, which would have had far less impact, in the Sino-Soviet context, than unrestricted annihilation.[357]

In the third week of October 1965, once the PKI had been denounced and killing had started, not only the army but also Sukarno's Japanese wife, Dewi, was pressing Sukarno to ban the PKI, according to UK Ambassador Gilchrist: "Green and I have reports that Madam Dewi (who is lying very low) says she has been threatened with death by Sukarno because of the anti-Chinese and anti-PKI line she has been pressing on him."[358]

After September 30, 1965, even the spouses of the skeleton staff at the US Embassy (which included a few women but mostly men) were requested by Washington to leave. Martens' action in handing over to Suharto a list of PKI names—the handover done via Adam Malik's

adjutant, Tirta Kentjana Adhayatman—was revealed by US researcher and journalist Kathy Kadane. Deputy CIA Station Chief in Jakarta Joseph Lazarsky said that "Suharto's Jakarta headquarters was the central collection point for military reports from around the country detailing the capture and killing of PKI leaders … [and that] checkoff work was also carried out at the CIA's intelligence directorate in Washington."[359]

Green himself, during the interview by Martens, said, "Various US agencies wanted to put more officials in Indonesia than we thought was desirable." Intervention of this type would only have provided a more visible target, as Martens explained:

> The embassy under Marshall Green's guidance had rightfully avoided any kind of overt contact in order not to play into the hands of the communists. Suharto and Malik and the others also kept their distance for that reason because they didn't want to support the Sukarno line that his enemies were lackeys of the imperialists.[360]

In the context of achieving the maximum effect regarding the Sino-Soviet dispute, any evidence that the CIA had a hand in the Indonesian cataclysm would have undone the political benefits accruing from the destruction of the PKI. Because Green had been one of the inner-circle associates of Allen Dulles briefed on the Sino-Soviet dispute, he was aware that Moscow and Beijing would point the finger of blame at each other once the potential of the PKI was erased.

Despite Green's denial of any US presence on-site in Central Java where most of the killing occurred, two Americans, a man and a woman, were based in the town of Klaten—located between Yogyakarta and Surakarta, a known PKI stronghold—sometime in late 1965 when the army's systematic massacre of PKI-affiliated villagers began. Margot L. Lyon,[361] who was a graduate student from the University of California at Berkeley, was told of their presence by two young government employees at the district level when she commenced research in Klaten at the end of 1971. As she was from the United States, they assumed she would know them and were eager to talk about them. Her informants insisted the man

and woman came from the US Embassy. However, when Lyon later asked embassy officials about the presence in Klaten of Americans (from whatever agency) at that time, any such presence was denied.[362] Lyon's informants told her that the two Americans assisted Indonesian army officers and local authorities in setting up what local people then referred to (in the singular) as the 'Operation Room'. Located within local government offices, it served as headquarters to coordinate the response of military and government officials in that time of turmoil. Her informants referred to wall maps and advanced communications equipment and were clearly impressed to have organizational assistance from foreigners, all the more so when one of them was a woman. Presumably, this assistance was to ensure the capture of PKI leaders from Klaten or others who might have fled there.

Land Reform

Land reform in East and Central Java was a desperate issue, but how did it become part of the mass killing? Before the 1965–66 regime change, the two sides in land-reform dispute were separated by the army. On one side were landless rice farmers, petani, whose very existence depended on getting some land to grow rice. They comprised the bulk of PKI membership. Petani turned to the PKI peasant organization known as Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI), the Indonesian Farmers Movement. They were supporting legal land reform in the hope of securing a small patch to grow their own food. On the other side were Muslim landlords for whom land reform was seen as a threat to their livelihood, wealth, and status—their very existence. Landowners flocked to the main Muslim political association, Nahdlatal Ulama, NU, which had two youth groups, Ansor and Banser. Both were involved in combating land-reform activities. Banser members wore a green uniform and had paramilitary training.

Only 1 percent of all landowners possessed more than five hectares,[363] and the "better-off peasants" usually two to five hectares. Most had no land at all, and these petani comprised 60 to 70 percent of persons on the land

pursuing subsistence-based agriculture. This percentage was directly correlated with the PKI's dominance of voting in regional elections.

Ironically, very little land reform was actually achieved, despite the presence of Nyoto in Sukarno's ruling Presidium with "supervisory responsibilities" for land reform.[364] Uncertainty generated trepidation on both sides. This was kept at boiling point by radio broadcasts from Malaysia, the work of British intelligence under Norman Reddaway depicting PKI followers as infidels. This propaganda was going beyond the issues of Konfrontasi; these radio broadcasts were a Cold War weapon, looking ahead to regime change. Sukarno had requested the British broadcasts be stopped, but he was ignored.

The radio broadcasts from Singapore exacerbated the hostility, homing in on essential doctrinal differences between Islam and Communism, particularly the issue of belief in God, completely bypassing the momentous adjustment Aidit made for "Indonesian communism." Aidit had discarded this tenet of communism—atheism being too alien a concept for the average petani. Yet, as historian Jess Melvin[365] has pointed out, when Muslims (and Catholics) were being supervised by the army to conduct mass killing in Aceh, the fatwa passed by Muslim clerics condoned the participation of ordinary Muslims. Aidit's own contact with religion began at a very early age, and, as a teenager, he'd read the Quran through twice, and as a muezzin was calling the people to pray at the mosque. Only when in his hometown in Tanjung Pandan in Belitung did he pray five times a day; in Jakarta, with his family he always celebrated the ritual at the end of Ramadhan, in Indonesia known as Idul Fitri or Lebaran. At PKI headquarters in Jakarta, Jalan Kramat Raya 81, Lebaran was celebrated every year. In 1963 and 1964, Aidit spent Christmas Eve with a Catholic family. From the radio broadcasts that were deliberately provocative, misconstruing, and misrepresenting and that contributed to the fatal consequences that befell the nation, one would have thought anybody remotely linked with the PKI was the devil incarnate.

In March 1965, armored cars were sometimes used to separate both sides, preventing open hostility between NU Muslims and BTI

representatives leading landless peasants. UK Ambassador Sir Andrew Gilchrist, whose wartime experience was in "special operations," commented on the unrest: "As regards the lawlessness here again, the PKI (whose land-reform activities have provoked the wealthier Muslims) seem at the moment to be getting the worst of it in a campaign of assassination of which the extent is only gradually becoming known in Jakarta."[366]

However, in October-November 1965 when mass killing started, it was at the behest of the army. A cable from the US Consulate in Medan, Sumatra (December 1965), was indicative of the mindset. Muhammadiyah preachers were broadcasting from mosques that all who joined the communist party must be killed, saying they are the "lowest order of infidel, the shedding of whose blood is comparable to killing a chicken."[367]

Rumors are Hatched

Foreign Minister Subandrio and President Sukarno had repeatedly told Kennedy that only 10 percent of PKI members had any real grasp of politics. Of those in the PKI Politburo with chairman D. N. Aidit, tertiary qualifications were limited to one person only, Ir. Sakirman,[368] a civil engineer who had graduated from the highly respected Bandung Institute of Technology.[369] The period of Japanese occupation and then the war of independence left little time for completing education in the decade of the 1940s. Sakirman was the elder brother of Major General Siswondo Parman who in 1965 was head of Army Intelligence.

When talking to Kennedy about the PKI, Sukarno's description of the party under Aidit as a "revolutionary nationalist party" was not too dissimilar to an assessment of the PKI by a top British bureaucrat, Derek Tonkin of the Southeast Asia Department in the Foreign Office, London.

Tonkin's background shows his level of credibility—enough for us, at least, to evaluate his assessment of the PKI. He served as attaché in the British Embassy in Warsaw, 1955–57, two years of which he actually worked in the US Embassy there under Ambassador Joseph Beam, who was a specialist in Chinese affairs. "That is where a lot of negotiations between

the United States and China took place at that time,"[370] Tonkin commented. For the 1963–66 period, he was in charge of the Indonesia desk at the Foreign Office in London after he had gained extensive on-site experience in Cambodia and Thailand (where he returned as ambassador before he retired in 1989).

In May 1965, he described the PKI as a "staunchly nationalist party that has no intention of subordinating itself to the will of Peking [Beijing]." He continued:

> I am also of the opinion if the PKI were to assume power in Indonesia whether by constitutional means or, at a later stage, by force, the type of a regime which would be established in Indonesia would not be an orthodox communist regime…. I therefore consider it misleading to interpret the possibility of a PKI takeover in Indonesia in conventional Kremlinologist terms. The neo-communists we might expect in Indonesia would be of a Javanese Imperialist nature.[371]

Unlike the Dulles' approach, Tonkin's comments are similar to the view taken by US Ambassador Jones who, by chance, left Jakarta in the same month as Tonkin wrote his assessment, May 1965. "Sukarno hated to see Jones go," admitted Marshall Green, who was transferred from the embassy in South Korea (after regime change there) to replace Jones. Because there was a delay of one month before Green took up his new position in Jakarta, his arrival did not exactly coincide with the first shock-wave effect of a major "black operation"—let's call it the "Council of Generals false effect"—a crucial step in the final countdown to regime change in Indonesia.

This joint British-American operation had the effect of confirming PKI suspicion that a Council of Generals was planning to take power in Jakarta, but significantly, it directed suspicion toward London rather than Washington. Sukarno's failing health from a kidney disorder and the possibility he could die in office meant that the PKI's umbrella of protection against the army would continue only for a limited time. The army too

realized this. Their planning had an additional urgency because the PKI wanted a fifth-force—arming civilians to form a viable fighting unit alongside the army, navy, air force, and police. In January 1965, Yani formed a discussion group of generals who met "regularly, in secret."[372] This group was the core of the rumor that a Council of Generals had been formed. On May 22, Sukarno summoned Yani, who described it as a group to discuss staff matters, promotions, and appointments. But Sukarno's suspicion was well founded, as Geoffrey Robinson has shown from a secret telegram to the Department of State (January 21, 1965) from Ambassador Jones:

> According to the telegram, Parman [head of army intelligence] had indicated that there was "strong sentiment" within the "top military command" for a "takeover of government" prior to Sukarno's demise and that "specific plans" for such a coup were being developed. Moreover, as described in the telegram, the army leadership realized that no coup targeting Sukarno directly could ever succeed, so it was suggested that "the coup would be handled in such a way as to preserve Sukarno's leadership intact" but to leave him with a fait accompli. That was a fair description of what actually happened on October 1, 1965.[373]

Jakarta was a quagmire of conspiracies and political tension. Rumors about the existence of the Council of Generals were circulating in early 1965, but what sparked Sukarno's interest on May 22 was an incident involving an American, William Palmer, director of the Association of American Film Importers in Indonesia. Student demonstrators had ransacked the US Information Agency library in Jakarta and attacked the residence of the US ambassador. Accusations about Palmer being a CIA agent were followed by a mob attack on the American Motion Picture Association. Palmer was living in the Puncak mountain-resort area south of Jakarta. In April his unoccupied villa was ransacked by youths, probably part of Foreign Minister Subandrio's BPI intelligence network. In the villa they "found a telegram, allegedly by the British Ambassador in Jakarta, Andrew Gilchrist.

It had all the signs of being a forgery but became known as the "Gilchrist document," dated March 24, 1965. It used the words "our local army friends" and helped to start a rumor that Gilchrist was conspiring to bring about regime change in Indonesia with the help of the Council of Generals, who were planning to make a move against Sukarno. It struck a raw nerve in all pro-Sukarno persons or groups who benefited from being under his broad political umbrella, especially the PKI. The notion that the Indonesian army was about to strike was reinforced by the Council of Generals false effect, which provided the motivation to form the September 30 Movement.

Archival documents from Kew, United Kingdom, reveal a coup in the planning, in June 1965, involving persons in the British Embassy in Bangkok. This operation was a success, but there was no coup. The real plan was to leak news of this purported coup to Jakarta, for the ears of D. N. Aidit, chairman of the PKI, to create a red-light warning that the Council of Generals was planning to depose Sukarno. This became a political catalyst with October 5 as a deadline. This day was the twentieth annual celebration of the Indonesia Armed Forces' formation during the struggle for independence, and on that day, it was rumored, the Council of Generals would make its move. Whoever started the rumor that October 5 was the day the generals intended to oust Sukarno remains unknown—"no evidence has appeared showing that the Council of Generals was in fact planning a coup attempt at the beginning of October."[374] However, Colonel Abdul Latief of the September 30 Movement explained how Suharto confirmed it, indirectly. In the book he published when finally released from prison, he wrote the following:

> Two days before the October 1, 1965 event, I along with my family visited General Suharto's house…. I intended to ask him about information concerning the Council of Generals and at the same time report to him what I knew. It was he himself who informed me that a subordinate of his from Yogyakarta named Subagyo had informed him the day before I came to his house of the existence of

the Council of Generals that would stage a coup d'état against the government of President Sukarno.[375]

Suharto was confirming the urgency facing the Movement to strike against the Council of Generals before the (rumored) coup d'état on October 5, 1965.

"The Council of Generals False Effect"

The first step was to create a threat in the form of the Council of Generals. The incident in Bangkok was "evidence"—actually a hoax—of the perceived threat. It was outrageously simple: when President Sukarno was visiting Bangkok, he would be held in the dungeon of the British Embassy, on the pretext that the PKI in Jakarta were preparing a coup,[376] while British contacts within the Indonesian army, "our local army friends," seized power in Jakarta. What actually gave credence to this nonsense was the political ranking of the persons who next became involved. This crude outline of a coup was brought to the attention of US Secretary of State Dean Rusk after a Thai informant, Nai Thanat Khoman, had contacted the US Embassy in Bangkok.[377]

Thanat was an ideal, high-level informant. He had been Thailand's foreign minister in 1962, had met Kennedy in Washington, and signed an anticommunist communique with Dean Rusk. As well, the previous year, he had arranged a five-day conference on Konfrontasi. So he had all the credentials and a plethora of contacts.

When Washington was informed of the Council of Generals false effect, the British Embassy in Washington received a tongue-lashing from Rusk on June 22, 1965. He declared that the "US would not tolerate a 'half-baked coup' against Sukarno."[378] For Rusk to call it "half-baked" does not necessarily imply he was aware of any American coup in the pipeline that the British might have jeopardized, but simply that the so-called coup was poorly conceived and bound to fail—hence the reaction of Dean Rusk, let's say, seemed genuine.

But in reality, this coup plan was craftily conceived. It was a cheap weapon directed at the PKI, designed to fester, to encourage the PKI to take action against the Council of Generals. And it worked, or at least contributed to the end result. Right from the start, when Thanat Koman brought it to the US Embassy in Bangkok, this "coup project" was aiming to make sure that what had happened, the procedure from Bangkok to Washington and the political standing of the people involved, would reach the person at the end of the line—Aidit.[379]

However, the archival documents also state[380] that Rusk said Thanat Khoman had twice told him, "The Indonesian army were planning to forestall a Communist takeover in Indonesia and were waiting to act until Sukarno's back was turned." The most likely source of this information that Thanat told Rusk would have been Ali Murtopo, the top intelligence officer for Major General Suharto. Murtopo (and his then understudy, Benny Murdani) initiated secret talks in Bangkok with the British to ascertain their reaction in the event of the Indonesian Army ending Konfrontasi. "Ali Murtopo and Yoga Sugama were [Suharto's] intelligence officers, Ali heading an independent intelligence unit known as OPSUS (Special Operations), which had been set up within Kostrad in 1964 to seek ways of putting an end to 'Confrontation' with Malaysia."[381]

Of course, what Thanat told Rusk, twice, changes the level of Rusk's involvement, but the fact that he quashed the British coup proposal was the intended news to reach Aidit. To rebuff the British coup proposal was part of a larger scenario of regime change that Rusk knew, or had been informed, was coming. Marshall Green's opinion of Dean Rusk (in the Library of Congress interviews) pushes an image of his noninvolvement in Indonesia:

> Dean Rusk in my opinion was one of our great secretaries of state, but, as far as Indonesia was concerned, he never was very interested in Indonesia. He reacted so strongly to the Indonesian attacks on Malaysia and the British that he stood back from Indonesian affairs, leaving them in other officials' hands.

Dean Rusk (like Dean Acheson) was "present at the creation" of Indonesia, having deliberately taken a demotion in the State Department to enable him to participate in Far Eastern affairs. It was Rusk who provided the USS *Renville* in 1948 for negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia. Rusk was a top army-intelligence officer from the War Department. He had a reputation for reticence rather than being overly effusive, and an awareness of European sensibilities, but Marshall Green misrepresents Rusk's interest in Indonesia in the Cold War during both the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies. He was head of the Rockefeller Foundation when the Panel opted to "drive a wedge between Moscow and Peking." Rusk was just as capable of sending weapons to assassinate President Trujillo in the Dominican Republic as he was of theatrically rapping British knuckles when he knew his actions ultimately would assist in ousting President Sukarno. His role in the "false effect," originating in Bangkok, marks him as a participant in creating the Council of Generals that was a catalyst for regime change. So when Senator Fulbright of Arkansas[382] in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was asking Marshall Green about the killings in Indonesia, ousting Sukarno, and whether or not "we were involved in the coup," to which Green replied in the negative—the Council of Generals false effect shows London and Washington both were participants. Nevertheless, Indonesian perception of foreign interference in Indonesian affairs was weighted more toward the United Kingdom than the United States because Konfrontasi remained such a dominant issue, adding credence to the Council of Generals false effect.

An incident in late 1964, in response to a brief display of Konfrontasi spreading to the Malay peninsula and the possibility that Indonesian aircraft might be used, brought a prompt British response. In a massive show of British naval power, British ships circled Java to show that Jakarta was just as vulnerable as Kuala Lumpur. A British aircraft carrier, *Victorious*, with a full admiral onboard and escorted by several warships, headed menacingly through the Sunda Strait, along the southern coastline of Java and back to Singapore.

The head of Air Force Intelligence, Heru Atmodjo,[383] one of a select few persons appointed by Sukarno with the authority to launch an attack, explained to me the tense moments of decision. *Victorious*, with fighter planes on deck, was approaching the Sunda Strait. The Indonesian Air Force was on full alert with two squadrons, MiG21s and TU-16s, ready and waiting for the order. (The TU-16 was an intercontinental jet bomber with a speed of 625 miles per hour, capable of sinking ships with radio-controlled missiles.) Heru Atmodjo arranged a last-minute agreement: on condition that the British planes on the carrier were below deck, he granted permission to pass. Indonesian planes flew overhead as the British ships passed through Indonesian waters. However, when international waters were reached, the planes were brought back on deck, and took to the air. British planes flew alongside Indonesian planes, and when it was reported that a British pilot had fired a burst of gunfire, straight ahead, a provocative challenge, Indonesia pilots were ordered back to base. After the British warships returned via Lombok Strait to Singapore, the Indonesian cruiser, *Irian*, was placed in the Sunda Strait on sentry duty.

Once the British Navy had demonstrated the threat to Jakarta, Konfrontasi returned to its former level of conflict. When the frequency of Sarawak border skirmishes began to wane, London began "Operation Claret," penetrating far inside Indonesia's border to provoke response in order to keep the conflict going.

In another incident also in late 1964,[384] ten Indonesian fighter planes were seriously damaged on the tarmac of Madiun Air Force Base—but there were no accusations, no anticolonial tirades. It was claimed a lighted cigarette had ignited a large ammunition dump at 5:30 a.m. A decision was made that civilians should be trained as guards for all the air force bases across Indonesia. A training program for young men and women began at the Halim base in Jakarta. In early September 1965 when the first training session ended, in their place came PKI Youth volunteers (Pemuda Rakyat) at Halim. It was understood they were part of the nationwide call for twenty-one million volunteers of all political persuasions, for the anti-Malaysia campaign.[385] Training centers began in many other cities.

Sukarno's daughter, Megawati, then studying agriculture in Bandung, also joined. Some of the youths in training at Halim later became involved in the September 30 Movement, but this was the doing of Sjam.

Sjam

When PKI membership in the late 1950s was starting to increase more rapidly, the army too became more politically assertive, its civil-military function being an outcome of the 1958 rebellion. The PKI at this time assigned several covert operators to assess "the possibility of gaining influence among officers in the armed forces." One of these operators was Sjam. The nickname Sjam was derived from the fourth syllable of his full name, Kamaruzaman bin Ahmad Mubaidah. Commenting on the remarkable political flexibility displayed by Sjam in obtaining some appointments, Harold Crouch wrote: "He managed to get himself appointed in 1957 as an informant to the head of intelligence in the army's Jakarta garrison."[386]

In December 1964, Sjam was appointed by PKI Chairman D. N. Aidit to head the Special Bureau, which was tasked with ascertaining leftist sympathy (not necessarily pro-PKI) from within the Indonesian Army officer ranks. After an initial group was formed, and one or two officers withdrew, the core of the movement by early September 1965 involved Sjam and two army officers, Lieutenant Colonel Untung and Colonel Abdul Latief. The name of the group was chosen later, simply because Thursday, September 30, was the date on which action was to be taken to forestall the alleged coup by the Council of Generals. Troops gathered on a Thursday night, but the action took place in the early hours of Friday morning, after the moon had set, October 1, 1965.

On September 28, only two days before the September 30, Movement took action, it gained another member, its highest-ranking officer, Brigadier General Supardjo. He had just arrived in Jakarta from West Kalimantan where he was a Kostrad commander (Fourth Combat Command) in Konfrontasi. His direct superior, Major General Suharto, in charge of army

participation in Konfrontasi, had visited him there only two weeks previously. When Supardjo arrived in Jakarta, he straightaway went to see Sjam. John Roosa, an academic who has specialized on this period,[387] accessed Indonesian court proceedings in which Supardjo explained his involvement in the movement was a result of Sjam. He had known Sjam for nearly a decade as a source of military intelligence. Roosa quoted Supardjo's description of Sjam as "an informer of the army, and in possession of an Army ID card."[388] That is, Sjam was working in the Special Bureau for Aidit but maintained credibility within his army contacts by also supplying them with information. Simply by flashing his card, Sjam was able to gain access to Kostrad headquarters, where Suharto was in charge. In other words, in the same way that Sjam assisted Supardjo, Sjam —because this was his expertise—also would have found ways to assist both Suharto and his chief of intelligence, Ali Murtopo.

Sjam's involvement was used to implicate Aidit and the entire membership of the PKI. Sjam's role in organizing youth training at Halim, in the period leading up to October 1965, later became part of the PKI coup accusation. In early September when the initial youth-training period at Halim had ended, Sjam arranged for more volunteers. The secretary general of Pemuda Rakyat, Sukatno, was the one who had arranged the previous volunteers, men and women, but this time Sjam approached Sukatno to ask Nyono in the PKI Politburo for more volunteers. During later court proceedings, this direct PKI involvement was interpreted as preparation for the coup.[389]

Moreover, when the time came for the action planned by the September 30 Movement—abducting the generals—it was Sjam who insisted on the inclusion of the plainclothed youths in the trucks collecting the generals on the night of September 30. This had double-barreled consequences: First, the inclusion of civilians led to utter disorganization—some men in plainclothes and others in uniforms created problems from the start with leadership and identification when boarding the trucks. Second, this disorganization and the presence already of persons in street clothes made it easier for gangsters or mafia (the Indonesian term is *preman*) to be

included. In other words, what was then seen as Sjam's strong pro-PKI stance later became a significant factor in undermining the movement.

Sjam's problematic arrest in March 1967—after the 1965–66 mass killings—indicated he had friends in high places. The first two attempts to arrest him were foiled because Sjam was forewarned. Twice, the arresting officer (a lieutenant in counterintelligence) had located Sjam's whereabouts and notified army intelligence, who then as a matter of procedure contacted his superior, Suharto. Sjam was to be arrested at 6:00 a.m. the following morning. Twice Sjam was forewarned and fled before the impending arrest. When Sjam's whereabouts (in Bandung) was discovered a third time, the arresting officer was warier, but he followed the same procedure, notifying his superiors that he would make the arrest at 6:00 a.m. the following day, as he had done before. But then he moved immediately, and by this means successfully captured Sjam. Two years later, the arresting officer himself was imprisoned on a trumped-up charge and almost lost his life.[390]

In the first Jakarta radio announcement of Sjam's arrest and in the first newspaper report, by Sinar Harapan (March 13, 1967), Sjam was described as a "double agent." Soon after, however, this changed to descriptions of Sjam as a "convinced communist, head of a Biro Khusus (special bureau)" set up personally by Aidit to acquire influence within the army. In the evidence he provided in subsequent military court proceedings, Sjam emphasized "the one who actually gave the commands and instructions and drafted the texts for declarations to be broadcasted through the radio had been Aidit."[391]

Sjam remained in prison until 1986. Heru Atmodjo and fellow prisoners closely observed Sjam during his imprisonment. When he made court appearances, he traveled in a limousine; he always ate fine meals, not prison muck; in his cell—confirmed by Sjam's own adopted son, who apparently visited him there[392]—were bags filled with money; and he was never executed, but simply vanished. Atmodjo insisted that reports of Sjam being executed in 1986 are not correct. One final statement was made by Aidit's wife, Tanti, a medical doctor, imprisoned until the late 1970s. As soon as she was released, she went to visit Sjam in prison (according to her

son, whom I interviewed in 2018), and standing directly in front of his cell door, she called him a "traitor."

In addition to these four in the movement—Sjam, Latief, Untung, and Supardjo—there was also peripheral support in Jakarta from Major Sujono[393] in the Indonesian Air Force Base at Halim. He was involved in the guard-training that took place there. In 1965, Merdeka Square in central Jakarta was half an hour's drive from Halim. A house on this location was used briefly as the headquarters for the movement on October 1, only for a day, after which the movement disintegrated and its members were hunted down by Suharto. Sjam's link with both Latief and Untung was part of his work in the PKI Special Bureau, but all three shared a friendship with Suharto, the very person who used his "inside knowledge" of the movement and gross falsification to legitimize his rise to power.

Roosa has shown that Sjam was the dominant member of the movement, not Latief, and not Untung, who was the titular leader. One British Embassy report described Untung as "not overly bright," and in a US intelligence memo, Untung was described as "merely a dupe."[394] Neither Sujono nor Brigadier General Supardjo (despite the rank) had leadership roles.

The September 30 Movement had support from some officers in several other locations in Java, all part of the Diponegoro Division. In Semarang, Colonel Suherman, in charge of intelligence, had just returned mid-1965 from intelligence training with US instructors at Okinawa. A "friend of Suharto," Suherman and two associates, Colonel Marjono and Lieutenant Colonel Usman, were aligned with the September 30 Movement. When the movement collapsed within a day, they fled to Mount Merapi and Mount Merbabu.[395] They were captured and simply "disappeared." Nevertheless, similar actions planned in several towns beyond Jakarta, all of which lasted only a few hours before Suharto quashed the movement in Jakarta, added sinister veracity to the alleged PKI coup. Responsibility for the deaths of Suherman, Marjono, and Usman was claimed later by Suharto's henchman, Sarwo Edhie Wibowo (then RPKAD commander, Indonesian Special

Forces, now known as Kopassus). Their disappearance severed all pre–September 30 connections with Suharto, their former Diponegoro commander.

The Diponegoro command was seven years earlier. Suharto and his intelligence officers, Ali Murtopo and Yoga Sugama, were involved in a flourishing smuggling racket in Central Java that brought substantial benefits to many officers. A reprimand from Nasution in Jakarta Army headquarters led to a "reeducation course" for Suharto at the Army Staff and Command School (Seskoad) in Bandung. As fate would have it, this brought him into contact with a CIA asset, Suwarto, who was then deputy head of the training program. Suharto started at Seskoad on November 1, 1959, was promoted to brigadier general on November 17, and completed his studies on December 17, 1960. He then worked alongside Army Chief of Staff Nasution in Jakarta Army headquarters. Bob Elson, who wrote a biography of Suharto,[396] noted that Ali Murtopo joined him there. As commander of the campaign to oust Dutch colonial rule from New Guinea, 1962–63, Suharto's status soared, and then, as Kostrad commander, he called Yoga Sugama, his other main intelligence officer, back from Yugoslavia.

Army Leadership

By early 1965, Konfrontasi was turning into a weeping sore. Inflation was straining the Indonesian economy, PKI-army tension was rising, coup rumors were rife, and assassination in the air. Sukarno used Jakarta's Antara news service on May 18, 1965, to disclose yet another foiled assassination attempt,[397] involving not only President Sukarno and Foreign Minister Subandrio, the most likely successor to the presidency, but also the head of the Indonesian army, General Ahmad Yani. This would have left Yani's replacement from the ranks of the military in a very powerful position. "Standard Operating Procedure" in the Army High Command stated that administrative duties in the absence of Yani—that is, when his whereabouts were known—passed into the hands of Major General Mursjid (Siliwangi

division), but in the event of Yani becoming incommunicado or his whereabouts unknown, operational command must go to the senior commanding officer (i.e., in command of troops), who was Kostrad commander Major General Suharto.

There were half a dozen other generals of similar rank, were the position to become available, but General Nasution, although defense minister, seemed the most likely candidate. Based on a secret CIA cable dated September 1964, Geoffrey Robinson has drawn attention to the formation of an "anticommunist coalition combining reliable army and civilian elements … [in which] the CIA named those officers it considered to be 'friendly' and 'on the good side' of Confrontation and Communism." The first two names were Nasution and Suharto.[398] However, a previous CIA document[399] regarding a preferred replacement for Sukarno from the army had already discounted Nasution. This document was provided for Kennedy by Allen Dulles. No individual was mentioned as the preferred person, but as the (then) head of the Indonesian army, General Nasution was specifically named as not the person for the job; the CIA's first preference—on the basis of his anti-PKI credentials, at least—was Suharto. However, from a PKI perspective, Suharto was seen as "progressive" as far back as 1948. The pre-1965 perception of Suharto, in political terms, as middle of the road, is quite different to the reality of Suharto having covert connections with both sides of politics.

According to Sumarsono,[400] former head of Pesindo (the earlier name for Pemuda Rakyat), Suharto's progressive reputation started in Madiun, 1948, when he was sent by General Sudirman, head of the army, to assess political conditions there. It had been incorrectly reported the PKI were mounting a rebellion against the Republican government in Yogyakarta, under Hatta. After surveying conditions in Madiun, Suharto went on the local radio in support of Sumarsono's claim that there was no rebellion. But this appeal for calm was lost in the competing announcements by PKI leader Musso, and a horrendous battle ensued. At no time during his two decades in the military did Suharto acquire a reputation of being anti-PKI. When Suharto was Diponegoro commander in Central Java, his position on

ending martial law was greatly appreciated by the PKI. He seemed to be more concerned with business than politics and exhibited no overt animosity toward the PKI as some army officers did. So if the CIA identified Suharto (after Nasution) as having the best anti-PKI credentials, he must have been meeting secretly with CIA officers directly or persons who conveyed to them his real political aspirations.

In the alleged assassination plot in May 1965, Yani's inclusion (by whoever was the source of the plot) implies he, like Nasution, was similarly discounted as the preferred candidate to replace Sukarno. This was four months before the debacle by the September 30 Movement when Yani and five other generals were killed, three of whom were members of the original Council. Nasution was on the list too but escaped.

The alleged assassination plot on Sukarno, Subandrio, and Yani drew a different interpretation from British Ambassador Gilchrist in his comment to the Foreign Office. He saw it as evidence of a stronger link between Yani and President Sukarno. His comment to the Foreign Office was "The choice of Yani as a fellow target of the alleged plot confirms the role Yani has been playing."[401] Yani was anticommunist, vehemently against the formation of a fifth force, but Gilchrist was saying relations between Yani and Sukarno were actually better than what was portrayed in public. Nasution was implacably opposed to Sukarno's approach to the PKI. His relations with Yani, however, were tinged with personal rivalry. Yani had assumed the top position in the army when Sukarno replaced Nasution, kicked upstairs to become minister for Defense and Security after the New Guinea sovereignty dispute was settled. Even though Nasution commanded no actual troops, he still commanded immense respect because of his two decades of experience since Indonesian independence. This caused some ill-feeling between the two because Yani (like Suharto) had been Nasution's former subordinate. This rift was beginning to show in terms of comparative loyalty within the army itself.

With fast cars and women, the lifestyle of General Yani as head of the army drew criticism from some lesser-ranking officers such as Lieutenant Colonel Untung, a key figure in the September 30 Movement. Yani could

be seen driving his shiny white Lincoln around the streets of Jakarta and was regarded as being close to the Americans. He had done military training in the United States and was close to Major Benson, military attaché at the American embassy in Jakarta. Benson's wife also was close to Yani's family.

Untung's criticism of Yani was echoed by Colonel Abdul Latief, who also was prominent in the movement. Latief controlled mobile battalions in Jakarta (as commander of First Infantry Brigade of the Fifth Territorial Command), part of the Jakarta Garrison under Major General Umar Wirahadikusumah. In 1965, Lieutenant Colonel Untung commanded the army First Battalion of Sukarno's palace guard, the Cakrabirawa (then written as Tjakrabirawa), comprising one battalion each from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and police (including military police).

Even before the Council of Generals motivated the movement to be formed and action taken, Untung and Latief shared a common dislike of the dissolute lifestyle of some senior officers, degrading the image of the Indonesian armed services and failing to uphold traditional values. The same motive had inspired a naval mutiny in Surabaya, in February 1965, when junior officers rebelled against their commanding officers.

In Surabaya, lieutenants, captains, and NCOs, led by the son of Dr. Leimana (General Nasution's neighbor), rebelled against the libertine lifestyle enjoyed by the top-ranking officers, philandering and squandering Navy funds. This mutiny had the support of more than 150 officers and two former Indonesian ambassadors. Coming after a previous leadership struggle in the Indonesian Navy in 1959, this mutiny by the Progressive Revolutionary Officers Movement caused profound disruption. Gilchrist commented:

> There was such a collapse of Administration that the Air Force had to take over all the arrangements for the reception of recent Soviet arms deliveries [the 1960 arms deal, still being delivered]. The number of officers who are out of action (through dismissal,

imprisonment or indoctrination courses) is said to be considerably higher than anyone had thought so far.[402]

The same issues that led to the failed mutiny in the navy were mirrored in the army. For Latief and Untung, the mutiny stirred a sentiment for junior army officers to take action, a sentiment seized upon by Sjam and politicized by the suspicion that President Sukarno was under imminent threat by a group of generals.

Suharto the Link

Both Untung and Latief were strong supporters of Sukarno. Although the Surabaya naval mutiny provided a moral precedent for action, when they were told the Council of Generals was planning a coup against Sukarno they felt duty-bound to act. The person who provided the political motivation—for Latief and Untung were professional soldiers, not political agitators—was Sjam, the Special Bureau political operator directly under Aidit, chairman of the PKI. Suharto knew Latief and Untung—indeed, they were close friends—but Suharto also knew Sjam.

Sjam and Suharto were together in Indonesia's postwar independence struggle. According to Bob Elson,[403] Sjam was "the leader of the PKI's 'Special Bureau' [in 1965, and] had been known to Suharto from 1945 when both were involved in the Pathuk group [the name of an area] in Yogyakarta." On the links between Sjam and Suharto in the days of the revolution, Elson cites half a dozen references,[404] but Roosa merely cites Elson without even pointing out the link between Sjam and Suharto in Pathuk. Clearly, the allegiance between Sjam and Suharto is important and influenced not only how the events on September 30, 1965, unfolded but also how we interpret them. When Sjam was in Pathuk, any involvement in combat was incidental; his role—for the next two decades—was political, mainly instructive and organizing meetings. Suharto may have visited the place where Sjam lived, Elson points out, but they were not together in combat.

This was not the case with Abdul Latief, who also was in Pathuk with Suharto in 1945; both were soldiers. When they enlisted in the army together, only the final digit in their registration numbers was different.[405] "We were like family," explained Latief during court evidence, "and didn't have any problem at all. Indeed, we had a very close relationship."[406] Claims have been made that because Sjam, Suharto, and Latief were in Pathuk in 1945, they all knew each other, but Latief denied this when I interviewed him in Cipinang Prison in 1998, still incarcerated after thirty-three years.[407]

During his trial, which was delayed for thirteen years, Latief told the Indonesian military court that on the night of September 30, 1965, he had spoken with Suharto at Gatot Subroto Army Hospital, not far from Kostrad headquarters. Suharto and his wife, Ibu Tien, were visiting their young son, Tommy, when Latief arrived about 11:00 p.m. He spoke briefly with Suharto in the hospital room, telling him that the movement would start "the action" that night. Latief told me Suharto asked him, "Who will bring the generals to the president?" Then he left. Earlier at 9:00 p.m. Latief had spoken with Untung and Supardjo, and at 1:00 a.m. he spoke with them again to confirm "Suharto is behind us," that is, supporting the action. Latief had also spoken with Suharto a few days earlier in Suharto's own house, following up a previous visit on September 15[408] when Untung also (but separately) had met Suharto, who promised his support for the "action." Would Suharto not have informed Yani or Nasution, the two leading generals on the list of those to be abducted, unless it suited his plan?

"Suharto was one of us," Latief declared to me. His air of defiance did not hide the frustration. At his own trial, Latief revealed that Suharto had known beforehand of the plan to abduct the generals, but when Latief requested Suharto's wife, Ibu Tien, to be asked to testify that Latief had indeed spoken with her husband, twice, this was declared irrelevant. The court would have realized immediately that, if this were the case, Suharto had a hand in the outcome—the death of the generals.

In Suharto's own explanation for escaping assassination (when he was interviewed in 1970 by a German journalist from *Der Spiegel*, the largest weekly news magazine in Europe), he provided an absurd explanation why Latief had visited him in the hospital: "Around eleven o'clock Colonel Latief, one of the *Putschists*, came to the hospital, but evidently he shrank back from murdering me in a public place. Shortly after midnight I went home but was soon awakened and informed about the abductions."[409] How could Latief reply to the president? He was not brought to court until 1978 and was struggling to stay alive in solitary confinement. He had been shot in the leg and bayoneted in the thigh; in the early stage of imprisonment, he stayed alive by eating rat.[410]

In 1996, other highly placed sources in Jakarta brought to my attention information that some persons in the military judiciary, in Latief's case, might already have known. These two sources were the former deputy head of the State Intelligence Agency, then known as BAKIN (and after 2001 as BIN) and a prominent member of the Indonesian parliament. These two persons, together, taking extraordinary precautions to be discrete as this was still two years before President Suharto resigned, informed me that Suharto had spoken with Brigadier General Supardjo in the early morning hours of October 1, only hours before the September 30 Movement went to the houses of the generals. The two sources explained to me that after Colonel Abdul Latief's hospital visit to Suharto on the night of September 30, Suharto then went to see Supardjo in his army house in central Jakarta. (Supardjo's family was in his Bandung residence.) He had arrived in Jakarta on September 28 and visited Sjam immediately and then again the following night. A meeting between Suharto and Supardjo, in the early hours of October 1, would leave not a shred of doubt that Suharto was on the inside of the September 30 Movement. This also means Suharto's meeting with Supardjo in Kalimantan two weeks earlier was not simply a consultation dealing with Konfrontasi.

When Suharto gave his first public explanation of the tumultuous events surrounding September 30 addressing the National Front[411] on October 15,

1965, he made a point of commenting on the presence of Supardjo in Jakarta:

> I was rather startled to learn that General Supardjo had come to Jakarta at all, let alone that he was at the Palace very early in the morning, without letting either KOSTRAD or the Mandala Preparedness Command [Konfrontasi] know beforehand, and especially myself as Deputy Commander of the Mandala Preparedness Command.

Not once but twice, Suharto is saying, the honor accorded his rank and position was rebuked by the presence of Supardjo in not having been notified of his arrival in Jakarta. As his Kostrad commander and his Konfrontasi commander, Suharto was telling his audience this was a double-dose of disrespect. In the account Supardjo himself wrote of the movement, when he was in hiding in 1966 awaiting inevitable arrest, he did not mention this meeting with Suharto after midnight, three hours or so before the trucks went to the generals' houses. While writing his account, fully aware that Suharto had assumed absolute control, Supardjo referred only to "Nasution-Suharto" (Roosa has pointed out) without mentioning Suharto's name individually. This is extraordinary. Perhaps it was an example of belated (but futile) respect. He was caught, tried, and executed. It goes without saying that the midnight meeting strongly supports Latief's claim, when he said that Suharto was "one of us."

Latief explained to me during the Cipinang interview (May 1998) that the movement had no plan to kill anybody at all. Killing was never considered, never discussed, never even thought of. The plan was for arrest and arraignment; the generals were to be brought before President Sukarno to explain themselves. Holtzappel's forensic appraisal of Untung, word by word, yielded a similar approach: "He certainly was not in favor of killing the generals. He wanted a proper processing of the generals by the president himself."[412] Instead, when Sukarno expressed extreme consternation about the death of the generals, as Untung and Latief found out the following morning, they both agreed to end the movement.[413]

So who changed the original plan so that it became an order to collect the generals "dead or alive," from kidnapping to killing? One of the truck drivers, Sergeant Major Bungkus, explained to Cornell University's top Indonesia expert, Ben Anderson,[414] what took place. (In Anderson's interview with Bungkus published in the journal *Indonesia*, the words of Bungkus as direct quotations are used below). Of the truck drivers who collected the generals, only Sergeant Major Bungkus was not executed—tortured in terrible ways, but not executed. His truck went to General Pandjaitan's house. Bungkus recalled late in the afternoon of September 30, troops were gathering in an old rubber garden or plantation on the outskirts of Jakarta. The location was well outside the Halim Air Base. As Bungkus explained, "Some of the people there were men I didn't know. They were in mufti [i.e., civilian clothes], … What was going on? I had no idea." The person in charge of the Cakrabriwawa troops was Dul Arif. Late that afternoon, he gave a briefing to platoon commanders. Bungkus continued:

> Our Battalion Commander [Untung] has assigned me the task of handling the departure of Tjakra [Cakrabriwawa] units for a mission. There's this group of generals, called the Council of Generals, which is about to make a coup against President Soekarno…. Our mission is to foil it…. So we have to get ready, and then go and *nangkap* [arrest or capture] them [the Generals].

Night fell, Bungkus said, and still they waited. Then "in the middle of the night, there was another briefing." Bungkus quoted Dul Arif's words: "I have been ordered by the Battalion Commander himself to give this briefing. Our mission is to foil the planned coup by the Council of Generals." "Then we went over our targets one by one—seven generals in all…. Since their homes were in different places, different squads were to go to each home to confront them. The plan was to capture them dead or alive."

Who was responsible for the change in plan? Dul Arif said the Battalion Commander *himself* gave the order to shoot the generals if necessary, but if such an order did not come from Untung or Latief, some other person must

have given Dul Arif the last-minute instructions falsely claiming to have the authority. A likely person to have done this—one whom Dul Arif would have respected and at the same time obeyed—was Ali Murtopo. He had been Dul Arif's commander in the 1950s "when both were in the Banteng Raiders in the fight against Darul Islam."[415]

Whoever it was who issued the last-minute change in orders remains unknown, but there was one person, Dul Arif, who could have revealed this crucial detail. Dul Arif had an Arab name but was from Madura. Known for his bravery in battle and described as "a big man with dark-coloured skin," he was the person in charge of the trucks that night. However, when the movement stalled on October 1 and Major General Suharto assumed control of the army, quickly mounting formidable opposition, many of the Cakrabriwawa troops who had participated, including Dul Arif, immediately left Jakarta in a convoy of trucks heading for Central Java. After 160 miles, just before the convoy reached the north coast town of Tegal, which is in the district or regency known as Brebes, Ali Murtopo appeared. He requested that Dul Arif accompany him,[416] perhaps using his superior rank or their joint Madurese ethnicity[417] to convince Dul Arif to go with him. But once out of eyesight, Dul Arif disappeared forever. The answer to why Ali Murtopo wanted Dul Arif dead is linked to another question: Was it possible Ali Murtopo was responsible for issuing the last-minute order—"dead or alive"—that resulted in some of the generals (e.g., Yani) being killed immediately?

Were Preman Included as Hit Men?

Both Nasution and Yani were at the top of the list to be killed, but Nasution escaped over the fence of the neighboring Iraqi embassy, where he hid, listening quietly for many hours before reemerging.

The person in charge of the troops going to collect General Nasution, or at least, the highest noncommissioned officer among those troops, was Pelda Djahurup—another Madurese, dark-skinned like Dul Arif but considerably younger and described as a "kid." He also was killed by Ali

Murtopo. Maybe Djahurup would have known the answer to the question: Who were the armed persons, not in uniform but in street clothes, who went to the house of Nasution at the same time as the troops, and returned later, still bent on killing Nasution?

Latief's superior officer was commander of the Jakarta garrison, Umar Wirahadikusumah[418] (who, like Adam Malik, rose to the position of vice president). That morning, Umar explained later, he did not meet Suharto until 8:00 a.m. but before then went three times to the house of Nasution. "Nas, Nas," he'd called out, "it's me, Umar." Nasution could hear him, but remained silent in the Iraqi embassy garden, separated by a high fence from his own house. Accompanying Umar, there were some armed men who were not in uniform. Umar later said "he saw these men" but neglected to explain they were with him; he had returned to Nasution's house and was accompanied by armed gangsters, preman. Nasution knew they were there to finish the job, and had he responded when Umar was calling his name, he may not have survived.

The presence of these armed men in street clothes at Nasution's house on the morning of October 1, 1965, was also recorded (in Indonesian) in a government publication[419] published in Jakarta in 1967, in which it is stated: "Major-General Umar saw armed men wearing civilian/street clothes near the house." In the Old Order (the Sukarno era) the Indonesian word used for "civilian clothes or mufti" was "preman," but during the New Order, the meaning of the word "preman" came to refer more to the gangster lifestyle and the individuals who wore the street clothes. The use of "preman" on September 30, 1965, was the first instance in the New Order of this practice, which became so commonplace the meaning of the word itself changed.

Nasution

One of many topics I discussed with General Nasution, intermittently over a period of thirteen years, was the event that night when he was nearly killed in the early morning hours of October 1, 1965. Four truckloads of troops

carrying more than one hundred men arrived. They did not stop at Nasution's house but mistakenly outside the house of the neighbor, Dr. Leimana, from Ambon, who was second vice premier under Subandrio.[420] In the melee that followed when they realized it was the wrong residence, a policeman outside Leimana's house was killed in hand-to-hand fighting: Police Brigadier Karel Tubun, a member of the special mobile force in the police (Brimob), was posthumously awarded a Hero of the Revolution medal, given to his widow.

So who comprised the rabble that killed Brigadier Tubun outside Leimana's house, then shot at Nasution as he made his escape, accidentally killing his daughter and abducting his adjutant in the belief—according to later accounts—that it was the general himself? Or was the actual reason for the abduction of Lieutenant Tendean that he'd been confronted by preman who then seized him to ensure their presence remained unannounced? Clearly, they had murder on their mind; they started even before they were at the correct address.

As Nasution was recounting that night, he drew my attention to a painting of his five-year old daughter, Ade Irma Suryani, shot by one of the intruders. But then, in a more reminiscent mood, he said that when his wife later obtained further details about the events that led to the death of their daughter—events that later led to General Suharto assuming the presidency—Nasution's wife refused to talk to Suharto ever again. For the rest of her life she conducted no conversation with Suharto, who remained president for the next three decades. Nasution was clearly saying that his wife blamed Suharto for the death of their daughter. He did not disagree when I summarized what he had just told me, but he refused to expand on what he had said already. Holding Suharto responsible for the death of the daughter is the same as saying Suharto was responsible for killing the generals.

"He was One of Us."

Suharto's friendship with Latief and Untung was the key to how the movement started. Unlike Yani's flashy lifestyle, Suharto maintained a

traditional Javanese persona, even as a major general. For example, Suharto tended to go home for lunch with his wife, Ibu Tien, rather than eat at an expensive restaurant as many top-level army officers often did. Because Suharto epitomized the indispensability of traditional beliefs and customs, he had the continuing admiration and friendship of Untung and Latief.

When Suharto was commander of Diponegoro 454 Battalion and in charge of the anti-Dutch campaign, Untung was the first person to parachute into Netherlands New Guinea. Battalion 530 from East Java was also used by Suharto, and both battalions, 454 and 530, played a key role in the September 30 Movement. Sjam informed the court:

> Actually, one month before Armed Forces Day [5th October] there was the news that those two battalions … would be used…. Then we [the Special Bureau] did some research into these two units. After that we thought we could use them, and so we exploited the opportunity for using the troops, for reinforcing the troops, we had in Jakarta for the movement. So it wasn't intentional—it was an accident because they happened to be assigned to Jakarta, and we, taking advantage of that, determined that we could invite them to join the movement.[421]

Battalions 454 and 530 did not just happen to be assigned! Sjam knew that Suharto, as Kostrad commander, was the person who arranged for these two Battalions to be in Jakarta at that time. Untung was a former commander of 454 Battalion when Suharto was divisional commander. In Jakarta on September 30, Suharto visited both battalions encamped in Senayan stadium. It was highly unusual—as Heru Atmodjo explained to me—that both battalions arrived "fully armed," and immediately he knew something was planned. Latief told me: "Suharto ordered them to bring the equipment [fully armed for seven days]."

Marking the end of the anti-Dutch campaign in May 1963, Suharto had personally awarded 249 military decorations[422] to individual soldiers—more than one-third of 454 Battalion. The personal link proved crucial on October 1, 1965, when these two battalions, as part of the movement,

occupied the telecommunications building and radio station in Merdeka Square but made no attempt to occupy Kostrad headquarters. Quite the opposite, in fact—so friendly were relations between Kostrad and the battalion troops that they used Kostrad toilet facilities, wandering in and out as though they and Kostrad shared the same political terrain. Suharto's gesture of support lasted only for a few strategic hours, until the 2:00 p.m. radio announcement, which he then used as evidence to claim the movement was a PKI coup.

According to a British Foreign Office report, D. N. Aidit was captured on November 20, 1965, and "having refused interrogation was shot by the army on 21 November." However, a telegram from Marshall Green on November 18 notes that Aidit was already caught but "for publication, he remains still at large."[423] Suharto's pilot, Sudjai,[424] flew Suharto to Semarang in the morning hours of November 21, and from there, a few hours' drive, it is highly probable that he travelled to Boyolali to verify the capture or death of Aidit. Nyono was one of the few top PKI figures brought to trial (February 14-21, 1966). Most were summarily executed.

Questioned about the formation of the movement, Nyono said that after Aidit returned from Europe and Beijing the Politburo met three times in August 1965. There were two urgent issues: the Council of Generals and President Sukarno's health. He'd collapsed twice while giving speeches during the fortnight before his usual independence-day oration. A few days after August 17, according to Nyono, Aidit said that a group of pro-Sukarno "progressive officers" (Untung and Latief) wanted to make a move to counteract the Council of Generals, and Aidit asked if the PKI should support them. Sjam had already primed Untung and Latief on the likelihood of the Council of Generals attempting to oust Sukarno. Also, the friendship between Suharto, Untung, and Latief meant that Suharto had credibility within the movement. If we combine the Suharto-Sjam link with Suharto's prior acquaintance with Untung and Latief, it raises the possibility that Sjam's first contact with Untung and Latief as part of his Special Bureau work may originally have been at the suggestion of Suharto. This would mean, from the very start of the September 30 Movement, Suharto was not

just a “member of the board” but a foundation member. When a plan of action was formulated by Untung, Latief, and Sjam, Suharto, although not a direct participant, was involved.

General Nasution as minister of Defense posed a serious obstacle to any advance of “Nasakom” because he opposed granting any leeway to the PKI. Aidit himself took this matter to Sukarno, Subandrio, members of the military, and directly to Nasution. Aidit wanted to show how the PKI was essentially an Indonesian party, in an effort to improve relations between the PKI and the army. The rivalry between Nasution and Yani was also discussed when Aidit met Nasution, as internal army rivalry was having a deleterious effect overall on army relations with the PKI.

According to Lieutenant Colonel Heru Atmojo, head of intelligence in the Indonesian Air Force, Aidit also talked with Major General Suharto, but not as openly as his talks with Nasution. Aidit regarded Suharto as “a revolutionary and progressive officer.” He was fully conversant with the problem Aidit was facing, recalcitrant generals opposing Nasakom, and fully aware of the plan to arraign the so-called Council of Generals before Sukarno to explain themselves. He offered the movement his military assistance. As a follow-up to this, it was Aidit’s intention to form a Revolution Council composed of a spectrum of political persuasions, with someone at the helm sympathetic toward PKI aims and willing to draw together those parties interested in forming a Nasakom government under Sukarno.

Aidit had also talked with Mao Zedong about the same idea of forming a council or committee, but in the conversation with Mao he called it a “military committee.” Taomo Zhou, who was able to gain access to the Chinese archives, wrote, “On August 5, 1965, Aidit, his wife Tanti, and Jusuf Aditorop, the deputy party secretary of the PKI, had a meeting in Beijing with Mao Zedong and other top Chinese leaders.”[425] The transcript of the conversation between Mao and Aidit was as follows:

> **Mao:** I think the Indonesian right wing is determined to seize power
> Are you determined too?

Aidit: [Nods] If Sukarno dies, it would be a question of who gains the upper hand…. The United States advised Nasution not to initiate a coup. This is because if he initiates a coup, the left wing would also take the same course of action. The Americans told Nasution that he should wait patiently; even if Sukarno dies, he [Nasution] should be flexible rather than [initiate] a coup. He accepted the suggestion from the Americans.

Mao: That is unreliable. The current situation has changed.

Aidit: We plan to establish a military committee. The majority of that committee would be left-wing, but it should also include some middle elements…. The head of this military committee would be an underground member of our party, but he would identify himself as [being] neutral.

Aidit's information about Nasution—that the Americans told him not to initiate a coup—needs to be viewed alongside Dulles' advice to Kennedy in 1961 that Nasution was not the man to replace Sukarno. Simply put, the Americans had someone else in mind to replace Sukarno, so the "advice" given to Nasution "to wait patiently" was just disinformation. Premised on the situation at that time, Mao's comment was accurate enough.

On September 28, two days before "the action" by the movement, according to Heru Atmodjo, Aidit and Suharto met at "some place." When I asked the whereabouts, precisely, Heru Atmodjo shook his head rather than give a verbal reply. Whether he was reluctant to answer because he did not know, or did not want to implicate somebody else, I cannot say. Aidit asked Suharto to lead the movement, but he demurred.[426] At this very meeting, the date of "the action" was decided, September 30, for the movement to *abduct* the Council of Generals. Aidit's request to Suharto was in relation to the same military committee that Aidit mentioned to Mao Zedong. Suharto was in a unique position, considering he was at the top of the CIA list (discounting Nasution) of Indonesian generals who were anti-PKI.

The name change from "military committee or council" to "Revolution Council" was the doing of Sjam, as he later explained in court, because it

"had a wider meaning."[427] This occurred about ten days before the action.

"Where is Sjam?"

Using his own intelligence network in 1965, Nasution confirmed that Sjam and Suharto together had been observed visiting Colonel Suwarto of the Army Staff College (Seskoad) in Bandung. Suwarto was more than just associated with the CIA, according to Nasution. He declared bluntly, "He was CIA." When I asked Guy Pauker about this, he replied that "Suwarto was a good friend of mine."[428] Pauker used to visit him in Bandung as well as take him to the United States. Suharto had studied at Seskoad, so perhaps he was visiting his mentor, but from Nasution's style of communicating (having interviewed him many times between 1983 and 1996) I could see he was implying the Sjam-Suharto visit was CIA-related. It was possible that Pauker met Suharto face to face in Bandung, after Suharto had left Seskoad, but Pauker's reply was evasive. He said he "did not meet Suharto when he studied at Seskoad in Bandung but heard favorable comments about him from other officers…. As I recall those distant days, I never met Sjam."

Another incident also highlights the extraordinary relationship between Sjam and Suharto. The sound of shooting at 4:00 a.m. by troops of the September 30 Movement aroused public concern in both the Menteng area of central Jakarta and also the area known as "Blok M" where Brigadier General Pandjaitan lived. His address was Jalan (Street) Sultan Hasanuddin No.53, Melawai, Kebayoran Baru. All the other generals targeted that night had residences in Menteng. At that time Suharto was living in Jalan Haji Agus Salim, No. 98, near a main street that runs directly to Merdeka Square and Kostrad headquarters. From Suharto's residence the sound of gunfire in Menteng or Blok M would not have been audible. However, Major General Umar Wirahadikusumah, who was only a few minutes' walk away from General Yani's house, surely would have heard a Thompson submachine gun at 4:00 a.m.

A total of four people came to Suharto's house in the early hours of October 1 to notify him of shooting. The first was a "television cameraman named Hamid Syamsuddin who reported hearing shooting in the city area"—presumably at Pandjaitan's house. He woke Suharto about 4:30 a.m. but the Kostrad commander reportedly said he paid no attention to this news. He "didn't think much of it at the time."[429]

The second and third were Suharto's neighbors. When word spread that some sort of military action had taken place, his first neighbor Mashuri dutifully informed Suharto "about 5:30 a.m." Suharto explained: "He told me that early that morning shots had been heard, that there had been shooting, and that they had heard there had been kidnappings … [The names of generals were listed]…. Soon afterwards another neighbour came round to report the same thing."

Umar Wirahadikusumah (for several hours preoccupied with trying to locate Nasution who escaped) later explained that he had sent Lieutenant Colonel Sujiman to Suharto's house, but Suharto himself said the account of both neighbors "was confirmed with the arrival of a General, a colleague of mine, a colleague from the Army, who gave me the same information." Suharto was recalling this event two weeks later, when he was addressing the National Front leaders. Commenting on how he assumed the leadership of the army, he did not mention countermanding Sukarno's request for Major General Pranoto Reksosamodro to be Yani's replacement. Glibly mixing the rapacious with the obsequious, he said the following:

> So I was able to draw the conclusion that the Army leadership could be said to be paralysed. Therefore, urged on by my desire that, since the Army is also an instrument of the revolution … ready to render service … to the Great Leader of the Revolution … I decided on my own to assume leadership of the Army.

It was still too early for his army chauffeur to start work, Suharto went on to explain, so he dressed and drove himself to the nearby Kostrad headquarters, arriving just before 7:00 a.m. It had taken Suharto almost ninety minutes to dress and travel to work, ten minutes away, so it would

seem there was no urgency to inform his Kostrad colleagues about the kidnapping or disappearance of most of the army general staff.

And when Suharto arrived in Kostrad headquarters early on October 1, Ali Murtopo was there already. Explaining to the National Front audience how he, Suharto, responded to the crisis, he declared, "It turned out that among all my staff officers, there was not one who knew anything about the affair." What is known, however—later revealed by General Muskita, then Kostrad chief of staff[430]—is that when Suharto entered Kostrad headquarters and found Ali Murtopo waiting for him, the first words Suharto uttered were: "Where is Sjam?"

Murtopo would have known Sjam from the contact both of them had with Suharto. Sjam at that moment was at Halim Air Force Base, or the Pondok Gede rubber-garden location nearby that acquired the name "the crocodile hole" (Lubang Buaya), where the troops went when they had brought back the generals. Three were already dead—Yani, Haryono, and Pandjaitan—and three still alive—Soetojo, Parman, and Soeprapto. Major General Haryono, who was one of Yani's deputies, was well known for trying to promote a modus operandi for a Nasakom-type of government. So many millions of poor rice farmers in Indonesia supported the PKI that Haryono had declared, "We have to find a way to live with the PKI." Aristides Katoppo, who pointed out Haryono's willingness for political compromise, also commented that when the PKI was accused of killing Haryono there was an obvious incongruity. But this was inconsequential in later court proceedings. When the political head of the September 30 Movement, Sjam, readily admitted he was behind the catastrophe of the death of the generals, ultimate responsibility fell on Sjam's Special Bureau superior, Aidit. Every opportunity was taken to blame Aidit for all of the criminal activity Sjam put forward as fulfilling his role in the Special Bureau. One leading journalist (representing Agence France Presse) who attended many of the court proceedings was Brian May. In his book *Indonesia Tragedy*, he wrote, "The only witness who said that they intended murder from the beginning appears to have been Sjam."[431]

To highlight who really benefitted from the death of the generals, May reminds his reader that Australian academic Harold Crouch already asked the hypothetical: "What would have happened if the plan to collect the generals in order to present them to President Sukarno had gone according to plan—that is, if nobody was killed?" And the answer follows:

> If the generals, including Nasution, had all been arrested and accused of plotting against the president, it is possible to believe that the president would have endorsed the [September 30 Movement]'s action. With presidential endorsement, it would have been very difficult for the remaining army leadership to move against the dissidents.

Suharto could not have risen to the position he did, virtually overnight, had the generals not been killed. Once this personal motive is included in the political algorithm, the overlap with Sjam's role, or dual roles, demystifies much of the murkiness.

The presence of preman in the trucks collecting the generals has never been fully acknowledged, so the military court version of what happened must be reexamined to ascertain if "evidence" was constructed. For example, the accepted version of General Yani's death was that Sergeant (second-class) Gijadi Wignyosoeharjo killed Yani. In his trial, he admitted he was the person who killed Yani on the night of September 30, 1965. This Cakrabirawa sergeant told the court he was armed with a Thompson automatic and shot seven bullets through a glass door, into the back of Major General Yani.

Gijadi, once under arrest, would soon have realized torture was commonplace and execution inevitable. We may surmise that rather than be subjected to torture again, and again in the future, confessing to a crime that he did not even commit may have been a better option. His execution was delayed for twenty-three years. Did a Cakrabirawa confession avoid mentioning in court the presence of preman? Because of the confusion boarding the trucks, which was Sjam's doing, preman were able to be

included in the detachments heading for the houses of the generals, and they were not there merely as observers.

A comment from the US Embassy in Jakarta by Counselor for Political Affairs Edward E. Masters (later ambassador to Jakarta, 1977–81), was shared with the British Embassy and subsequently archived. Masters' comment was noted as follows:

> If the Army leadership had merely been seized and not executed, the entire episode would have taken on a different character…. To have settled for capture and denigration of Army leaders with Sukarno's collaboration would have entailed considerably fewer immediate risks of counteraction and would have been almost equally effective in emasculating the Army as a political force.[432]

Masters is asking why the generals were killed if arresting them would have safely achieved the movement's political goal. But such niggling doubt was pushed aside by authoritative voices such as Harlan Cleveland, US permanent representative to NATO, in whose opinion the "major lesson from the 30 September coup was that the Communists were still ready to murder in an attempt to obtain power."[433]

Some diplomatic correspondence cast doubt on those accused by Suharto of killing the generals. The Chargé d'Affaires in the British Embassy, Jakarta, recounted a conversation in Nanking he'd had with General Yani's brother, a professor of plant ecology. He strongly believed his brother, the head of the army, was killed by a "wild element … led by a Minister in the Government"—not by Aidit, whom the professor knew well. The inference seemed to be Subandrio, but no name was mentioned.[434] Further diplomatic disagreement with Suharto's accusation against Aidit was noted by Dutch Ambassador Rookmaaker,[435] who drew attention to the "detachments which murdered the generals." Apart from saying that he did not think "the PKI as a whole was behind it," he could offer no hard evidence at that time, but now more is known about the detachments and Rookmaaker's suspicion seems well founded.

In the trucks that collected the generals were several hundred troops from the Untung's own Palace Guard and some from Latief's First Infantry Brigade, some from Battalion 454, some "PKI youth auxiliaries" from Pemuda Rakyat, and some preman or gangsters. Did the second, "dead or alive" briefing from Dul Arif provide a new moral imperative to use Thompson automatics? The level of utter disorganization that actually facilitated the outcome, largely Sjam's doing, was compounded by further bungling, inexperience, and tension of the moment. Sjam's attempt to exert control over what should have been strictly a military operation permitted the inclusion of the preman whose intention was murder. Who benefited from the inclusion of gangsters? And how would the radio audience have reacted on October 1 if it had been announced that gangsters were involved in the death of some generals?

Sjam Delivered Both Radio Announcements—7:15 a.m. and 2:00 p.m.

At 7:15 a.m. on October 1, 1965, Jakarta radio was interrupted by an announcement, only a few minutes after the radio station had switched from local to national coverage, as was normal practice. With the exception of a few army personnel in places like Semarang and Yogyakarta (waiting for the Jakarta announcement as a signal, as instructed by Sjam[436]), the radio audience remained unaware of any change. The announcer's voice was normal even though the radio station had been occupied by troops; there was no suggestion of impending political upheaval and certainly no suggestion of replacing President Sukarno.

The courier from the movement who brought the 7:15 a.m. statement to the radio station was Sjam. Signed by Untung and clearly supportive of President Sukarno, it began:

> On Thursday, September 30, 1965, a military move took place within the army … aided by troops from other branches of the Armed Forces. The September 30th Movement which is led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung, Commandant of a Battalion of the

> Tjakrabirawa, the personal bodyguard of President Sukarno, is directed against Generals who were members of the self-styled Council of Generals … a subversive movement sponsored by the CIA … which had planned to carry out a counter-revolutionary coup prior to October 5, 1965.[437]

Suharto was in his Kostrad office. On the outskirts of Jakarta at Lubang Buaya, not far from Halim Air Base, three of the abducted generals were still alive: it was another hour or so before they too were shot and the bodies of all six, with Nasution's adjutant, thrown down a well. (The bodies were located three days later.)

Suharto had prepared plans already, in detail, that contained the order to attack the PKI. It was the start of the mass killing that would soon spread to central Java and continue for months. By mid-morning on October 1, Suharto had sent the order to Brigadier General Ishak Djuarsa, the regional military command in Aceh, the most northerly province in Sumatra. As Jess Melvin explains, Suharto notified Djuarsa that "a Coup movement has occurred under the leadership of Lieut[enant] Col[onel] Untung."[438] Melvin states: "This order was sent during the morning and appears to be the earliest known record of such an order sent by Suharto on this day. His next known order was not sent until later that evening at 9 pm."

Extensive preparation for a violent army response against the PKI in Aceh were outlined in the order. Melvin reminds her readers that this order was actually sent before the second, crucial radio announcement.

At 2:00 p.m. another announcement from the movement was read over Jakarta radio. This was the announcement Suharto used to justify his move against the PKI, claiming to "protect the president"—but the orders sent to Djuarsa preempted the 2:00 p.m. radio announcement by several hours!

The second radio announcement was a brazen threat to "decommission" Sukarno's cabinet. This was the basis of the so-called PKI attempted coup and was what Suharto used to justify his pogrom against the PKI, leading to mass killing and regime change.

Margot Lyon also has explained how Suharto's personal orders were delivered by Sudjai, the army pilot who later wrote a detailed account:

> Sudjai was entrusted with personally delivering General Suharto's secret orders to the commanders of the crucial military divisions of East, Central, and West Java in the first days of October 1965.
>
> It is clear that the instructions he and his crew conveyed contained Suharto's plan for the destruction of the PKI right down to the local level.[439]

Suharto's link with the September 30 Movement gave him the prior knowledge of the coup on October 1—which he utilized, sending the order to Aceh *a few hours before the event actually happened*. By doing this, even though the evidence has emerged half a century after the event, it is evidence he was on the inside of the movement and participated in the death of the six generals as a means of achieving control of the Indonesian army and ultimately, political power. The strategy he used in ousting President Sukarno neatly fits the CIA template for regime change. His friendship with the CIA asset in Bandung and his close relationship with persons in the US Embassy in Jakarta acquire new significance because of the historical evidence that has emerged.

Is there a shred of doubt about Suharto's prior involvement in the September 30 Movement when his orders to Aceh on the morning of October 1 show he was aware of the contents of the 2:00 p.m. radio announcement before it actually was made? On the radio, it was claimed a Revolution Council with forty-five names had been established to replace Sukarno's government. Who wrote this, who typed this, who signed this? The courier who took it to the radio station, the same courier who took the first announcement earlier that morning, was Sjam.

The subject of a "revolution council" or "military council" had been discussed before by Aidit and Sjam and members of the movement. In these discussions the Revolution Council was seen as a body that forms a rival

organization to the Council of Generals and simultaneously functions as a catalyst for accelerating the process of forming a Nasakom cabinet.[440]

Suharto's prior awareness of the "coup announcement," as evidenced through the research of Jess Melvin, means that Suharto and Sjam would also have discussed the Revolution Council.

But the Revolution Council brought by Sjam to the radio station for the 2:00 p.m. announcement was not the same Revolution Council discussed by Aidit and members of the September 30 Movement. One was compliantly promoting a Nasakom cabinet under President Sukarno; the other was defiantly declaring to replace the government. The words of the second radio announcement show the intent: "The Indonesian Revolution Council will constitute the source of all authority in the Republic of Indonesia … [and] the Dwikora Cabinet automatically assumes a decommissioned status."

The announcement said there had been a "purge" of generals who had been planning a coup; yet this 2:00 p.m. announcement itself was declaring a coup! It was bombastic nonsense. In the morning announcement, the movement was protecting President Sukarno, and now it was decommissioning his cabinet. Murdering the generals rather than arresting them was not the objective of Untung or Latief, but once Sjam was in control of the movement that had Suharto's implicit support, he was able to steer it toward a preplanned, catastrophic outcome. Not until the killing of the generals, the moment when Indonesian history changed irretrievably, did Latief realize they had been played like puppets in a larger political game.

It was Sjam, not Aidit, who made it into a coup declaration, creating a green light for Suharto to intervene with the catchphrase "protecting the president." Suharto needed Aidit to be acknowledged as the author of the coup. This is where Subekti (as Aidit's secretary) had political leverage, a bargaining point to stay alive. The typed pages, which were read out on the radio as a September 30 Movement announcement, have never been found. The document, referred to as Decree No. 1 (as two other decrees followed) went missing.

Roosa states, “It is not clear who, if anyone, signed Decree no. 1 concerning the formation of the Indonesian Revolution Council. There exists neither the original document nor a photograph of it.”[441] When the radio announcer read it out, he concluded with “Signed—Lt. Colonel Untung. Jakarta, October 1, 1965.”

But it was not signed by hand; it was merely typed. In his trial (Roosa explains) Untung claimed he signed, but later admitted he had not. Supardjo “disowned the radio announcement”; Heru Atmodjo said he’d “never even seen the text before it was broadcast.”

Subekti, as Aidit’s secretary, testified that he was the person who typed out the pages of the second radio announcement. Subekti, like Latief, was never executed. In Subekti’s case, avoiding execution required a strong negotiating point. This he had and gave evidence to that effect, as the person who typed the announcement for the “coup,” claiming Aidit and Sjam prepared the announcement. This would have been enough for Subekti to avoid execution when the truth was known by his interrogators that Sjam had acted alone.

Subekti testified that decommissioning Sukarno’s cabinet was at the behest of Aidit but even Roosa comments that “Subekti did not explain why or how Aidit did that. The Revolution Council [in the original format] … was intended to pressure the Sukarno government to move further left, not to replace the existing cabinet ministers.”[442]

Subekti’s court evidence does not stand up to scrutiny. Sjam delivered the final text to the radio station, handing over an unsigned version that bore no relation to what had previously been discussed. What he handed over was “the coup,” in hard copy—the work of Sjam, not Aidit. Moreover, the orders Suharto issued—*before the actual 2:00 p.m. radio announcement yet showing awareness of its contents*—indicates his foreknowledge and involvement in the September 30 Movement and the death of the generals, deepening beyond belief his culpability in one of the worst mass murders of the twentieth century.

Marshall Green did not admit his role in the Cold War consequences of the Indonesian tragedy until the 1990s. In the 1960s Green merely alluded

to involvement by the United States. For example, when he was back in Washington in March 1968 urging members of the US Congress to continue the war in Vietnam (just after the Tet Offensive), Congressmen Dorn from South Carolina and Whitener from North Carolina put on record the briefing they had from Ambassador Green. He told them, “The stand for freedom which our country has been making in Vietnam was responsible for the forces of freedom taking over the Government of Indonesia.”

AFTERWORD
BY JAMES DiEUGENIO

When one follows the contemporaneous coverage in the mainstream American media of the horrors that befell Indonesia in 1965–66, one can begin to see how and why the so-called mainstream media (MSM) has fallen into disrepute. One can also see how their reliance on and agreement with government sources lowered them to their present public status of little or no confidence. For example, in a 2018 Axios poll published in the journal *The Hill*, it was reported that 72 percent of the respondents thought the media reported stories they knew to be deliberately misleading.

In looking at the coverage of the overthrow of Indonesia's President Sukarno in 1965, the question should be, what took so long to arrive at that judgment? If ever there was an example of false reporting, this was it. It ranks up there with the mantra of "Americans were fighting for democracy" in Vietnam. Both ersatz rubrics were voiced by the same sources: the mainstream media and our Washington leaders. On October 11, 1965, Max Frankel of the *New York Times* filed a report headlined "US is Heartened by Red Setback in Indonesia Coup." This was approximately ten days after the advent of one of the bloodiest of all post–World War II genocides. Yet Mr. Frankel and the *Times* said America should be "heartened" by the atrocity when he continued in this vein of reportage five months later. On March 13, 1966, he wrote that the Johnson administration "found it difficult today to hide its delight with the news from Indonesia" about the army's triumph over the communists. In other words, the ongoing mass slaughter of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians filled the White House with incontinent delight. Frankel continued on to term the leader of the coup and

consequent slaughter, General Suharto, as "an efficient and effective military commander." Frankel is describing a man running a well-equipped army that butchered tens of thousands of its own defenseless citizens as an "effective military commander."

If only that were all.

A month later, on April 5, 1966, the *Times* praised the Indonesian military as "rightly playing its part with utmost caution." Three days later, publisher C. L. Sulzberger stated, "Almost everyone is pleased by the changes now being wrought." This Orwellian crescendo was capped by a now infamous *Times* column by James Reston of June 19, 1966. It was titled, "A Gleam of Light in Asia." The idea Reston was conveying was that if American policies in Vietnam were not as successful as President Johnson would like, the anti-communist triumph in Indonesia was a success of which the president could be justifiably proud. One might have asked Mr. Reston, "Of what?"

One month later, on July 15, 1966, *Time* magazine put Suharto on its cover. The banner was headlined, "Indonesia: The Land the Communists Lost." Which was an oxymoron, since the communists never had the country to begin with. The story stated that although the military had helped slaughter perhaps as many as four hundred thousand civilians—and in the most hideous manner, many of them decapitated—that army was "scrupulously constitutional and commanding vociferous popular support." It then quoted Suharto as saying, "Indonesia is a state based on law, not on mere power." This was from the man who, just ten years later—after getting approval from President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger—would begin yet another atrocity, this time in East Timor. That one ended with approximately one hundred thousand killed and the annexation of East Timor into Indonesia. The liberation of East Timor did not begin until the fall of Suharto in 1998.

In 1967, a book was published that placed the establishment's seal of approval on the journalistic musings of Mr. Frankel and Mr. Reston. The author was John Hughes, of *The Christian Science Monitor*, and the book

Indonesia Upheaval. Chapter 22, "Return to Respectability," begins with this paragraph:

> With its new accent on constitutionality and legality, the Indonesia leadership now scheduled a session of the People's Consultative Congress for May 12. The aim was to revive the constitutional process, breathe new life into the Congress, and transform it from an instrument of Sukarno into the genuine policymaking body it was originally intended to be.

This is how Hughes describes the advent of a murderous, tyrannical kleptocracy, one that would soon outdo the crimes and thievery of Joseph Mobutu in Congo, for the simple reason that Indonesia was even richer in natural resources than Congo. As was later revealed, while Hughes was ostensibly a reporter in Jakarta, he also did assignments for the American embassy. He later went to work for Ronald Reagan's State Department.[443]

The basis of these false narratives—the twin ideas that Sukarno was somehow a communist and that the PKI had an inordinate influence over the massive Indonesian state—were never the facts at all. But they had to be presented as such in order to justify the horrors that Suharto initiated and with which the United States was thoroughly involved. As Greg Poulgrain writes in his new book *JFK vs. Allen Dulles: Battleground Indonesia*, Sukarno told President Kennedy that the communist party, the PKI, was really a nationalist party, not a communist one. The members needed some ability to make a living since most were landless peasants. He felt that perhaps 10 percent of them were really communists.

But there was little doubt that the PKI was an important aspect of Sukarno's ruling coalition. For it balanced out the tendency of some powerful players in the military to side with the residue of colonialism, from which Indonesia had only been free for fifteen years. Colonialism layered over a third-party figurehead—whether it is Mobutu or Suharto—is properly termed imperialism. In the *Time* magazine article referred to, the author notes how certain industries were now being sold off by Suharto to Western powers. (It was not revealed in the story, but, as we will see, an

executive of *Time* organized a Jakarta businessmen's junket in order to entice them into these investments.) One of the first corporations to set up shop in Indonesia, and at a bargain price, was Freeport Sulphur, later renamed Freeport McMoran. In fact, as Poulgrain's book shows with a photo, that was the first contract Suharto signed after Sukarno was shunted offstage. Therefore, the enormous riches in gold, silver, oil, and copper that existed in West Irian did not go, as Sukarno had planned, to the citizens of Indonesia. They went to the stockholders of Freeport McMoran—after Suharto got his share for doing their dirty work. This is what the above-noted Pulitzer Prize winner John Hughes labels "constitutionality and legality."

When, after an abrupt overthrow, large corporations suddenly prosper in the Third World, it is usually due to their own government applying influence there for them. A good prior example would be the influence of United Fruit Company toward the American State Department in preparing the coup against the republic of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala. In that 1954 overthrow, an attorney friend of the New Orleans "private investigator," Guy Banister—one Maurice Gatlin—was advising Thomas Cabot of the State Department about the covert preparations against Arbenz. Cabot was Michael Paine's cousin. Paine would later be an acquaintance of Lee Harvey Oswald, and let him abide in his home the night before he allegedly murdered President Kennedy in November of 1963.[444] That summer, Oswald had worked out of Banister's office as an agent provocateur.[445] The murder of President Kennedy is quite relevant in the context of Poulgrain's book. With a surfeit of evidence, Dr. Poulgrain shows it is highly unlikely that Suharto would have come to power if Kennedy had not been assassinated.

In this book, Greg Poulgrain has brought out the American imperial influence in the Indonesian overthrow through his characterization of a person and a corporation. The person he delves into, and who becomes the antagonist of his volume, is the formidable figure of Allen Dulles. Dulles was a long-term partner in the giant corporate law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell. The managing partner of that firm was Allen's elder brother,

John Foster Dulles. Through Allen's service in that firm, he learned about the Ertsberg. This occurred through a joint Dutch/American sponsored three-man expedition, which included the geologist Jean Jacques Dozy. In 1936, that expedition scaled the highest point in Dutch New Guinea. According to the oft-told story—perhaps a myth—Freeport Sulphur's Forbes Wilson later discovered the Dozy report and felt it could justify an engineering feasibility study with the Netherlands, who claimed the Ertsberg at the time. A contract was signed on February 1, 1960.[446] A second expedition was then formed.

Through interviews with the Dutchmen directly involved, Poulgrain reveals there were two hidden secrets in these explorations and business dealings. First, for pecuniary reasons, Dozy had underestimated the gold deposits available at the Ertsberg, part of the Carstensz Pyramid. Wilson further distracted from the true value of the deposits there by titling the Erstberg "Copper Mountain." As Poulgrain shows, by misusing the term "grains" for "grams," Dozy underestimated the gold reserves at the Ertsberg by a factor of over fifteen. Once that was corrected, it made the Ertsberg the greatest repository of gold in the world at that time. The value of the gold there dwarfed the copper deposits.

But, as the explorers also knew, very near the Ertsberg was a mining deposit in an alpine meadow called the Grasberg. If one can believe it, the Grasberg turned out to hold even richer deposits of gold, silver, and copper than the Ertsberg. It was just two miles away. The total monetary value of the deposits in both places was not in the millions, or in the tens of millions, or hundreds of millions of dollars. The cumulative value over forty-five years of mining turned out to be over a hundred billion dollars. To state the obvious, that is the kind of money that not only have people killed for but also wars have been started over.

As Poulgrain notes, through serving their accounts at Sullivan & Cromwell, Allen Dulles was quite friendly with the Rockefeller family. In fact, he and his brother Foster came to have prominent positions in the Council on Foreign Relations due to the Rockefeller influence there. Another close acquaintance of the Rockefeller family was the wealthy

newspaper publisher John Hay Whitney. Back in 1930, Whitney was one of the founders, and later a director, of Freeport Sulphur.[447] Whitney's company had holdings in Cuba that, after the revolution, were later nationalized by Fidel Castro. These included the subsidiaries called Nicaro Nickel and Moa Bay Mining Company.[448]

Once Castro took control of these companies, Freeport began to explore alternative methods of bringing nickel ore into America through Canada—which still had relations with Cuba. That ore would then be refined in Louisiana, either in New Orleans or at nearby Brathwaite, where Freeport had some major operations. Clay Shaw was part of that exploratory effort through Canada and took at least two trips there. One of the flights was piloted by David Ferrie. In fact, Shaw had accompanied one of the directors of Freeport—probably Charles Wight—to Cuba, and David Ferrie also piloted this flight.[449]

In other words, as New Orleans DA Jim Garrison did with many things, he was the first to discover the importance of Freeport Sulphur to Cuba, Indonesia, and the JFK case. When Gaeton Fonzi joined the House Select Committee, he continued this research as a source of possible leads into the murder of President Kennedy.[450] As Greg Poulgrain notes, this nexus may also have impacted the murder of Dag Hammarskjöld, and certainly the overthrow of Sukarno.

But Jim Garrison's discoveries about Freeport went even further. He found a witness, James Plaine of Houston, who told him that a Mr. Wight of Freeport Sulphur had contacted him about an assassination plot against Fidel Castro. Considering the amount of money Freeport was about to lose in Cuba, plus how remarkably well connected the Freeport Board of Directors was, this does not at all seem unlikely. In addition to John Hay Whitney, that board included New York banker and member of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Jean Mauze; Admiral Arleigh Burke, who also served on Committee for a Free Cuba; and former Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett.[451] When a company had that kind of insulation, plotting to kill Castro was not off the table.

The problem was simple: John F. Kennedy was *not* plotting to kill Castro. As the CIA's Inspector General Report proves, the agency never had presidential approval for the plots they designed to kill Fidel Castro.[452] As writers like Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and others have shown, this was a cover story to divert from their own culpability.

This points to one of the overall themes of *JFK vs. Allen Dulles: Battleground Indonesia*—namely, that there was a large, almost canyon size, difference between how Allen Dulles viewed the Third World and how President Kennedy looked at it. One can fairly say that this was the reason that Kennedy decided the CIA director had to be relieved of his duties, which he formally was in November of 1961. As several authors, especially David Talbot, have pointed out, by the middle of 1961, Dulles had backed the rebel generals in their overthrow of Charles DeGaulle in their dispute over freeing Algeria, he had deceived Kennedy over various aspects of the Bay of Pigs invasion, and he had concealed the murder of African leader Patrice Lumumba from the new president for almost one month. The last may have been done because Dulles knew Kennedy would favor the Congo's Lumumba in his struggle with the mother country of Belgium.[453]

This aspect deserves special mention in the context of Poulgrain's work. In the summer of 1957, Senator John F. Kennedy strode to the podium in the Senate and made one of the most compelling and memorable speeches of the decade concerning American foreign policy. It has come to be known as the Algeria speech. And it created a firestorm of controversy at the time.[454] Up until then, President Eisenhower had been looked upon as one's favorite uncle—the one you would like to go to the beach with and share sandwiches and soft drinks afterward. But now, this young, first-term senator was vilifying him as befriending a corrupt and failing overseas European empire, one that had no chance of winning this war for independence against Algeria on the north coast of Africa. But worse, Kennedy was also comparing this ill-fated Algerian campaign to what had just happened three years earlier in French Indochina. There, Eisenhower had contemplated using atomic weapons at the siege of Dien Bien Phu to

help France maintain control of their colony. Young Kennedy could not understand why he was the only one to comprehend that the same fey pattern was repeating itself. And, in both cases, America was going to be seen as siding with European colonialism against emerging nationalism.

That speech was not very popular in Washington. But it was popular in the Third World, especially in Africa. Two years prior to that speech, Sukarno had hosted the first meeting of the fledgling nonaligned movement in Bandung, Indonesia. It was founded because of this specific issue: Cold War interference with nationalism in the Third World. To put it mildly, CIA Director Allen Dulles and his brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, were not backers of this idea or of the nonaligned movement itself.

When Kennedy fired Allen Dulles in the fall of 1961, it sent a signal to the power elite. As they knew, Richard Nixon would have invaded Cuba when he saw the Bay of Pigs operation failing.[455] With the failure of that invasion, there was no way now for Freeport—or any other American enterprise—to get its confiscated assets back from Castro. For those in control of Freeport, the compensation attempt now shifted to Indonesia. For only a very few people knew about the huge potential of the virtual El Dorado in the Carstensz Pyramid. One of them was Allen Dulles. Dulles was the lawyer at Sullivan & Cromwell who had knowledge of the 1936 joint American/Dutch exploration, since he handled the accounts of the American companies involved. The expenses were shared on a 60:40 basis, in favor of his clients' interests—both of whom were Rockefeller related.

Once Dag Hammarskjöld was murdered—and there seems to be little question today that his death was the result of foul play, as the United Nations announced it was assassination four years ago—President Kennedy now had to take on an enormous dual burden. For as revealed by Poulgrain, there were two problem areas the pair had discussed: Congo and Indonesia.[456] Both leaders were opposed to letting the newly independent countries, and their enormous riches, fall back under the reins of European imperialism. In retrospect, it is remarkable that, after Hammarskjöld was killed, Kennedy honored that commitment to both countries. In fact, he visited the United Nations twice and begged them, in the name of

Hammarskjöld, not to leave Congo. But there was one important matter that neither he, nor Hammarskjöld, nor Sukarno knew about. But Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns did. And that was the enormous wealth of the Erstberg and Grasberg. Because they did not know, Kennedy and Sukarno could not understand why the Dutch wanted to hold onto Netherlands New Guinea, or Western New Guinea, which was later renamed West Irian and then West Papua. After Sukarno led the Indonesian independence struggle to success in 1949, the Dutch refused to turn over that territory. When Sukarno tried to move the issue in the United Nations, Foster Dulles would not support it.[457]

Unwittingly, with Kennedy and Sukarno in the lead, the Rockefeller interests were now in the driver's seat for the monumental riches in West Irian. Because of Kennedy's friendship with Sukarno, he would advocate for Indonesia to obtain West Irian from the Dutch. This would benefit Dulles' clients and colleagues—the Rockefeller clan, Whitney, and the Freeport board—since now the Dutch claim to that area would be neutralized. When President Kennedy helped Sukarno attain suzerainty over West Irian, for all intents and purposes, this rendered null the partnership between Dutch Shell and the two American Rockefeller associated companies: Standard Vacuum Oil and Far Pacific Investments. Dutch Shell held only a 40 percent interest. All that was keeping the American interests from exploiting it was Sukarno's nonaligned nationalism.

Sukarno claimed that stopping President Kennedy's intended visit Indonesia, to end 'Confrontation with Malaysia', was the motive behind the assassination. Sukarno himself was unaware that the event which would lead to his own ousting was only 22 months away, and unaware that the regime-change planned for Indonesia was part of Cold War strategy to further the Sino-Soviet split. Oblivious to these future implications, Sukarno's claim may yet prove to be correct despite being villified by political opponents. Had JFK's visit to Jakarta proceeded, events which marred the end of the Sukarno era would not have occurred as they did. With Kennedy's visit, Sukarno would have remained president-for-life;

without Kennedy's visit, Sukarno – indeed, Indonesia – was heading into a political cataclysm for which Moscow and Beijing would blame each other.

The idea that the aim of the Sukarno overthrow was not fear of the PKI but to place Indonesia back under the thumb of imperial exploiters was first fully voiced in America in a little-known pamphlet. The author was Deirdre Griswold, and today, the name of her long essay is "Indonesia: Second Greatest Crime of the Century." At the beginning of Part 4 of her work, Griswold discards the idea that there was any kind of danger from the PKI. She openly asserts that the aim of the overthrow was simply foreign exploitation of Indonesia's colossal natural resources. She writes: "There was plenty of profit to be made in Indonesia, once the Sukarno government, the Communists and the revolutionary nationalists were defeated."[458] Back in 1970, she noted that Freeport was getting the rights to the Ertsberg at fire-sale prices. But she was only referring to the copper deposits, which today we know turned out to be quite minor compared to the gold wealth.

Griswold also commented on a 1967 NBC News special about Indonesia. It pictured workers now laboring at a rubber plantation owned by Goodyear—at gunpoint.[459] The soldiers holding the guns were under the command of the Indonesian army. Political prisoners were being transferred to work at forced labor plantations. These workers were now carrying ID cards labeling their race, religion, and occupation. The army generals promoted under Suharto to do foreign corporate bidding now lived like kings.

In the summer of 1969, President Nixon visited Jakarta. After a splendid dinner, over the cheers and approval of the press, Nixon praised Suharto's new regime. And the ever-reliable Max Frankel wrote, "Indonesia is the great prize of American diplomacy in Asia." Frankel then added that Nixon was "cheerfully rattling off statistics of Indonesia's economic potential, soaking up the cheers of the crowd and offering tributes to independence and democracy."[460] One is left to reconcile those NBC images of workers at gunpoint and political prisoners transferred to rubber plantations with the phrase "independence and democracy." For by 1968, there were *five hundred* American corporations applying to do business in

Indonesia.[461] The idea that Nixon was trying to convey, that somehow Indonesia was going to be the new Japan—featuring a prosperous middle class, a technologically innovative economy, along with democratic institutions—was pure propaganda.

But one is left to wonder what that state dinner would have been like if it had been Sukarno and Kennedy at the table instead of Suharto and Nixon. In 1996, Lisa Pease wrote a milestone article on this very subject. That is, the 1965 coup against Sukarno and how the directors of Freeport benefited from the selling off of Indonesia by the new leader Suharto. She also wrote about the very different plans that President Kennedy had for the country. These were designed to boost Sukarno, expand the Indonesian economy, and to begin to send large amounts of economic aid and advisor there. As she noted, under Kennedy, the amount of profits American corporations returned to Indonesia was 60 percent.[462] As Poulgrain shows, this was a direct result of Kennedy sending trade representatives to Indonesia to negotiate these arrangements. It was this concession that was needed to fulfill Sukarno's eight-year plan to strengthen his economy by getting Indonesia out of debt and creating its own means of mineral extraction.[463] This did not continue under President Lyndon Johnson. One reason was that the directors of Freeport, like Augustus "Gus" Long and Whitney, were active in Johnson's 1964 campaign against Republican Barry Goldwater.[464] Johnson was now beholden to them. After his brother's death, Bobby Kennedy told the Soviets that Johnson was much more sympathetic to big business claims than President Kennedy was. He would therefore stack his administration with several corporate cronies.[465] As we shall see, one was an ad and information director for Freeport. What happened in Indonesia in 1965 exemplified that Bobby Kennedy understood the difference between his brother and Lyndon Johnson.

As Poulgrain describes it, one of the reasons that President Kennedy wanted to visit Sukarno in 1964 was to defuse Konfrontasi. This was the dispute between the British and Sukarno over the formation of the federation of Malaysia. Sukarno correctly perceived this as a way for the

British to maintain economic control over their territories in Southeast Asia by *seeming* to grant them independence without actually doing so.[466] As a leader of the Third World decolonization movement, Sukarno would naturally oppose this. In spite of Sukarno, the British—the greatest colonizers in the modern world—were intent on continuing with their plans. Part of that plan was to smear Sukarno as the antagonist in the small-scale violent outbursts, when, in fact—with help from the CIA—they had designed these as provocations against the Indonesia leader to portray him as the aggressor.[467] Without Kennedy's visit, this plan continued. It was successful in not just smearing Sukarno but also in isolating him from the West and forcing him into a closer alliance with the Soviets and Chinese. That meant it was now easier to characterize him as a communist—which he wasn't.

In a previous book, Poulgrain noted that November of 1963 marked not only the assassination of JFK but also the death of Sukarno's economics minister, Djuanda.[468] Because of the growing military expenses of the Malaysian conflict, the lack of a large aid package from Kennedy, and the death of Djuanda, the Indonesian economy began to be racked by inflation. Djuanda was important because he was the minister who was working with both the American economic mission Kennedy had assigned, and the International Monetary fund (IMF).[469] Ambassador Howard Jones later said that Djuanda was the only person who could envision the entire economic picture for the country. Sukarno trusted him to give the state a leading role in economic development.[470]

After Kennedy's death, President Johnson had to be pushed into meeting with Indonesia's representative to the funeral, General Nasution. When Howard Jones reminded Johnson about Kennedy's commitment to visit Jakarta in 1964, he got an ominous presidential reply: "I wonder whether the closer we get to Sukarno the more difficult he becomes."[471] As State Department representative Michael Forrestal noted, Kennedy had a difficult time with his Indonesia policy, since very few people were interested in the country while many were opposed to Sukarno. JFK was

willing to bear that burden. LBJ made it clear he was not so inclined. He said that he was not going to bear any political burdens on behalf of Indonesia. He spoke about Sukarno in strongly demeaning terms, and when he was supposed to sign a bill to keep minimal aid to Indonesia flowing, he refused.[472] As Roger Hilsman of the State Department observed, that act would have been routine with Kennedy.[473] As Hilsman then described it, Johnson then began to transfer the aid program to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. It was now destined to be a purely military package. The writing was on the wall. American foreign policy toward Indonesia was being reversed.

Sukarno understood this. He also understood that Kennedy's total aid program—worth nearly $400 million—was going to be eliminated, which it was. Angrily, Sukarno shouted at Jones, "To hell with your aid!"[474] As Hilsman wrote: "The United States in fact, had made a major shift in its policy. It had abandoned its efforts to steer the new nationalism of Indonesia into constructive channels."[475]

Without Djuanda to counsel him, Sukarno now would not deal with the International Monetary Fund. In 1964, he made a fiery speech on Independence Day, August 17. He declared that 1965 would be the country's Year of Living Dangerously. In December of 1964, Sukarno pulled Indonesia out of the United Nations when Malaysia was admitted.[476] It is startling to note how fast the tide turned against Sukarno after Kennedy was killed. After his speech and his UN abandonment, ballast was given to those who wanted a hardline against Sukarno. These included people like Republicans John Tower and George Bush and Democrat Birch Bayh. The CIA issued a report titled "Sukarno and the Communists." Predictably, it forecast the PKI and Sukarno growing closer, until Indonesia became a modified communist state, thus betraying Sukarno's natural sympathies.[477] In Jakarta, American diplomat Frances Galbraith wired to Washington:

> Be alert to development potential for meaningful dissidence, especially in outer islands and West Java, and be prepared to move rapidly in support of Army should Sukarno-PKI pressures on Army

leader or other occurrences precipitate army revolt against Sukarno.[478]

By September of 1964, the CIA was outlining models of covert action for the State Department against Sukarno.[479] That memo mentioned certain groups that had visited the American embassy and opposed the current leadership. The Agency said the aim of these actions should be "agitation and the instigation of internal strife between communist and non-communist elements." CIA and State Department officers now began to have meetings on the subject. In November of 1964, the White House approved covert actions to begin to seek out and encourage alternative leadership groups and fracture Sukarno's coalition.[480] In one year, American policy had gone from doing all that was possible to bolster Sukarno to now finding ways to undermine and replace him.

To top it off, Lyndon Johnson had appointed director Gus Long of Freeport Sulphur to the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.[481] This was a presidentially appointed panel to advise and suggest intelligence-gathering and covert actions. In fact, what happened in Indonesia in 1965 had been predicted in December of 1964. A Dutch intelligence officer assigned to NATO revealed that Indonesia would fall to the West like a rotten apple. Western intelligence agencies would design a premature communist coup that would fail. That failure would provide an opportunity for the army to crush the PKI and make Sukarno a prisoner of their goodwill.[482] In June of 1965 the acting ambassador to Indonesia, Francis Galbraith, warned the American ambassador to Malaysia not to raise the issue of an army coup plan. Because the United States was "aware of a good deal of maneuvering going on beneath the surface" and that Indonesians were "past masters of intrigue and may be deliberately trying [to] create the opposite impression for their own reasons."[483] After Francis Galbraith retired, he went to work for both Freeport and Bechtel Corporation.[484] Bechtel made millions setting up the complex mining operation at the Ertsberg. In 1965, Marshall Green—who Poulgrain notes was a friend and colleague of the Dulles

brothers—now became the permanent replacement for Howard Jones as ambassador.

There is little or no doubt today that there was American covert involvement with the 1965 coup, and—as we will see—American aid in the massacres of the PKI. As Emma Kast notes in her online essay on the topic, although Johnson seriously curtailed Kennedy's aid program, the United States still channeled funds to the Indonesian military. And the CIA gave extensive support and training to the paramilitary anti-PKI units.[485] Once the massacres of the PKI began, the army requested portable communications equipment from Ambassador Green in order to coordinate their prolonged and expansive decimation operations. Green arranged for this as long as the compliance could remain secret.[486] What Poulgrain adds in his book is the stunning revelation that officials, possibly from the American Embassy, were stationed in the army's operational headquarters during the massacres. This kind of operation was probably part and parcel of the smuggling of communications equipment the CIA furnished to the army. Once the equipment was delivered, the National Security Agency could monitor the army transmissions, providing the CIA with real time information, including specific orders about who to kill in the PKI.[487] Therefore, the idea held by some that all the Americans did was to furnish lists of names is now rendered wholly obsolete.[488]

Kathy Kadane first researched the story that revealed that the CIA was supplying thousands of names to the State Department, which then went to Green at the embassy, who then forwarded the lists to the army. When Kadane's story appeared in widely read newspapers and magazines, certain parts of it were edited or omitted. The embassy officers she interviewed were allowed to backtrack on what they told her in interviews. But there is no doubt that the lists were disseminated by the embassy and they were being checked off as the army slaughtered the victims—both at the embassy in Jakarta and in Washington.[489] About a month into the extermination campaign, the army requested medicines and small arms. Green recommended complying with the request, and Washington agreed.[490]

Later on, Green also recommended dispersing funds to a certain Indonesian army unit to continue its murderous operations.[491]

The killing campaign went on for months on end. Today, no one can really determine how many were slaughtered simply because they were members of the PKI. The startling thing is that the United States did nothing to try to halt, or even decrease, the killings once they began. As we have seen, they actually tendered aid to make it all more effective. The idea was to eliminate Sukarno's popular support, so he could never return to power. That would have endangered the imperial plans of the State Department, the CIA, and private American businesses to turn Indonesia into an American feudal colony.

Although his power was greatly weakened during the massacres, Sukarno refused to ban the PKI. Some in the army tried to nationalize American industries for their own benefit. But the White House soon made clear this would not be tolerated.[492] Since America was spending an inordinate amount of money in Vietnam, the State Department got Japan to front immediate cash and commodities to alleviate an emergency economic crisis. [493] Meanwhile, after consultation with Washington, Ambassador Green made it clear to Suharto that the sooner Sukarno was rendered ineffective and the more public was the announcement that his policies would be reversed, the faster Washington would arrange an economic plan for the new regime.[494] Both goals were accomplished by April of 1966. By August, President Johnson had now signed a determination that aid could be started again to Indonesia.[495] Jakarta now rejoined the United Nations and signed an agreement called the Bangkok Accords to end the Malaysian dispute.

Hubert Humphrey told LBJ that the new regime wanted to be friendly with the United States. After a meeting with Adam Malik, the new economics minister, Humphrey told the president, "They are interested in encouraging U.S. private investment."[496] Ambassador Green pushed the same message—the need for private investment—to Suharto.[497] The key model for this happening was the case of Freeport Sulphur. James Moyer

had been the ad and information director for the company as it had planned on entering into the Ertsberg in West Irian. Sukarno blocked that entry when he went on a wave of nationalizing businesses in 1965. Moyer then went to work at the White House in early September. In November, with Sukarno still ostensibly in power, Freeport began to negotiate with the new regime. In March of 1966, when Sukarno had been marginalized, Freeport engineers and technicians were working in West Irian.[498]

The arrangement with Freeport was actually written in the United States.[499] Suharto now reversed all of Sukarno's previous business nationalizations. The president of *Time* magazine, James Linen, decided to organize a businessmen's consortium to invest in Indonesia. He then met with State Department officials and proposed a junket to Jakarta.[500] The net result of all of this was that, in the guise of free enterprise and modernization, the State Department and the CIA were creating a classic fascist state: one in which corporations were protected by the army, and such protection allowed them to abuse their employees and degrade the environment. When Suharto was swept from power three decades later, the mask was removed from this alleged triumph. It proved that—contrary to what President Nixon and the *New York Times* were trumpeting—what happened in Indonesia was not anywhere close to what happened in Japan. Even after Suharto's ouster, nearly half of all Indonesians lived at or below the poverty line.[501] Companies like Freeport were allowed to pay their workers subsistence wages, while wrecking the environment during three decades of reaping colossal profits, with which they paid security forces to intimidate their workers.[502]

Freeport so abused their employees that foreign journalists were virtually forbidden to be near its facilities.[503] By 2011, Freeport-McMoRan was one of the two largest mining enterprises in the world. The year before, it registered just under $19 billion in overall revenues. Yet, it paid its workers in West Irian between $1.50 and $3.00 per hour. Even though Freeport had a private security force of 725 company guards for the Grasberg, it also paid both the local police and the military hundreds of

thousands of dollars to supplement that force. As John Rockefeller Jr. had done during the horrendous Ludlow Massacre, Freeport had corrupted the law enforcement process with money. What were these forces now protecting? Individual rights, or the crimes and abuses of Freeport? As has been widely reported, striking workers were fired upon, and several were killed or wounded.[504] Other reports say that whole villages were invaded. This was done because Freeport had budgeted $79.1 million to police and military forces over a ten-year period.

Sanctioned by Suharto, it is not an exaggeration to say that Freeport went to war in West Irian. They did this in two ways: directly against the native inhabitants, and indirectly—by making the air and water toxic. (The word "polluted" is not nearly strong enough in this context.) When certain tribes—like the Amunge—protested Freeport's practices and the length of its stay, the government relocated two thousand of them.[505] In 1977, Freeport paid the military $1 million to put down a native revolt. If protests continued, the demonstrators were beaten up and placed in small containers. Sometimes they were beaten so seriously that they did not recover and died from their injuries.[506]

The waste product from the mining of the Ertsberg and Grasberg has had a serious impact on the rain forests. Mining operations there release a mixture of slimes and chemical precipitates called tailings. Freeport has decided not to get rid of these in a safe way. So it has dumped hundreds of thousands of tons into nearby rivers. So much copper has been dumped into rivers that it is not safe to drink natural water. Sustenance farming has been endangered because of flooding due to the tonnage of tailings in the rivers. The water ecosystem of the area, including marine organisms, has been seriously damaged by these dangerous mining practices.[507]

How did it all happen? How did such a disaster befall the people of Indonesia?

When Sukarno was placed under house arrest, it was at least partly done at the request of the United States. For as long as he was on or near the stage he posed a threat to the new regime, which was so assiduously

establishing itself. Washington worried that "as long as Sukarno is around … there is a direct threat to the realization of the fundamental aims of the New Order."[508] The way he was ultimately neutralized and placed under house arrest was the threat of going on trial. He was accused by Omar Dhani of knowing all about the September 30 Movement, and he made no effort to either prevent it or stop the killing of six generals. Dhani was convicted and sentenced to death. Facing the threat of a trial and a prison term, in early 1967 Sukarno handed over what little power he had left to Suharto.

But, as Greg Poulgrain explicates in detail, what happened on the night of September 30, 1965, was not at all what those protecting Sukarno had planned—or what he himself had expected. Although Dhani was given capital punishment, he was never executed. In fact, with Suharto still in power, he was pardoned in 1995. He lived to be eighty-five years old.

On the night of September 30, 1965, six generals were abducted and later killed. This allowed Suharto, in charge of the the Strategic Command (Kostrad), to put down what appeared to be a coup attempt against Sukarno. Very quickly, Suharto used state radio to brand this a plot by the PKI, and he blamed the murders on the communists. Although earlier studies tried to portray what happened next—the massacres against the PKI—as some kind of spontaneous uprising, more recent scholarship by Jess Melvin and Geoffrey Robinson has shown this was not the case. The army played a central role in the slaughter, and—as we have noted—they were supplemented through Ambassador Green and the CIA with not just lists, but small arms, communications gear, and funding. Using the apparent emergency as his rationale, Suharto began to ignore orders from Sukarno.[509] The coup de grâce was a film shown on TV depicting the tortured and mutilated bodies of the dead generals and blaming the brutalization on the PKI.

As more than one commentator has pointed out, that film was doctored.[510] Later autopsies revealed that no such mutilations were present. In other words, this was a propaganda ploy to inflame the populace against

the PKI. When one of the defendants in the so-called overthrow attempt went on trial in early 1967, he hinted at what had really occurred. Brigadier General Supardjo said that Indonesian history since September 30, 1965, had been completely distorted. He went on to say that there was no communist plot behind the coup, and further, the aim was not to overthrow Sukarno. What had occurred was an attempt to prevent a coup by a body called the "Council of Generals." But that the end result entailed what this body had wished for, in that "the ministers of the legal government are now in jail," and three of them had been sentenced to death.[511]

The triumph of Greg Poulgrain's book is that he elucidates what actually happened that night to a point that no other writer I know of has matched, let alone surpassed. As former CIA official Ralph McGehee wrote many years ago, the agency has officially concealed what it did in Indonesia. But the twenty-five-year veteran wrote that secretly it was so proud of its success that it recommended "it as a model for future operations."[512] As we shall see, it appears it did.

Poulgrain has interviewed many, many people from the archipelago. He talked to some of them after they were released from prison because of their involvement with the September 30 Movement. With those disclosures, plus other recent important information that has been brought to light, he makes us see that bizarre evening as an intricately designed covert operation. The architects knew that Sukarno was too strong to move against directly. They therefore created a chimerical menace, distributed its scent, infiltrated those who were disposed to save Sukarno, and then sprung their trap. As I have said on more than one occasion, I respect Allen Dulles' brains as much I don't the uses to which he put them. I do not know if he drew this plan up himself. But it was so ingenious—and the ersatz use of a castrated general was clearly a psychological ploy that looked forward to a similar tactic used by the CIA in Chile in 1973—that it is difficult not to ponder a direct relationship. In fact, in the overthrow in Chile, the use of the mutilated general image was codenamed Plan Djakarta. And in the days leading up to the coup against Salvador Allende, cards were sent to leftists

saying “Djakarta is approaching.”[513] In other words, as in Indonesia, the left would be massacred.

In addition to that there is the figure of Guy Pauker, a close friend of Allen Dulles and his academic expert on Indonesia. As Poulgrain reveals, Pauker admitted to him that he was a good friend of Colonel Suwarto. They were so close that Pauker visited him several times in Indonesia. According to Nasution, Suwarto was a CIA agent. It is significant that he was instrumental in officer education. He was an enemy of Sukarno’s concept of Guided Democracy and schooled his students on how they should run over government.

After filling in some of the past mysteries of what happened that terrible night, Poulgrain caps his work with a scene out of a John LeCarre novel. When Suharto arrived at Kostrad headquarters, three generals had been killed and three more would be killed later that morning.. He did not request an intelligence briefing on the situation. Instead, he asked: “Where is Sjam?” As Poulgrain demonstrates, once one knows who Sjam was and his role in the September 30 Movement, those three words shine a klieg light into the subterranean depths of an intricately designed, diabolical plot. One then understands why the CIA considered it both a masterpiece and a model of covert action and did all it could to keep it under wraps.

As the reader can see, it is almost impossible to imagine this would have occurred if President Kennedy had lived. Greg Poulgrain shows us how his death in Dallas directly relates to the horrors that overtook the Indonesian archipelago.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The extended time frame of the research for this book does not diminish the gratitude I have for those who have helped. For research begun decades ago, I have accumulated a debt of profound gratitude. To those who provided documents, arranged interviews or contacts, and so on, I offer a sincere thank you. At times the research seemed as though I was lifting into place great slabs of evidence, constructing a 'literary henge', rather than one of stone. My sources were in endless files, databases, slips of paper, memories, whispers, newspapers, and libraries, mainly in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Indonesia, the United States, and Australia. Those who assisted know how deeply grateful I am, and let me say here that I could not have continued without their encouragement and advice.

More recently, in 2019, as the start of the Suharto era came into focus—Chapter 7—so too did its link with the dénouement of President Kennedy, in which the experience and advice of James DiEugenio and Len Osanic can be added to the list. A thank you also to Professor Robert Cribb for the maps included in this work; to Mark Gompertz and Caroline Russomanno; and to Phillip Mahnken, David Trudinger, and Calum Hyslop for discussion and critical comment. My deepest gratitude to my wife Rosemary and family, Evan and Sarah, now adults, for whom my research and writing must have seemed akin to the thankless task of "rerolling the boulder up the same hill."

Attempting an explanation of Suharto's role in 1965, when so many before me had tried repeatedly, has been made more accessible by recent work in Jakarta that has shown Suharto himself to have been a "hidden variable." Otherwise I'd have encountered the political equivalent of a

fractal landscape, infinite possibilities within a finite perimeter. So rather than a process of compiling "slabs" as in the early chapters, the final chapter was more a process of "sifting through sand," and by this means the culprit or culprits emerge, caged in the geopolitics of the Cold War.

A final word of acknowledgment to a uniquely talented Papuan musicologist Arnold Ap, whom I met in 1983 in Abepura, when he was working in the museum there. After recontextualising a traditional Papuan melody, *Yamko Rambe Yamko*, Arnold Ap created a hauntingly beautiful tune that has become part of every Indonesian schoolchild's musical education. Few realize, however, that the contemporary cadence and lyrics, the "flowers in the field," are actually referring to killing in Papua, untrammeled and unreported after the influence of the ogre of 1965 spread to Papua. Arnold was killed in 1984, Easter Monday.

Dr. Greg Poulgrain
August 12, 2019, Brisbane
ypoulgrain@gmail.com

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Government and UN Publications and Archives

National Archives (British), Kew, Foreign Office and Colonial Office

Congressional Record, 90th Congress.

Foreign Relations of the United States (*FRUS*)

US Department of State, National Archives and Records Administration

United Nations General Assemply, A/68/800, 21st March 2014,

Sixty-eighth session, Agenda item 175, "Investigation into the Conditions and Circumstances Resulting in the Tragic Death of Dag Hammarskjöld and of the Members of the Party Accompanying Him," with Annex, "Whether the Evidence Now Available Would Justify the United Nations in Reopening Its Inquiry into the Death of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 1759 (XVII) of 26 October 1962."

UN General Assembly, A/71/1042, September 5, 2017. Seventy-first session: Agenda item 130, "Investigation into the Conditions and Circumstances Resulting in the Tragic Death of Dag Hammarskjöld and of the Members of the Party Accompanying Him," http://www.hammarskjoldinquiry.info/pdf/ham_150_Othman_report_251017.pdf

US Senate, *An Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental*

Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders," W. W. Nortoin & Company, NY, 1976. *Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of*

President Kennedy, Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964 (Warren Report).
Report on Netherlands New Guinea for the Year 1952 (presented to UN Secretary General) by the Ministry of Overseas Territories and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague.
War Department, Corps of Engineers US Army, Southwest Pacific Area, map.

Newspapers, Magazines, and Journals

Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde (*Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia*), an online publication
Boston Globe
Business History Review
Canberra Times
Der Spiegel
Foreign Affairs
Global Review
Herald (South Carolina)
Indonesia (Cornell)
Inside Indonesia (online, Melbourne)
Journal of Contemporary Asia
Journal of Global History
Journal of Pacific History
Mercury (Hobart)
Newsweek
New York Times
Petroleum Press Service
Rozenberg Quarterly Magazine (online)
San Francisco Examiner
The Guardian (international edition)
Washington Post

Articles, Dissertations, and Books

Allison, John M. *Ambassador from the Prairie: Or, Allison Wonderland*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973.

Archbold, R. "Results of the Archbold Expedition 1938–9." Bulletin of American Museum of Natural History, 111, no. 79 (1942):

Arief, Sritua. *The Indonesian Petroleum Industry*. Singapore: Sritua Arief Associates, 1976.

Bemmelen, R. W. van. *The Geology of Indonesia*. The Hague: Government Printing Office, 1949.

Benda, Harry, James Ikura, and Koichi Kishi, eds. *Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965.

Bone, Robert C., Jr. *The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1958.

Brackman, Arnold C. *Indonesian Communism: A History*. New York:Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.

———. *Southeast Asia's Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago.* London: Pall Mall Press, 1966.

Bunnell, Frederick P. "The Central Intelligence Agency—Deputy Directorate for Plans 1961 Secret Memorandum on Indonesia: A Study in the Politics of Policy Formulation in the Kennedy Administration." *Indonesia*, no. 22 (October 1976):

Chang, Gordon, H. *Friends and Enemies*: *The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990.

Colijn, A. H. *Naar de Eeuwige Sneeuw van Nieuw Guinee-De Bestijing van het Carstenszgebergte*. 6th ed. Amsterdam: Scheltens & Giltay, n.d. First published 1937.

Conboy, Kenneth, and James Morrison. *Feet to the Fire: CIA Covert Operations in Indonesia, 1957–1958*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999.

Crouch, Harold. *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1978.

Dake, Antonie C. A. *In the Spirit of the Red Banteng: Indonesian Communists between Moscow and Peking*. The Hague, Paris: Mouton, 1973.

d'Audretsch, F. C., R. B. Kluiving, and W. Oudemans. *Economic Geological Investigation of NE Vogelkop (Western New Guinea) Carried Out by the Foundation Geological Investigation NNG 1959–62*. The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1966.

De Bouter, Kyle C. "Curbing Communism: American Motivations for Intervening Militarily in Indonesia and Dutch Newspaper Representations, 1953-1957." PhD diss., Erasmus University Rotterdam, November 2013.

Derkach, Nadia. "The Soviet Policy towards Indonesia in the West Irian and the Malaysian Disputes." *Asian Survey* 5, no. 11 (November 1965): 566–571

Dodd, Karl C. *Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan.* Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1966.

Dodd, William E. Jr. and Martha Dodd, eds. *Ambassador Dodd's Diary, 1933–1938*. London: Gollancz, 1941.

Elson, R. E. *Suharto: A Political Biography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Feith, Herbert. *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*. Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1962.

Ford, Harold P. "Calling the Sino-Soviet Split: The CIA and Double Demonology," note 33. NIE 100-3-60, Sino-Soviet Relations, 9 August 1960.

Fursenko, Aleksandr, and Timothy Naftali. *One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958–1964*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997.

Griswold, Deirdre, Eric Norden, William Worthy, Andrew March, and Mark Lane. *The Silent Slaughter: The Role of the United States in the Indonesian Massacre.* Introduction by Lord Bertrand Russell. New York; Marzani and Munsell, 1966.

Grose, Peter. *Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles.* London: Andre Deutsch, 1995.

Harrer, H. *I Come From The Stone-Age*. London: Companion Book Club, 1964.

Harvey, Barbara S. *Permesta: Half a Rebellion*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977.

Hering, Bob. *Soekarno: Founding Father of Indonesia 1901–1945*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002.

Higgins, Rosalyn. *UN Peacekeeping 1946–67*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970.

Higham, Charles. *Trading with the Enemy: The Nazi-American Money Plot, 1933–1949*. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1983.

Hindley, Donald. *The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951–1963*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966.

Hoffman, Carl. *Savage Harvest: A Tale of Cannibals, Colonialism, and Michael Rockefeller's Tragic Quest for Primitive Art.* Melbourne: Text Publishing, 2014.

Hudson, G. F., Richard Lowenthal, and MacFarquhar. "The Sino-Soviet Dispute." China Quarterly, Summit House, London. 1961. Documents and analysis, 227 pages. (1961):

Jones, Howard Palfrey. *Indonesia: The Possible Dream*. 4th ed. Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1980.

Jong, L. de. *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog*. 11c. The Hague: State Publishing, 1986.

Ju, Woo Jung. "The Rise and Fall of the Djakarta-Peking Axis, 1949-1966." PhD diss., Mississippi State University, 1967.

Kahin, Audrey R. and George McT. Kahin. *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia.* New York: The New Press, 1995.

Kempe, Frederick. *Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth.* New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2011.

Larson, Henrietta M., and Kenneth Wiggins Porter. *History of Humble Oil & Refining Company: A Study in Industrial Growth*. New York: Harper

& Brothers, 1959.
Lazzaro, Joseph. "JFK Assassination: Jacqueline Kennedy, RFK Did Not Believe Only One Person Assassinated President John F. Kennedy." *International Business Times*, December 20, 2013, http://www.ibtimes.com/jfk-assassination-jacqueline-kennedy-rfk-did-not-believe-only-one-person-assassinated-president-john.
Leith, Denise. *The Politics of Power: Freeport in Suharto's Indonesia*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003.
Lev, Daniel S., and Ruth McVey, eds. *Making Indonesia: Essays on Modern Indonesia in Honor of George McT.Kahin*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996.
LeVine, Steve. *The Oil and the Glory: The Pursuit of Empire and Fortune on the Caspian Sea*. New York: Random House, 2007.
Lijphart, A. *The Trauma of Decolonisation: The Dutch and West New Guinea.* New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966.
May, Brian. *The Indonesian Tragedy.* London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1978.
McNamara, Robert S., and Brian VanDeMark. *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam*. New York: Vantage Books, 1995.
Mealey, George A. *Grasberg: Mining the Richest and Most Remote Deposit of Copper and Gold in the World, in the Mountains of Irian Jaya, Indonesia* (New Orleans: Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold, 1996).
Melvin, Jess. *The Army and the Indonesian Genocide: Mechanics of Mass Murder*. London and New York: Routledge, 2018.
Morris, Errol, dir. The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara. 2003; Los Angeles: Sony Pictures Classics, 2004, DVD.
Mortimer, Rex. *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959–1965*. Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2006. First published by Cornell University Press, 1974.
Mosley, Leonard. *Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen and John Foster Dulles and Their Family Network.* London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1978.

Muschik, Eva-Maria. “Managing the World: The United Nations, Decolonization, and the Strange Triumph of State Sovereignty in the 1950s and 1960s.” *Journal of Global History* 13, no. 1 (2018): 121–144.

Pease, Lisa. “JFK, Indonesia, CIA & Freeport Sulphur.” *Probe Magazine*, March-April 1996.

———. “Midnight in the Congo: The Assassination of Lumumba and the Mysterious Death of Dag Hammarskjöld.” *Probe Magazine*, March-April, 1999.

Poulgrain, Greg. “Delaying the Discovery of Oil in West New Guinea.” Journal of Pacific History 34, no. 2 (1999).

———. The Genesis of Konfrontasi: Malasia, Brunei and Indonesia, 1945[em dash]1965. Kuala Lampur: SIRD, 2014.

———. The Incubus of Intervention: Conflicting Indonesia Strategies of John F. Kennedy and Allen Dulles. Kuala Lampur: SIRD, 2015.

Preston, Thomas. *The President and His Inner Circle Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in Foreign Policy Making*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

Prouty, L. Fletcher. *The Secret Team: The CIA and its Allies in Control of the World.* Taipei: Imperial Books and Records Company, 1973.

Robinson, Geoffrey B. *The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres 1965-66*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018.

Rockefeller, John D., *Random Reminiscences of Men and Events.* Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1937.

Roosa, John. *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto’s Coup d’Etat in Indonesia*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006.

Rosamona. *Martinja Aidit: Marsekal Lubang Buaja*. Jakarta Government publication, 1967.

Sampson, Anthony. *The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Shaped*. London: Coronet Books. 1975.

Schaffer, Howard B. *Ellsworth Bunker: Global Troubleshooter, Vietnam Hawk*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003.

Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House*. London: Mayflower Dell, 1967.

Schoenbaum, Thomas J. *Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kennedy and Johnson Years.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988.

Simpson, Bradley R. *Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and US–Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008.

———. "Modernising Indonesia: United States–Indonesian Relations, 1961–1967." PhD diss., Northwestern University, 2003.

Skidelsky, Robert. "Dag Hammarskjold's Assumptions and the Future of the UN." October 17, 2005, http://www.skidelskyr.com/site/article/dag-hammarskjolds-assumptions-and-the-future-of-the-un/.

Smith, Robert Ross. "Airfields on the Vogelkop Peninsula." In *The Approach to the Philippines*, vol. 2, 425–449. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1953.

Sorensen, Theodore C. *Kennedy*. New York: Harper and Row, 1965.

Srodes, James. *Allen Dulles: Master of Spies*. Washington DC: Regnery Publishing, 1999.

Sukarno, Dr. *Under the Banner of Revolution*, Vol. 1. Jakarta: Yayasan Bung Karno, 2005.

Sullivan, J. H. "The US and the New Order in Indonesia." PhD thesis, American University, 1969.

Sundhaussen, Ulf. *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945–1967*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982.

Talbot, David. *Brothers: The Hidden History of the Kennedy Years*. New York: Free Press, 2007.

———. *The Devil's Chessboard: Allen Dulles, the CIA, and the Rise of America's Secret Government.* New York: Harper Collins, 2015.

Tanzer, M. *The Political Economy of International Oil and the Underdeveloped Countries*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.

Veenendaal, Harry, Jort Kelder, and G. van Maasdijk. *ZKH, Hoog Spel aan het hof van Zijne Koninkelijke Hoogheid*. Rotterdam: Ali Baba, 2009.

Visser, W. A., and J. J. Hermes, comps. *Verhandelingen Van Het Koninklijk Nederlands Geologisch-Mijnbouwkundig Genootschap [Geological Results of the Exploration for Oil in Netherlands New Guinea, Carried out by the Nederlandsch Nieuw Guinee Petroleum Maatschappij]*. The Hague:,1962.

Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: History of the CIA*. Camberwell, Australia: Allen Lane/Penguin, 2007.

Williams, Maslyn. *Five Journeys from Jakarta: Inside Sukarno's Indonesia*. New York: William Morrow & Company, 1965.

Williams, Susan. *Who Killed Hammarskjöld? The UN, the Cold War and White Supremacy in Africa*. London: Hurst & Company, 2011.

Wardaya, Baskara T. *Cold War Shadow: United States Policy Toward Indonesia, 1953–1963*. Yogyakarta: Galang Press, 2007.

Wilson, Forbes. *The Conquest of Copper Mountain*. New York: Atheneum, 1981.

Yergin, Daniel. *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power*. New York: Free Press, 1991.

Zagoria, Donald. *The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956–61: The Widening Breach between the Russian and Chinese Communists*. New York: Atheneum, 1966.

Interviews/Correspondence

Adhayatman (in house of Adam Malik, August 1983)

Andrew Gilchrist (Sir), former ambassador, UK Embassy, Jakarta (correspondence)

Audrey Kahin and George Kahin (correspondence and email)

Jim Killen, former minister of Defence, Australia (telephone)

Sir Garfield Barwick, former foreign minister, Australia (his house, Sydney, 1986)

Henry Heymann (US Consulate, Surabaya, 1965, Library of Congress interview)

Conor Cruise O'Brien (correspondence)

Dean Rusk, former US secretary of state (correspondence)

Jean Jacques Dozy, geologist (in his home in the Netherlands)

Joseph Luns, former Dutch foreign minister, NATO secretary general (NATO headquarters, Brussels)

Adam Malik, former foreign minister and vice president of Indonesia (in his house, Jakarta, 1983).

General Nasution, former head of Indonesian Army in Jakarta for more than thirteen years. 1983-1996; interview in house of Nasution.

Inessa Fomenko (by telephone, 2019–19)

Raphael den Haan (in his house in Brisbane, 2014–15)

Heru Atmodjo (in his house in Jakarta, November 28, 1999)

Guy Pauker, MIT/RAND/CIA, associate of Allen Dulles (correspondence)

Laurens van der Post (correspondence)

Kartono Kadri, BPI Indonesia (in his house in Jakarta)

Aristides Katoppo (in his house in Jakarta, 2018)

Margot L. Lyon (Canberra)

Robert J. Martens (Library of Congress interview)

Robert Elson (Brisbane)

Marshall Green (Library of Congress interview)

George de Mohrenschildt, *I'm a Patsy: My Contact with Lee Harvey Oswald, The Warren Commission, and the JFK Assassination Conspiracy* (History Matters website)

George Ivan Smith, friend of Dag Hammarskjöld (in his house in Stroud, UK)

Madam Dewi Sukarno (correspondence and telephone, Paris, 1998)

Madam Supeni, Sukarno's roving ambassador (interviewed in Jakarta, 1991)

Willem Oltmans (interviewed in his house in the Netherlands)

Sunario, former Indonesian foreign minister, university professor (in his house in Jakarta)

Susan Williams (email)

Colonel Fletcher Prouty (correspondence)

Nishijima Shigetada (in his house, Tokyo, 1983).

Sukardjo Adidjojo, SH, lawyer for CIA pilot Allen Pope (in his house in Jakarta)

Roeslan Abdulgani, former Indonesian foreign minister, Suharto appointee (interviews in Jakarta and The Netherlands)

Derek Tonkin (Foreign Office interview by Malcolm McBain, online)

Oei Tjoe Tat (interviewed in his house in Jakarta, 1992)

Mrs. Zijlstra, wife of geologist killed in December 1962 (The Netherlands)

Zulkifli Lubis, Colonel Indonesian Army, head of Intelligence of PRRI rebels (in Jakarta)

NOTES

Chapter 1

1 Truman appointed Smith as DCI on October 7, 1950. Allen Dulles joined Smith the following month and was his deputy by August 1951. He officially took over from Smith on February 26, 1953.

2 Peter Grose, *Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1995), 310.

3 Grose, 334.

4 Tom Braden, a generation younger than Allen Dulles, had been his assistant in Washington in 1951 in the early days of the CIA.

5 Allen W. Dulles, interview by Thomas Braden, December 5 and 6, 1964, p. 3, John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Collection, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston, MA.

6 The electoral margin was 303–219.

7 Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 197.

8 Dulles, interview, 7.

9 Grose, *Gentleman Spy*, 288.

10 Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 230.

11 Dulles, interview, 15.

12 Dulles, 2.

13 Sorensen, 308. Subsequent assessment of the Bay of Pigs fiasco by General Maxwell Taylor concluded it was “militarily marginal.” The Taylor Committee (which included Admiral Arleigh Burke, Allen Dulles, and Robert Kennedy) found that “the invasion plan had become quite specific well before the Kennedy administration took

command." Using only 1,400 Cubans on the beachhead meant that "victory was never a possibility." Providing US air support was tantamount to US invasion, which Kennedy refused. The net outcome was heightened Cold War tension. From this perspective the Bay of Pigs, win or lose, was not averse to Dulles' wider strategic interests.

14 Dulles, interview, 14. Dulles informed JFK just before his inauguration about the massive arms deal between Jakarta and Moscow: it changed the Cold War in Southeast Asia. In the Braden interview, 1965, the wariness of Dulles even to mention Indonesia is most notable. An interview between Allen Dulles and Ian Fleming (released by the CIA 2000/05/23) was arranged in June 1964 for each to promote their latest book. Howard E. Hunt had helped Dulles write *The Craft of Intelligence*. At one point in the conversation, Fleming mentioned President Kennedy, saying: "A lot of adventure went out of the world when he died…. He was an extraordinary man. It just hit us like a sledge hammer in England." To which Dulles replied, "He was – he *was* extraordinary," and immediately changed the topic.

15 Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia* (New York: The New Press, 1995), 20.

16 James Srodes, *Allen Dulles*: *Master of Spies* (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1999), 11.

17 "In terms of the numbers killed," according to the CIA in 1968, "the anti-PKI massacres in Indonesia rank as one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century, along with the Soviet purges of the 1930s, the Nazi mass murders of the Second World War, and the Maoist bloodbath of the early 1950s." US Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *Indonesia—1965: The Coup That Backfired* (Washington, DC: CIA, 1968), 71.

18 Letter from Kissinger to Dulles, November 28, 1952. Declassified and approved for release June 11, 2013, CIA-RDP80M01009A0001000 10120-5. This visit occurred at the start of the three month demurral before Allen Dulles was appointed DCI, so

Kissinger may have been requested (as others were) to lobby for Allen.

19 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, *1961–1963*, ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 172, Memorandum of Conversation, April 24, 1961, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d172.

20 Grose, *Gentleman Spy* 341.

21 John D. Rockefeller, *Random Reminiscences of Men and Events* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1937), 57.

22 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *A Thousand Days*: *John F. Kennedy in the White House* (London: Mayflower-Dell, 1967), 205.

23 Srodes, *Allen Dulles*, 6.

24 Newspaper article on Proklamasi: https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/08/20/intriguing-days-ahead-independence.html.

25 For the first interview, which included some blunt questions, I was accompanied by an official translator, a Japanese woman. Midway through the interview, she pulled me aside and whispered, "You cannot talk like this to such an important person." When the translator left the room briefly, Nishjima (whose command of English was excellent) whispered to me, "There's no need to bring the translator next time. Just come by yourself, and we'll talk freely."

26 Hatta: "If we proceed with the demand for Papua, it is possible that we shall not be satisfied with Papua only and that we may want to include the Solomons and so on as far as the middle of the Pacific Ocean…. I am inclined to say that … it should be left to the Papuan people themselves. I recognize that the Papuans have the right to be an independent nation." Peter Worsley, *The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of Cargo Cults in Melanesia* (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 135. First published MacGibbon & Kee, (London: 1957).

27 The Portuguese, who came mainly for spice and gold, used to delineate the (Indonesian) archipelago with a rhyming expression: "from the Nicobars to the Papuas." The Nicobar Islands (now part of India) and the Andaman Islands were northwest of Sumatra, and

south of Myanmar (Burma) in the Bay of Bengal. The Spice Islands were west of the "land of the Papuas."

28 Nederlandsche Nieuw Guinea Petroleum Maatschappij, NNGPM, was comprised of Royal Dutch BPM 40 percent and US held 60 percent through StanVac and Standard California.

29 Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1962), 104.

30 Personal interviews in the house of Sunario, January 1988. Roeslan Abdulgani also referred to this source of US funding as coming from either US oil interests or the CIA. Both Sunario and Roeslan were former foreign ministers. After his death in 2005, it was revealed that Roeslan—at some time during his long career—had links with Dutch intelligence.

31 *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, Australian Government, 1957, 882.

Chapter 2

32 The delay in the timing of the announcement of the "discovery" of the Grasberg in 1988, a decade before the end of the Suharto era, was to the benefit of the mining company, not the host country. One of Indonesia's top lawyers, who was an Indonesian minister in charge of a parliamentary commission, told me he had seen (some time before the interview) documentary evidence that President Suharto was receiving payment in the form of a percentage from Freeport into a non-Indonesian bank account. Suharto stepped down in 1998. "In 1999 alone, Grasberg produced more than double the ore recovered from Ertsberg during its life." Denise Leith, *The Politics of Power*: *Freeport in Suharto's Indonesia* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003), 64.

33 A. H. Colijn, *Naar de eeuwige sneeuw van Nieuw Guinee*, (1937; 6th ed., Amsterdam: Scheltens & Giltay, no date).

34 J. J. Dozy, "Geological Results of the Carstensz Expedition 1936," *Leidse Geol. Mededelingen*, vol. 11, 1939.

35 "El Dorado" refers to a mythical kingdom of gold in Colombia that gained currency during the Spanish empire. Gold was once so plentiful that, during the initiation ceremony of the king, golden bracelets, ear-rings, and ornaments were dropped from a raft into a lagoon; the king, his body covered in gold dust, then immersed himself in the water. In the 1500s, numerous attempts by Spanish, German, and English explorers all failed to locate the site, but the abundance of gold taken from indigenous inhabitants tended to magnify the mythical status of El Dorado. The El Dorado in Papua, however, was real!

36 John Foster Dulles (brother of Allen Dulles) was the US representative in charge of weapons purchasing by allies of the United States. Hubertus van Mook, who was in charge of weapons purchasing for the Indies, viewed the US response very unfavourably, and on November 18, 1941 a special mission from the Indies sought urgent munitions from Australia.

37 Dozy used the same expression in subsequent interviews. See George A. Mealey, *Grasberg*: *Mining the Richest and Most Remote Deposit of Copper and Gold in the World, in the Mountains of Irian Jaya, Indonesia* (New Orleans: Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold, 1996), 71.

38 Interview with Dr. J. M. A. H. Luns, secretary general of NATO and former minister of Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands Government. The interview, which lasted ninety minutes (three times longer than scheduled) took place in the office of the secretary general at NATO in Brussels, on July 15, 1982.

39 Bradley R. Simpson, *Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and US-Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 95.

40 George A. Mealey, *Grasberg: Mining the Richest and Most Remote Deposit of Copper and Gold in the World, in the Mountains of Irian Jaya, Indonesia* (New Orleans: Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold, 1996), 71.

41 Heinrich Harrer, *I Come from the Stone Age*. (London: Companion Bookclub, 1964), 54. The inclusion of the word "gold" by Harrer, while a reflection of his own irrepressible nature, must have been regarded seriously by the sponsors of the expedition whose purpose was not to publicize the gold. Despite my repeated attempts to arrange an interview with Harrer, his response was not forthcoming. Harrer died January 7, 2006, at the age of ninety-three. Dozy claimed that Harrer returned the notebook to him and that it was subsequently donated to the Netherlands Alpine Club. "So they have got it," he said. When I checked this claim, it proved (of course) to be false.

42 Arend Lijphart, *The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966), 51.

43 Lijphart, 198.

44 Sunario, several interviews in his house in Jakarta, February 1988.

45 Robert C. Bone Jr., *The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1958), 8.

46 Forbes Wilson, *The Conquest of Copper Mountain* (New York: Atheneum, 1981).

47 The price in 1980 was about $1.20 per pound. The May 2014 price was $3.15 per pound but has reached above $4.

48 F. C. d'Audretsch, R. B. Kluiving, and W. Oudemans, *Economic Geological Investigation of NE Vogelkop (Western New Guinea): Carried out by the Foundation Geological Investigation NNG 1959–62* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1966), 26.

49 Mealey, *Grasberg*, 72–74.

50 To convert ounces (troy) to grains, multiply by 480; to convert ounces (troy) to grams multiply by 31.103481.

51 When I contacted Mrs. Zijlstra in an old-peoples' home in the Netherlands in 1981, she was absolutely convinced the death of her husband was not simply an accident. In the 1960s, the dijk had only a single-lane but this was later converted to a double lane, as it is today.

Chapter 3

52 L. Fletcher Prouty, private correspondence to author, June 29, 1996.

53 Darul Islam emerged after Indonesian independence and, decades later, morphed into Jemiah Islamiah, which was linked with the Bali bombing in 2002. Only in the New Order under Suharto, years after the instability caused by Darul Islam in the 1950s designed to destabilize the Sukarno government, was it revealed that the CIA had funded millions of dollars for Darul Islam.

54 Frederick P. Bunnell, "The Central Intelligence Agency—Deputy Directorate for Plans 1961 Secret Memorandum on Indonesia: A Study in the Politics of Policy Formulation in the Kennedy Administration," *Indonesia* no. 22 (October 1976), 158. Bunnell includes the full text of the CIA briefing paper, dated March 22, 1961.

55 Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 23 telegram 144, Jones to Department of State https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d144.

56 Srodes, *Allen Dulles*, 57–58.

57 A quarter of a million foreign troops, stationed mostly in Siberia and Archangel, were supporting the White army. These included seventy thousand Japanese (some remained in north Sakhalin until 1925), Czechoslovaks, British (including Indian and Australian troops), American, Canadian, French, Greek, Polish, Estonian, Rumanian, Serb, Italian, and Chinese.

58 V. R. Menzhinsky was the chairman of the OGPU (1926–34), which evolved into the GUGB (1934–41) and then the KGB.

59 One example is Dulles' link with Van Santvoord Merle-Smith, who graduated from Princeton 1911 (five years earlier than Allen) and completed law at Harvard. Merle-Smith became a war hero in 1918 (his commanding officer was "Wild Bill" Donovan) and then military aide to Secretary of State Bert Lansing (Allen's uncle) for the American Peace Mission. Merle-Smith and Allen Dulles at Versailles engaged in "endless stimulating discussions." In the early post-war

years, Merle-Smith was third assistant secretary of state but retired to practice law until 1941 when he was sent to Australia as top US intelligence officer prior to Pearl Harbor. Dulles and Donovan at this time were setting up the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and had FDR's approval to find a way to bring the "isolationist" United States into European war. Merle-Smith's role was crucial in relaying reports of Japanese war plans in the final days before Pearl Harbor. In early 1942, when two shiploads of Japanese detainees from Netherlands East Indies (including top naval spies who had been conspiring with Indonesian nationalists) were sent to Australia for wartime internment, Merle-Smith in Canberra played a pivotal role. In August 1942, they were included in a repatriation exchange organized by Washington. Two of the top Japanese Navy spies were Yoshizumi Tomegoro and Nishijima Shigetada, who arranged the August 17 Proclamation of Independence by Sukarno.

In 1942, after General Douglas McArthur realized the strategic value of the top Japanese in the exchange, he refused to allow OSS to operate in his Southwest Pacific Area command. The Dutch insisted on an agreement (it proved futile) that the NEI be handed back to Dutch authorities after US forces had ended the Japanese occupation. The inclusion of these naval spies in the repatriation exchange added immensely to the difficulties of Dutch recolonization. This war crime has never been investigated. In my opinion, Van Santvoord Merle-Smith participated under great duress, on direct orders from his wartime superiors in United States, and he died from stress before the war ended. See Greg Poulgrain, "The Loveday Exchange, Australia, 1942: The Japanese Naval Spies Return to Java," *Indonesia* no. 55 (April 1993), 140–150.

60 "I'm a patsy" were the words uttered by Lee Harvey Oswald, in a brief moment as he was whisked past the surrounding media, claiming he had been set up. The manuscript of the book *I'm a Patsy*, which George de Mohrenschildt was writing at the time of his death in March 1977, is available on the History Matters website. The full

title of George DeMohrenschildt's book is *I'm a Patsy: My Contact with Lee Harvey Oswald, The Warren Commission, and the JFK Assassination Conspiracy*. De Mohrenschildt noted that Jenner (a decade after the Warren Commission) became well known in connection with Watergate.

61 Grose, *Gentleman Spy,* 346, 563.

62 De Mohrenschildt gave their names as Everett Glover and Volkmar Schmidt. "Everett Glover is a chemist at Magnolia Laboratories, Standard Oil of New York Research Laboratories," explained de Mohrenschildt, adding that the second chemist had a PhD and the nickname "Messer Schmidt." In fact, the party guests included "a lot of friends of Everett Glover's whose names I do not recall." But the questioning then pried out further names such as Mr. and Mrs. Norman Fredricksen, Richard Pierce and his fiancé, and Miss Betty MacDonald, who was the librarian at Magnolia Laboratory. Ruth Paine was another, and from the questions it seems de Mohrenschildt (who was very evasive) knew Ruth Paine from before the party as both participated in "singing groups." Ruth Paine later helped arrange the job for Oswald in the Texas School Book Depository. De Mohrenschildt commented in an offhand way that Oswald "definitely was the center of attention that night" when, in reality, the party seems to have been constructed entirely for the purpose of providing access to Oswald. Although he spoke Russian, Oswald, born October 18, 1939, was (at the time of the party) a poorly educated twenty-three-year-old who, coming from a dysfunctional family, had not even finished high school. See pp. 256–60 of Warren Commission Hearings, Vol. IX.

63 Srodes, *Allen Dulles*, 121. Parenthesis in original.

64 More than once, Dimitri was placed in front of a firing squad and given the countdown, as means of trying to force him to name accomplices. He lived until 2002 when he was more than one hundred years of age.

65 Grose, *Gentleman Spy*, 101.

66 As secretary of state, he was the first to begin the practice of assigning a military attaché as part of embassy staff. John Foster had a profound influence on the young Allen Dulles.

67 James W. Gould, *Americans in Sumatra* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), 62.

68 L. Fletcher Prouty, "Understanding Special Operations and Their Impact on the Vietnam War Era," interview by David T. Ratcliffe, May 5–8, 1989, part 111:1, transcript, https://ratical.org/ratville/JFK/USO/tapes.pdf.

69 The first husband of Allene Tew (1872–1955), David Hostetter, was the millionaire son of the inventor of Hostetter "bitters" and was known as one of America's top gamblers. He died young, and later during WWI so did their son, a twenty-five-year-old pilot, claimed by a top German air ace, Von Greim, as his twenty-fifth kill. Her second marriage in 1904 to Morton Colton Nichols, a stockbroker, lasted only months; the third, in 1912, was to Anson Wood Burchard of General Electric. The fourth marriage, April 1929 to October 1935, to Heinrich XXXIII Reuss, ended in divorce. (In the title, Prinz Reuss zu Köstritz, the *zu*—similar to *von*—implied noble lineage.) When she married Count Kotzebue, she was exceedingly rich and already accustomed to life as a royal.

70 Archbold, R., A.L. Rand, and L.J. Brass, 'Results of the Archbold Expeditions', *Bulletin of the American Museum of Natural History* 1942. 79:197–288.

71 This prewar image of Papuan society is in stark contrast to how the Papuans were depicted in 1961–62, when their political independence—a distinct possibility at that time—threatened to disrupt the geopolitical machinations of others. The film *Dead Birds* by Robert Gardner and 1962 book *Under the Mountain Wall* by Peter Matthiessen (with CIA support for this project) depicted the Dani people, whom Archbold had first contacted, as engaged in continuous primitive warfare and not fit for independence.

72 Two weeks after speaking with Hitler (Srodes, *Allen Dulles*, 173), "Dulles flew to London to brief the British Foreign Office." Lord Cadogan noted the detail about Dulles' banking friends but dismissed Dulles' concern that Hitler seemed set on provoking trouble with Poland.

73 "Report on the Dutch East Indies (1940) prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Chapman, Australian Military Intelligence for the Australian Prime Minister," 243/5/32, index 556/4 423/6, Canberra National Archives.

74 Allen Dulles was one of a small group empowered by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to find a way to involve the United States in the war in Europe. The president was informed that an oil embargo on Japan would force it to sweep southward to seize the oil of the Indies, which is precisely what occurred.

75 See Harry Veenendaal, Jort Kelder, and G. van Maasdijk. *ZKH, Hoog Spel aan het hof van Zijne Koninkelijke Hoogheidm* (Rotterdam: Tichting Ali Baba, 2009). (Title translated: HRH: High Level Game at the Palace of His Royal Highness.)

76 The president of the Republic of South Maluku (RMS) was Christiaan Soumokil, who was very intelligent with a trusting nature. After the RMS was declared on April 24, 1950, and the Indonesian army responded in November, Soumokil and others fled to the large island of Ceram, adjacent to NNG. A decade later, December 1962, when the Dutch were being ousted from New Guinea, Soumokil was captured after his whereabouts was betrayed by a "trusted religious associate." On April 12, 1966, a month after Suharto took power from Sukarno, Soumokil was executed.

77 "Indonesia-Malaya desk, Colonial Office, London, report prepared for Minister of Colonial Affairs," London National Archives, Colonial Office, Public Records, 1022 53, 10/338/01.

78 Humble Oil was involved in similar allegations. Other cooperation between Standard Oil and IG Farben resulted in Germany obtaining the patents to tetraethyl lead, crucial to hundred-octane aviation fuel,

in exchange for synthetic rubber—a swap almost labeled as treason by the Senate investigation. See Anthony Sampson, *The Seven Sisters* (London: Coronet Books, 1975), 94.

79 Warren Commission Hearings, Volume IX, 179.

80 After the assassination of Kennedy, de Mohrenschildt wrote a letter to the mother of Jackie Kennedy, Mrs. Janet Auchinloss. This letter was later given to Allen Dulles, her close friend, and it became evidence in the Warren Commission Hearings. Dulles also asked de Mohrenschildt some questions directly, and he remembered one of these was "Did Lee have a reason for hating President Kennedy?"

81 Dulles to Hollister December 9, 1955. Released 2003/07/29: CIA-RDP80B01676 R001000090026-6.

82 French colonial territories included Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia). Japan had free access to these territories and used them as a springboard in the move south in December 1941 to take the Netherlands East Indies.

83 *The Mercury* p.1, "VICHY'S TREACHERY Britain and France Brought to Parting of Ways Warning by Minister," May 24, 1941. *The Spectator*, July 3, 1941, "Washington, Whitehall and Weygand." "The case of the oil-tanker Scheherazade is disturbing. This French vessel, bound from the United States for Casablanca, in French Morocco, was detained by the British naval authorities, but released on the urgent request of the American State Department, which appears satisfied that General Weygand is pursuing a different policy from the Petain-Darlan administration, and should therefore be given economic support. Evidence of that in this country is conspicuously lacking, and the conviction is firmly held that of any imports, particularly oil, which get into French hands a considerable proportion will soon get into German hands." The "Scheherazade" was France's largest oil-tanker.

84 Henrietta M.Larson and Kenneth Wiggins Porter, *History of Humble Oil & Refining Company: A Study in Industrial Growth* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), 425.

85 In my university days, I worked as a roughneck with Austral United Geophysical, drilling for oil and gas. Geophysical and Humble Oil were the two companies subcontracted by NNGPM to do the seismic work and drilling in prewar Netherlands New Guinea.

86 By the end of 1975, the larger Walio-Kasim-Jaya oil field had a total output of around 170,000 barrels per day—by adding together individual discoveries at Kasim-Jaya and a third large field, Walio, with contributions such as Kasim III (23,000 barrels per day), Jaya II (10,950 barrels per day), and Jaya III (17,200 barrels per day). See Sritua Arief, *The Indonesian Petroleum Industry* (Singapore: Sritua Arief Associates, 1976).

87 "Report on Netherlands New Guinea for the Year 1952," presented to the secretary general of the United Nations pursuant to Article 73(e) of the charter, by the Ministry of Overseas Territories and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, Chapter 2, 14. See Greg Poulgrain, "Delaying the 'Discovery' of Oil in West New Guinea," *Journal of Pacific History* 34, no. 2 (1999).

88 NLG 8.6 million in 1952 was $22.75 million. If we calculate the rate of production from the "undiscovered" oil field at 170,000 barrels per day, then the 1952 value of oil at $1.71 per barrel comes to $106 million—or more than four times the revenue of the Klamono and Mogoi-Wasian fields before they "declined."

89 W. A. Visser and J. J. Hermes, comps., *Verhandelingen van Het Koninklijk Nederlands Geologisch-Mijnbouwkundig Genootschap* (The Hague: Nederlandsch Nieuw Guinee Petroleum Maatschappij, 1962), 8.

90 I was unable to find the cause of death in 1956 of R. F. G. R. Gheyselinck.

91 Visser and Hermes, *Verhandelingen*, Table 1-1, 26.

92 H. J. Benda, J. K. Irikura, and K. Kishi, eds., *Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia*: *Selected documents* (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1965), document 57, 214.

93 Nishijima Shigetada in discussion with the author, at his home in Tokyo over a ten-day period, August 1983.

94 J. J. Dozy, D. A. Erdman, W. J. Jong, G. L. Krol, and C. Schouten, "Geological Results of the Carstensz Expedition 1936," *Leidsche Geologische Mededeelingen* 11, no. 1 (1939), 68–131.

95 Benda, Irikura, and Kishi, *Japanese Military Administration*, 214.

96 The report, much of which was missing from its folder, was located in the file "West New Guinea," in the Royal Tropical Institute in Amsterdam. During my interview with Nishijima, he told me that (sometime after the war—perhaps the early 1950s) he had gone around the world to various libraries attempting to remove reports containing information on this wartime oil field. He wanted to know how I had discovered the information. An initial snippet, misplaced in Monash University Library, Melbourne, I'd found completely by chance.

97 One year ago, the discovery of a crashed World War II plane in the remote jungle of Papua, inland from Fak-Fak, was brought to my attention. Papuans collecting scented wood ("geharu") had found it and their mobile-phone photos of metallic ID tags showed it was Australian, so I notified appropriate authorities. The plane was a Catalina, missing since September 2, 1943, with a crew of ten. It was carrying mines to be dropped near Sorong, precisely where the Japanese were exporting oil from an unknown source. A forensic analysis team started in 2019. They will conclude the cause of the crash was bad weather, but this may not be the case. Why? The Mimika airstrip nearby meant Japanese planes were close enough to intercept the Catalina. Archival records show that almost every attempt by General Douglas MacArthur to land persons inside West New Guinea was thwarted because someone was leaking information to the Japanese. For this first attempt to use a Catalina to drop mines in West New Guinea (rather than PNG), the Japanese may have had prior warning.

98 When NNGPM was formed in 1935, Standard Oil succeeded in gaining entry into Netherlands New Guinea, having been rebuffed for many years. What convinced the Dutch colonial authorities to change tack so suddenly was the interception of a letter (from an official in a commercial organization set up by Japanese Naval Intelligence) indicating that Japanese oil interests were planning to conduct secret oil exploration in the territory. Significantly, in 1921–22, Standard Oil's subsidiary NKPM had similarly used the Japanese threat (in that case, the threatened sale of the US company and its Indies interests to Japanese) in order to obtain greater concessions in Java for NKPM. See P. Mellish Reed, "Standard Oil in Indonesia, 1898–1928," *Business History Review* 32, no. 33 (1958), 322.

99 Nishijima was involved in other ways preparing for this eventuality. He had introduced Sukarno to his Japanese wife, who took the name Dewi. She was a former nightclub girl. Archival records show Dewi was passing on detailed information about Sukarno through diplomatic channels. When she and Sukarno disagreed about declaring the PKI illegal (after September 30, 1965), he finally realized her priorities and forced her to return to Japan.

100 L. de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog*, vol.11c (The Hague: Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, 1986), 387. If Sele 40 and Mogoi-Wasian were both included in this reference, it raises the question of why the Dutch armed forces did not utilize the oil during the 1945–49 period, or the Dutch government in the 1950s. On the other hand, once the US military had been alerted to the presence of oil, it would have enquired into the exploration conducted by Standard Oil/Humble Oil immediately prior to the Japanese invasion.

101 "Australian War Memorial," file 9/5/17, index 721/1, 80/6, Canberra National Archives.

102 Karl C. Dodd, Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan (Washington, DC : Government Printing Office, 1966), 563.

103 War Department, Corps of Engineers, US Army, *Kaiboes Baai: Dutch New Guinea, Provisional Map*, 1944, 44 x 45 cm, Australian War Memorial, https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/LIB100022988. Map in possession of author.

104 Robert Ross Smith, "Airfields on the Vogelkop Peninsula: The Approach to the Philippines," in *The US Army in World War II, the War in the Pacific*, (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953), 427.

105 On January 10, 1996, the results of yet another discovery of natural gas in Bintuni Bay (by the US company Atlantic Richfield) were announced as "in excess of 100 million cubic feet of natural gas."

106 The companies included Trend Ltd., Denver, Colorado (27 percent); Mid-American Pipeline Company, Tulsa, Oklahoma (10 percent); North Central Oil Corporation, Houston, Texas (10 percent); Southern Cross, Denver, Colorado (10 percent); South Pacific Oil (Fluor Corporation), Los Angeles, California (10 percent), C. Itoh & Company, Tokyo (10 percent); EURAFREP, Paris (20 percent); Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas (Suisse), Geneva (3 percent). Source: *Petroleum News* (January 1979), 20 and (January 1981), 28. The 3 percent allocated to Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas (i.e., the Netherlands) harks back to Allen Dulles' prewar days when the Standard Oil representative in Paris also took the position of bank director.

107 Compare the Petromer success ratio of 1:1.2 with Royal Dutch Shell success ratios, as tabulated by M. Tanzer in *The Political Economy of International Oil* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969): sites with no scientific exploration (1:30), geological exploration (1:10), geophysical exploration (1:6), and geological and geophysical exploration (1:5).

108 *Newsweek*, Feb. 18, 1974, 34. Geological holes are those that, prior to drilling, are sunk to only a few hundred meters in order to determine the location of the main well, such as those put down before the prewar Sele 39 and 40 test wells.

109 Frank Robson, "The Real-Life Tarzan of Australia's Deep North," *Sydney Morning Herald*, April 3, 2011, http://www.smh.com.au/national/the-reallife-tarzan-of-australias-deep-north-20110402-1csjp.html#ixzz2YuN2l7tO.

Chapter 4

110 Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia* (New York: The New Press, 1995), 3.

111 John M. Allison, *Ambassador from the Prairie: Or, Allison Wonderland* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), 301.

112 Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 45.

113 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957,* eds. Robert J. McMahon, Harriet D. Schwar, and Louis J. Smith, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 216, Report by the Intelligence Advisory Committee, March 5, 1957, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d216#fn1.

114 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, ed. Robert J. McMahon, vol. 17, Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (John Gordon Mein) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Walter S. Robertson), April 14, 1958, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v17/d59#fn-source.

115 Indonesian parliamentary criticism described the October 17 affair as military centralization with political motivation, an attempt to fashion the Indonesian army into a stronghold of the US-aligned Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI). The coup attempt resulted in the dismissal of Nasution and, among others, the PSI representative Ali Budiardjo who (in the 1970s) became the first Indonesian director in the US mining company, Freeport Indonesia.

116 PRRI refers to Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia or Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia. Permesta

refers to Piagam Perjuangan Semesta or Charter of Universal Struggle.

117 Wisner unfairly was blamed for the 1956 CIA failure in Hungary. John Foster Dulles as secretary of state had withdrawn support from this CIA operation at precisely the wrong time, in order to achieve his own larger goals in the Suez crisis that erupted at the same time. Allen was shocked by the actions of his brother, but nevertheless in 1958, when he reemployed Wisner, Allen Dulles' underlying intention in "helping the rebels in Sumatra" utilized Wisner's reputation of failure in 1956. Wisner was done in by both the Dulles brothers.

118 Because Pauker's presence came to the fore mainly after Washington's political démarche, he does not figure in Audrey and George Kahin's extensive study of the 1958 rebellion, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia*. George Kahin did not have a high opinion of Pauker. At various times, Kahin was asked by presidential advisors to comment on Pauker's reports. In personal correspondence with me, Audrey Kahin has noted that Pauker's close affiliation with the military caused concern.

119 Others had made the same observation (e.g., US Ambassador Cumming in 1955), but Pauker is referring to actually moving the chess pieces as part of the strategy that—some years later—achieved a desired end.

120 Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 149.

121 Kahin and Kahin, 164.

122 Bunnell, "The Central Intelligence Agency," 142, 158.

123 Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 3.

124 Kyle C. de Bouter, "Curbing Communism: American Motivations for Intervening Militarily in Indonesia and Dutch Newspaper Representations, 1953–1957" (PhD diss., Erasmus University Rotterdam, November 2013), 3.

125 Jones, Howard Palfrey, *Indonesia—the Possible Dream*, Jakarta, Gunung Agung, 1971. p.71.

126 Kartono Kadri, in discussion with the author in Jakarta, November 1999 and January 2000. Sunario and Roeslan Abdulgani also referred to secret US funding, but Kartono Kadri was referring specifically to post-PRRI funding.

127 Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*.

128 Kahin and Kahin, 86.

129 From 1954 to April 1956, when it was discovered, Frank Wisner's Cold War triumph was a three hundred meter tunnel under the East Berlin border. This allowed the CIA to tap the East German telephone service, covering the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin, Red Army Headquarters, and the private lines of Soviet and East German leaders.

130 L. Fletcher Prouty, *The Secret Team: The CIA and Its Allies in Control of the United States and the World* (Taipei: Imperial Books and Records Company, 1973), 54.

131 Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 18.

132 Allison*, Ambassador from the Prairie,* 305.

133 Allison, 334.

134 Allison, 314.

135 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957*, eds. Robert J. McMahon, Harriet D. Schwar, and Louis J. Smith, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 130, Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State with Telegram*,* December 28, 1955*,* http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d130.

136 Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 85

137 Kahin and Kahin, 85

138 Allison, *Ambassador from the Prairie*, 307.

139 Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent, worked with Al Ulmer (CIA) to produce the blue movie. Maheu (the same age as Ulmer, born in 1917) died in 2008. Perhaps Maheu's real claim to fame was that for

thirteen years he was the public liaison man for Howard Hughes, and in that time he met Hughes only twice, and very briefly.

140 Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 85.

141 Kahin and Kahin, 86.

142 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957*, eds. Robert J. McMahon, Harriet D. Schwar, and Louis J. Smith, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 270, Editorial Note, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d270.

143 Allison*, Ambassador from the Prairie,* 314.

144 Allison*,* 307.

145 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957*, eds. Robert J. McMahon, Harriet D. Schwar, and Louis J. Smith, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 129, Memorandum, December 22, 1955, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d129#fn1.

146 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, eds. Robert C. McMahon, Harriet Schwar, and Louis J. Smith, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 140, Memorandum, February 27, 1956, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d140.

147 Joseph Luns, in discussion with author, July 1982.

148 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, eds. Robert J. McMahon, Harriet D. Schwar, and Louis J. Smith, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 143, Telegram, March 13, 1956, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d143.

149 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955–1957, eds. Robert J. McMahon, Harriet D. Schwar, and Louis J. Smith, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 150, Telegram, April 7, 1956, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d150.

150 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955–1957, eds. Robert C. McMahon, Harriet Schwar, and Louis J. Smith, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 145, Memorandum of a Conversation, March 16, 1956, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d145

151 Australia, too, after being Indonesia's closest ally at the time of independence, was in the process of formulating a policy of self-

determination for the Papuan people, but this was cast aside after lobbying by Allen Dulles, in the late 1950s. His argument (contrary to his own Indonesia strategy) was that if Indonesia was denied its claim to the New Guinea territory, the consequences for Australia would be having to contend with the menace of Indonesia going communist.

152 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955–1957, eds. Robert J. McMahon, Harriet D. Schwar, and Louis J. Smith, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 158, Memorandum of Conversation, May 17, 1956, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d158. Roeslan, it should be remembered, had links with Dutch intelligence.

153 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955–1957, eds. Robert C. McMahon, Harriet Schwar, and Louis J. Smith, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 251, Memorandum, August 21, 1957, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d251#fn1. This memo, dealing with a significant change in US policy, was initialed for Secretary Dulles by William B. Macomber Jr., the secretary's special assistant. Without closer analysis of daily diaries, the reason for this is not clear. It was one year since John Foster Dulles had been diagnosed with cancer and less than two years before his death.

154 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955–1957, eds. Robert C. McMahon, Harriet Schwar, and Louis J. Smith, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 271, Memorandum, October 2, 1957, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d271#fnref1.

155 Grose, *Gentleman Spy*, 334, and Srodes, *Allen Dulles*, 71. Prior to the creation of the new position as under secretary for Political Affairs in August 1959, with Robert Murphy as the first appointee, the deputy under secretary for Political Affairs assisted the secretary and under secretary in the formulation and conduct of US foreign policy. Robert Murphy served as deputy under secretary from 1953 to 1959.

156 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955–1957, Doc. 271.

157 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955–1957, eds. Robert J. McMahon, Harriet D. Schwar, and Louis J. Smith, vol. 22, Southeast

Asia, Doc. 273, United States Minutes of ANZUS Council Meeting, October 4, 1957, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d273.

158 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955–1957, Doc. 273.

159 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955–1957, eds. Robert J. McMahon, Harriet D. Schwar, and Louis J. Smith, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 289, Telegram, November 15, 1957, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d289.

160 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955–1957, eds. Robert J. McMahon, Harriet D. Schwar, and Louis J. Smith, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 256, Telegram, August 27, 1957, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d256.

161 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955–1957, eds. Robert J. McMahon, Harriet D. Schwar, and Louis J. Smith, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 262, Special Report on Indonesia, September 3, 1957, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d262.

162 Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 96.

163 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955–1957, eds. Robert C. McMahon, Harriet Schwar, and Louis J. Smith, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 340, Telegram, December 30, 1957, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d340#fn1.

164 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955–1957, eds. Robert C. McMahon, Harriet Schwar, and Louis J. Smith, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 330, Telegram, December 21, 1957, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d330.

165 Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, *Feet to the Fire: CIA Covert Operations in Indonesia, 1957–1958* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1999), 93.

166 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955–1957, eds. Robert C. McMahon, Harriet Schwar, and Louis J. Smith, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 333, Telegram, December 23, 1957, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d333.

167 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955–1957, Doc. 333.

168 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955–1957, eds. Robert J. McMahon, Harriet D. Schwar, and Louis J. Smith, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 340, Telegram, December 30, 1957, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d340.

169 Allison, *Ambassador from the Prairie*, 341. The naval attaché told Allison the interview was with his predecessor.

170 Allison, 315.

171 John Gordon Mein was director of the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until May 1960. He later served as US ambassador to Guatemala, where, on August 28, 1968, he became the first US ambassador to be assassinated while in office.

172 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1958–1960, ed. Robert J. McMahon, vol. 17, Indonesia, Doc. 4, Editorial Note, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v17/d4.

173 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1958–1960, ed. Robert J. McMahon, vol. 17, Indonesia, Doc. 25, Telegram, February 24, 1958, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v17/d25#fn-source.

174 Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy,* 280, endnote 27.

175 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955–1957, eds. Robert J. McMahon, Harriet D. Schwar, and Louis J. Smith, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 331, Telegram, December 21, 1957, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d331.

176 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955–1957, eds. Robert J. McMahon, Harriet D. Schwar, and Louis J. Smith, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 332, Editorial Note, December 23, 1957, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d332.

177 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955–1957, eds. Robert J. McMahon, Harriet D. Schwar, and Louis J. Smith, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 217, Editorial Note, March 6, 1957, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d217.

178 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955–1957, eds. Robert J. McMahon, Harriet D. Schwar, and Louis J. Smith, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 257, National Intelligence Estimate 65–57, August 27, 1957. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d257.

179 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955–1957, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 257.

180 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1958–1960, ed. Robert J. McMahon, vol. 17, Indonesia, Doc. 43, Telegram, March 15, 1958, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v17/d43#fn-source.

181 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955–1957, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 332.

182 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955–1957, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 331.

183 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955–1957, eds. Robert J. McMahon, Harriet D. Schwar, and Louis J. Smith, vol. 22, Southeast Asia, Doc. 334, Telegram, December 23, 1957, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d334.

184 Nishijima Shigetada in discussion with author, Tokyo, August 1983.

185 Memorandum, Ambassador Gilchrist, Jakarta, to Foreign Office, London. April 29, 1965. British National Archives, Kew, FO 371-180313.

186 Lord Selwyn-Lloyd was foreign secretary in 1955–60, chancellor of the exchequer in 1960–62, and speaker of the House of Commons in 1963–64.

187 Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 126.

188 Kahin and Kahin, 126 and endnote 19. Soon after Howard Jones deposited the document entitled “US Assurances to British re Indo Policy and Rebellion” in the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, California, Kahin and Kahin gained access before it was classified.

189 Kahin, 126.

190 When I contacted Pohan by telephone, he was living in Seattle under a new identity and refused to answer questions on any subject. He seemed utterly shocked to have received my telephone call out of the blue.

191 L. Fletcher Prouty, private correspondence to author, June 29, 1996.

192 *Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1958–1960, ed. Robert J. McMahon, vol. 17, Indonesia, Doc. 11, Memorandum, January 31, 1958, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v17/d11.

193 Conboy and Morrison*, Feet to the Fire*, 75.

194 Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 147.

195 Kahin and Kahin, 133.

196 SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), formed in September 1954 to "prevent communism from gaining ground in the region," involved the United States, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan.

197 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1958–1960, ed. Robert J. McMahon, vol. 17, Indonesia, Doc. 13, Editorial Note, February 7, 1958, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v17/d13.

198 Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 105–06.

199 Kahin and Kahin, 141–42.

200 Kahin and Kahin, 141.

201 Kahin and Kahin, 148. Herter took over for John Foster Dulles when he died the following year.

202 Burke (Chief of Naval Operations, 1955–61) in May 1958 sent the 6th Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean with two marine battalions, in response to Lebanon's President Camille Chamoun's request for assistance when invasion from Syria seemed possible.

203 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1958–1960, ed. Robert J. McMahon, vol. 17, Indonesia, Doc. 35, Memorandum of Conversation, March 12, 1958, See especially enclosure A of memorandum from special assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for

NSC Affairs (Rear Admiral Triebel) to president's special assistant for NSC Affairs (Robert Cutler). Replying to Triebel two days later, Cutler wrote: "I am not clear to whom Joint Chiefs were making this recommendation or why … some three months after its date."

204 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960*, ed. Robert J. McMahon, vol. 17, Indonesia, Doc. 28, Editorial Note, March 4, 1958, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v17/d28#fn-source. The editorial note discusses telegrams 2847 and 2852.

205 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960*, vol. 17, Indonesia, Doc. 28. The personal assistant was Phyllis D. Bernau.

206 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1958–1960, ed. Robert J. McMahon, vol. 17, Indonesia, Doc. 30, Editorial Note, March 7, 1958, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v17/d30.

207 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1958–1960, ed. Robert J. McMahon, vol. 17, Indonesia, Doc. 29, Telegram, March 6, 1958, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v17/d29.

208 Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 150.

209 Kahin and Kahin, 151.

210 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960*, ed. Robert J. McMahon, vol. 17, Indonesia, Doc. 35, Memorandum of Conversation, March 12, 1958, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v17/d35.

211 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960*, vol. 17, Indonesia, Doc. 29.

212 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1958–1960, ed. Robert J. McMahon, vol. 17, Indonesia, Doc. 33, Telegram, March 8, 1958, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v17/d33.

213 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960*, vol. 17, Indonesia, Doc. 33.

214 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960*, vol. 17, Indonesia, Doc. 33.

215 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960*, ed. Robert J. McMahon, vol. 17, Indonesia, Doc. 40, Telegram, March 15, 1958, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v17/d40.

216 General Nasution in discussion with author.

217 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960*, ed. Robert J. McMahon, vol. 17, Indonesia, Doc. 39, Telegram, March 14, 1958, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v17/d39.

218 Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 154.

219 Conboy and Morrison, *Feet to the Fire*, 94.

220 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960*, ed. Robert J. McMahon, vol. 17, Indonesia, Doc. 52, Telegram, April 6, 1958, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v17/d52.

221 Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 174

222 Kahin and Kahin, 174.

223 By the time the PRRI/Permesta ended officially in 1961, it had joined forces with several other regional rebellions in Indonesia—e.g., in Aceh (which started in 1953), the Kahar Muzakar rebellion in South Sulawesi (which started in 1950), and even the Darul Islam rebellion in West Java (which began soon after Indonesian independence). This apparent expansion in fact weakened Permesta. Its rebel force bridged any Muslim-Christian divide, but once joined with Muslims fighting against Jakarta for a separate Muslim state, overall motives for Permesta became somewhat blurred. A total of a hundred thousand were said to have surrendered, but this number included soldiers and families in various rebellions hoping to participate in government-rehabilitation schemes. See Herbert Feith and Daniel S. Lev, "The End of the Indonesian Rebellion," *Pacific Affairs* 36, No. 1 (Spring 1963), 32–46.

224 When Allen Pope parachuted from his plane (bombing Ambon), he had documents on him implicating Nationalist Chinese in the PRRI/Permesta rebellion. This prompted a massive campaign against all Chinese, including those who were linked with the PKI. I interviewed Pope's Indonesian lawyer, Sukardjo Adidjojo, SH,

(September 1983) in his home, Jalan Sumenep 29, Jakarta Pusat. He told me that Pope's plane was brought down by a single rifle bullet and the person responsible brought his rifle along to court to prove it. In the opinion of Colonel Fletcher Prouty, who organized flights for pilots like Pope, the only way Pope could have had so many documents with him was if he had intended to come down, which suggests the whole episode was an intelligence ploy aimed at the Chinese. Subandrio forced thousands to leave Indonesia, and the PRC sent ships to help the mass evacuation back to China. One of the unanswered questions in this incident is, what happened to Pope's Indonesian flying companion, Harry Rantung, who also landed by parachute?

225 The Permesta Air Force was known as Angkatan Udara Revolusioner (AUREV). By mid-April 1958, it had American, Filipino, and Taiwanese Chinese pilots, using up to nine planes, according to Barbara Harvey, *Permesta: Half a Rebellion* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1977), 107.

226 Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 180. The Kahins cite Howard Jones. They state, "In the book he [Jones] wrote twelve years after the bombing, he stated that the civilian casualties were reported to be 'in the vicinity of 700,' but while pursuing his official duties he abided by the Jakarta government's official casualty figure of six civilians and seventeen members of the armed forces."

227 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960*, ed. Robert J. McMahon, vol. 17, Indonesia, Doc. 54, Telegram, April 8, 1958, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v17/d54

228 Conboy and Morrison, *Feet to the Fire*, 100.

229 Sukardjo Adidjojo, SH, in discussion with author, Jukarta Pusat, Indonesia, September 1983.

230 Conboy and Morrison, *Feet to the Fire*, 139.

231 Conboy and Morrison, 146.

232 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1958–1960, ed. Robert J. McMahon, vol. 17, Indonesia, Doc. 37, Letter, March 14, 1958, http

s://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v17/d37.

Chapter 5

233 Eva-Maria Muschik, "Managing the World: The United Nations, Decolonization and the Strange Triumph of State Sovereignty in the 1950s and 1960s," *Journal of Global History* 13, no. 1 (March 2018), 125. Muschik cited Paul Kennedy, *The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations* (New York: Random House, 2006), 61.

234 Eva-Maria Muschik, 126.

235 MacArthur, who lived in the Astoria, had the opportunity to inform Kennedy of West New Guinea's potential oil resources but did not. His presidential aspirations had been irreparably damaged by President Truman, who relieved him of command for insubordination during the Korean War. A critic of Kennedy at the Democratic National Convention, July 2, 1960, Truman subsequently became a close, personal friend.

236 John F. Kennedy, "Address by President John F. Kennedy to the UN General Assembly," US Department of State, Archived Content, September 25, 1961, https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/io/potusunga/207241.htm. The address was given following the death (now deemed assassination) of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarrskjöld.

237 John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, "Adlai E. Stevenson, 1961," file JFKPOF-033-007, Kennedy Archives, https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/033/JFKPOF-033-007.

238 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, ed. Harriet D. Schwar, vol. 20, Congo Crisis, Doc. 44, Memorandum, undated, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d44.

239 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1976), 24. First published by US Government Printing Office. Select

Committee to Study Governmental Operations, "Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate: Together with Additional, Supplemental, and Separate Views," 50, https://archive.org/stream/finalreportofsel01unit/finalreportofsel01unit_djvu.txt.

240 Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, *Report into the Accident of 1961*, November 1961, http://www.hammarskjoldcommission.org/key-documents/. Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, *Report of the Commission on the Accident Involving Aircraft SE-BDY*, February 1962, http://www.hammarskjoldcommission.org/key-documents/.

241 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, ed. Harriet D. Schwar, vol. 20, Congo Crisis, Doc. 116, Editorial Note, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d116. See also UN General Assembly, A/5069 *Report of the Commission of Investigation into the Tragic Death of Dag Hammarskjöld and of Members of the Party Accompanying Him*, http://www.hammarskjoldcommission.org/key-documents/.

242 Rösiö, Bengt, *The Ndola Disaster*, (Stockholm: Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, November 1992), http://www.hammarskjoldcommission.org/key-documents/.

243 UN General Assembly, A/68/800, March 21, 2014. 68th Session, Agenda item 175. Investigation into the conditions and circumstances resulting in the tragic death of Dag Hammarskjöld and of the members of the party accompanying him.

244 Susan Williams, *Who Killed Hammarskjöld? The UN, the Cold War and White Supremacy in Africa* (London: Hurst & Company, 2011), 200.

245 1962 UN Crash Report, Annex 1. (At the bottom of the cover page, the report informs the reader the annex to the report is issued separately under the symbol A/506g/Add.l.)

246 George Ivan Smith (the Ivan was short for Sullivan) came from Brisbane, my own hometown, so part of our meetings involved some reminiscing. His brother was in charge of the Boggo Road Prison,

which no longer operates, but the memory in silhouette of guards patrolling along the high imposing walls on Annerley Road was one of the more enduring images of my childhood. George Ivan Smith died in 1995.

247 Robert Skidelsky, "Dag Hammarskjöld's Assumptions and the Future of the UN," *Robert Skidelsky* (blog), October 17, 2005, http://www.skidelskyr.com/site/article/dag-hammarskjolds-assumptions-and-the-future-of-the-un/.

248 UN General Assembly, "Investigation into the Conditions and Circumstances," Annex: Report of the Commission of Enquiry, Paragraph 11.5. Truman could not be specific as the Astoria deal would have led to even more criticism by Khruschev of the role of the Secretary General.

249 Dag Hammarskjöld, "The United Nations and the Newly-Independent Countries", address to the Economic Club, New York, NY, March 8, 1960, at the Astor Hotel. https://search.archives.un.org/uploads/r/united-nations-archives/6/f/9/6f9490aada91bf7c86198ab6f0b753b277493a946a1e2fb3469b212be108c9c8/S-0928-0001-08-00001.pdf Press Release SG/900 is the twentieth item in the archive of 123 pages. "My theme today," he began, "will be the help that the United Nations may be able to give in connection with the economic, and associated social and administrative problems of independence and impending independence." Despite the Secretary-General's plea for Africa to remain "outside the conflict, the competition, the cold war", the assassination of Lumumba (covertly organized later that year by Allen Dulles) ensured the Congo was ensnared; and very soon after, Hammarskjöld himse

250 Williams, Who Killed Hammarskjöld?, 151. Williams cites the declassified CIA document "Memorandum for the Record. Subject: Information Concerning the Accidental Death of Dag Hammarskjold', 17 January 1975, C00023116, DDRS" the Accidental Death of Dag Hammarskjöld," January 17, 1975, C00023116, DDRS.

251 Not only Irish but also Indonesian troops served in the Congo. The very next assignment in 1962 for the same planes that brought UN troops to the Congo was to transport 1,500 troops from Pakistan to West Irian.

252 In its wake came the "Luns Plan," in which the Dutch foreign minister proposed a similarly prominent role for the United Nations but without the Dutch administration exiting, as envisaged by Hammarskjöld. According to the son of Joseph Luns, Huub Luns (whom I interviewed in Amsterdam), before his father announced the "Luns Plan" to the General Assembly, he knew it would not be approved. To ask "why did he persist?" is like asking "how did he remain foreign minister for nineteen years?"

Chapter 6

253 In 1956 President Eisenhower established the Presidential Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, and in 1957, on the recommendation of the board, the US Intelligence Board began to act as a focus for all intelligence chiefs to consult with DCI Dulles.

254 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 151, Brief, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d151.

255 Guy Pauker, 'Indonesia: Year of Transition', A Survey of Asia in 1966: Part II, Vol. 7 No. 2, Feb., 1967, Asian Survey, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley. (pp. 138-150) DOI: 10.2307/2642526

256 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963,* ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 151, Memorandum, Footnote, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d145.

257 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 156, Memorandum, March 27, 1961, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d156.

258 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 162, Memorandum of Conversation, April 10, 1961, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d162.

259 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 162.

260 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 162.

261 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 163, Memorandum of Conversation, April 10, 1961, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d163.

262 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 172, Memorandum of Conversation, April 24, 1961, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d172. Conversation recounted directly as recorded/noted at the time.

263 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 206, Memorandum, November 30, 1961, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d206.

264 The Bureau was under the direction of Dr. R. V. de Bruyn—the "Jungle Pimpernel." During the wartime occupation of New Guinea by the Japanese, he had remained in the jungle, helped by the Papuan natives. When jungle observers reported the Japanese had plentiful oil at Sele, a Catalina was sent (unsuccessfully) from Australia in 1943 to drop mines. At the funeral of the Jungle Pimpernel in the Netherlands in 1979, a wreath arrived from Papuan people who had kept in contact since the war.

265 Our ghoulish fascination with cannibalism and head-hunting has led to a plethora of fictionalized accounts about the disappearance of Michael Rockefeller. When I contacted one such author, Paul Toohey (*Rocky Goes West*), he admitted that he did not interview Rene

Wassing, although from his book the reader is led to believe that he did. Similarly, I contacted Carl Hoffman, the author of *Savage Harvest: A Tale of Cannibals, Colonialism, and Michael Rockefeller's Tragic Quest for Primitive Art* (2014). He too failed to meet Rene Wassing, with the result that the reader gets the strong impression Michael Rockefeller could see the coastline before he attempted to swim, but the book is a well-researched fictionalized account.

266 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 214, Memorandum, December 17, 1961, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d214.

267 This was a remarkably astute choice. Malik was the Indonesian ambassador in Moscow when the arms deal was finalized; he was also close with the Americans—in fact, working with the CIA. It is possible that Subandrio, who was at the top of Indonesia's intelligence, was aware of this inside connection. Moreover, because of the post-war decade he'd spent in the United Kingdom, he himself had well-developed links with the British.

268 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 219, Memorandum, January 4, 1962, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d219.

269 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 217, Memorandum, December 27, 1961, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d217.

270 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 215, Memorandum, December 18, 1961, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d215.

271 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 220, Memorandum, January 12, 1962, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d

220. Can either Kennedy's question or Komer's comment be interpreted as showing fore-knowledge of the attack? Komer's reference to "intelligence community" suggests possibly the CIA was requested to contact the Indonesians. The immediate aim of a limited military action was to prompt emergency negotiations, which is precisely what happened. The ultimate aim was to change the direction of talks, which were still leaning toward self-determination, which Kennedy's advisor saw as detrimental to US interests. One interpretation of the US transcripts might be that a plan had been hatched, with presidential approval, to bring about a small clash of Dutch-Indonesian forces so as to enable the issue to be brought to the negotiating table, shortcutting Dutch plans for self-determination. There is certainly no official record of such a request.

272 George Aditjondro in discussion with author, University of Newcastle, 1995. The MTBs had about 135 miles to travel, whereas the Dutch destroyers had many hundreds of miles to cover to be at that location, at that time. Only with prior notification could they have been in place, waiting; radar alone would not have provided sufficient warning time. Furthermore, if Suharto (in charge of Mandala) had contact with Clark Air Base and/or the CIA in this operation, this does not necessarily imply any covert CIA link at this stage. Yos Sudarso in 1974 was designated a hero by Suharto, yet if he was responsible for notifying Clark Air base, Suharto was responsible for Yos Sudarso's death. Kaimana, the township on the southern coastline of Papua and destination of Yos Sudarso's ill-fated MTB, later became part of a popular, romantic song in Indonesia, "Meet me at Kaimana'.

273 Both had been transferred from the British after the war. HMS *Scourge* became the *Evertsen* and HMS *Scorpion* the *Kortenaer*. (Both were scrapped in 1963.) The third destroyer in NNG was the *Piet* (an ex–Royal Navy ship formerly known as HMS *Serapis*)

274 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 244, Memorandum of

Conversation, March 2, 1962, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d244.

275 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 244.

276 Howard B. Schaffer, *Ellsworth Bunker: Global Troubleshooter, Vietnam Hawk* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 23. "As well, in 1957 Allen Dulles personally recommended Ellsworth Bunker for membership of the Century Association, one of New York's oldest and most distinguished clubs. 'He is a man of parts,' wrote Dulles, 'a delightful companion, wise counsellor on world affairs, and an honor to the profession of diplomacy in which he is now engaged'".

277 In the interim period (August 15, 1962–May 1, 1963) the New York Agreement provided for a UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA). A multinational force was supposed to supervise the change-over. From the US came fifty-nine military aides, twelve from Canada, and 1,537 troops from Pakistan, the 14th Punjab. Rosalyn Higgins (*United Nations Peacekeeping 1946–67*, Oxford University Press, 1970) has explained that no paperwork exists to explain how these Muslim troops were sent to Papua as they linked with Muslim Indonesian troops and turned a blind eye to the killing of Papuans, which started during UNTEA. The fifty-three-year-old Pakistani foreign minister, Ali Bogra, (who had spent two years in Washington as ambassador, 1956–57) arranged for the UN Security Force. Clearly, a deal was arranged, but during a visit to New York, January 23, 1963, he died of a heart attack in the street.

278 Sukarno allocated control of the Sele oil-exploration area to the PKI (see Chapter 3), necessitating a move by the Japanese to offer to take over the area, which they did, until Sukarno was ousted.

279 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 287, Memorandum, August 16, 1962, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d287.

280 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 293, Memorandum of Conversation, October 11, 1962, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d293.

281 Most notable is J. A. C. Mackie, *Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974). Mackie did not even interview Azahari, the main political figure in Brunei and incorrectly blamed for starting the Brunei rebellion.

282 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 155, Memorandum, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d155.

283 Roy Henry was later transferred to Hong Kong where his proclivity for having sexual relations with young males created a scandal well publicized in the media.

284 One of the editors of Partindo's newspaper *Bintang Timur* was Armunanto, a close friend of Subandrio (both from Malang) and a former Indonesian ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Both were arrested by Suharto's troops on March 17, 1966. Subandrio, after having his death sentence commuted at the request of the Queen of England, spent three decades in prison. At the front door of his house in Jakarta, I was three times refused an interview in 1996. A Jakarta newspaper had published an article of mine (alongside articles by Subandrio and Indonesian Air Force commander Omar Dani, who also had just been released) in which I revealed archival evidence that British intelligence had assisted Subandrio. In the 1964–65 period, however, Subandrio loosened ties with the United Kingdom—much to the wrath of the British—and sought closer ties with Beijing.

285 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 291, Memorandum, October 11, 1962, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d291.

286 Gerald Ford was with Dulles on the Warren Commission. In October 1973, Ford was appointed vice president by Nixon when Spiro Agnew resigned under allegations of tax evasion. In August the following year, Nixon resigned, and Ford became president. He appointed Nelson Rockefeller as vice president.

287 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 302, Telegram, March 1, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d302.

288 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 302. Djuanda died on November 7, 1963, after having a drink at the Hotel Indonesia. See Poulgrain, *Genesis of Konfrontasi*, 310 "When I asked General Nasution for his opinion, he said that 'Hotel Indonesia was full of spies from all countries—anyone could have killed him.' Djuanda's heart medication was minor, explained Nasution. Heart failure was the official cause of death, but 'there was no autopsy.'" Nasution in discussion with author, Jakarta, January 1988. Djuanda definitely was overworked, trying to revive the Indonesian economy.

289 Huntley Film Archives, "Malaysia War with Indonesia," YouTube video, 26:17, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2DXqIM4y6WA.

290 Steven Farram, "Ganyang! Indonesian Popular Songs from the Confrontation Era, 1963–1966," *Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia* 170, no.1 (January 1, 2014): 1–24, https://brill.com/view/journals/bki/170/1/article-p1_1.xml?lang=en.

291 Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 98.

292 Baskara T. Wardaya, SJ, *Cold War Shadow: United States Policy toward Indonesia, 1953–1963* (Yogyakarta, Indonesia: Galang Press, 2007), 377.

293 Thomas Preston, *The President and His Inner Circle: Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in Foreign Affairs* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 113–114.

294 Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 5.

295 Simpson, 69. Simpson cites *Report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program* (Washington, D:Government Printing Office, 1959), vol. 2, 55.

296 Simpson, 69. Simpson incorporated quotations from the Memorandum of Discussion at the 410th Meeting of the NSC, Washington, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1959*, vol. 16, 97–103.

297 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 155.

298 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 155, Attachment, Paragraphs 9 and 10.

299 David Ransome, "The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre," *Ramparts* 9, no. 4 (1970): 26–49.

300 Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 74. Simpson cites a memo to Sargent Shriver.

301 Howard Palfrey Jones, *Indonesia: The Possible Dream*, 296.

302 Dean Rusk, private correspondence with author when he was retired, at the School of Law, University of Georgia. The letter was dated January 8, 1992, although Rusk and I corresponded over a decade starting October 25, 1982.

303 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 303, Memorandum, March 6, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d303.

304 Standard Vacuum (Stanvac)—Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony Mobil—and Caltex Pacific (Caltex)—Standard Oil of California and Texas—comprise investment of $300 million. US oil, with Shell, produced 90 percent of Indonesia's oil.

305 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 306, Memorandum, undated, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d306.

306 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 302, Memorandum, July 23,

1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d312.

307 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 312, Attachment, Memorandum, July 23, 1963.

308 See Poulgrain, *Genesis of Konfrontasi*, 9. "Second-in-charge of the British Embassy in Jakarta in mid-1963, Ralph Selby, admitted that when Ambassador Gilchrist replaced 'Bunny' Fry that year, Gilchrist 'was sent there to be hostile.' Gilchrist himself confirmed this in correspondence with the author." Ralph Selby in discussion with author, June 2, 1991, Hayling Island, UK. Sir Andrew Gilchrist KCMG, private correspondence with author, October 31, 1992.

309 "10,000 in Jakarta Attack and Burn British Embassy," *New York Times*, September 19, 1963, https://www.nytimes.com/1963/09/19/archives/10000-in-jakarta-attack-and-burn-british-embassy-building-sacked-in.html.

310 The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 847.

311 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 319, Telegram, November 4, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d319.

312 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 290, Memorandum, September 25, 1962, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d290.

313 Public Papers of the Presidents, 850.

314 Dean Rusk, private correspondence with author, January 8, 1992. The agreement between Sukarno and Kennedy to end Konfrontasi did not proceed. As Rusk told me, it "was rendered moot by President Kennedy's assassination."

315 Jones, *Indonesia: The Possible Dream,* 62.

316 John H. Sullivan, "The US and the New Order in Indonesia" (PhD thesis, American University, 1970), 63.

317 David Talbot, *The Devil's Chessboard: Allen Dulles, the CIA, and the Rise of America's Secret Government* (New York: Harper Collins, 2015).

Chapter 7

318 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 290. (Ten lines of telegram not declassified.)

319 Pramoedya Ananta Toer, foreword to *The Genesis of Konfrontasi: Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia, 1945–1965*, by Greg Poulgrain (Kuala Lampur: SIRD, 2014).

320 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963,* ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 23, Southeast Asia, Doc. 325, Memorandum, December 16, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d325.

321 Jones*, Indonesia: The Possible Dream*, 298.

322 Richard M. Nixon, "Asia after Viet Nam," *Foreign Affairs* 46, no. 1, 1967, 111.

323 When Walter Bedell Smith at Truman's request took over as DCI on October 7, 1950, he set up the Office of National Estimates under William Langer, the Harvard historian who had led the Research and Analysis branch in the OSS. Deputy assistant director for National Estimates was Sherman Kent, at that time a college professor but with a similar OSS background in intelligence. A friend of Sherman Kent, Sidney Dillon Ripley, was in charge of OSS in wartime Southeast Asia. At the start of the war, Ripley worked with Allen Dulles in the Rockefeller Center. Prewar, he had worked in Netherlands New Guinea as an ornithologist.

324 Harold P. Ford, "Calling the Sino-Soviet Split: The CIA and Double Demonology," Central Intelligence Agency, 33n, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter98_99/art05.html#rft33.

325 Harold P. Ford, "Calling the Sino-Soviet Split," 74n.

326 The official defection of Kim Philby, who surfaced in Moscow in July 1963, seemed to compound the Cold War paranoia, perhaps because Philby (former MI6 counterintelligence chief with the CIA) had been a close friend of Angleton and met regularly with Allen Dulles, socially and officially.

327 Tim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA* (Camberwell, Australia: Allen Lane/Penguin, 2007), 261.

328 Nishijima Shigetada in discussion with author, Tokyo, August 1983.

329 Marshall Green, interview by Robert J. Martens, May 12, 1987, Frontline Diplomacy, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, https://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000448/.

330 Oei Tju Tat, in discussion with author, Jakarta, August 8, 1990. In the later stages of Konfrontasi, Oei Tju Tat was appointed by Sukarno as the leading civilian in its administrative hierarchy. He was a well-respected lawyer, middle-of-the-road politically, and general chairman of Partindo whose secretary general was an adopted son on Sukarno, Asmara Hadi. The dominant radical voice of Partindo was Iskandar Kamel, formerly Ibrahim Ya'acob from Malaya, forced into exile by the British in the 1950s.

331 The term "bureaucratic capitalists" meant "Indonesian military involved in politics and the economy." See Rudolf Mrázek, *The United States and the Indonesian Military 1945–1965: A Study of an Intervention,* vol. 2 (Prague: Oriental Institute in Academia, Publishing House of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1978), 131.

332 Memo from S.J.G. Cambridge, British Embassy Jakarta, to D.Tonkin, Southeast Asian Dept, Indonesia desk, Foreign Office, London, January 13, 1965. F.O. 371/180310.

333 Marshall Green, interview, May 12, 1987.

334 A prominent example of the PKI not being averse to religion was Made Puger, a devout Hindu and leader of the PKI in Bali. Bali witnessed horrific massacres with the incoming New Order of Suharto, and Puger was grotesquely executed.

335 Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Books, 1978), 48.

336 Eisenhower refused on the advice of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles. John Foster had secretly promised Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns that the United States would support the Dutch to defend West New Guinea against Indonesian aggression. Eisenhower was advised not to visit Jakarta to avoid the question of giving—or not giving—US support to the Indonesians to oust the Dutch. Allen Dulles' constant denial of significant US arms for Indonesia led to the arms deal with the Soviet Union.

337 British Embassy Jakarta memo, note from Antara newspaper, January 16, 1965, sent to Foreign Office, London. FO 371 180320

338 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957*, Doc. 333.

339 Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes,* 261.

340 Derek Tonkin, interview by Malcom McBain, August 3, 2000, Foreign Office interviews. https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/media/uploads/files/Tonkin.pdf.

341 Adam Malik in discussion with author in his house, in Jakarta, August 1983. The meeting was arranged by Nishijima Shigetada.

342 The ultimate irony in berating Sukarno (and Indonesia) for "going communist" when he was not is that Communist China and the United States subsequently became intertwined in trade and investment. Kissinger Associates has benefited immensely from contracts arranging Indonesian natural resources to China. It was Sukarno's insistence that Indonesia (while promoting foreign investment) should maintain operational control of its own resources that necessitated depicting him as a political obstacle. After the ransacking that became the norm during the Suharto era, Indonesia still has not recovered operational control as opposed to "agreed percentages."

343 Mrázek, *The United States and the Indonesian Military*, vol. 2, 131. A comparison of the 70 percent with today's military expenditure of

about 1 percent of GDP can be misleading, as the army now controls a huge swath of the Indonesian economy through both illegal and legal businesses. The latter were supposed to have been handed over to the government as part of army reform, but this plan was eliminated with the rise of "radical Islam" in Indonesia, even though tainted (as President Wahid intimated) with the omnipresent army. Nevertheless, in 1963, by stopping Konfrontasi, rescheduling Soviet arms payments, and distributing the 70 percent expenditure on the armed forces more equitably, Indonesia might have avoided the horrendous trauma it endured in 1965–66.

344 Indonesian lawyer in discussion with author, 1996. The lawyer/politician should remain unnamed because his family is in Jakarta.

345 "Democratic centralism" was the term used by Mao Zedong to describe the form of government in the People's Republic of China during the 1950s and early '60s.

346 François Godement, *The New Asian Renaissance: From Colonialism to the post–Cold War*, trans. Elisabeth J. Parcell (New York: Routledge, 1997), 207.

347 Antonie C. A. Dake, *In the Spirit of the Red Banteng—Indonesian Communists between Moscow and Peking* (The Hague: Mouton & Company, 1973), 435. See also (from RAND) Nadia Derkach, "The Soviet Policy towards Indonesia in the West Irian and the Malaysian Disputes," *Asian Survey*, 5, no. 11 (November 1965): 571. "Open opposition to Indonesia policy would have proved the Chinese contention that the Soviet Union has no genuine interest in national liberation movements and would have further strengthened Chinese influence in Indonesia. Furthermore, the Soviets would have run squarely counter to the policy of the Communist Party of Indonesia which has identified itself with the confrontation policy."

348 By this time the spelling of his name was Yani rather than Jani.

349 Jess Melvin, *The Army and the Indonesian Genocide: Mechanics of Mass Murder* (London and New York: Routledge, 2018), 4.

350 National Archives, Telegram 147 from Indonesia US Embassy to Jakarta, RG 59.

351 Robert J. Martens, Political Officer, Jakarta (1963-1966) interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, Library of Congress, September 13, 1991, https://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000751/

352 Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics 1959–1965* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1974), 366. Mortimer cited *Harian Rakyat*, August 20, 1965. A figure of twenty million is often cited. This figure is from Rex Mortimer, based on Aidit's figures but allowing for duplication. The twenty-seven million figure is what Aidit claimed the party's membership was.

353 Green, interview by Robert J. Martens.

354 John Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement & Suharto's Coup d'État in Indonesia* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 195. Roosa cited Brad Simpson, "Modernizing Indonesia: United States–Indonesian Relations, 1961–1967" (PhD diss., Northwestern University, 2003).

355 Green, interview by Robert J. Martens.

356 John Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder.*

357 In my opinion, Adam Malik, with one year to live, was somehow seeking to rid himself of this aspect of the killing, for the sake of posterity.

358 Dewi, formerly Naoki Nemoto, was an eighteen-year-old nightclub girl when introduced to Sukarno by Nishijima Shigetada. She worked in the foreigner-friendly Akasaka district. Her brother committed suicide when she agreed to marry Sukarno and to become (as the Foreign Office wrote) "the foremost spearhead of Japanese diplomacy towards Indonesia." Memorandum, Ambassador Gilchrist, Jakarta, to Foreign Office, London. October 21, 1965 1965. British National Archives, Kew, FO 371-180313.

359 Kathy Kadane, "Ex Agents Say CIA Compiled Death Lists for Indonesians: After 25 Years, Americans Speak of Their Role in Exterminating Communist Party," *San Francisco Examiner*, May 20,

1990. Her article also appeared in *The Herald* (South Carolina, May 19), the *Washington Post* (May 21), and the *Boston Globe* (May 23).

360 Martens, interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy, Library of Congress.

361 Margot L. Lyon, "1965 and the Indonesian Coup: 50 Years On" (interview, Australian National University Annual Confernce, Canberra, September 17, 2005). Lyon's informants also referred to the presence of a helicopter that (if a *Bell* UH-1 Iroquois or "Huey") would have taken less than thirty minutes to transport the two Americans to Klaten from a ship offshore, part of the US 7th Fleet. According to Bertrand Russell in his 1968 publication, *The Silent Slaughter: The Role of the United States in the Indonesian Massacre,* the 7th Fleet was then off the coast of Java. A telegram from the National Security Archive, George Washington University (RG 84, Entry P 339, Jakarta Embassy Files, Box 14, Folder 5 pol 23-9 Sept 30th Movement Nov 10-19 1965) supports Russel's claim. In reply to a note by Marshall Green, Norman B. Hannah, political advisor to the commander-in-chief for the Pacific, CINPAC, on October 23, 1965, offered "covert assistance" including transport, which may well have included a helicopter for the two Americans.

362 In a timely addition, fifteen American civilians in 1965 joined the "approximately thirty" military personnel already involved in the Military Assistance Program for Indonesia. See Peter Dale Scott, "The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno 1965–1967," *Pacific Affairs* 58, (Summer 1985): 239–264.

363 In West Java specifically, the statistics were even worse. The 1963 Agricultural Census of the the Central Bureau of Statistics found in West Java, where there were 6,558,650 adult farmers, only 11,929 had over five hectares—less than 0.2 percent. Pauker, critical of land reform attempted by the PKI, restates the century-old problem: "There is simply not enough land to redistribute among the poor and landless peasants." Guy J.Pauker, "Political Consequences of Rural Development Programs in Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs* 41, no. 3 (Fall 1968): 399.

364 Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1978), 7.

365 Jess Melvin, *The Army and the Indonesian Genocide,* 47.

366 Gilchrist to Foreign Office, F.O.371/180310, March 8, 1965, NA, FO 371:180310.

367 "Files Reveal US Had Detailed Knowledge of Indonesia's Anti-Communist Purge," *The Guardian*, international ed., Oct 17, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/17/indonesia-anti-communist-killings-us-declassified-files.

368 Sakirman's wife was related to Sartono, chairman of DPR (one of Indonesia's Houses of Parliament), and after the execution of Sakirman, Sartono's family took care of Sakirman's children.

369 This was the same institute where Sukarno had studied engineering. In Dutch colonial times, ITB was known as THS (Technische Hoge School). Today it is still one of Indonesia's top universities.

370 Derek Tonkin, interview by Malcom McBain, August 3, 2000, Foreign Office, https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/media/uploads/files/Tonkin.pdf.

371 Derek Tonkin, Minutes, May 26, 1965, NA, FO 371:180313.

372 Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder, 189. Roosa cites Central Intelligence Agency, *Indonesia 1965: The Coup That Backfired* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1968). See also Hugh B. Tovar, "The Indonesian Crisis of 1965-1966: A Retrospective," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 7, no. 3 (Fall 1994): 313–38.

373 Geoffrey Robinson, *The Killing Season: A History of Indonesian Massacres, 1965–66* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018), 105.

374 Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia,* 107.

375 Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder,* 76, citing Latief's own book, *Pledoi Kol. A. Latief, Soeharto Terlibat G30S* [The Defense Statement of Colonel A. Latief: Soeharto Was Involved in the September 30th Movement]. (Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi, 2000).

376 British archives, Kew, Foreign Office (FO) 371:180314. "Dean Rusk told [UK] Washington Embassy 22 June [1965] "… Foreign Office, London was informed. Sukarno was to be held in British Embassy, Bangkok, "on the grounds that the PKI [Jakarta] were preparing a coup."

377 The informant, Nai Thanat Khoman, may have been in contact with Ali Murtopo, who had links with British intelligence. At that time, Murdani was under Ali Murtopo, and both were under Suharto's command. But later (as president) Suharto drew Murdani closer to him as a tactic to isolate Murtopo, to curb his potential for becoming a rival. And later still, Suharto moved similarly against Murdani.

378 FO 371:180314. British embassy in Washington informed Foreign Office, London, of the encounter with Rusk.

379 Aidit's most reliable information on the Council of Generals, according to Njono, "came from Brigadier General of Police Sutarto, head of the BPI intelligence staff of Minister Subandrio," as well as from other sources. "The information indicated that the danger posed by the Council of Generals was real." See Coen Holtzappel, "Professional Blindness and Missing the Mark: The Thirtieth September Movement as Seen by the Perpetrators. Between Registered Facts and Authoritative Opinions—Part 2," *Rozenberg Quarterly*, June 4, 2008, http://rozenbergquarterly.com/professional-blindness-and-missing-the-mark-the-thirtieth-september-movement-as-seen-by-the-perpetrators-between-registered-facts-and-authoritative-opinions-part-two/. Holtzappel cites Njono's court evidence, February 14–21, 1966.

380 FO 371:180314.

381 David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975–83*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1984), 22. Suharto's Kostrad group was quite distinct from Yani's group, which also (with Sukarno's approval) sent a secret emissary to the British, Major General Sukendra, to end Konfrontasi. Unlike Murtopo, Sukendra made no headway. Sukendra was Nasution's former

intelligence officer, strong in his anti-PKI stance, trained in the United States with CIA contacts, but apparently (unlike Suharto) regarded as too voluble.

382 Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes*, 261.

383 Heru Atmodjo, in discussion with author in his house, Jakarta, November 28, 1999. Atmodjo was trained as a pilot in Bakersfield, California, in the mid-1950s, and again in the United States, in 1961, in an intelligence course. He was imprisoned for fifteen years without trial. He died in 2011 and was buried in the Kalibata Heroes Cemetery, Jakarta, only to be exhumed a short time later by rabid elements in the army and reburied in a nondescript grave at the other end of Java.

384 Yet another incident occurred on March 26, 1965, when Indonesia's largest army munitions factory in Bandung caught fire and exploded, killing scores of people in the inferno that raged for twenty-four hours. It was claimed there was no evidence of sabotage.

385 Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945– 1967* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982), 186.

386 Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, 83.

387 Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder*.

388 Roosa, 91.

389 Nyono's evidence before the military court, according to Holtzappel, (specifically his letter from the Politbiro to President Sukarno, August 28, 1965) "implied that in case of the expected reply from the president, any action by the military would be canceled. Yet from Untung's minutes it appears that Sjam used the month of September to prepare for exactly what the letter to the president was meant to prevent—active support for a preemptive military strike against the Council of Generals." See Holtzappel, http://rozenbergquarterly.com/professional-blindness-and-missing-the-mark-the-thirtieth-september-movement-as-seen-by-the-perpetrators-between-registered-facts-and-authoritative-opinions-part-one/.

390 Aristides Katoppo, in discussion with the author in his house in Jakarta, August 3, 2018. At that time, Katoppo was one of the top journalists in Indonesia (also writing for the *New York Times*). The arresting officer involved Katoppo in the capture of Sjam by handing him the camera that had photographs showing the place and time of Sjam's arrest. He did this before taking Sjam to headquarters because he realized someone in HQ previously had been informing Sjam to warn him before the impending arrest. The arresting officer, in later years, became a Christian philanthropist, devoting his life to helping victims of the events of 1965–66.

391 Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder*, 255. Repeatedly in the military court Sjam was asked, "Who gave that order?" to which he invariably replied, "D. N. Aidit."

392 Katoppo, in discussion with author.

393 In military court proceedings, the order to kill the remaining generals at Lubang Buaya, three or four hours after sunrise, was via Sujono and carried out under the directions of Dul Arif. One reason why Sjam said he gave the order (on Aidit's instructions) was apparently to avoid the need for Latief to make an appearance in court. When Latief did appear in the late 1970s, he loudly proclaimed that Suharto had prior warning of the intended abduction of the generals, but this was not reported in Jakarta media. When Latief requested Ibu Suharto give evidence to confirm Latief visited their house two days before the event, and the hospital (where Suharto and his wife were) hours before the event, the judge declared it was "not relevant."

394 Intelligence Memorandum, "The Upheaval in Indonesia," October 6, 1965, Johnson Library, National Security File, Indonesia, vol. 5, Memos, 10/65–11/65, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA.

395 Ben Anderson, "The World of Sergeant-Major Bungkus: Two Interviews with Ben Anderson and Arif Djati," *Indonesia* 78 (October 2004): 54.

396 R. E. Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 78.

397 Details on the assassination attempt were not given, but it was probably by plane. Ten years earlier, the entire Chinese delegation for the Bandung Conference crashed into the Java Sea when a time bomb exploded in the wheel bay of the starboard wing of Air India's Kashmir Princess. The intended victim, Zhou Enlai, was not onboard. Wary of traveling with one group, he had taken an alternative flight at the last minute.

398 Robinson, The Killing Season, 103. Robinson cites CIA Intelligence Info Cable #TDCS-315-00846-64, "US-Indonesian Relations," September 19, 1964, 1981, #273B. As well, Peter Dale Scott has noted that Jan Walandouw (described as a possible CIA contact from 1958) visited Washington "some months" before September 30, 1965, to "advocate Suharto as a leader" in the plan to eliminate the PKI. If this visit (as Scott suggests) was at Suharto's instigation, it highlights his perception that Nasution was an impediment to becoming army commander.

399 Frederick Bunnell, "The Central Intelligence Agency—Deputy Directorate for Plans 1961 Secret Memorandum on Indonesia: A Study in the Politics of Policy Formulation in the Kennedy Administration," *Indonesia* 22 (October 1976). See Attachment A—President Sukarno, paragraph 8, 164 and Attachment B, Countervailing Forces, paragraph 1, 165.

400 Sumarsono was living in Sydney, where I first interviewed him in 1996, until he passed away in January 2019, almost one hundred years of age. Pemuda Rakyat in 1965 was the People's Youth wing of the PKI.

401 Gilchrist to Foreign Office, May 29, 1965, NA, FO 371:180313.

402 Gilchrist to Foreign Office, March 4, 1965, NA, DH 1015:39. The mutiny was known as the GPPR, Gerakan Perwira Progressif Revolusioner, the Movement of Progressive Revolutionary Officers.

403 Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography*, 114.

404 Bob Elson, in discussion with author. He explained that his focus was on Suharto, not Sjam.

405 Tides Katoppo, in discussion with author, in his house in Jakarta, August 3, 2018.

406 Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder,* 77.

407 One possible reason that Latief was not executed (as were most of those involved in the September 30 Movement) is that while his friendship with Suharto was known to have started in 1945, Latief's unfamiliarity with Sjam had the effect of minimizing or negating the Suharto-Sjam link. So Latief was "living proof." It was not camaraderie that kept him alive. Any of his trial statements, revelations, or claims that made the court uncomfortable were simply dismissed. Latief spent twelve years in Salemba and twenty-one years in Cipinang, where I interviewed him in May 1998.

408 Latief, *Pledoi,* 38.

409 *Der Spiegel*, No. 27, June 1970, 98. (*Der Spiegel* from Hamburg is a news weekly of world renown.) One year earlier, Suharto made the first public acknowledgement of Latief's hospital visit (after it was mentioned in court) in a book by Arnold Brackman, *The Communist Collapse in Indonesia* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), 100. Suharto claimed Latief wanted "to check on me."

410 Abdul Latief, in discussion with author, Cipinang prison, May 1998.

411 On October 15, 1965, Suharto addressed the Central and Regional leaders of the National Front—a body established by Sukarno in August 1960, which included all political parties and organizations, with the military holding eleven of seventy-three national positions. At provincial level, the military chaired nine of seventeen branches. See Melvin, *The Army and the Indonesian Genocide*, 97.

412 Coen Holtzappel, "Professional Blindness and Missing the Mark: The Thirtieth September Movement as Seen by the Perpetrators. Between Registered Facts and Authoritative Opinions—Part 1," *Rozenberg Quarterly*, June 4, 2008, http://rozenbergquarterly.com/professional-blindness-and-missing-the-mark-the-thirtieth-september-movement-as-seen-by-the-perpetrators-between-registered-facts-and-authoritative-opinions-part-one/.

413 Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder*, 108.

414 Ben Anderson, "The World of Sergeant-Major Bungkus: Two Interviews with Benedict Anderson and Arief Djati" *Indonesia* 78 (October, 2004): nn–nn, 7-60.

415 Anderson, 42, 20, "The Banteng Raiders were formed in June 1952 by Ahmad Yani, then a brigade commander in western Central Java. They were elite units recruited and trained to fight the Darul Islam rebellion."

416 Atmodjo, in discussion with author. These details were obtained by him during his time of imprisonment with the soldiers who witnessed the event.

417 Anderson (1936–2015) was still investigating this Madurese link when he died in Malang, Java, of a heart attack.

418 W. F. Wertheim, "Suharto and the Untung Coup: The Missing Link," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 1, no. 2 (Winter 1970): 53. It was Umar Wirahadikusumah who arranged for the PKI paper *Harian Rakyat* to be published on October 2 (when the movement had collapsed, Aidit had already gone to Yogyakarta, and all media but army papers had been closed down), expressing in very broad terms belated support for the movement. News about the killing of the generals broke immediately after it was published. Also, the absence of Umar and Suharto from the list of generals to be killed was later explained by Brigadier General Sutjipto Judodihardjo, minister for the police. They were less important, he said, and "could be killed later on."

419 Rosamona, *Martinja Aidit: Marsekal Lubang Buaja* (Jakarta: state publication, 1967), 104. The style of Indonesia language uses the old-style spelling. "Majdjen Umar melihat orang2 pakaian preman jang bersendjata dekat rumah." Margot Lyon brought this government publication to my attention. The frontispiece included a photo of Suharto, but obviously he never read the book. It seems to have remained unread in the University Indonesia library for more than half a century.

420 That is, third in line in the state power structure, after Foreign Minister Subandrio. Third vice premier was Chairul Saleh, from Padang, Sumatra, which was Sukarno's way of positioning east, west, and central Indonesia (Java) next to the president.

421 Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder*, 256–57.

422 Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography*, 86.

423 National Archives, Telegram from US Embassy Jakarta to Dept. of State, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15-1 INDON, October 18, 1965.

424 Margot Lyon, "Testimony of a Messenger," *Inside Indonesia*, April-June, 2106, https://www.insideindonesia.org/testimony-of-a-messenger. Sudjai's memoir "Spiritual Flight Missions of the New Order" (Misi Penerbangan Spiritual Orde Baru) was published in the online newsletter *The Global Review,* June 29, 2009.

425 Zhou, Taomo, "China and the Thirtieth of September Movement," *Indonesia* 98 (2014): 50–51. The other leaders were Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, and Chen Yi. Jusuf Aditorop (Ajitorop) was one of the twelve-member PKI Politburo.

426 Tides Katoppo, in discussion with author, in his house, December 14, 2017. Katoppo confirmed it was "recorded in an army report" that Suharto, Sjam, and Aidit had been seen together "a few days before September 30, 1965," but (as in Heru Atmodjo's account of the meeting) the actual location was not clear.

427 Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder*, 251.

428 Guy Pauker, private correspondence with author, August 8, 2000.

429 Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography*, 99.

430 Aristides Katoppo, in discussion with author, in his house in Jakarta, August 3, 2018.

431 May, *The Indonesian Tragedy,* 119. Pemuda Rakyat (PKI youth, not in uniform) who were included in the trucks that went to the houses of the generals were not included in the court proceedings. A possible reason for this might be that their inclusion would have raised the question why others not in uniform who were included in the trucks,

i.e., preman, were not brought to trial. Consequently, the involvement of preman in the killings of the generals was never mentioned in court proceedings.

432 British Archives, Kew. UK. Foreign Office 371: 180323. Ambassador Gilchrist (November 5, 1965) forwarded to London comment by Edward E. Masters, Counselor of US Embassy for Political Affairs, Jakarta, querying the logic of killing the generals.

433 The UK delegation to NATO, Paris, October 13, 1965, reported Cleveland's view that "Communist instigation had been established."

434 British Embassy to HSH Stanley, Malaysia/Indonesia Department, London, November 2, 1965, NA, FO 180324.

435 Burrows to Hanbury-Tenison, Malaysia/Indonesia Department, London, October 14, 1965, FO 180320, DH 1015:216. Notes taken by Burrows, British Embassy, Jakarta.

436 Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder*, 218.

437 This transcription, published in what is known as the "Cornell Paper" by Ben Anderson and Ruth McVey, with the assistance of Frederick Bunnell, is based on translations of the 1965 Indonesian text in the newspapers *Antara* (Warta Berita), October 1 (afternoon edition), and *Harian Rakyat*, October 2. The Cornell Paper," or *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia*, was published by Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project in 1971. First circulated as an internal paper only months after the event, not for publication, it was leaked, and subsequently published six years later.

438 Melvin, *The Army and the Indonesian Genocide*, 112.

439 Lyon, "Testimony of a Messenger." See also Sudjai's memoir in the *Global Review*, June 29, 2009.

440 Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder*, 166, from the courtroom defense plea in 1973 by Munir, a PKI Politburo member.

441 Roosa, 48.

442 Roosa, 151.

Afterword

443 "Kathy Kadane's Research," Antenna.nl, http://wvi.antenna.nl/eng/ic/pki/kadane/kadane.html.

444 James DiEugenio, *Destiny Betrayed*, 2nd ed., (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2012), 196

445 DiEugenio, 111–14.

446 Lisa Pease, "David Atlee Phillips, Clay Shaw and Freeport Sulphur," *Probe Magazine,* May-June 1996, 20.

447 Pease, 17.

448 Pease, 18.

449 DiEugenio, *Destiny Betrayed*, 208

450 Gaeton Fonzi, in discussion with author, 1996.

451 Pease, "David Atlee Phillips," 24.

452 Scott Breckinridge, *Church Committee Report*, 132.

453 DiEugenio, *Destiny Betrayed*, 29

454 John F. Kennedy, *The Strategy of Peace* (New York: HarperCollins, 1960), 62–80.

455 Arthur M. Schlessinger Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 288.

456 James DiEugenio, "Hammarskjold and Kennedy vs. The Power Elite," Kennedys and King.

457 Robert Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World,* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 112

458 Deirdre Griswold, "The Second Greatest Crime of the Century," Workers World, https://www.workers.org/indonesia/index.html.

459 Griswold.

460 Griswold.

461 "The US and Indonesia: Three Administrations," *Probe Magazine*, 3, no. 4 (May–June 1996): 26. 4, 26.

462 Pease, "David Atlee Phillips," 22.

463 Bradley Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 40. All references to the book in this Afterword are to the ebook version.

464 Pease, "David Atlee Phillips," 22.

465 David Talbot, *Brothers: The Hidden History of the Kennedy Years*, New York: Free Press, 2007, 32.
466 Poulgrain, *The Genesis of Konfrontasi*, 298–99.
467 Poulgrain, 6.
468 Poulgrain, 310.
469 Simpson, Economists with Guns, 36.
470 Simpson, 49.
471 Simpson, 49.
472 Simpson, 49.
473 Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, New York: Doubleday, 1967, 407
474 Simpson, *Economists with Guns,* 51.
475 Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, 409.
476 Pease, "David Atlee Phillips," 23.
477 CIA report in National Intelligence Estimates 55.
478 Telegram from Jakarta to State, August 24, 1964.
479 CIA Memorandum of September 18, 1964.
480 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, *1964–68*, ed. Edward C. Keefer, vol. 26, Indonesia, Doc. November 19, 1964, 181–84.
481 Pease, "David Atlee Phillips," 22.
482 Neville Maxwell, "CIA Involvement in the 1965 Military Coup: New Evidence from Neville Maxwell," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 9, no. 2 (1979): 252.
483 Telegram from Jakarta to State June 16, 1965.
484 *New York Times*, June 27, 1986.
485 Emma Kast, "Re-Examining US Intervention in Indonesia," April 19, 2013, https://www.e-ir.info/2013/04/19/re-examining-us-intervention-and-manipulation-in-1965-indonesia/.
486 Telegrams from State to Jakarta of October 14 and 22, 1965.
487 Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 59.
488 Kathy Kadane, "U.S. Officials' Lists Aided Indonesian Bloodbath in '60s," Washington Post, May 21, 1990, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/05/21/us-officials-lists-aided-indonesian-bloodbath-in-60s/ff6d37c3-8eed-486f-908c-3eeafc19aab2/.

489 "Kathy Kadane's Research," Antenna.nl, http://wvi.antenna.nl/eng/ic/pki/kadane/kadane.html. Interview transcripts are located at the site; they show how subjects backtracked and mainstream media omitted certain sections.
490 Memo for the 303 Committee, November 17, 1965.
491 Telegram from Jakarta to State, December 2, 1965.
492 Telegram from State to Jakarta, December 11, 1965; Memo for the President from George Ball, December 10, 1965.
493 State Department letter from James Thomson to Robert Komer, March 18, 1966.
494 Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 75.
495 Memorandum from Walt Rostow to President Johnson, August 31, 1966.
496 Memorandum from Hubert Humphrey to President Johnson, May 13, 1966.
497 Telegram from Jakarta to State, May 27, 1966.
498 Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 82.
499 Telegram from Jakarta to State, January 5, 1967.
500 Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 83.
501 "Poverty in Indonesia: Always with Them," *The Economist*, September 16, 2006.
502 Denise Leith, *The Politics of Power: Freeport in Suharto's Indonesia*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002.
503 Samantha Michaels, "Is a US Mining Company Funding a Violent Crackdown in Indonesia?" *Atlantic Monthly*, November 29, 2011.
504 Michaels.
505 Kirk M. Soodhalter, "Freeport McMoran: Exporting Environmental Racism," Tulane University, http://www.tulane.edu/~bfleury/envirobio/enviroweb/Freeport.htm.
506 Soodhalter.
507 Soodhalter.
508 Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 84.

509 Bradley Simpson, "The United States and the 1965–1966 Mass Murders in Indonesia," *Monthly Review,* December 1, 2015, https://monthlyreview.org/2015/12/01/the-united-states-and-the-19651966-mass-murders-in-indonesia/.

510 Ben Anderson, "How Did the Generals Die?" *Indonesia* 43 (April 1987), https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/53860/INDO_43_0_1107009306_109_134.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

511 *New York Times*, March 1, 1967.

512 *The Nation*, April 11, 1981.

513 Donald Freed and Fred Landis, *Death in Washington*: *The Murder of Orlando Letelier*, Booklyn, NY: Lawrence Hill Books, 1980, 92, 105.

INDEX

7th Fleet, 99, 127, 133-4, 177,
'Task force 75', 94,
off Java in 1966, 134
Abdulgani, Roeslan, ix, 107, 275, 278n30, 288n126, 290n152
Acheson, Dean, 222
Act of Free Choice, 44, 84, 172,
Adhayatman, ix, 205, 215, 274
Adidjojo, Sakardjo, 147, 275, 295n224
Aditorop, Jusuf, ix, 239, 313n425
Aid – Dutch aid for NNG, 176
JFK aid program, 178, 182-83, 187, 191, 193-94, 197, 198 (discontinued), 199 (JFK wants aid to continue), 202, 210,
Indonesian request for PRRI, 133
Soviet Union, xxviii, 165, 172, 177,
United States, x, xxix, xxx, 9, 30, 104, 111, 116, 134, 168, 177, 258 (LBJ cuts JFK aid program and Sukarno's response)
United States aid in 1965 coup and killings, 259-61, 307n361 (two Americans supervise Indonesian army killing of PKI in Klaten, 1966)
US for postwar Netherlands, 17, 104
Aidit, Dipa Nusantara, ix, xvii (see under 'Sjam' and 'Subekti'), 78 (and Admiral Maeda), 207-8, 211 (visit to Indonesia by Khruschev), 224-5, 238 (captured and killed)
and September 30 Movement, 213
belief in God; in contact with religion, 214, 217
and Council of Generals rumour, 222, 238,
talks with Nasution; and talks with Suharto, 238, 240
talks with Mao Zedong, 239
and wife, Tanti, 226, 239
Allison, John, ix, x, 88, 98-99, 101-5, 108, 111-12 (suggests UN involvement in New Guinea), 112-25 (dismissal), 134, 136, 140, 195, 268, 287n111, 289n132, 291n169,
Aquino, Benigno "Ninoy", ix, 139-40
Archbold, Richard, ix (and John. D. Archbold), 61, 174, 268, 283n70

Arief, Sritua, 77, 268, 284n86
Assassination, xix, xxvi, 8, 12, 14, 45, 49-50, 51 (HSCA) House Select Committee on Assassination, 52-3, 66, 71, 105, 157, 200, 218, 228-29, 232 (Suharto alleged), 253, 255 (Sukarno on JFKs's), 257, 267, 271-72, 274, n281, n284, n303, n311 (attempt on Zhou Enlai)
Lumumba, xiii, 157-58 (Dulles), n249
attempts on Sukarno, 105, 109, 121 (Cikini), 114, 172, 210,
Benigno Aquino Jr.,140
Hammarskjöld (and Dulles), 150, 154-55, 255, n296,
Atmodjo, Heru, ix, 223, 226, 237, 239
Auchinloss, Janet, 65, 284n80

Bakker, Theodore, ix, xii, 39-40
Baku oilfields, vi-vii, xv, 48, 53-4, 65
Bandung Conference, xxvii, 34, 89, 254, 311n397
Barton, F.C., ix, 186
Barwick, Garfield, x, 274
Baird, Jim, 104
Bay of Pigs, viii, xxvi, 4, 6, 13, 18, 46, 192, 194, 254, 276n13
Beatrix, 60
Becker, Loftus E., 137
Benson, George, x, 116-18, 144, 229,
Benson, Roy, x, 140, 144
Berlin, Jack, x, 136, 141
Bernhard, Leopold Frederik (Prince), x, xiii, xix, xxi, 59-60 (meets Princess Juliana), 60-4 (Viceroy of the Indies), 73, 169,
Bogra, Ali (Pakistan Foreign Minister), n301
Bolsheviks, 48, 53
Boven Digoel, 60, 89
Blitz (magazine), 118-20, 125
Brown, William Andreas, x, 186
Bundy, McGeorge, xi, 168, 177
Bunker, Ellsworth, x, 17, 181-2, 184, 205, 272, 300n276
Bungkus - Sergeant-Major, x, 233-4, 310n355, 312n414

Casey, Richard, 131, 167
Chiang Kai-shek, 146
Clay, Lucius, x, 30, 188,
Cold War, viii, xxii, xxviii, 1, 7-8, 21, 46, 52, 66, 72, 89, 95, 97, 110-11, 114, 122-3, 128, 130, 134 (and strategy of Allen Dulles), 139, 147, 150, 153, 160, 162, 164-6, 170, 183, 18

7-8, 192-3, 196, 199-200, 202, 207, 209, 214, 217, 223, 248, 254-5, 266, 273, 276n13, 277n14, 288n129, 297n244 and n249, 303n292, 304n326, 306n346
Colijn, Anton H., x, 25-8, 269, 278n33
Collier, Robert, x, 116-8, 123, 208,
Conboy, Kenneth, 116, 144, 147-8, 269, 291n165, 293n193, 294n219, 295n228/30/31
Cottrell, Sterling J., x, 120, 124, 136-8, 140-43
Council of Generals, xiii, xxii, 219-25, 230, 234, 238-40, 245-46, 263, 309n379, 310n389,
Crouch, Harold, 224, 242, 269, 308n364/374, 310n386
Cumming, Hugh S., x, 98-101, 113-14, 120, 288n119

Decolonization, 14, 63, 89, 106, 127, 151, 185, 187, 189, 191, 197, 257, 271, 279n42, 296n233
Deterding, Henri, vii, x, 19-20, 26, 54
Djahurup, xi, 235,
Djojohadikusumo, Dr Sumitro, xi, 93, 132
Djuanda Kartawidjaja, xi, xii, 115-17, 120-21, 139, 141-42, 188-89, 257-58, 302n288
Djuarsa, Ishak, xi, 245,
Dodd, Karl,C., 81 (official military historian of the American Corps of Engineers).
Dodd, William, E., 61 (US Ambassador in Berlin 1936),
Donovan, William, xi, 281n59
Dozy, Jean Jacques, xi, xii, xviii, 23-29, 31-44, 60, 210, 252, 274, 278n34, 279n37/41, 285n94
Dul Arif, xi, 234-35, 244, 310n393
Dulles, Allen Welsh vi-viii, x-xxi, xxvi-xxix, 43, 53-54, 89-90, 105, 178, 204, 207-10, 219, 228, 239, 252, 254, 259, 264
adulterous affairs, 11
advises JFK not to follow up settlement of WNG dispute, 185-86
appointed DCI, 1-4, 9
associates and contacts - Ellsworth Bunker, 181-82 ; Harr, Burke, Ulmer, 101, 133;
Kissinger, 188 ; Kotzebue, 49, 56-57; Lansdale, 165; Marshall Green, 207, 216; Murphy, 108;
Pauker, 92-93, 193-94, 264; Ripley, 61, 304n323; Schacht, 61 ; Sherman Kent, 204, 303n324;
Sterling Cottrell, 138-43; Ellene Tew, 57; Van Santvoord Merle-Smith, 281n59
Cold War crises, 165
covert Indonesia strategy in conflict with JFK's plan, 46
in Dallas five weeks before, 53
and George de Mohrenschildt, 49-50
and Hammarskjöld, 150 (involved in death of), 163 (Dulles' motive in Operation Celeste)
Hitler meeting, 20, 61

ICA established, 66
'Indonesian Perspectives' (1961 paper), 168
'Java going communist', 91
influences Australia, 110
differences with Allison, 111-12, 118
gout, 114
lawyer for Sullivan & Cromwell, 12, 15, 20 (defeats Deterding), 48-49, 56, 58,
long-term strategy, 111
misinforms JFK, Washington, 117, 149, 204
NNGPM, 19-20, 24-26, 44, 58, 60, 68, 79,
Outer Islands Rebellion (PRRI), 91-8, 99 (Allison), 120-135, 145-8 (CIA pilots),
proposed military training, 193
racism, 124
Scheherazade bistro in Paris, xiii, 56
Scheherazade oil tanker, 67, 283n83
South Maluku weapons, 63
Sino-Soviet, 113 (report urging link between PKI and Sino-Soviet bloc)
Warren Commission, 51, 53, 65, 79
West New Guinea (NNG), 13, 15, 17,
WW1, WW2, OSS, 1, 9, 15 (penetrated Hitler's circle; first person approached by Japanese to surrender), 47, 61,
Dulles, John Foster, xi-xii, xx, xxi, xxvii, 1-2, 10, 66, 90, 100, 112, 114, 124, 126, 135, 140, 254, 271, 279n36, 288n117, 290n153, 293n201,
colon cancer, 11
support for Germany, 64,
Suez and Hungary, 96-97
inviting Sukarno to USA, 105-6
secretly promised support for Dutch, 115, 305n336
John Foster led by Allen, 137-38
and Outer Islands Rebellion (PRRI), 96, 102-3,
proposes independence for Papuans, 107-8
Sullivan & Cromwell, 56, 252,
Eisenhower, Dwight x, xi, xii, xvii, xviii, xix, xxix, 1, 2, 9-11, 14, 91, 96-97, 101, 105, 106, 108, 109, 124, 130, 135, 165-66, 187, 192, 196, 210, 254, 270, 277n15, 287n110, 288n118, 298n253, 305n336

Elson, Robert, 227, 231, 270, 274, 311n396/403/404, 313n422/429
Epstein, Edward Jay, 51, 52

Felt, Harry Donald, xi, 136
Fomenko, Michael, xi, xii, xv, 84-87

Fomenko, Jeanne, xv, 69, 84, 85, 87
Forrestal, Michael V., xi, 196, 199, 203, 258
Fraiss, Pierre, xi, 67

De Gaulle, Charles, 200
Gerbrandy, Pieter, xi, 33, 34, 44,
Gheyselinck, R.F.G.R., xi, 74, 75, 285n90,
Gijadi Wignyosoeharjo, xii, 243
Gilchrist, Andrew, xii, 209, 215, 218, 220, 229, 230, 274, 292n185, 303n308, 307n358, 308n366, 311n401/402, 313n432,
Goodell, Val, xii, 99, 104
Goodpaster, Brig-General, xii,
Green, Marshall, x, xii, 205, 206-11, 213-16, 219, 222-23, 238, 248, 259-61, 263, 274, 304n329, 305n333, 307n353/355/361
Gruisen, Jan van, xii, 39

Haan, Raphael den, xii, 84-6, 274,
Harr, Karl Gotttlieb, xii, 100, 101
Halifax, E.W., xx, 62,
Hammarskjöld, Dag, xii, xvii, xix, xxiii, 89, 112, 151-60
  altimeters checked by Hoover, 158
  'Operation Celeste', 153, 154 (Allen Dulles' involvement)
Harrer, Heinrich, xii, xviii, 32, 33, 270, 279n41
Hatta, M., xii, 16, 60, 76, 78, 88-9, 91, 171, 228, 278n26
Henry, Roy, 184-5, 301n203
Herter, Christian A., xii, 11, 126, 133, 293n201
Heymann, Henry, xii, 208-9, 274
Hollister, John B., xii, 66, 284n81
Hoover, J. Edgar, 3-4, 158-9 (altimeters on UN Sec-General's plane),
Humble Oil, vi, vii, xxi, 66, 68-9, 71, 74, 271, 283n78, 284n84/85, 286n100
Humphrey, Don D., xii, 178, 193,
Hunt, E. Howard, 277n14
Husein, Ahmad, xii, 120

Jefferson, Thomas, 105, 207
Jenner, Albert E., xii, 50-2, 55, 64-69, 71, 85, 281n60
Johnson, Robert H., 177
Jonge, B.C. de, xii, 62
Jones, Howard Palfrey, x, xii, 46, 95, 100, 108, 120, 126, 140-46, 167-68, 183, 189, 191, 195-98, 200, 205, 219, 258-59, 270, 280n55, 288n125, 293n188, 295n226, 303n301, 304n315/321
  start of Confrontation, 188

Sukarno says CIA has plans to topple him, 202-03
Kadane, Kathy, xii, 215, 260, 307n359, 314n443, 315n488, 316n489
Kadri, Kartono, xii, 95, 274, 288n126
Kennedy, John F. (JFK) vi, viii, ix, xi, xiii, xiv, xvi, xvii, xix, xxii, xxiii, xxvi, xxviii, xxix, xxx
Adlai Stephenson to JFK, 152-53
admiration from Indonesia for solving NG crisis, 192, 200
aid program, 30, 111 (similar to Allison's), 178, 182-83, 187-89, 191-95, 197-99 (JFK against aid cut), 198 (aid discontinued), 202, 210, 258 (LBJ cuts JFK aid program)
Allen Dulles, 1-14, 22, 46-47, 151-52,
Allen Pope, xvi, xxix, 45, 145-48, 275 (lawyer), 295n224,
appointment of Allen Dulles, 6, 13, 47, 159
and CIA document, 228, 239,
on Hammarskjöld's death, 152
Jakarta visit proposal, 191-92, 194, 195 (Rusk confirms JFK's intention), 199 (Joint Chiefs see Kennedy's visit as pro-Sukarno), 200, 203, 206 (Dekon), 210,
and Nai Thanat Khoman, 221
New Guinea (sovereignty dispute), 9-10, 12-13, 17-18, 21, 30-31, 38, 45, 58, 60-64, 71, 165-66, 168-73, 175-79, 181-89, 202,
nuclear disarmament talks, 152-53, 178
and PKI, 96, 218, 251
Rusk confirms Indonesian 'fiscal discipline', 196 (Sukarno still has Juanda – see 257-58, 302n288)
and Sino-Soviet dispute, viii, xxiv, 8, 154, 204, 210-11, 255
and Sukarno, 46, 196, 198, 207, 255-56
and Truman, 160
UN involvement in sovereignty dispute, 151-53, 170 (JFK does not tell Luns), 161-64,
Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell), 136
Warren Commission, 49-53
Kennedy, Robert, 10, 180
Kent, Sherman, xii, 204, 304n323
Kissinger, Henry, viii, xiii, 8, 9 (Rockefeller panel), 188, 209-11, 250, 277n18, 305n342,
Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich, 7, 152-54, 178, 211, 270, 271
Komer, Robert, xiii, 168, 172-73, 177, 179, 196, 299n271, 316n493
Kotzebue, Paul, xiii, xix, 56, 57, 59, 282n69
Kotzebue Sound, Alaska, 48
Kutepov, Pavel, xiii, 48, 49, 55, 56,

Lansdale, Edward G., x, xiv, 136, 165-67
Lansing, Robert, vi, xiii, 47, 65, 281n59

Latief, Abdul, xiii, xxiv, 221, 225-27, 229-38, 244, 247, 308n375, 310n393, 311n407, 312n408/9/10
Leimana, Johannes, xiii, xix, 170, 230, 236,
Lincoln, Abraham, 105, 207,
Lijphart, A., xiii, 33, 34, 271, 279n42/43
Lingen, G. F. Th. van, xiii, 74, 75,
Lubis, Zulkifli, xiii, xvii, 91-93, 122, 127, 132, 133, 275,
Lukman, M.H., 89, 208
Lumumba, Patrice, xiii, 153 (Allen Dulles responsible for death of), 155-57, 163, 254, 272, 298n249,
Luns, Joseph, xiv, xix, xxiii, 29-31, 39, 44, 71-73, 106, 115, 169-170, 176-78, 180-82, 255, 274, 279n38, 289n147, 298n252, 305n336

Malik, Adam, ix, xiv, xxii, xxiii, 80, 177, 180, 181, 198, 205-07, 209, 211, 214-15, 235, 261, 274, 299n267, 305n341, 307n357
Mao Zedong, xiv, 211, 239, 240, 277n17, 306n345
MacArthur, Douglas (General), xiv, xxi, 16, 20, 29, 39, 72, 80, 81, 151, 285n97, 296n235
MacArthur, Roderick, xiv,
Macmillan, Harold, xiv, 126,
Maheu, Robert, xiv, 289n139
Maeda, Rear Admiral Tadashi, xiv, 15, 16, 20, 76-80, 83, 87
Marjono and Usman, xiv, 227,
Martens, Robert, J., xiv, 205, 208, 211, 214, 215, 274, 304n329m 306n351, 307n353/355/360
Mashuri, xiv, 241
Masters, Edward E., xiv, 243, 313n432,
May, Brian, xiv, 242, 271, 305n335, 313n431
McNamara, Robert, xiv, 258, 271
Mealey, G.A., xiv, 32, 39, 271, 279n37, 280n49
Megawati, ix, xviii, 224,
Mein, John Gordon, xiv, 119, 287n114, 291n171,
Melvin, Jess, xiv, xxx, 212, 217, 245, 246, 263, 271, 306n349, 308n365, 312n411, 314n438
Merle-Smith, Van Santvoord, xiv, 281n59
Menzhinsky, V.R., xiv, 55, 280n58
Menzies, Robert, xiv,
de Mohrenschildt, George, vii, xi, xiv, xv, 49-53, 55, 56, 64-71, 75, 79, 84-86, 274, 281n60, 282n62, 284n80
de Mohrenschildt, Jeanne, xi, xv, 51, 52, 84, 85, 87
von Mohrenschildt, Baron Sergius, vii, xv, 54, 56, 57
Morrison, James, 144, 147-48, 269, 291n165, 293n193, 294n219, 295n228/230/231

Murdani, Benny, xv, 222, 309n377
Murphy, Robert, xv, 108-10, 126, 148, 149, 290n155
Murtopo, Ali, xv, xvii, 222, 225, 227, 234, 235, 241, 242, 309n377/381
Muskita, Josef, xv, 242
Mussert, Anton, xv, 62

Nasution, A.H., xi, xvii, xviii, xix, 91, 92, 94, 115-17, 120, 139, 142-45, 148, 165-68, 182, 203, 211, 213, 227-31, 233, 235-36, 238-42, 245, 264, 274, 287n115, 294n216, 302n288, 309n381, 311n398
Nasution, Ade Irma Suryani, xv, 236
National Security Council (NSC), xiii, xxi, 101, 103, 113-14, 121, 152, 168, 172, 196,
Nishijima Shigetada, xiv, xv, 15-17, 71, 76-80, 125, 205, 275, 281n59, 285n93/96, 286n99, 292n184, 304n328, 305n341, 307n358
Nixon, Richard Milhous, xiii, 3, 4, 92, 95, 105 (Sukarno a nationalist, not a communist), 203, 207, 211, 254, 256, 261, 302n286, 304n322
NNGPM, vii, xi, xxi, 19, 20, 23, 24-27, 29, 32, 44, 58, 60, 61, 68, 70, 73-75, 77-79, 82, 83, 278n28, 284n85, 286n98
Notowidigdo, Moekarto, xv, 107,
Nyono – (Njono), xv, 225, 238, 309n379, 310n389
Nyoto – (Njoto) xv, 208, 217,

O'Brien, Conor Cruise, 159, 163, 274
Oei Tjoe Tat, xviii, 206, 275, 305n330,
Oltmans, Willem, xv, 51, 274
Oswald, Lee Harvey, xv, 50, 52, 54, 251, 274, 281n60

Pauker, Guy, x, xvi, xviii, xix, 92-3, 98, 166-68, 193, 240, 264, 274, 288n118/119, 298n255, 308n363, 313n428
PKI – Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)
  Dulles, A., 90-93, 95, 105, 123, 128, 202, 204
  Ideology and praxis 9, 70, 89-90, 111, 123, 143, 146, 193, 197, 202, 206-07, 216-19, 239
  Maeda xiv, 78-79, 87
  martial law 90, 94, 116-117, 145
  mass killings 8, 9, 146, 212 215-16, 217, 238, 245-46
  membership numbers 1965, 215-22, 224-29, 231, 237-240, 244-46, 251
  NNG 70-71, 72, 78-79, 83, 87, 89, 96, 168-169, 182
  PKI 'largest communist party outside Sino-Soviet bloc 9, 89, 204, 214
  September 30 movement 220, 222, 225-26, 231, 237-38, 232, 245-46
  Sino-Soviet bloc 9, 89, 98, 113, 128, 187, 204, 209, 211, 239
  Sino-Soviet Split 187, 202, 204-05, 209, 210, 211, 213-14, 216
  Sjam and Subekti, viii, xvii

Suharto, viii, xviii, xxii, 212-13, 215, 227-29, 231
Sukarno, 9, 113, 122, 147, 188, 207-208, 212, 215, 217, 218, 229
tension with army 95, 113, 146, 182, 187, 188-89, 194, 197, 202, 204, 219, 228
threat of PKI used to manipulate political objectives 93, 100, 105, 113-114, 123, 126, 128, 166, 168-169, 182, 187, 189, 194
wielded no power in government 116-117, 122, 208
Palmer, William, xvi, 220,
Pohan, E.S., xvi, 127
Pope, Allen, xvi, xix, 45, 145-48, 275, 295n224
Powers, Gary, xvi, 147, 153
Pramoedya Ananta Toer, 203
Prijono, Achmad, xvi, 41
Prouty, Fletcher, Colonel, 45, 57, 127, 147-48, 153, 272, 275, 280n52, 282n68, 289n130, 293n191, 295n224,
PRRI-Permesta Outer Island Rebellion, 1958
a deception, 127
Dulles, A. vii, 93, 94 (later informed JFK that rebellion was 'permitted to wither from lack of sustenance'), 96-7, 99, 102, 103, 107, 114, 118, 120-2, 127, 132, 133, 137, 140, 143, 145, 148
CIA Covert Operation, viii, 91, 95-99, 102, 117-18, 122, 126, 132, 134, 139, 140-42, 143, 145
'perceived failure', 93
'Task Force 75', x, 130-35
Consolidation of power in central army command, 129, 130, 145
Rift between PRRI military and civilian leaders, 131, 132
Pope and Prouty, 145-48
Rahman, Tunku Abdul, xvi, 189, 190, 197
Reddaway, Norman, xvi, 217
Rijkens, Paul, xvi, 73
Ripley, Sidney Dillon, 61 (OSS), 61, 304n323
Robertson, Walter S., xvi, 104
Robson, Frank, 86, 287n109
Rockefeller family
John D., vi, xvi, 12, 19, 23, 272, 277n21
Nelson, xvi, 8 (Panel), 15, 173, 302n286
Michael, xvi, xix, 18, 173-76, 270, 299n265
Rockefeller oil (Standard, Caltex), vi, vii, ix, x, xv, xviii, xxi, 8, 12, 19, 23, 24-26, 28, 52-54, 56-58, 61, 64-68, 73, 74, 79, 115, 133, 135, 136, 141-43, 164, 175, 196, 255, 278n28, 282n62, 283n78, 286n98/100, 286n106, 303n304
Roosa, John, xvi, 225, 227, 231, 233, 247, 272, 307n354/356, 308n372/375, 310n387/388/391, 311n406, 312n413, 313n421/427, 314n436/440/1/2

Rusk, Dean, xxi, 167 (letter from Nasution), 168-69, 195-97, 200, 221-23, 272, 274, 303n302/314, 308n376, 309n378

Sakirman, xvi, 218, 308n368,
Sarwo Edhie, xix, 227
Schacht, Hjalmar, xvii, 61
Schermerhorn, W., xvii, 74,
Schlesinger, Arthur M., 13, 14, 30, 47, 272, 277n22,
Selwyn-Lloyd, John, xiii, 126, 292n186
Simbolon, xvii, 130
Simpson, Bradley, 193, 272, 279n39, 302n291/294/295/296/300, 307n354, 315n463/469/70/71/72/74/487, 316n494/498/500/508/509
Sino-Soviet Bloc (and dispute), xix, xxiv, 9, 89, 92, 97, 113, 128, 149, 162, 204-05, 209-11, 213-14, 216, 255, 270, 273, 304n324/325
Sjam (Kamarusaman bin Achmad Mubaidah), 224-227, 230, 231-32, 237-238, 240, 242-247
Smith, George Ivan, xvii, 150, 152-54, 156, 158-59, 163, 274, 297n246,
Smith, Joseph Burkolder, xvii, 101,
Sorensen, Theodore, xvii, 3, 4, 6, 273, 276n7/10/13
Sprague, Mansfield D., xvii, 149
Starr, Frank, xvii, 186
Subandrio, xvii, xviii, xxiv, 95, 122, 124, 125, 140, 141, 146, 177, 186, 188, 207, 218, 220, 228, 229, 236, 238, 244, 295n224, 299n267, 301n284, 309n379, 313n420
Subekti. xvii, 247,
Sudarso, Yos, xvii, 180, 300n272,
Sugama, Yoga, xvii, 222, 227,
Suherman, xvii, 227,
Sujiman, xviii, 241
Sukarno
  Assassination attempts 105, 109, 114, 119-121, 172, 228-29
  CIA 92, 95, 97-99, 101-103, 105, 108, 111, 113-114, 117, 120-124, 130, 139, 147, 168, 185, 194-195, 198, 201, 207, 210, 215-216, 228-229, 245, 246,
  Council of Generals 218-224, 238-239, 242-243, 245
  Dewi Sukarno 125, 215
  Indonesian Military 116, 117, 122, 130, 188, 212, 215, 219, 223, 228-229, 241
  in exile, 60
  internal - external affairs, 89-90, 106-107, 110, 124, 146, 185, 189-191, 208, 217, 250
  Japan, 15-16, 76-80, 120, 125, 206
  Jones, Howard, 188-89 (‘Sukarno did not start Konfrontasi’), 15, 199-200, 202, 219
  Kennedy, John F., 9-10, 14, 24, 45-46 (visit), 72, 168, 169-172, 176, 178-179, 183, 185, 188, 192, 194-202, 207, 210, 218

LUNS, Joseph, 31
Malik, A., 205-207
Nasakom, 206-208, 214, 239, 246
NNG Resources, 21-24, 34, 37-39, 41, 70-72 (unaware of oilfield), 76-80, 83, 210
NNG Dispute, 10, 13, 16-17, 21, 34, 38, 63, 89, 106-107, 110, 130, 134, 165, 169-172, 176-179, 183
Non-aligned movement (Bandung), xxvi, xxvii, 89
Outer Island Rebellion, 78, 90, 110, 120, 122, 127, 134, 144
Personal health, 219, 238
PKI, 8, 9, 70-72, 78-79, 91, 116-117, 122-123, 188, 194, 206-208, 212-215, 217, 218, 219, 220, 229, 239, 245, 247
Suharto and Sjam, 245, 246, 247
Untung and Latief, 230, 233, 244, 245, 247
Sullivan and Cromwell, xii, xix, xxi, 12, 15, 20, 47-9, 56-9, 100, 182, 252, 255
Sumarsono xviii, 228, 311n400
Sutowo, General Ibnu, xviii, 70,
Supardjo - Brigadier-General, xviii, 225-27, 231-33, 247, 263
Suwarto – Colonel, xviii, 227, 240, 264,
Suwito, xviii, 136, 140,
Syamsuddin, Hamid, xviii, 241,

Teagle, Walter C., xviii, 54, 67,
Temple, Philip, xviii,
Tendean, Pierre, xix, xxiii, 236,
Tew, Allene (Countess Kotzebue), xix, 57-60, 282n69,
Thanat, Khoman, xiii, 221-22, 309n377,
Tonkin, D., xix, 218, 219, 275, 305n332/340, 308n370/71
Treibel xix,
Trujillo, Rafael, xix, 223,
Truman, Harry S., xix, 1, 4, 160, 272, 276n1, 296n235, 297n248, 304n323,
Tubun, Karel, xix, 236,
Tutu, Desmond, xix, 153, 154, 157

Ulmer, Alfred Jnr., xix, 101-03, 289n139,
Untung – Lt. Colonel, xiii, xvii, xviii, 212, 225-27, 229-31, 233-34, 236-38, 244-45, 247, 310n389, 312n418,
U Thant, 177, 180-81, 197

Van Kampen, xix, 30, 31

Warren, Earl, vii, xi, xii, xv, xix, 14, 49-54, 64, 65, 68, 70, 71, 79, 86, 87, 115, 267, 274, 281n60, 282n62, 284n79/80, 302n286

Wassing, Rene, xix, 173-75, 299n265,
Whiting, Allen S., xix, 92,
Wilson, Forbes, xix, 35, 37-42, 252, 273, 280n46,
Wirahadikusumah, Umar, xviii, xx, 230, 235, 240, 241, 312n418, 313n419,
Wisner, Frank, xvi, xx, 92, 96-97, 101, 127, 168, 288n117/129,
Wissel, Frits J., xx, 25-27
Wrangel (General), xiii, xx, 48, 56

Yani – (Jani), xii, xx, xxiii, 115, 212, 219, 228, 229, 231, 235, 236, 238, 240-43, 306n348, 309n381, 312n415,
Yoshizumi Tomegoro, xiv, xx, 76, 78, 281,

Zhou, Taomo, 239, 311n397, 313n425,
Zijlstra, G., xx, xxi, 37, 38, 43, 44, 275, 280n51